e8东的信 _作者: 美 沃伦·巴菲特-第35章
按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
s when we expect a gain。
我们的保费收入规模预计在未来几年内都会维持在相当低的水平，因为有利可图的生意实在是少之又少，随它去，在Berkshire我们不可能在知道明明会亏钱的情况下，还去硬接生意，光是接看起来有赚头的生意，就让我们的麻烦够多了。
Despite … or perhaps because of … low volume； our profit picture during the next few years is apt to be considerably brighter than the industry。 We are sure to have an exceptional amount of float pared to premium volume； and that augurs well for profits。 In 1989 and 1990 we expect our float/premiums ratio to be at least three times that of the typical property/casualty pany。 Mike Goldberg； with special help from Ajit Jain； Dinos Iordanou； and the National Indemnity managerial team； has positioned us well in that respect。
尽管（也或许正因为如此）我们的保单量少，可以预期的我们的获利情况在未来几年内也会比同业来的出色，相较于保单量我们有高比例的浮存金，通常这代表着获利，在1989与1990这两年内，我们的浮存金/保费收入比例至少会是同业水准的三倍以上，Mike Goldberg在Ajit Jain等人的协助下，加上国家产险的经营团队使我们站在相当有利的位置。
At some point … we don know when … we will be deluged with insurance business。 The cause will probably be some major physical or financial catastrophe。 But we could also experience an explosion in business； as we did in 1985； because large and increasing underwriting losses at other panies coincide with their recognition that they are far underreserved。 in the meantime； we will retain our talented professionals； protect our capital； and try not to make major mistakes。
有一点我们不知道什么时候，我们会被保险事业拖垮，有可能会是一些重大的天然或是经济上的意外，但我们也有可能会遇到像1985年一样爆炸性的成长，因为当其它同业因长期杀价抢单，一夕之间损失突然爆发，才发现损失提列准备远远不足，在那种情况下，我们一定会稳固好我们的专业人员与资本并尽量避免犯下重大的错误。
Marketable Securities
有价证券投资
In selecting marketable securities for our insurance panies； we can choose among five major categories： （1） long…term mon stock investments； （2） medium…term fixed…ine securities； （3） long…term fixed…ine securities； （4） short…term cash equivalents； and （5） short…term arbitrage mitments。
在为我们的保险事业选择有价证券投资之时，我们主要有五种选择（1）长期股票投资（2）长期固定收益债券（3）中期固定收益债券（4）短期约当现金（5）短期套利交易
We have no particular bias when it es to choosing from these categories。 We just continuously search among them for the highest after…tax returns as measured by mathematical expectation；？limiting ourselves always to investment alternatives we think we understand。 Our criteria have nothing to do with maximizing immediately reportable earnings； our goal； rather； is to maximize eventual net worth。
对于这五种类型的交易，我们没有特别的偏好，我们只是持续不断地寻找最高的税后报酬预计的数学期望值，且仅限于我们认为了解熟悉的投资，我们无意让与短期的帐面盈余好看，我们的目标是让长期的净值极大化。
Below we list our mon stock holdings having a value over 100 million； not including arbitrage mitments； which will be discussed later。 A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100％。
下表是我们超过一亿美元以上的普通股投资，（不包含套利交易，这部份我们后面会再谈），一部份的投资系属于Berkshire关系企业所持有
Shares pany Cost Market
…
（000s omitted）
3；000；000 Capital Cities/ABC； Inc。 。。。。。。。。。。。。。。 517；500 1；086；750
14；172；500 The Coca…Cola pany 。。。。。。。。。。。 592；540 632；448
2；400；000 Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation Preferred* 。。。。。。。。。。。。 71；729 121；200
6；850；000 GEICO Corporation 。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。 45；713 849；400
1；727；765 The Washington Post pany 。。。 9；731 364；126
*Although nominally a preferred stock； this security is financially equivalent to a mon stock。
Our permanent holdings … Capital Cities/ABC； Inc。； GEICO Corporation； and The Washington Post pany … remain unchanged。 Also unchanged is our unqualified admiration of their managements： Tom Murphy and Dan Burke at Cap Cities； Bill Snyder and Lou Simpson at GEICO； and Kay Graham and Dick Simmons at The Washington Post。 Charlie and I appreciate enormously the talent and integrity these managers bring to their businesses。
我们永久的持股…资本城/ABC、GEICO汽车保险与华盛顿邮报依旧不变，同样不变的是我们对于这些管理阶层无条件的敬仰，不管是资本城/ABC的Tom Murphy 与 Dan Burke、GEICO汽车保险的Bill Snyder 与Lou Simpson，还有华盛顿邮报的Kay Graham与 Dick Simmons，查理跟我对于他们所展现的才能与品格同感敬佩。
Their performance； which we have observed at close range； contrasts vividly with that of many CEOs； which we have fortunately observed from a safe distance。 Sometimes these CEOs clearly do not belong in their jobs； their positions； nevertheless； are usually secure。 The supreme irony of business management is that it is far easier for an inadequate CEO to keep his job than it is for an inadequate subordinate。
他们的表现，就我们最近距离的观察，与许多公司的CEO截然不同，所幸我们能与后者保持适当的距离，因为有时这些CEO实在是不适任，但却总是能够坐稳其宝座，企业管理最讽刺的就是不适任的老板要比不适任的部属更容易保住其位置。
If a secretary； say； is hired for a job that requires typing ability of at least 80 words a minute and turns out to be capable of only 50 words a minute； she will lose her job in no time。 There is a logical standard for this job； performance is easily measured； and if you can make the grade； youe out。 Similarly； if new sales people fail to generate sufficient business quickly enough； they will be let go。 Excuses will not be accepted as a substitute for orders。
假设一位秘书在应征时被要求一分钟要能够打80个字，但录取之后被发现一分钟只能打50个字，很快地她就可能会被炒鱿鱼，因为有一个相当客观的标准在那里，其表现如何很容易可以衡量的出来；同样的，一个新进的业务，若是不能马上创造足够业绩，可能立刻就要走路，为了维持纪律，很难允许有例外情形发生。
However； a CEO who doesn perform is frequently carried indefinitely。 One reason is that performance standards for his job seldom exist。 When they do； they are often fuzzy or they may be waived or explained away； even when the performance shortfalls are major and repeated。 At too many panies； the boss shoots the arrow of managerial performance and then hastily paints the bullseye around the spot where it lands。
但是一个CEO表现不好，却可以无限期的撑下去，一个原因就是根本没有一套可以衡量其表现的标准存在，就算真的有，也是写的很模糊，或是含混解释过去，即便是错误与过失一再发生也是如此，有太多的公司是等老板射箭出去后，再到墙上把准心描上去。
Another important； but seldom recognized； distinctionbetween the boss and the foot soldier is that the CEO has no immediate superior whose performance is itself getting measured。 The sales manager who retains a bunch of lemons in his sales force will soon be in hot water himself。 It is in his immediate self…interest to promptly weed out his hiring mistakes。 Otherwise； he himself may be weeded out。 An office manager who has hired inept secretaries faces the same imperative。
另外一个很重要但却很少被提起老板与员工之间的差别是老板本身没有一个直接可以衡量判断其表现的上司，业务经理不可能让一颗老鼠屎一直留在他那一锅粥之内，他一定会很快地把它给挑出来，否则可能连他自己都会有问题，同样的一个老板要是请到一位无能的秘书，也会有相同的动作。
But the CEOboss is a Board of Directors that seldom measures itself and is infrequently held to account for substandard corporate performance。 If the Board makes a mistake in hiring； and perpetuates that mistake； so what？ Even if the pany is taken over because of the mistake； the deal will probably bestow substantial benefits on the outgoing Board members。 （The bigger they are； the softer they fall。）
但CEO的上司也就是董事会却很少检视其绩效，并为企业表现不佳负责，就算董事会选错了人，而且这个错误还持续存在又怎样？即使因为这样使得公司被接收，通常交易也会确保被逐出的董事会成员有丰厚的利益（且通常公司越大，甜头越多）
Finally； relations between the Board and the CEO are expected to be congenial。 At board meetings； criticism of the CEO performance is often viewed as the social equivalent of belching。 No such inhibitions restrain the office manager from critically evaluating the substandard typist。
最后董事会与CEO之间的关系应该是要能够意气相投，在董事会议当中，对于CEO表现的批评就好象是在社交场合中打嗝一样不自然，但却没有一位经理人会被禁止不准严格地审核打字员的绩效。
These points should not be interpreted as a blanket condemnation of CEOs or Boards of Directors： Most are able and hard…working； and a number are truly outstanding。 But the management failings that Charlie and I have seen make us thankful that we are linked with the managers of our three permanent holdings。 They love their businesses； they think like owners； and they exude integrity and ability。
以上几点不是要一杆子打翻一条船，大部分的CEO或是董事会都相当努力、能干，有一小部份更是特别的杰出，但查理跟我在看过很多失败的例子之后，更加对于我们能够与前面三家公司优秀的经理人共事感到非常幸运，他们热爱他们的事业，想法跟老板一致，且散发出才气与品格。
In 1988 we made major purchases of Federal Home Loan Mortgage Pfd。 （reddie Mac？ and Coca Cola。 We expect to hold these securities for a long time。 In fact； when we own portions of outstanding businesses with outstanding managements； our favorite holding period is forever。 We are just the opposite of those who hurry to sell and book profits when panies perform well but who tenaciously hang on to businesses that disappoint。 Peter Lynch aptly likens such behavior to cutting the flowers and watering the weeds。 Our holdings of Freddie Mac are the maximum allowed by law； and are extensively described by Charlie in his letter。 In our consolidated balance sheet these shares are carried at cost rather than market； since they are owned by Mutual Savings and Loan； a non…insurance subsidiary。
1988年我们做出两项重大的决定，大笔买进联邦家庭贷款抵押公司（Freddie Mac）与可口可乐，我们打算要持有这些股票很长的一段期间，事实上当我们发现我们持有兼具杰出企业与杰出经理人的股权时，我们最长的投资期间是永久，我们跟那些急着想要卖出表现不错的股票以实现获利却顽固地不肯出脱那些绩效差的股份的那群人完全相反。彼得林区生动地将这种行为解释成砍除花朵来当作野草的肥料，我们持有Freddie Mac的股份比例是法令规定的上限，这部份查理在后面会详加为各位说明，因为他们是属于共同储贷…我们一家非保险的子公司所投资，所以在我们的合并资产负债表当中，这些持股将以成本而非市价列示。
We continue to concentrate our investments in a very few panies that we try to understand well。 There are only a handful of businesses about which we have strong long…term convictions。 Therefore； when we find such a business； we want to participate in a meaningful way。 We agree with Mae West： too much of a good thing can be wonderful。？
我们持续将投资集中在少数我们能够了解的公司之上，只有少部份是我们想要长期投入的，因为当我们好不容易找到这样的公司时，我们会想要达到一定的参与程度，我们同意Mae West的看法，好东西当然是多多益善。
We reduced our holdings of medium…term tax…exempt bonds by about 100 million last year。 All of the bonds sold were acquired after August 7； 1986。 When such bonds are held by property…casualty insurance panies； 15％ of the ax…exempt？ interest earned is subject to tax。
去年我们减少在中期免税债券约一亿美元的投资，所有卖出的债券都是在1986年之后才取得的，当这些债券由产险公司所持有的时候，其中15％的利息收入是要课税的。
The 800 million position we still hold consists almost entirely of bonds randfathered？under the Tax Refo
