second treatise of government-第28章

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to　all　other　creatures　for　　their　preservation　from　injury？　　I　answer：　Self…defence　is　a　part　　of　the　law　of　nature；　nor　can　it　be　denied　the　community；　even　　against　the　king　himself：　but　to　revenge　themselves　upon　him；　　must　by　no　means　be　allowed　them；　it　being　not　agreeable　to　that　　law。　　Wherefore　if　the　king　shall　shew　an　hatred；　not　only　to　　some　particular　persons；　but　sets　himself　against　the　body　of　the　　common…wealth；　whereof　he　is　the　head；　and　shall；　with　　intolerable　ill　usage；　cruelly　tyrannize　over　the　u7hole；　or　a　　considerable　part　of　the　people；　in　this　case　the　people　have　a　　right　to　resist　and　defend　themselves　from　injury：　but　it　must　be　　with　this　caution；　that　they　only　defend　themselves；　but　do　not　　attack　their　prince：　they　may　repair　the　damages　received；　but　　must　not　for　any　provocation　exceed　the　bounds　of　due　reverence　　and　respect。　　They　may　repulse　the　present　attempt；　but　must　not　　revenge　past　violences：　for　it　is　natural　for　us　to　defend　life　　and　limb；　but　that　an　inferior　should　punish　a　superior；　is　　against　nature。　　The　mischief　which　is　designed　them；　the　people　　may　prevent　before　it　be　done；　but　when　it　is　done；　they　must　not　　revenge　it　on　the　king；　though　author　of　the　villany。　　This　　therefore　is　the　privilege　of　the　people　in　general；　above　what　　any　private　person　hath；　that　particular　men　are　allowed　by　our　　adversaries　themselves　（Buchanan　only　excepted）　to　have　no　other　　remedy　but　patience；　but　the　body　of　the　people　may　with　respect　　resist　intolerable　tyranny；　for　when　it　is　but　moderate；　they　　ought　to　endure　it。　　　　　　Sec。　234。　　Thus　far　that　great　advocate　of　monarchical　power　　allows　of　resistance。　　　　　　Sec。　235。　　It　is　true；　he　has　annexed　two　limitations　to　it；　　to　no　purpose：　　　　　　First；　He　says；　it　must　be　with　reverence。　　　　　　Secondly；　It　must　be　without　retribution；　or　punishment；　and　　the　reason　he　gives　is；　because　an　inferior　cannot　punish　a　　superior。　　　　　　First；　How　to　resist　force　without　striking　again；　or　how　to　　strike　with　reverence；　will　need　some　skill　to　make　intelligible。　　　He　that　shall　oppose　an　assault　only　with　a　shield　to　receive　the　　blows；　or　in　any　more　respectful　posture；　without　a　sword　in　his　　hand；　to　abate　the　confidence　and　force　of　the　assailant；　will　　quickly　be　at　an　end　of　his　resistance；　and　will　find　such　a　　defence　serve　only　to　draw　on　himself　the　worse　usage。　　This　is　　as　ridiculous　a　way　of　resisting；　as　juvenal　thought　it　of　　fighting；　ubi　tu　pulsas；　ego　vapulo　tantum。　　　And　the　success　of　　the　combat　will　be　unavoidably　the　same　he　there　describes　it：

　　　　　　…　Libertas　pauperis　haec　est：　　　　　　　Pulsatus　rogat；　&　pugnis　concisus；　adorat；　　　　　　　Ut　liceat　paucis　cum　dentibus　inde　reverti。

This　will　always　be　the　event　of　such　an　imaginary　resistance；　　where　men　may　not　strike　again。　　He　therefore　who　may　resist；　　must　be　allowed　to　strike。　　And　then　let　our　author；　or　any　body　

else；　join　a　knock　on　the　head；　or　a　cut　on　the　face；　with　as　　much　reverence　and　respect　as　he　thinks　fit。　　He　that　can　　reconcile　blows　and　reverence；　may；　for　aught　I　know；　desire　for　　his　pains；　a　civil；　respectful　cudgeling　where…ever　he　can　meet　　with　it。　　　　　　Secondly；　As　to　his　second；　An　inferior　cannot　punish　a　　superior；　that　is　true；　generally　speaking；　whilst　he　is　his　　superior。　　But　to　resist　force　with　force；　being　the　state　of　war　　that　levels　the　parties；　cancels　all　former　relation　of　　reverence；　respect；　and　superiority：　and　then　the　odds　that　　remains；　is；　that　he；　who　opposes　the　unjust　agressor；　has　this　　superiority　over　him；　that　he　has　a　right；　when　he　prevails；　to　　punish　the　offender；　both　for　the　breach　of　the　peace；　and　all　　the　evils　that　followed　upon　it。　　Barclay　therefore；　in　another　　place；　more　coherently　to　himself；　denies　it　to　be　lawful　to　　resist　a　king　in　any　case。　　But　he　there　assigns　two　cases；　　whereby　a　king　may　un…king　himself。　　His　words　are；　　　　　　Quid　ergo；　nulline　casus　incidere　possunt　quibus　populo　sese　　erigere　atque　in　regem　impotentius　dominantem　arma　capere　&　　invadere　jure　suo　suaque　authoritate　liceat？　　Nulli　certe　quamdiu　　rex　manet。　　Semper　enim　ex　divinis　id　obstat；　Regem　honorificato；　　&　qui　potestati　resistit；　Dei　ordinationi　resisit：　non　alias　　igitur　in　eum　populo　potestas　est　quam　si　id　committat　propter　　quod　ipso　jure　rex　esse　desinat。　　Tunc　enim　se　ipse　principatu　　exuit　atque　in　privatis　constituit　liber：　hoc　modo　populus　&　　superior　efficitur；　reverso　ad　eum　sc。　　jure　illo　quod　ante　regem　　inauguratum　in　interregno　habuit。　　　At　sunt　paucorum　generum　　commissa　ejusmodi　quae　hunc　effectum　pariunt。　　At　ego　cum　plurima　　animo　perlustrem；　duo　tantum　invenio；　duos；　inquam；　casus　quibus　　rex　ipso　facto　ex　rege　non　regem　se　facit　&　omni　honore　&　　dignitate　regali　atque　in　subditos　potestate　destituit；　quorum　　etiam　meminit　Winzerus。　　Horum　unus　est；　Si　regnum　disperdat；　　quemadmodum　de　Nerone　fertur；　quod　is　nempe　senatum　populumque　　Romanum；　atque　adeo　urbem　ipsam　ferro　flammaque　vastare；　ac　novas　　sibi　sedes　quaerere　decrevisset。　　Et　de　Caligula；　quod　palam　　denunciarit　se　neque　civem　neque　principem　senatui　amplius　fore；　　inque　animo　habuerit　interempto　utriusque　ordinis　electissimo　　quoque　Alexandriam　commigrare；　ac　ut　populum　uno　ictu　　interimeret；　unam　ei　cervicem　optavit。　　Talia　cum　rex　aliquis　　meditator　&　molitur　serio；　omnem　regnandi　curam　&　animum　ilico　　abjicit；　ac　proinde　imperium　in　subditos　amittit；　ut　dominus　　servi　pro　derelicto　habiti　dominium。　　　　　　Sec。　236。　　Alter　casus　est；　Si　rex　in　alicujus　clientelam　se　　contulit；　ac　regnum　quod　liberum　a　majoribus　&　populo　traditum　　accepit；　alienae　ditioni　mancipavit。　　Nam　tunc　quamvis　forte　non　　ea　mente　id　agit　populo　plane　ut　incommodet：　tamen　quia　quod　　praecipuum　est　regiae　dignitatis　amifit；　ut　summus　scilicet　in　　regno　secundum　Deum　sit；　&　solo　Deo　inferior；　atque　populum　etiam　　totum　ignorantem　vel　invitum；　cujus　libertatem　sartam　&　tectam　　conservare　debuit；　in　alterius　gentis　ditionem　&　potestatem　　dedidit；　hac　velut　quadam　regni　ab　alienatione　effecit；　ut　nec　　quod　ipse　in　regno　imperium　habuit　retineat；　nec　in　eum　cui　　collatum　voluit；　juris　quicquam　transferat；　atque　ita　eo　facto　　liberum　jam　&　suae　potestatis　populum　relinquit；　cujus　rei　　exemplum　unum　annales　Scotici　suppeditant。　　　Barclay　contra　　Monarchom。　1。　iii。　c。　16。

　　　　Which　in　English　runs　thus：

　　　　　Sec。　237。　　What　then；　can　there　no　case　happen　wherein　the　　people　may　of　right；　and　by　their　own　authority；　help　themselves；　　take　arms；　and　set　upon　their　king；　imperiously　domineering　over　　them？　　None　at　all；　whilst　he　remains　a　king。　　Honour　the　king；　　and　he　that　resists　the　power；　resists　the　ordinance　of　God；　are　　divine　oracles　that　will　never　permit　it；　The　people　therefore　　can　never　come　by　a　power　over　him；　unless　he　does　something　that　

makes　him　cease　to　be　a　king：　for　then　he　divests　himself　of　his　　crown　and　dignity；　and　returns　to　the　state　of　a　private　man；　and　　the　people　become　free　and　superior；　the　power　which　they　had　in　　the　interregnum；　before　they　crowned　him　king；　devolving　to　them　　again。　　But　there　are　but　few　miscarriages　which　bring　the　matter　　to　this　state。　　After　considering　it　well　on　all　sides；　I　can　　find　but　two。　　Two　cases　there　are；　I　say；　whereby　a　king；　ipso　　facto；　becomes　no　king；　and　loses　all　power　and　regal　authority　　over　his　people；　which　are　also　taken　notice　of　by　Winzerus。　　　　　　The　first　is；　If　he　endeavour　to　overturn　the　government；　　that　is；　if　he　have　a　purpose　and　design　to　ruin　the　kingdom　and　　commonwealth；　as　it　is　recorded　of　Nero；　that　he　resolved　to　cut　　off　the　senate　and　people　of　Rome；　lay　the　city　waste　with　fire　　and　sword；　and　then　remove　to　some　other　place。　　And　of　Caligula；　　that　he　openly　declared；　that　he　would　be　no　longer　a　head　to　the　　people　or　senate；　and　that　he　had　it　in　his　thoughts　to　cut　off　　the　worthiest　men　of　both　ranks；　and　then　retire　to　Alexandria：　　and　he　wisht　that　the　people　had　but　one　neck；　that　he　might　　dispatch　them　all　at　a　blow；　Such　designs　as　these；　when　any　king　　harbours　in　his　thoughts；　and　seriously　promotes；　he　immediately　　gives　up　all　care　and　thought　of　the　common…wealth；　and　　consequently　forfeits　the　power　of　governing　his　subjects；　as　a　　master　does　the　dominion　over　his　slaves　whom　he　hath　abandoned。　　　　　　Sec。　238。　　The　other　case　is；　When　a　king　makes　himself　the　　dependent　of　another；　and　subjects　his　kingdom　which　his　　ancestors　left　him；　and　the　people　put　free　into　his　hands；　to　　the　dominion　of　another：　for　however　perhaps　it　may　not　be　his　　intention　to　prejudice　the　people；　yet　because　he　has　hereby　lost　　the　principal　part　of　regal　dignity；　viz。　　to　be　next　and　　immediately　under　God；　supreme　in　his　kingdom；　and　also　because　　he　betrayed　or　forced　his　people；　whose　liberty　he　ought　to　have　　carefully　preserved；　into　the　power　and　dominion　of　a　foreign　　nation。　　By　this；　as。　　it　were；　alienation　of　his　kingdom；　he　　himself　loses　the　power　he　had　in　it　before；　without　transferring　　any　the　least　right　to　those　on　whom　he　would　have　bestowed　it；　　and　so　by　this　act　sets　the　people　free；　and　leaves　them　at　their　　own　disposal。　　One　example　of　this　is　to　be　found　in　the　Scotch　　Annals。　　　　　　Sec。　239。　　In　these　cases　Barclay；　the　great　champion　of　　absolute　monarchy；　is　forced　to　allow；　that　a　king　may　be　　resisted；　and　ceases　to　be　a　king。　　That　is；　in　short；　not　to　　multiply　cases；　in　whatsoever　he　has　no　authority；　there　he　is　no　　king；　and　may　be　resisted：　for　wheresoever　the　authority　ceases；　　the　king　ceases　too；　and　becomes　like　other　men　who　have　no　　authority。　　And　these　two　cases　he　instances　in；　differ　little　　from　those　above　mentioned；　to　be　destructive　to　governments；　　only　that　he　has　omitted　the　principle　from　which　his　doctrine　　flows：　and　that　is；　the　breach　of　trust；　in　not　preserving　the　　form　of　government　agreed　on；　and　in　not　intending　the　end　of　　government　itself；　which　is　the　public　good　and　preservation　of　　property。　　When　a　king　has　dethroned　himself；　and　put　himself　in　　a　state　of　war　with　his　people；　what　shall　hinder　them　from　　prosecuting　him　who　is　no　king；　as　they　would　any　other　man；　who　　has　put　himself　into　a　state　of　war　with　them；　Barclay；　and　those　　of　his　opinion；　would　do　well　to　tell　us。　　This　farther　I　desire　　may　be　taken　notice　of　out　of　Barclay；　that　he　says；　The　mischief　　that　is　designed　them；　the　people　may　prevent　before　it　be　clone：　　whereby　he　allows　resistance　when　tyranny　is　but　in　design。　　Such　　designs　as　these　（says　he）　when　any　king　harbours　in　his　thoughts　　and　seriously　promotes；　he　immediately　gives　up　all　care　and　　thought　of　the　common…wealth；　so　that；　according　to　him；　the　　neglect　of　the　public　good　is　to　be　taken　as　an　evidence　of　such　　design；　or　at　least　for　a　sufficient　cause　of　resistance。　　And　　the　reason　of　all；　he　gives　in　these　words；　Because　he　betrayed　　or　forced　his　people；　whose　liberty　he　ought　carefully　to　have　　preserved。　　What　he　adds；　into　the　power　and　dominion　of　a　

foreign　nation；　signifies　nothing；　the　fault　and　forfeiture　lying　　in　the　loss　of　their　liberty；　which　he　ought　to　have　preserved；　　and　not　in　any　distinction　of　the　persons　to　whose　dominion　they　　were　subjected。　　The　peoples　right　is　equally　invaded；　and　their　　liberty　lost；　whether　they　are　made　sla