second treatise of government-第26章

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tion　of　the　government：　for　the　end　why　people　entered　　into　society　being　to　be　preserved　one　intire；　free；　independent　　society；　to　be　governed　by　its　own　laws；　this　is　lost；　whenever　　they　are　given　up　into　the　power　of　another。　　　　　　Sec。　218。　　Why；　in　such　a　constitution　as　this；　the　　dissolution　of　the　government　in　these　cases　is　to　be　imputed　to　　the　prince；　is　evident；　because　he；　having　the　force；　treasure　　and　offices　of　the　state　to　employ；　and　often　persuading　himself；　　or　being　flattered　by　others；　that　as　supreme　magistrate　he　is　　uncapable　of　controul；　he　alone　is　in　a　condition　to　make　great　　advances　toward　such　changes；　under　pretence　of　lawful　authority；　　and　has　it　in　his　hands　to　terrify　or　suppress　opposers；　as　　factious；　seditious；　and　enemies　to　the　government：　whereas　no　　other　part　of　the　legislative；　or　people；　is　capable　by　　themselves　to　attempt　any　alteration　of　the　legislative；　without　　open　and　visible　rebellion；　apt　enough　to　be　taken　notice　of；　　which；　when　it　prevails；　produces　effects　very　little　different　　from　foreign　conquest。　　Besides；　the　prince　in　such　a　form　of　

government；　having　the　power　of　dissolving　the　other　parts　of　the　　legislative；　and　thereby　rendering　them　private　persons；　they　can　　never　in　opposition　to　him；　or　without　his　concurrence；　alter　the　　legislative　by　a　law；　his　conse　power；　neglects　and　abandons　that　charge；　so　that　the　　laws　already　made　can　no　longer　be　put　in　execution。　　This　is　　demonstratively　to　reduce　all　to　anarchy；　and　so　effectually　to　　dissolve　the　government：　for　laws　not　being　made　for　themselves；　　but　to　be；　by　their　execution；　the　bonds　of　the　society；　to　keep　　every　part　of　the　body　politic　in　its　due　place　and　function；　　when　that　totally　ceases；　the　government　visibly　ceases；　and　the　　people　become　a　confused　multitude；　without　order　or　connexion。　　　Where　there　is　no　longer　the　administration　of　justice；　for　the　　securing　of　men's　rights；　nor　any　remaining　power　within　the　　community　to　direct　the　force；　or　provide　for　the　necessities　of　　the　public；　there　certainly　is　no　government　left。　　Where　the　　laws　cannot　be　executed；　it　is　all　one　as　if　there　were　no　laws；　　and　a　government　without　laws　is；　I　suppose；　a　mystery　in　　politics；　unconceivable　to　human　capacity；　and　inconsistent　with　　human　society。　　　　　　Sec。　220。　　In　these　and　the　like　cases；　when　the　government　　is　dissolved；　the　people　are　at　liberty　to　provide　for　　themselves；　by　erecting　a　new　legislative；　differing　from　the　　other；　by　the　change　of　persons；　or　form；　or　both；　as　they　shall　　find　it　most　for　their　safety　and　good：　for　the　society　can　　never；　by　the　fault　of　another；　lose　the　native　and　original　　right　it　has　to　preserve　itself；　which　can　only　be　done　by　a　　settled　legislative；　and　a　fair　and　impartial　execution　of　the　　laws　made　by　it。　　But　the　state　of　mankind　is　not　so　miserable　　that　they　are　not　capable　of　using　this　remedy；　till　it　be　too　　late　to　look　for　any。　　To　tell　people　they　may　provide　for　　themselves；　by　erecting　a　new　legislative；　when　by　oppression；　　artifice；　or　being　delivered　over　to　a　foreign　power；　their　old　　one　is　gone；　is　only　to　tell　them；　they　may　expect　relief　when　it　　is　too　late；　and　the　evil　is　past　cure。　　This　is　in　effect　no　　more　than　to　bid　them　first　be　slaves；　and　then　to　take　care　of　　their　liberty；　and　when　their　chains　are　on；　tell　them；　they　may　　act　like　freemen。　　This；　if　barely　so；　is　rather　mockery　than　　relief；　and　men　can　never　be　secure　from　tyranny；　if　there　be　no　　means　to　escape　it　till　they　are　perfectly　under　it：　and　　therefore　it　is；　that　they　have　not　only　a　right　to　get　out　of　　it；　but　to　prevent　it。　　　　　　Sec。　221。　　There　is　therefore；　secondly；　another　way　whereby　　governments　are　dissolved；　and　that　is；　when　the　legislative；　or　　the　prince；　either　of　them；　act　contrary　to　their　trust。　　　　　First；　The　legislative　acts　against　the　trust　reposed　in　them；　　when　they　endeavour　to　invade　the　property　of　the　subject；　and　to　　make　themselves；　or　any　part　of　the　community；　masters；　or　　arbitrary　disposers　of　the　lives；　liberties；　or　fortunes　of　the　　people。　　　　　　Sec。　222。　　The　reason　why　men　enter　into　society；　is　the　　preservation　of　their　property；　and　the　end　why　they　chuse　and　　authorize　a　legislative；　is；　that　there　may　be　laws　made；　and　　rules　set；　as　guards　and　fences　to　the　properties　of　all　the　　members　of　the　society；　to　limit　the　power；　and　moderate　the　　dominion；　of　every　part　and　member　of　the　society：　for　since　it　　can　never　be　supposed　to　be　the　will　of　the　society；　that　the　　legislative　should　have　a　power　to　destroy　that　which　every　one　　designs　to　secure；　by　entering　into　society；　and　for　which　the　　people　submitted　themselves　to　legislators　of　their　own　making；　　whenever　the　legislators　endeavour　to　take　away；　and　destroy　the　　property　of　the　people；　or　to　reduce　them　to　slavery　under　　arbitrary　power；　they　put　themselves　into　a　state　of　war　with　the　　people；　who　are　thereupon　absolved　from　any　farther　obedience；　　and　are　left　to　the　common　refuge；　which　God　hath　provided　for　　all　men；　against　force　and　violence。　　Whensoever　therefore　the　　legislative　shall　transgress　this　fundamental　rule　of　society；　

and　either　by　ambition；　fear；　folly　or　corruption；　endeavour　to　　grasp　themselves；　or　put　into　the　hands　of　any　other；　an　absolute　　power　over　the　lives；　liberties；　and　estates　of　the　people；　by　　this　breach　of　trust　they　forfeit　the　power　the　people　had　put　　into　their　hands　for　quite　contrary　ends；　and　it　devolves　to　the　　people；　who。　　have　a　right　to　resume　their　original　liberty；　and；　　by　the　establishment　of　a　new　legislative；　（such　as　they　shall　　think　fit）　provide　for　their　own　safety　and　security；　which　is　　the　end　for　which　they　are　in　society。　　What　I　have　said　here；　　concerning　the　legislative　in　general；　holds　true　also　concerning　　the　supreme　executor；　who　having　a　double　trust　put　in　him；　both　　to　have　a　part　in　the　legislative；　and　the　supreme　execution　of　　the　law；　acts　against　both；　when　he　goes　about　to　set　up　his　own　　arbitrary　will　as　the　law　of　the　society。　　He　acts　also　contrary　　to　his　trust；　when　he　either　employs　the　force；　treasure；　and　　offices　of　the　society；　to　corrupt　the　representatives；　and　gain　　them　to　his　purposes；　or　openly　preengages　the　electors；　and　　prescribes　to　their　choice；　such；　whom　he　has；　by　sollicitations；　　threats；　promises；　or　otherwise；　won　to　his　designs；　and　employs　　them　to　bring　in　such；　who　have　promised　before…hand　what　to　　vote；　and　what　to　enact。　　Thus　to　regulate　candidates　and　　electors；　and　new…model　the　ways　of　election；　what　is　it　but　to　　cut　up　the　government　by　the　roots；　and　poison　the　very　fountain　　of　public　security？　for　the　people　having　reserved　to　themselves　　the　choice　of　their　representatives；　as　the　fence　to　their　　properties；　could　do　it　for　no　other　end；　but　that　they　might　　always　be　freely　chosen；　and　so　chosen；　freely　act；　and　advise；　　as　the　necessity　of　the　common…wealth；　and　the　public　good　　should；　upon　examination；　and　mature　debate；　be　judged　to　　require。　　This；　those　who　give　their　votes　before　they　hear　the　　debate；　and　have　weighed　the　reasons　on　all　sides；　are　not　　capable　of　doing。　　To　prepare　such　an　assembly　as　this；　and　　endeavour　to　set　up　the　declared　abettors　of　his　own　will；　for　　the　true　representatives　of　the　people；　and　the　law…makers　of　the　　society；　is　certainly　as　great　a　breach　of　trust；　and　as　perfect　　a　declaration　of　a　design　to　subvert　the　government；　as　is　　possible　to　be　met　with。　　To　which；　if　one　shall　add　rewards　and　　punishments　visibly　employed　to　the　same　end；　and　all　the　arts　of　　perverted　law　made　use　of；　to　take　off　and　destroy　all　that　stand　　in　the　way　of　such　a　design；　and　will　not　comply　and　consent　to　　betray　the　liberties　of　their　country；　it　will　be　past　doubt　what　　is　doing。　　What　power　they　ought　to　have　in　the　society；　who　thus　　employ　it　contrary　to　the　trust　went　along　with　it　in　its　first　　institution；　is　easy　to　determine；　and　one　cannot　but　see；　that　　he；　who　has　once　attempted　any　such　thing　as　this；　cannot　any　　longer　be　trusted。　　　　　　Sec。　223。　　To　this　perhaps　it　will　be　said；　that　the　people　　being　ignorant；　and　always　discontented；　to　lay　the　foundation　of　　government　in　the　unsteady　opinion　and　uncertain　humour　of　the　　people；　is　to　expose　it　to　certain　ruin；　and　no　government　will　　be　able　long　to　subsist；　if　the　people　may　set　up　a　new　　legislative；　whenever　they　take　offence　at　the　old　one。　　To　this　　I　answer；　Quite　the　contrary。　　　People　are　not　so　easily　got　out　　of　their　old　forms；　as　some　are　apt　to　suggest。　　They　are　hardly　　to　be　prevailed　with　to　amend　the　acknowledged　faults　in　the　　frame　they　have　been　accustomed　to。　　　And　if　there　be　any　　original　defects；　or　adventitious　ones　introduced　by　time；　or　　corruption；　it　is　not　an　easy　thing　to　get　them　changed；　even　　when　all　the　world　sees　there　is　an　opportunity　for　it。　　This　　slowness　and　aversion　in　the　people　to　quit　their　old　　constitutions；　has；　in　the　many　revolutions　which　have　been　seen　　in　this　kingdom；　in　this　and　former　ages；　still　kept　us　to；　or；　　after　some　interval　of　fruitless　attempts；　still　brought　us　back　　again　to　our　old　legislative　of　king；　lords　and　commons：　and　　whatever　provocations　have　made　the　crown　be　taken　from　some　of　　our　princes　heads；　they　never　carried　the　people　so　far　as　to　

place　it　in　another　line。　　　　　　Sec。　224。　　But　it　will　be　said；　this　hypothesis　lays　a　　ferment　for　frequent　rebellion。　　To　which　I　answer；　　　　　　First；　No　more　than　any　other　hypothesis：　for　when　the　　people　are　made　miserable；　and　find　themselves　exposed　to　the　ill　　usage　of　arbitrary　power；　cry　up　their　governors；　as　much　as　you　　will；　for　sons　of　Jupiter；　let　them　be　sacred　and　divine；　　descended；　or　authorized　from　heaven；　give　them　out　for　whom　or　　what　you　please；　the　same　will　happen。　　The　people　generally　ill　　treated；　and　contrary　to　right；　will　be　ready　upon　any　occasion　　to　ease　themselves　of　a　burden　that　sits　heavy　upon　them。　　They　　will　wish；　and　seek　for　the　opportunity；　which　in　the　change；　　weakness　and　accidents　of　human　affairs；　seldom　delays　long　to　　offer　itself。　　He　must　have　lived　but　a　little　while　in　the　　world；　who　has　not　seen　examples　of　this　in　his　time；　and　he　must　　have　read　very　little；　who　cannot　produce　examples　of　it　in　all　　sorts　of　governments　in　the　world。　　　　　　Sec。　225。　　Secondly；　I　answer；　such　revolutions　happen　not　　upon　every　little　mismanagement　in　public　affairs。　　Great　　mistakes　in　the　ruling　part；　many　wrong　and　inconvenient　laws；　　and　all　the　slips　of　human　frailty；　will　be　born　by　the　people　　without　mutiny　or　murmur。　　But　if　a　long　train　of　abuses；　　prevarications　and　artifices；　all　tending　the　same　way；　make　the　　design　visible　to　the　people；　and　they　cannot　but　feel　what　they　　lie　under；　and　see　whither　they　are　going；　it　is　not　to　be　　wondered；　that　they　should　then　rouze　themselves；　and　endeavour　　to　put　the　rule　into　such　hands　which　may　secure　to　them　the　ends　　for　which　government　was　at　first　erected；　and　without　which；　　ancient　names；　and　specious　forms；　are　so　far　from　being　better；　　that　they　are　much　worse；　than　the　state　of　nature；　or　pure　　anarchy；　the　inconveniencies　being　all　as　great　and　as　near；　but　　the　remedy　farther　off　and　more　difficult。