e8东的信 _作者: 美 沃伦·巴菲特-第34章
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Most people； no matter how sophisticated they are in other matters； feel like babes in the woods when purchasing jewelry。 They can judge neither quality nor price。 For them only one rule makes sense： If you don know jewelry； know the jeweler。
大部分的人们不管在其它行业多么学有专精，但是遇到买珠宝首饰时，就像是迷失在森林里的小孩子一样，不会判断东西的品质好坏与价格高低，对这些人来说，只要记住一条，不懂珠宝没有关系，只要认识珠宝商就好。
I can assure you that those who put their trust in Ike Friedman and his family will never be disappointed。 The way in which we purchased our interest in their business is the ultimate testimonial。 Borsheim had no audited financial statements； nevertheless； we didn take inventory； verify receivables or audit the operation in any way。 Ike simply told us what was so and on that basis we drew up a one…page contract and wrote a large check。
我敢保证大家只要放心交给Friedman家族，一定不会让各位失望，我们购买波仙股权的方式就是最好的证明，波仙没有会计师查核报告，也没有盘点存货、验证应收帐款或是做任何方式的查核，他们只是简单地告诉我们如何如何，于是双方就草拟的一页简单的合约，并由我们开出一大笔金额的支票。
Business at Borsheim has mushroomed in recent years as the reputation of the Friedman family has spread。 Customers now e to the store from all over the country。 Among them have been some friends of mine from both coasts who thanked me later for getting them there。
随着Friedman家族声誉的远播，近年来波仙珠宝的生意越做越大，客户从美国各地远道而来，其中也包含我一些从东西两岸来的朋友，他们也都很感谢我能带他们去参观波仙。
Borsheim new links to Berkshire will change nothing in the way this business is run。 All members of the Friedman family will continue to operate just as they have before； Charlie and I will stay on the sidelines where we belong。 And when we say all members the words have real meaning。 Mr。 and Mrs。 Friedman； at 88 and 87； respectively； are in the store daily。 The wives of Ike； Alan； Marvin and Donald all pitch in at busy times； and a fourth generation is beginning to learn the ropes。
波仙的营运模式并不会因为Berkshire的加入而有所改变，所有的家族成员仍将持续在各自的岗位上奋斗，查理跟我会站在旁边默默支持，事实上所有的成员包含高龄88岁与87岁的老先生与老太太，仍然每天到店里工作，其它儿子媳妇也是从早忙到晚，家族的第四代已正准备开始学习接班。
It is great fun to be in business with people you have long admired。 The Friedmans； like the Blumkins； have achieved success because they have deserved success。 Both families focus on what right for the customer and that； inevitably； works out well for them； also。 We couldn have better partners。
跟你所欣赏的人一起共事实在是一件很大的乐趣，Friedmans家族的成功就像是B太太家族的成功一样，实至名归，两个家族都坚持对客户有益的事之上，同时对他们自己也有很大的益处，这是我们最好的事业伙伴。
Insurance Operations
保险事业营运
Shown below is an updated version of our usual table presenting key figures for the insurance industry：
下表是有关保险事业的几项主要的数据更新
Statutory
Yearly Change bined Ratio Yearly Change Inflation Rate in Premiums After Policyholder in Incurred Measured by
Written （％） Dividends Losses （％） GNP Deflator （％）
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988（Est。）
3。8 3。7 5。0 8。5 22。1 22。2 9。4 3。9
106。0 109。6 112。0 118。0 116。3 108。0 104。6 105。4
6。5 8。4 6。8 16。9 16。1 13。5 7。8 4。2
9。6 6。4 3。8 3。7 3。2 2。7 3。3 3。6
Source： A。M。 Best Co。
The bined ratio represents total insurance costs （losses incurred plus expenses） pared to revenue from premiums： A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit； and one above 100 indicates a loss。 When the investment ine that an insurer earns from holding on to policyholders？funds （he float？ is taken into account； a bined ratio in the 107…111 range typically produces an overall break…even result； exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders。
综合比率代表的是保险的总成本（损失加上费用）占保费收入的比率，100以下代表会有承销利益，100以上代表会有承销损失，若把持有保费收入浮存金（扣除股东权益部份所产生的盈余）所产生的投资收益列入考量，损益两平的范围大概是在107…111之间。
For the reasons laid out in previous reports； we expect the industry incurred losses to grow by about 10％ annually； even in years when general inflation runs considerably lower。 If premium growth meanwhile materially lags that 10％ rate； underwriting losses will mount； though the industry tendency to under reserve when business turns bad may obscure their size for a time。 As the table shows； the industry underwriting loss grew in 1988。 This trend is almost certain to continue … and probably will accelerate … for at least two more years。
基于前几次年报所说明的理由，即使是通货膨胀在这几年来相对温和，我们预期保险业每年损失增加的比率约在10％左右，若是保费收入成长没有到达10％以上，损失一定会增加，虽然保险公司在景气不好时，会习惯性地将损失暂时隐藏起来，如附表所示，1988年产业整体的损失确实增加，而这个趋势应该会继续持续下去，甚至在未来两年还会加速恶化。
The property…casualty insurance industry is not only subnormally profitable； it is subnormally popular。 （As Sam Goldwyn philosophized： n life； one must learn to take the bitter with the sour。？ One of the ironies of business is that many relatively…unprofitable industries that are plagued by inadequate prices habitually find themselves beat upon by irate customers even while other； hugely profitable industries are spared plaints； no matter how high their prices。
产险业的获利情况不但是相当的低，而且也是不太受尊重的行业，（就像是山姆高德温曾说一个人要学会体验人生的苦与乐，不过这行很讽刺的是，做的要死要活的同时，还要被客户糟蹋，不像有些赚翻了的行业，东西明明贵的要死，却是一个愿打，一个愿挨）
Take the breakfast cereal industry； whose return on invested capital is more than double that of the auto insurance industry （which is why panies like Kellogg and General Mills sell at five times book value and most large insurers sell close to book）。 The cereal panies regularly impose price increases； few of them related to a significant jump in their costs。 Yet not a peep is heard from consumers。 But when auto insurers raise prices by amounts that do not even match cost increases； customers are outraged。 If you want to be loved； it clearly better to sell high…priced corn flakes than low…priced auto insurance。
以早餐麦片为例，它的资产报酬率是汽车保险业的一倍（这也是为什么家乐氏与通用磨坊的股价净值比是五倍，而保险业者的股价净值比仅为一倍），麦片公司常常在调整产品售价，即便其生产成本没什么变，但消费者却连一个屁都不吭一声，但要是换做是保险业者，就算只是反映成本稍微调整一下价格，保户马上就会生气地跳起来，所以若你识相，最好是选择去卖高价的玉米片，而不是低价的汽车保险。
The antagonism that the public feels toward the industry can have serious consequences： Proposition 103； a California initiative passed last fall； threatens to push auto insurance prices down sharply； even though costs have been soaring。 The price cut has been suspended while the courts review the initiative； but the resentment that brought on the vote has not been suspended： Even if the initiative is overturned； insurers are likely to find it tough to operate profitably in California。 （Thank heavens the citizenry isn mad at bonbons： If Proposition 103 applied to candy as well as insurance； See would be forced to sell its product for 5。76 per pound。 rather than the 7。60 we charge … and would be losing money by the bucketful。）
一般大众对于保险业的敌视会造成严重的后果，去年秋天加州通过的一项103提案，虽然成本一再上涨，却还威胁要将汽车保费价格大幅压低，所幸法院后来检视这项提案予以搁置，但这次投票所带来的冲击未曾稍减，保险业者在加州已很难再有营运获利的空间，（感谢老天还好加州人没有对巧克力糖果感到反感，若是103提案也如保险般适用于糖果的话，喜斯可能被迫以每磅5。76元而不是现在的每磅7。6元，果真如此，喜斯可能就要亏大钱了）
The immediate direct effects on Berkshire from the initiative are minor； since we saw few opportunities for profit in the rate structure that existed in California prior to the vote。 However； the forcing down of prices would seriously affect GEICO； our 44％…owned investee； which gets about 10％ of its premium volume from California。 Even more threatening to GEICO is the possibility that similar pricing actions will be taken in other states； through either initiatives or legislation。
对Berkshire来说，这项法案的短期影响不大，因为即使在这法案之前，加州现行的费率结构也很难让我找到有获利的商机，然而这项压低保费的做法却会直接影响到我们持有44％股权的GEICO，约有10％2的保费收入系来自加州，更具威胁的是若其它州，不管是透过提案或是立法的方式，也跟进采取类似的行动，
If voters insist that auto insurance be priced below cost； it eventually must be sold by government。 Stockholders can subsidize policyholders for a short period； but only taxpayers can subsidize them over the long term。 At most property…casualty panies； socialized auto insurance would be no disaster for shareholders。 Because of the modity characteristics of the industry； most insurers earn mediocre returns and therefore have little or no economic goodwill to lose if they are forced by government to leave the auto insurance business。 But GEICO； because it is a low…cost producer able to earn high returns on equity； has a huge amount of economic goodwill at risk。 In turn； so do we。
若民众坚持汽车保险费的价格一定要低于成本，则最后可能要由政府直接来负责，股东或可暂时支应保户，但只有纳税人可以长久地给予支助，对大部分的产物意外险业者来说，社会化的汽车保险对于其股东不会有太大影响，因为由于这个产业是属于大众产品，保险业者所赚的投资报酬平平，所以若因此被政府强迫退出市场，也不会有太大的商誉损失，但GEICO就不一样了，由于它的成本低，相对地可以获得高报酬，所以可能会有很大的潜在商誉损失，而这当然会连带影响到我们。
At Berkshire； in 1988； our premium volume continued to fall； and in 1989 we will experience a large decrease for a special reason： The contract through which we receive 7％ of the business of Fireman Fund expires on August 31。 At that time； we will return to Fireman Fund the unearned premiums we hold that relate to the contract。 This transfer of funds will show up in our remiums written？account as a negative 85 million or so and will make our third…quarter figures look rather peculiar。 However； the termination of this contract will not have a significant effect on profits。
在1988年Berkshire的保费收入持续减少，到了1989年我们预期保费收入还会大幅下滑，一方面是因为消防人员退休基金即将于八月底到期，届时依合约我们必须将未到期的保费退还，估计总共退回的金额8；500万美元，这将使得我们第三季的数字看起来有点奇怪，当然这对于我们公司本身的获利不会造成太大的影响。
Berkshire underwriting results continued to be excellent in 1988。 Our bined ratio （on a statutory basis and excluding structured settlements and financial reinsurance） was 104。 Reserve development was favorable for the second year in a row； after a string of years in which it was very unsatisfactory。 Details on both underwriting and reserve development appear on pages 36…38。
Berkshire 1988年的承保表现依旧相当不错，我们的综合比率（依照法定基础扣除和解与财务再保）大约在104，损失准备提列在前几年不佳后，连续两年情况还算良好）
Our insurance volume over the next few years is likely to run very low； since business with a reasonable potential for profit will almost certainly be scarce。 So be it。 At Berkshire； we simply will not write policies at rates that carry the expectation of economic loss。 We encounter enough troubles when we expect a gain。
