e8东的信 _作者: 美 沃伦·巴菲特-第31章
按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
然而我们面对的主要问题还是不断增加的资金规模，先前各位也听过类似的说明，不过这个问题就好象是一个人的身体健康与年纪的关系一样，随着时间的流逝，问题也越严重，（当然在这种情况下，我们是希望这个问题越严重越好）
Four years ago I told you that we needed profits of 3。9 billion to achieve a 15％ annual return over the decade then ahead。 Today； for the next decade； a 15％ return demands profits of 10。3 billion。 That seems like a very big number to me and to Charlie Munger； Berkshire Vice Chairman and my partner。 （Should that number indeed prove too big； Charlie will find himself； in future reports； retrospectively identified as the senior partner。）
四年前我曾告诉各位若在未来十年，Berkshire想要每年维持15％的报酬，我们总共约要有39亿美元的获利，时至今日，这个数字暴增到103亿美元，对查理与我来说，这实在是无法承担之重，（当然若这个数字事后发现真的过大，大家或许会在以后的报告中，查理可能会另外个别署名资深合伙人）
As a partial offset to the drag that our growing capital base exerts upon returns； we have a very important advantage now that we lacked 24 years ago。 Then； all our capital was tied up in a textile business with inescapably poor economic characteristics。 Today part of our capital is invested in some really exceptional businesses。
虽然资金规模会影响到最后的投资报酬率，但同时我们也拥有另外一项以前没有的优势，过去我们大部分的资金都被绑在没有多大经济效益的纺织事业之上，如今部份的资金已转移到一些相当不错的事业。去年我将他们取名叫做七个圣徒�；水牛城日报、费区海默、寇比吸尘器、内布拉斯加家具量贩店、史考特费兹制造集团、喜斯糖果及世界百科全书等，今年七圣徒持续向前迈进，大家可以发现以历史投资成本的角度来看，他们的投资报酬实在是惊人，没有依靠财务杠杆，平均股东权益报酬率高达67％。
Last year we dubbed these operations the Sainted Seven： Buffalo News； Fechheimer； Kirby； Nebraska Furniture Mart； Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group； See； and World Book。 In 1988 the Saints came marching in。 You can see just how extraordinary their returns on capital were by examining the historical…cost financial statements on page 45； which bine the figures of the Sainted Seven with those of several smaller units。 With no benefit from financial leverage； this group earned about 67％ on average equity capital。 In most cases the remarkable performance of these units arises partially from an exceptional business franchise； in all cases an exceptional management is a vital factor。 The contribution Charlie and I make is to leave these managers alone。
虽然其中一部分的企业本身就是属于强势的企业，但优良的管理却是绝对必要的条件，查理跟我唯一可以做的就是让他们放手去干。
In my judgment； these businesses； in aggregate； will continue to produce superb returns。 We’ll need these： Without this help Berkshire would not have a chance of achieving our 15％ goal。 You can be sure that our operating managers will deliver； the question mark in our future is whether Charlie and I can effectively employ the funds that they generate。
根据我个人的判断，这些企业总的来说，应该还会持续有好的表现，我们想要在往后年度继续维持15％报酬率的目标，绝对需要他们的支持，唯一的关键在于查理跟我是否能够有效地运用他们所贡献出来源源不绝的资金。
In that respect； we took a step in the right direction early in 1989 when we purchased an 80％ interest in Borsheim； a jewelry business in Omaha。 This purchase； described later in this letter； delivers exactly what we look for： an outstanding business run by people we like； admire； and trust。 It’s a great way to start the year。
在这点我们做出了一个正确的决定，那就是买下位于奥玛哈Borsheim珠宝80％的股权，这项购并案会在后面说明，与我们当初的预期相符，一家优秀的企业由我们所欣赏且信任的人来经营，今年有一个好的开始。
Accounting Changes
会计原则变动
We have made a significant accounting change that was mandated for 1988； and likely will have another to make in 1990。 When we move figures around from year to year； without any change in economic reality； one of our always…thrilling discussions of accounting is necessary。
1988年开始有一项重要的会计原则变动开始适用，展望1990年还会有一项变动，当经济现况没有改变，但会计帐面却必须将数字搬来搬去，我们一定会花一番工夫讨论一下影响层面。首先我习惯性的提出拒绝声明，虽然一般公认会计原则确有缺点，但我却必须坦承没有能力重新订出一套新的规则，虽然这套原则确有其先天性的限制，却不必就此废除，CEO大可以也应该将一般公认会计原则当作是对股东与债权人尽告知义务的开始而非结束；若他们只是提供阳春的财务报表，却没有附上经营分析所必要的关键讯息，部门经理人会发现会被总经理修理的很惨，同样的母公司的总经理是不是也应该向他的老板，也就是公司股东所有人，报告必要有用的信息。
First； Il offer my customary disclaimer： Despite the shortings of generally accepted accounting principles （GAAP）； I would hate to have the job of devising a better set of rules。 The limitations of the existing set； however； need not be inhibiting： CEOs are free to treat GAAP statements as a beginning rather than an end to their obligation to inform owners and creditors … and indeed they should。 After all； any manager of a subsidiary pany would find himself in hot water if he reported barebones GAAP numbers that omitted key information needed by his boss； the parent corporation CEO。 Why； then； should the CEO himself withhold information vitally useful to his bosses … the shareholder…owners of the corporation？ What needs to be reported is data … whether GAAP； non…GAAP； or extra…GAAP … that helps financially…literate readers answer three key questions： （1） Approximately how much is this pany worth？ （2） What is the likelihood that it can meet its future obligations？ and （3） How good a job are its managers doing； given the hand they have been dealt？
真正需要的是资料�；不管是一般公认、非一般公认或是一般公认以外，可以帮助财务报表使用者可以了解三个问题︰（1）这家公司大概价值多少？（2）它达到未来目标的可能性有多大？（3）在现有条件下，经理人的工作表现如何？
In most cases； answers to one or more of these questions are somewhere between difficult and impossible to glean from the minimum GAAP presentation。 The business world is simply too plex for a single set of rules to effectively describe economic reality for all enterprises； particularly those operating in a wide variety of businesses； such as Berkshire。
大部分的情况下，简单的财务数字并不能回答以上的问题，商业世界实在很难用一套简单的规则有效地来解释企业的经济实质状况，尤其是像Berkshire这种由许多各种不同产业组成集团。
Further plicating the problem is the fact that manymanagements view GAAP not as a standard to be met； but as an obstacle to overe。 Too often their accountants willingly assist them。 （ow much says the client； s two plus two？？ Replies the cooperative accountant； hat number did you have in mind？？ Even honest and well…intentioned managements sometimes stretch GAAP a bit in order to present figures they think will more appropriately describe their performance。 Both the smoothing of earnings and the ig bath quarter are hit lie？ techniques employed by otherwise upright managements。
更复杂的是许多管理阶层不把一般公认会计原则当作是应该达到的标准，而是应该要克服的阻碍，且大多数的会计师也心甘情愿给予协助，当客户问到二加二等于几？配合的会计师可能会回答︰「那要看你想要多少？」即使是诚实且正直的管理阶层有时也会超越一般公认会计原则，以使得报表数字更符合他们认为应该有的表现，不管是让损益平滑一点或是某季特别突出，都是还算正直的经营阶层经常运用的做帐技巧。
Then there are managers who actively use GAAP to deceive and defraud。 They know that many investors and creditors accept GAAP results as gospel。 So these charlatans interpret the rules imaginatively and record business transactions in ways that technically ply with GAAP but actually display an economic illusion to the world。
另外还有一些不肖经理人专门利用一般公认会计原则来进行欺骗与贪污，他们很清楚许多投资人与债权人把一般公认会计原则当作圣经朝拜，所以这些骗徒运用丰富的想象力技巧性让交易记录符合一般公认会计原则，但却与实际的经济实质背道而驰。
As long as investors … including supposedly sophisticated institutions … place fancy valuations on reported arnings that march steadily upward； you can be sure that some managers and promoters will exploit GAAP to produce such numbers； no matter what the truth may be。 Over the years； Charlie and I have observed many accounting…based frauds of staggering size。 Few of the perpetrators have been punished； many have not even been censured。 It has been far safer to steal large sums with a pen than small sums with a gun。
只要投资人，包含看起来复杂的专业投资机构，迷信稳定向上攀升的盈余数字，我们可以百分之百确定还会有经理人与拥护者不顾现实，继续滥用一般公认会计原则来满足投资人的需求，多年以来查理跟我看到许多会计诈骗案，鲜少有人因此被惩罚，有的甚至都没有被发现，用笔偷钱要比用枪抢劫要来的容易的多。
Under one major change mandated by GAAP for 1988； we have been required to fully consolidate all our subsidiaries in our balance sheet and earnings statement。 In the past； Mutual Savings and Loan； and Scott Fetzer Financial （a credit pany that primarily finances installment sales of World Book and Kirby products） were consolidated on a one…line basis。 That meant we （1） showed our equity in their bined net worths as a single…entry asset on Berkshire consolidated balance sheet and （2） included our equity in their bined annual earnings as a single…line ine entry in our consolidated statement of earnings。 Now the rules require that we consolidate each asset and liability of these panies in our balance sheet and each item of their ine and expense in our earnings statement。
1988年一般公认会计原则有一个很重大的转变，依新规定Berkshire必须将子公司与关系企业的资产与损益完全并到母公司的财务报表之上，在过去互助储贷与史考特费兹金融（主要从事世界百科全书与寇比吸尘器分期付款的信用公司），只须一次认列投资损益即可，意思是说（1）仅将被投资公司净值按投资比例以投资权益显示在Berkshire的合并资产负债表之上（2）仅将被投资公司年度损益按投资比例以投资利益显示在Berkshire的合并损益表之上，但是现在我们必须将被投资公司的资产与负债、营收与费用，放进合并的财务报表之上。
This change underscores the need for panies also to report segmented data： The greater the number of economically diverse business operations lumped together in conventional financial statements； the less useful those presentations are and the less able investors are to answer the three questions posed earlier。 Indeed； the only reason we ever prepare consolidated figures at Berkshire is to meet outside requirements。 On the other hand； Charlie and I constantly study our segment data。
这项转变低估了公司也要报告部门别信息，企业形态越复杂的公司，其按传统财务报表所加总出来的数字越没有意义，越没有办法让投资人回答前面所提的三个问题，事实上在Berkshire我们会准备合并数字的唯一原因就是要符合外部规定，查理跟我看的则是另一套部门别的信息。
Now that we are required to bundle more numbers in our GAAP statements； we have decided to publish additional supplementary information that we think will help you measure both business value and managerial performance。 （Berkshire ability to discharge its obligations to creditors … the third question we listed … should be obvious； whatever statements you examine。） In these supplementary presentations； we will not necessarily follow GAAP procedures； or even corporate structure。 Rather； we will attempt to lump major business activities in ways that aid analysis but do not swamp you with detail。 Our goal is to give you important information in a form that we would wish to get it if our roles were reversed。
现在我们被要求在�
