second treatise of government-第17章

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　authority；　　cannot　assume　to　its　self　a　power　to　rule　by　extemporary　　arbitrary　decrees；　but　is　bound　to　dispense　justice；　and　decide　　the　rights　of　the　subject　by　promulgated　standing　laws；　and　known　　authorized　judges：　for　the　law　of　nature　being　unwritten；　and　so　　no　where　to　be　found　but　in　the　minds　of　men；　they　who　through　　passion　or　interest　shall　miscite；　or　misapply　it；　cannot　so　　easily　be　convinced　of　their　mistake　where　there　is　no　　established　judge：　and　so　it　serves　not；　as　it　ought；　to　　determine　the　rights；　and　fence　the　properties　of　those　that　live　　under　it；　especially　where　every　one　is　judge；　interpreter；　and　　executioner　of　it　too；　and　that　in　his　own　case：　and　he　that　has　　right　on　his　side；　having　ordinarily　but　his　own　single　strength；　　hath　not　force　enough　to　defend　himself　from　injuries；　or　to　　punish　delinquents。　　To　avoid　these　inconveniences；　which　　disorder　men's　propperties　in　the　state　of　nature；　men　unite　into　　societies；　that　they　may　have　the　united　strength　of　the　whole　　society　to　secure　and　defend　their　properties；　and　may　have　　standing　rules　to　bound　it；　by　which　every　one　may　know　what　is　　his。　　To　this　end　it　is　that　men　give　up　all　their　natural　power　　to　the　society　which　they　enter　into；　and　the　community　put　the　　legislative　power　into　such　hands　as　they　think　fit；　with　this　　trust；　that　they　shall　be　governed　by　declared　laws；　or　else　　their　peace；　quiet；　and　property　will　still　be　at　the　same　　uncertainty；　as　it　was　in　the　state　of　nature。　　　　　　（*Human　laws　are　measures　in　respect　of　men　whose　actions　　they　must　direct；　howbeit　such　measures　they　are　as　have　also　　their　higher　rules　to　be　measured　by；　which　rules　are　two；　the　　law　of　God；　and　the　law　of　nature；　so　that　laws　human　must　be　　made　according　to　the　general　laws　of　nature；　and　without　　contradiction　to　any　positive　law　of　scripture；　otherwise　they　　are　ill　made。　　Hooker's　Eccl。　Pol。　l。　iii。　sect。　9。　　　　　　To　constrain　men　to　any　thing　inconvenient　cloth　seem　　unreasonable。　　Ibid。　l。　i。　sect。　10。）　　　　　　Sec。　137。　　Absolute　arbitrary　power；　or　governing　without　　settled　standing　laws；　can　neither　of　them　consist　with　the　ends　　of　society　and　government；　which　men　would　not　quit　the　freedom　　of　the　state　of　nature　for；　and　tie　themselves　up　under；　were　it　　not　to　preserve　their　lives；　liberties　and　fortunes；　and　by　　stated　rules　of　right　and　property　to　secure　their　peace　and　　quiet。　　It　cannot　be　supposed　that　they　should　intend；　had　they　a　

power　so　to　do；　to　give　to　any　one；　or　more；　an　absolute　　arbitrary　power　over　their　persons　and　estates；　and　put　a　force　　into　the　magistrate's　hand　to　execute　his　unlimited　will　　arbitrarily　upon　them。　　This　were　to　put　themselves　into　a　worse　　condition　than　the　state　of　nature；　wherein　they　had　a　liberty　to　　defend　their　right　against　the　injuries　of　others；　and　were　upon　　equal　terms　of　force　to　maintain　it；　whether　invaded　by　a　single　　man；　or　many　in　combination。　　Whereas　by　supposing　they　have　　given　up　themselves　to　the　absolute　arbitrary　power　and　will　of　a　　legislator；　they　have　disarmed　themselves；　and　armed　him；　to　make　　a　prey　of　them　when　he　pleases；　he　being　in　a　much　worse　　condition；　who　is　exposed　to　the　arbitrary　power　of　one　man；　who　　has　the　command　of　100；000；　than　he　that　is　exposed　to　the　　arbitrary　power　of　100；000　single　men；　no　body　being　secure；　that　　his　will；　who　has　such　a　command；　is　better　than　that　of　other　　men；　though　his　force　be　100；000　times　stronger。　　And　therefore；　　whatever　form　the　common…wealth　is　under；　the　ruling　power　ought　　to　govern　by　declared　and　received　laws；　and　not　by　extemporary　　dictates　and　undetermined　resolutions：　for　then　mankind　will　be　　in　a　far　worse　condition　than　in　the　state　of　nature；　if　they　　shall　have　armed　one；　or　a　few　men　with　the　joint　power　of　a　　multitude；　to　force　them　to　obey　at　pleasure　the　exorbitant　and　　unlimited　decrees　of　their　sudden　thoughts；　or　unrestrained；　and　　till　that　moment　unknown　wills；　without　having　any　measures　set　　down　which　may　guide　and　justify　their　actions：　for　all　the　power　　the　government　has；　being　only　for　the　good　of　the　society；　as　it　　ought　not　to　be　arbitrary　and　at　pleasure；　so　it　ought　to　be　　exercised　by　established　and　promulgated　laws；　that　both　the　　people　may　know　their　duty；　and　be　safe　and　secure　within　the　　limits　of　the　law；　and　the　rulers　too　kept　within　their　bounds；　　and　not　be　tempted；　by　the　power　they　have　in　their　hands；　to　　employ　it　to　such　purposes；　and　by　such　measures；　as　they　would　　not　have　known；　and　own　not　willingly。　　　　　　Sec。　138。　　Thirdly；　The　supreme　power　cannot　take　from　any　　man　any　part　of　his　property　without　his　own　consent：　for　the　　preservation　of　property　being　the　end　of　government；　and　that　　for　which　men　enter　into　society；　it　necessarily　supposes　and　　requires；　that　the　people　should　have　property；　without　which　　they　must　be　supposed　to　lose　that；　by　entering　into　society；　　which　was　the　end　for　which　they　entered　into　it；　too　gross　an　　absurdity　for　any　man　to　own。　　　Men　therefore　in　society　having　　property；　they　have　such　a　right　to　the　goods；　which　by　the　law　　of　the　community　are　their's；　that　no　body　hath　a　right　to　take　　their　substance　or　any　part　of　it　from　them；　without　their　own　　consent：　without　this　they　have　no　property　at　all；　for　I　have　　truly　no　property　in　that；　which　another　can　by　right　take　from　　me；　when　he　pleases；　against　my　consent。　　Hence　it　is　a　mistake　　to　think；　that　the　supreme　or　legislative　power　of　any　common…　wealth；　can　do　what　it　will；　and　dispose　of　the　estates　of　the　　subject　arbitrarily；　or　take　any　part　of　them　at　pleasure。　　This　　is　not　much　to　be　feared　in　governments　where　the　legislative　　consists；　wholly　or　in　part；　in　assemblies　which　are　variable；　　whose　members；　upon　the　dissolution　of　the　assembly；　are　subjects　　under　the　common　laws　of　their　country；　equally　with　the　rest。　　　But　in　governments；　where　the　legislative　is　in　one　lasting　　assembly　always　in　being；　or　in　one　man；　as　in　absolute　　monarchies；　there　is　danger　still；　that　they　will　think　　themselves　to　have　a　distinct　interest　from　the　rest　of　the　　community；　and　so　will　be　apt　to　increase　their　own　riches　and　　power；　by　taking　what　they　think　fit　from　the　people：　for　a　man's　　property　is　not　at　all　secure；　tho'　there　be　good　and　equitable　　laws　to　set　the　bounds　of　it　between　him　and　his　fellow　subjects；　　if　he　who　commands　those　subjects　have　power　to　take　from　any　　private　man；　what　part　he　pleases　of　his　property；　and　use　and　　dispose　of　it　as　he　thinks　good。　　　　　　Sec。　139。　　But　government；　into　whatsoever　hands　it　is　put；　

being；　as　I　have　before　shewed；　intrusted　with　this　condition；　　and　for　this　end；　that　men　might　have　and　secure　their　　properties；　the　prince；　or　senate；　however　it　may　have　power　to　　make　laws；　for　the　regulating　of　property　between　the　subjects　　one　amongst　another；　yet　can　never　have　a　power　to　take　to　　themselves　the　whole；　or　any　part　of　the　subjects　property；　　without　their　own　consent：　for　this　would　be　in　effect　to　leave　　them　no　property　at　all。　　And　to　let　us　see；　that　even　absolute　　power；　where　it　is　necessary；　is　not　arbitrary　by　being　absolute；　　but　is　still　limited　by　that　reason；　and　confined　to　those　ends；　　which　required　it　in　some　cases　to　be　absolute；　we　need　look　no　　farther　than　the　common　practice　of　martial　discipline：　for　the　　preservation　of　the　army；　and　in　it　of　the　whole　common…wealth；　　requires　an　absolute　obedience　to　the　command　of　every　superior　　officer；　and　it　is　justly　death　to　disobey　or　dispute　the　most　　dangerous　or　unreasonable　of　them；　but　yet　we　see；　that　neither　　the　serjeant；　that　could　command　a　soldier　to　march　up　to　the　　mouth　of　a　cannon；　or　stand　in　a　breach；　where　he　is　almost　sure　　to　perish；　can　command　that　soldier　to　give　him　one　penny　of　his　　money；　nor　the　general；　that　can　condemn　him　to　death　for　　deserting　his　post；　or　for　not　obeying　the　most　desperate　orders；　　can　yet；　with　all　his　absolute　power　of　life　and　death；　dispose　　of　one　farthing　of　that　soldier's　estate；　or　seize　one　jot　of　his　　goods；　whom　yet　he　can　command　any　thing；　and　hang　for　the　least　　disobedience；　because　such　a　blind　obedience　is　necessary　to　that　　end；　for　which　the　commander　has　his　power；　viz。　　the　　preservation　of　the　rest；　but　the　disposing　of　his　goods　has　　nothing　to　do　with　it。　　　　　　Sec。　140。　　It　is　true；　governments　cannot　be　supported　　without　great　charge；　and　it　is　fit　every　one　who　enjoys　his　　share　of　the　protection；　should　pay　out　of　his　estate　his　　proportion　for　the　maintenance　of　it。　　　But　still　it　must　be　with　　his　own　consent；　i。e。　　the　consent　of　the　majority；　giving　it　　either　by　themselves；　or　their　representatives　chosen　by　them：　　for　if　any　one　shall　claim　a　power　to　lay　and　levy　taxes　on　the　　people；　by　his　own　authority；　and　without　such　consent　of　the　　people；　he　thereby　invades　the　fundamental　law　of　property；　and　　subverts　the　end　of　government：　for　what　property　have　I　in　that；　　which　another　may　by　right　take；　when　he　pleases；　to　himself？　　　　　　Sec。　141。　　Fourthly；　The　legislative　cannot　transfer　the　　power　of　making　laws　to　any　other　hands：　for　it　being　but　a　　delegated　power　from　the　people；　they　who　have　it　cannot　pass　it　　over　to　others。　　The　people　alone　can　appoint　the　form　of　the　　common…wealth；　which　is　by　constituting　the　legislative；　and　　appointing　in　whose　hands　that　shall　be。　　And　when　the　people　　have　said；　We　will　submit　to　rules；　and　be　governed　by　laws　made　　by　such　men；　and　in　such　forms；　no　body　else　can　say　other　men　　shall　make　laws　for　them；　nor　can　the　people　be　bound　by　any　　laws；　but　such　as　are　enacted　by　those　whom　they　have　chosen；　and　　authorized　to　make　laws　for　them。　　　The　power　of　the　legislative；　　being　derived　from　the　people　by　a　positive　voluntary　grant　and　　institution；　can　be　no　other　than　what　that　positive　grant　　conveyed；　which　being　only　to　make　laws；　and　not　to　make　　legislators；　the　legislative　can　have　no　power　to　transfer　their　　authority　of　making　laws；　and　place　it　in　other　hands。　　　　　　Sec。　142。　　These　are　the　bounds　which　the　trust；　that　is　put　　in　them　by　the　society；　and　the　law　of　God　and　nature；　have　set　　to　the　legislative　power　of　every　common…wealth；　in　all　forms　of　　government。　　　　　　First；　They　are　to　govern　by　promulgated　established　laws；　　not　to　be　varied　in　particular　cases；　but　to　have　one　rule　for　　rich　and　poor；　for　the　favourite　at　court；　and　the　country　man　at　　plough。　　　　　　Secondly；　These　laws　also　ought　to　be　designed　for　no　other　　end　ultimately；　but　the　good　of　the　people。　　　　　　Thirdly；　They　must　not　raise　taxes　on　the　property　of　the　

people；　without　the　consent　of　the　people；　given　by　themselves；　　or　their　deputies。　　And　this　properly　concerns　only　such　　governments　where　the　legislative　is　always　in　being；　or　at　least　　where　the　people　have　not　reserved　any　part　of　the　legislative　to　　deputies；　to　be　from　time　to　time　chosen　by　themselves。　　　　　　Fourthly；　The　legislative　neither　must　nor　can　transfer　the　　power　of　making　laws　to　any　body　else；　or　place　it　any　where；　but　　where　the　people　have。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　CHAP。　　XII。

　　　　　　　Of　the　Legislative；　Executive；　and　Federative　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Power　of　the　Common…wealth。

　　　　　Sec。　143。　　THE　legislative　power