e8东的信 _作者: 美 沃伦·巴菲特-第37章
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ey have not needed special talents to do well； the trick； a la Peter Sellers in the movie； has simply been eing There。？In Wall Street the old proverb has been reworded： give a man a fish and you feed him for a day。 Teach him how to arbitrage and you feed him forever。？（If； however； he studied at the Ivan Boesky School of Arbitrage； it may be a state institution that supplies his meals。）
近几年来，大部分的套利操作都牵涉到购并案，不管是友善的或是敌意的皆然，在购并案狂热之时，几乎感觉不到托拉斯法的存在，投标的竞价履创天价，在当时套利客大行其道，在这行不需要太多的才能，唯一的技巧就像是Peter Sellers的电影那样，只要轧一脚就行，华尔街有一句经过改编的俗话，给一个人一条鱼，你只能养活他一餐，教他如何套利，却可以养活他一辈子，（当然要是他到学校学习套利，可能就要靠州政府过活了）
To evaluate arbitrage situations you must answer four questions： （1） How likely is it that the promised event will indeed occur？ （2） How long will your money be tied up？ （3） What chance is there that something still better will transpire … a peting takeover bid； for example？ and （4） What will happen if the event does not take place because of anti…trust action； financing glitches； etc。？
在评估套利活动时，你必须要能回答四个问题（1）已公布的事件有多少可能性确实会发生？（2）你的资金总计要投入多久？（3）有多少可能更好的结果会发生，例如购并竞价提高（4）因为反托拉斯或是财务意外状况发生导致购并案触礁的机率有多高？
Arcata Corp。； one of our more serendipitous arbitrage experiences； illustrates the twists and turns of the business。 On September 28； 1981 the directors of Arcata agreed in principle to sell the pany to Kohlberg； Kravis； Roberts & Co。 （KKR）； then and now a major leveraged…buy out firm。 Arcata was in the printing and forest products businesses and had one other thing going for it： In 1978 the U。S。 Government had taken title to 10；700 acres of Arcata timber； primarily old…growth redwood； to expand Redwood National Park。 The government had paid 97。9 million； in several installments； for this acreage； a sum Arcata was contesting as grossly inadequate。 The parties also disputed the interest rate that should apply to the period between the taking of the property and final payment for it。 The enabling legislation stipulated 6％ simple interest； Arcata argued for a much higher and pounded rate。
Arcata公司我们最曲折离奇的购并经验，说明了企业的曲曲折折，1981年9月28日该公司的董事同意将公司卖给KKR公司，一家在当时同时也是现在最大的融资买断公司，Arcata所从事的是印刷与森林产品，但其中值得注意的是在1978年美国政府决定征收该公司所有10；700公顷的红木林，以扩增国家公园的范围，为此政府决定分期支付该公司总金额9；790万美元的征收款，但Arcata公司却认为金额太少，同时双方也对适用的利率也争议，Arcata极力争取更高的赔偿金与适用的利率。
Buying a pany with a highly…speculative； large…sized claim in litigation creates a negotiating problem； whether the claim is on behalf of or against the pany。 To solve this problem； KKR offered 37。00 per Arcata share plus two…thirds of any additional amounts paid by the government for the redwood lands。
买下一家具有高度争议的公司将会让公司在谈判过程中，会增加许多的难度，不管诉讼案件是不利或是有利于公司皆然，为了化解这个难题，KKR决定支付Arcata每股37美元再加上政府额外赔偿款的三分之二，作为购并的条件。
Appraising this arbitrage opportunity； we had to ask ourselves whether KKR would consummate the transaction since； among other things； its offer was contingent upon its obtainingatisfactory financing。？A clause of this kind is always dangerous for the seller： It offers an easy exit for a suitor whose ardor fades between proposal and marriage。 However； we were not particularly worried about this possibility because KKR past record for closing had been good。
在评估过这项投资机会之后，我们自问KKR能否真正完成这项交易的关键在于他们是否能够顺利取得融资，这对卖方来说永远是风险最高的一项条款，追求者在提出求婚到正式结婚的这段期间，要落跑是很容易的一件事，不过在这个案子我们却不太担心，原因在于KKR过去的记录还算不错。
We also had to ask ourselves what would happen if the KKR deal did fall through； and here we also felt reasonably fortable： Arcata management and directors had been shopping the pany for some time and were clearly determined to sell。 If KKR went away； Arcata would likely find another buyer； though of course； the price might be lower。
我们还必须扪心自问若是KKR真的失败会如何，在这点我们觉得还好，Arcata的董事会与经营阶层已经在外兜售好一段时间了，显示该公司却有决心要出售，如果KKR跑掉，Arcata一定还会再找新的买主，当然届时的价格可能会差一点。
Finally； we had to ask ourselves what the redwood claim might be worth。 Your Chairman； who can tell an elm from an oak； had no trouble with that one： He coolly evaluated the claim at somewhere between zero and a whole lot。
最后我们还必须问自己，那块红木林的价值到底有多少？坦白说我虽然个人连榆树跟橡木都分不出来，但对于这个问题我的处理方式倒很简单，反正就是介于零到一大笔钱之间就对了。
We started buying Arcata stock； then around 33。50； on September 30 and in eight weeks purchased about 400；000 shares； or 5％ of the pany。 The initial announcement said that the 37。00 would be paid in January； 1982。 Therefore； if everything had gone perfectly； we would have achieved an annual rate of return of about 40％ … not counting the redwood claim； which would have been frosting。
后来我们开始从九月开始以每股33。5元买进Arcata股票，八个礼拜之内总共买进40万股，约占该公司5％的股权，隔年一月第一次对外公布股东每股可以拿到37元，换算年投资报酬约为40％，这还不包含可以的红木林赔偿损失。
All did not go perfectly。 In December it was announced that the closing would be delayed a bit。 Nevertheless； a definitive agreement was signed on January 4。 Encouraged； we raised our stake； buying at around 38。00 per share and increasing our holdings to 655；000 shares； or over 7％ of the pany。 Our willingness to pay up … even though the closing had been postponed … reflected our leaning toward whole lot？rather than ero？for the redwoods。
然而过程中不太顺利，到了12月宣布交易可能会延后，尽管如果1月铁定会签约，受到这项鼓励，我们决定再加码以38元每股至65。5万股，约7％的股权，我们的努力终于获得回报，虽然有点拖延，但结果却相当令人满意。
Then； on February 25 the lenders said they were taking aecond look？at financing terms ？in view of the severely depressed housing industry and its impact on Arcata outlook。？ The stockholders？meeting was postponed again； to April。 An Arcata spokesman said he id not think the fate of the acquisition itself was imperiled。？When arbitrageurs hear such reassurances； their minds flash to the old saying： he lied like a finance minister on the eve of devaluation。？
接着在2月25日融资银行说有鉴于房地产景气不佳，连带对Arcata的前景可能有所疑虑，故有关融资条件可能还要再谈，股东临时会也因此再度延期到四月举行，同时Arcata公司发言人表示他不认为购并案已触礁，但是当套利客听到这种重申时，脑中便闪过一句老话︰他说谎的方式就好象是即将面临汇率崩盘的财政部长一样。
On March 12 KKR said its earlier deal wouldn work； first cutting its offer to 33。50； then two days later raising it to 35。00。 On March 15； however； the directors turned this bid down and accepted another group offer of 37。50 plus one…half of any redwood recovery。 The shareholders okayed the deal； and the 37。50 was paid on June 4。
3月12日KKR宣布先前的约定无效，并将报价砍至33。5美元一股，两天后再调高至35美元，然而到了3月15日董事会拒绝了这项提议，并接受另一家集团37。5美元外加红木林一半的收益，股东会迅速通过这项交易，并于6月4日收到现金。
We received 24。6 million versus our cost of 22。9 million； our average holding period was close to six months。 Considering the trouble this transaction encountered； our 15％ annual rate of return excluding any value for the redwood claim … was more than satisfactory。
总计我们花了近六个月的时间，投资2；290万美元，最后收回2；460万美元，但若是加计这项交易中间所经历的风风雨雨，则15％的年报酬率（未包含红木林潜在收益）还算令人满意。
But the best was yet to e。 The trial judge appointed two missions； one to look at the timbervalue； the other to consider the interest rate questions。 In January 1987； the first mission said the redwoods were worth 275。7 million and the second mission remended a pounded； blended rate of return working out to about 14％。
不过好戏还在后头，承审法院指派两个委员会来解决这项纷争，一个负责认定红木林的价值，一个则负责应该适用的利率，隔年1月委员会认定红木林的价值为2。75亿美元，适用的复利率应为14％。
In August 1987 the judge upheld these conclusions； which meant a net amount of about 600 million would be due Arcata。 The government then appealed。 In 1988； though； before this appeal was heard； the claim was settled for 519 million。 Consequently； we received an additional 29。48 per share； or about 19。3 million。 We will get another 800；000 or so in 1989。
到了八月法官裁定这项决议，这代表政府需要再支付高达6亿美元的赔偿金，联邦政府立刻提出上诉，而就在上诉即将宣判结果时，双方以5。19亿美元达成和解，因此我们又额外收到1；930万美元，相当于每股29。48美元的大红包，之后还可以再拿到80万美元的进帐。
Berkshire arbitrage activities differ from those of many arbitrageurs。 First； we participate in only a few； and usually very large； transactions each year。 Most practitioners buy into a great many deals perhaps 50 or more per year。 With that many irons in the fire； they must spend most of their time monitoring both the progress of deals and the market movements of the related stocks。 This is not how Charlie nor I wish to spend our lives。 （What the sense in getting rich just to stare at a ticker tape all day？）
Berkshire的套利活动与其它套利客有些不同，首先相较于一般套利客一年从事好几十个案子，每年我们只参与少数通常是大型的交易案，有这么多锅子同时在煮，他们必须花很多时间在监控交易的进度与相关股票的股价变动，这并不是查理跟我想要过的生活方式，（为了致富，整天盯着计算机屏幕到底有何意义？）
Because we diversify so little； one particularly profitable or unprofitable transaction will affect our yearly result from arbitrage far more than it will the typical arbitrage operation。 So far； Berkshire has not had a really bad experience。 But we will … and when it happens we will report the gory details to you。
也因为我们只专注在少数几个案子，所以一个特别好或是特别差的案子，可能会大大地影响到我们一整年的套利成绩，所幸到目前为止，Berkshire还没有遇到什么惨痛的经验，一旦发生我一定会一五一十的向各位报告。
The other way we differ from some arbitrage operations is that we participate only in transactions that have been publicly announced。 We do not trade on rumors or try to guess takeover candidates。 We just read the newspapers； think about a few of the big propositions； and go by our own sense of probabilities。
另有一点不同的是我们只参与已经公开对外宣布的案子，我们不会仅靠着谣言或是去预测可能被购并的对象，我们只看报纸，思考几项关键因素，并依照我们判断的可能性做决定。
At yearend； our only major arbitrage position was 3；342；000 shares of RJR Nabisco with a cost of 281。8 million and a market value of 304。5 million。 In January we increased our holdings to roughly four million shares and in February we eliminated our position。 About three million shares were accepted when we tendered our holdings to KKR； which acquired RJR； and the returned shares were promptly sold in the market。 Our pre…tax profit was a better…than…expected 64 million。
到了年底，我们剩下唯一的套利投资是334。2万股的RJR Nabisco，投资成本2。82亿美元，目前市价3。04亿美元，今年一月我们增加持股到400万股，接着在二月全部出清。有300万股是KKR决定购
