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第44章

e8东的信 _作者: 美 沃伦·巴菲特-第44章

小说: e8东的信 _作者: 美 沃伦·巴菲特 字数: 每页3500字

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ze是多少,不管你跟他们提到全美那一个地区,他们都相当清楚当地的市场与竞争对手的状况。
Though we purchased Fechheimer four years ago; Charlie and I have never visited any of its plants or the home office in Cincinnati。 We're much like the lonesome Maytag repairman: The Heldman managerial product is so good that a service call is never needed。
虽然我们是在四年之前买下费区海默的,但查理跟我却从来没有去参观过他们的工厂或是位在辛辛那提的总部,我们有点像是无聊的Maytag维修工人,由Heldman所管理的东西因为太好根本不会坏,以致于我们从来就没有接过叫修的电话。
o Ralph Schey continues to do a superb job in managing our largest group … World Book; Kirby; and the Scott Fetzer Manufacturing panies。 Aggregate earnings of these businesses have increased every year since our purchase and returns on invested capital continue to be exceptional。 Ralph is running an enterprise large enough; were it standing alone; to be on the Fortune 500。 And he's running it in a fashion that would put him high in the top decile; measured by return on equity。
Ralph Schey还是继续发挥他的长才,为我们管理…世界百科全书、寇比吸尘器与史考特飞兹所组成的大集团,自从我们买下这些企业以来,他们的总盈余年年都成长,投资的报酬相当可观,Ralph所领导的企业集团真是够大,单单他旗下事业加总起来就足以名列财星五百大,而若以投资报酬的角度来看,大概可以让他排在前十名。
For some years; World Book has operated out of a single location in Chicago's Merchandise Mart。 Anticipating the imminent expiration of its lease; the business is now decentralizing into four locations。 The expenses of this transition are significant; nevertheless profits in 1989 held up well。 It will be another year before costs of the move are fully behind us。
有好几年,世界百科全书只在芝加哥的一个商业广场集中营运,有鉴于租约即将到期,未来它将分散成四个据点,搬迁的费用相当的庞大,不过尽管如此1989年的获利还是会增加,这项搬迁的费用要经过好几年的时间才会慢慢地消化吸收掉。
Kirby's business was particularly strong last year; featuring large gains in export sales。 International business has more than doubled in the last two years and quintupled in the past four; its share of unit sales has risen from 5% to 20%。 Our largest capital expenditures in 1989 were at Kirby; in preparation for a major model change in 1990。
寇比的生意去年特别的旺,尤其是在外销方面的成长惊人,近两年来的业绩已成长了一倍,累计四年来成长了四倍,市场占有率从5%增加到20%,我们1989年最大的资本支出就花在寇比身上,预计在1990年会有一次大改款。
Ralph's operations contribute about 40% of the total earnings of the non…insurance group whose results are shown on page 49。 When we bought Scott Fetzer at the start of 1986; our acquisition of Ralph as a manager was fully as important as our acquisition of the businesses。 In addition to generating extraordinary earnings; Ralph also manages capital extremely well。 These abilities have produced funds for Berkshire that; in turn; have allowed us to make many other profitable mitments。
Ralph的事业部门所贡献的盈余大概占非保险部门的四成左右,当我们在1986年初买下史考特飞兹时,能将Ralph一并挖过来当经理人,跟我们当初买下这家公司一样地重要,除了贡献可观的盈余之外,Ralph管理资金也是一把罩。这些能力使得Berkshire能够获得源源不绝的资金,让我们回头可以再做更多更好的投资。
And that pletes our answer to the 1927 Yankees。
以上就是我们的职棒先发阵容!
Insurance Operations
保险事业营运
Shown below is an updated version of our usual table presenting key figures for the property…casualty insurance industry:
下表是产物意外险业的几项重要的指数
Statutory 
Yearly Change bined Ratio Yearly Change Inflation Rate in Premiums After Policyholder in Incurred Measured by Written (%) Dividends Losses (%) GNP Deflator (%) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 (Est。)
3。8 3。7 5。0 8。5 22。1 22。2 9。4 4。4 2。1
106。0 109。6 112。0 118。0 116。3 108。0 104。6 105。4 110。4
6。5 8。4 6。8 16。9 16。1 13。5 7。8 5。5 8。7
9。6 6。5 3。8 3。8 3。0 2。6 3。1 3。3 4。2

Source: A。M。 Best Co。
The bined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) pared to revenue from premiums: A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit; and one above 100 indicates a loss。 When the investment ine that an insurer earns from holding policyholders' funds (〃the float〃) is taken into account; a bined ratio in the 107…111 range typically produces an overall breakeven result; exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders。
综合比率代表保险的总成本(理赔损失加上费用)占保费收入的比例,比率在100以下代表有承保的损失,在100以上则代表有承保的获利综合比率代表的是保险的总成本(损失加上费用)占保费收入的比率,100以下代表会有承销利益,100以上代表会有承销损失,若把持有保费收入浮存金(扣除股东权益部份所产生的盈余)所产生的投资收益列入考量,损益两平的范围大概是在107…111之间。
For the reasons laid out in previous reports; we expect the industry's incurred losses to grow by about 10% annually; even in years when general inflation runs considerably lower。 (Actually; over the last 25 years; incurred losses have grown at a still faster rate; 11%。) If premium growth meanwhile materially lags that 10% rate; underwriting losses will mount; though the industry's tendency to underreserve when business turns bad may obscure their size for a time。 
基于前几次年报所说明的理由,即使是通货膨胀在这几年来相对温和,我们预期保险业每年损失增加的比率约在10%左右,若是保费收入成长没有到达10%以上,损失一定会增加,(事实上过去25年以来,理赔损失系以11%的速度在成长),虽然保险公司在景气不好时,会习惯性地将损失暂时隐藏起来。
Last year we said the climb in the bined ratio was 〃almost certain to continue … and probably will accelerate … for at least two more years。〃 This year we will not predict acceleration; but otherwise must repeat last year's forecast。 Premium growth is running far below the 10% required annually。 Remember also that a 10% rate would only stabilize the bined ratio; not bring it down。
去年我们曾说若综合比率八成会继续上升,甚至在未来两年内还会加速,今年我们不再做加速的预期,不然的话还会再重复去年的预测,保费收入成长的幅度远低于每年最低10%成长的要求,而且大家要记住,10%只表示能抑止综合比率上升的情况,却不能使它下降。
The increase in the bined ratio in 1989 was a little more than we had expected because catastrophes (led by Hurricane Hugo) were unusually severe。 These abnormalities probably accounted for about two points of the increase。 If 1990 is more of a 〃normal〃 year; the bined ratio should rise only minimally from the catastrophe…swollen base of 1989。 In 1991; though; the ratio is apt to climb by a greater degree。
1989年的综合比率增加的幅度略高于我们的预期,原因在于意外灾害(主要是Hugo飓风)特别严重,这部份造成的影响大约占了2个百分点,假若1990年能够回到正常情况,相较于1989年略微膨胀的基础,综合比率可能只会增加一点点,然后到了1991年可能又会提高增加的幅度。
mentators frequently discuss the 〃underwriting cycle〃 and speculate about its next turn。 If that term is used to connote rhythmic qualities; it is in our view a misnomer that leads to faulty thinking about the industry's fundamental economics。
产业评论家常常会讨论到承保循环并预测它下一次反转的时点,若那个名词是用来暗示有节奏性的本质,则我们认为那他们就有点张冠李戴的把这个产业情况搞错了。
The term was appropriate some decades ago when the industry and regulators cooperated to conduct the business in cartel fashion。 At that time; the bined ratio fluctuated rhythmically for two reasons; both related to lags。 First; data from the past were analyzed and then used to set new 〃corrected〃 rates; which were subsequently put into effect by virtually all insurers。 Second; the fact that almost all policies were then issued for a one…to three…year term … which meant that it took a considerable time for mispriced policies to expire … delayed the impact of new rates on revenues。 These two lagged responses made bined ratios behave much like alternating current。 Meanwhile; the absence of significant price petition guaranteed that industry profits; averaged out over the cycle; would be satisfactory。
这个名词在几十年前当产业界与政府单位通力合作维持一个类似卡特尔组织时或许还适用,在那个年代,综合比率只因两个原因上下变动,两者都具有递延性,第一是过去的信息会被分析然而据以订定新的费率,一体适用于所有的保险业者之上;第二所有的保单通常是一次以三年为期,这代表着一张有问题的保单通常要花三年才能解决,所以新费率的实施影响有其递延性,这两个因素使得综合比率的变化有脉络可循,同时没有价格的竞争通常就保证可以有稳定的获利,意味着整个循环下来可以获致满意的报酬。
The cartel period is long gone。 Now the industry has hundreds of participants selling a modity…like product at independently…established prices。 Such a configuration … whether the product being sold is steel or insurance policies … is certain to cause subnormal profitability in all circumstances but one: a shortage of usable capacity。 Just how often these periods occur and how long they last determines the average profitability of the industry in question。
不过卡特尔的年代早已过去,现在的产业有几百家公司在销售同一种商品,价格各自独立,在这种情况下,不管所卖的商品是钢铁或是保单,除了产能短缺的情况之外,整体同业的获利一定很可怜,不过却须视所处产业的获利情况来决定短缺情况的发生时点与期间长短。
In most industries; capacity is described in physical terms。 In the insurance world; however; capacity is customarily described in financial terms; that is; it's considered appropriate for a pany to write no more than X dollars of business if it has Y dollars of net worth。 In practice; however; constraints of this sort have proven ineffective。 Regulators; insurance brokers; and customers are all slow to discipline panies that strain their resources。 They also acquiesce when panies grossly overstate their true capital。 Hence; a pany can write a great deal of business with very little capital if it is so inclined。 At bottom; therefore; the amount of industry capacity at any particular moment primarily depends on the mental state of insurance managers。 
在大部分的产业,产能是以具体的事物来呈现,不过在保险的世界里,产能所代表的却是指财务数字,亦即假设一家公司的净值有Y,那么他可以承接的保单大概就只能有X,就实务而言,做这样的限制其实效果相当有限,主管机关、保险掮客与客户对于其节制背后的保险公司的反应都很慢,而且就算真正的资本有被夸大的情况,他们也给予姑息,因此一家资本额不大的保险公司若他们愿意,照样可以接下一大堆保单,因此整个保险业的供给能量,主要还是视保险公司经理人本身的心态而定。
All this understood; it is not very difficult to prognosticate the industry's profits。 Good profits will be realized only when there is a shortage of capacity。 Shortages will occur only when insurers are frightened。 That happens rarely … and most assuredly is not happening now。
在了解内情之后,大家不难预知这个产业未来的获利情况,获利要好只有当供给短缺时才有可能发生,而供给短缺只有当保险业者感到害怕时才有可能发生,而偏偏这种情况又很少见,且可以确定短期之内不会出现。
Some analysts have argued that the more onerous taxes recently imposed on the insurance industry and 1989's catastrophes … Hurricane Hugo and the California earthquake … will cause prices to strengthen significantly。 We disagree。 These adversities have not destroyed the eagerness of insurers to write business at present prices。 Therefore; premium volume won't grow by 10% in 1990; which means the negative underwriting trend will not reverse。
有些分析师认为最近刚实施的保险业新税法过于繁重,同时加上Hugo飓风与加州的地震,将会是保险费率大幅提高,我们并不认同这样的看法,因为这些负面的因

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