e8东的信 _作者: 美 沃伦·巴菲特-第67章
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An economic franchise arises from a product or service that： （1） is needed or desired； （2） is thought by its customers to have no close substitute and； （3） is not subject to price regulation。 The existence of all three conditions will be demonstrated by a pany's ability to regularly price its product or service aggressively and thereby to earn high rates of return on capital。 Moreover； franchises can tolerate mis…management。 Inept managers may diminish a franchise's profitability； but they cannot inflict mortal damage。
藉由特定的产品或服务，一家公司可以成为特许的行业（1）它确有需要或需求（2）被顾客认定为找不到其它类似的替代品（3）不受价格上的管制，一家公司到底有没有具有以上三个特点可能从他是否能积极地为本身所提供的产品与服务订定价格的能力，从而赚取更高的资本报酬率，更重要的特许事业比较能够容忍不当的管理，无能的经理人虽然会降低特许事业的获利能力，但是并不会造成致命的伤害。
In contrast； 〃a business〃 earns exceptional profits only if it is the low…cost operator or if supply of its product or service is tight。 Tightness in supply usually does not last long。 With superior management； a pany may maintain its status as a low…cost operator for a much longer time； but even then unceasingly faces the possibility of petitive attack。 And a business； unlike a franchise； can be killed by poor management。
相对的，一般事业想要获致高报酬就只有靠着节省成本或是当其所提供的产品或服务供需不均之时，但是这种供给不足的情况通常维持不了多久，倒是透过优良的管理，一家公司却可以长期维持低成本的营运，但即使是如此，还是会面临竞争对手持续不断的攻击，而不像特许事业，一般事业有可能因为管理不善而倒闭。
Until recently； media properties possessed the three characteristics of a franchise and consequently could both price aggressively and be managed loosely。 Now； however； consumers looking for information and entertainment （their primary interest being the latter） enjoy greatly broadened choices as to where to find them。 Unfortunately； demand can't expand in response to this new supply： 500 million American eyeballs and a 24…hour day are all that's available。 The result is that petition has intensified； markets have fragmented； and the media industry has lost some … though far from all … of its franchise strength。
直到最近，媒体产业还拥有特许事业这三项特质，因此还能够订定侵略性的价格并容忍宽松的管理，不过现在的消费大众不断地寻找不同的信息与娱乐来源，也越来越能够接受各种不同的选择，另一方面很不幸的是消费者的需求并不会随着供给的增加而变大，五亿只美国眼睛，一天24小时，就这么多，不可能再增加了。所以结果可想而知竞争会变得更激烈，市场被区隔开，媒体产业因而丧失了部份原有的特许能力。
The industry's weakened franchise has an impact on its value that goes far beyond the immediate effect on earnings。 For an understanding of this phenomenon； let's look at some much over…simplified； but relevant； math。
媒体产业转为弱势，除了让短期盈余获利受到冲击之外，对其本身的价值将有更深远的影响，为了让大家了解这种现象，让我们来看看稍微简化但却颇为相关的数学算式。
A few years ago the conventional wisdom held that a newspaper； television or magazine property would forever increase its earnings at 6％ or so annually and would do so without the employment of additional capital； for the reason that depreciation charges would roughly match capital expenditures and working capital requirements would be minor。 Therefore； reported earnings （before amortization of intangibles） were also freely…distributable earnings； which meant that ownership of a media property could be construed as akin to owning a perpetual annuity set to grow at 6％ a year。 Say； next； that a discount rate of 10％ was used to determine the present value of that earnings stream。 One could then calculate that it was appropriate to pay a whopping 25 million for a property with current after…tax earnings of 1 million。 （This after…tax multiplier of 25 translates to a multiplier on pre…tax earnings of about 16。）
几年以来一般人都认为新闻、电视或是杂志产业的获利能力，可以永无止尽地以每年6％左右的比率成长，而且可以完全不必依靠额外的资金，也因此每年的折旧费用应该会与资本支出相当，而由于所需的营运资金也相当小，所以帐列盈余 （在扣除无形资产摊销前）几乎等于可以自由分配运用的盈余，也就是说拥有一家媒体事业，每年几乎可以有6％稳定增加的纯现金流入，同时若我们以10％的折现率来计算现值的话，等于是一次2；500万的投资，每年可以贡献100万美元的税后净利贡献（亦即约为25倍的税后本益比，若换成税前盈余本益比则约为16左右）。
Now change the assumption and posit that the 1 million represents 〃normal earning power〃 and that earnings will bob around this figure cyclically。 A 〃bob…around〃 pattern is indeed the lot of most businesses； whose ine stream grows only if their owners are willing to mit more capital （usually in the form of retained earnings）。 Under our revised assumption； 1 million of earnings； discounted by the same 10％； translates to a 10 million valuation。 Thus a seemingly modest shift in assumptions reduces the property's valuation to 10 times after…tax earnings （or about 6 1/2 times pre…tax earnings）。
现在假设条件改变，这家公司只拥有普通的获利能力，所以每年100万的获利只能上上下下起伏，这种打摆子的形式就是大部分公司的状况，而公司的获利想要有所成长，老板就必须要投入更多的资金才办得到（通常都是透过保留盈余的方式），经过我们将假设重新做修正，同样以10％加以折现，大概可以达到1；000万美元的价值，结果可以看出，一项看起来不大重要的假设变动却使这家企业的价值大幅减少至10倍税后盈余本益比（或6。5倍税前盈余本益比）。
Dollars are dollars whether they are derived from the operation of media properties or of steel mills。 What in the past caused buyers to value a dollar of earnings from media far higher than a dollar from steel was that the earnings of a media property were expected to constantly grow （without the business requiring much additional capital）； whereas steel earnings clearly fell in the bob…around category。 Now； however； expectations for media have moved toward the bob…around model。 And； as our simplified example illustrates； valuations must change dramatically when expectations are revised。
现金就是现金，不管今天它是靠经营媒体事业或是钢铁工厂得来的都一样，而过去同样是一元的获利，大家之所以看重媒体事业的原因是预期他会继续成长（股东不需要再投入额外的资金），而钢铁业很明显会落入打摆子的那类族群，不过现在大家对于媒体事业的看法也逐渐改为后者，而如我们刚刚所举简单的例子，评价的结果可能因为这样的修正而有很大的改变。
We have a significant investment in media … both through our direct ownership of Buffalo News and our shareholdings in The Washington Post pany and Capital Cities/ABC … and the intrinsic value of this investment has declined materially because of the secular transformation that the industry is experiencing。 （Cyclical factors have also hurt our current look…through earnings； but these factors do not reduce intrinsic value。） However； as our Business Principles on page 2…3 note； one of the rules by which we run Berkshire is that we do not sell businesses … or investee holdings that we have classified as permanent … simply because we see ways to use the money more advantageously elsewhere。 （We did sell certain other media holdings sometime back； but these were relatively small。）
我们在媒体事业有相当大的投资，不管是百分之百拥有的水牛城日报或是在华盛顿邮报与资本城/ABC的股票投资，而这些媒体事业的价值因为前面所提到的产业所面临的形态转变而大幅滑落，（景气循环因素也使得我们现在的透视盈余大受影响，虽然还不致于让实质价值减少），然而就像是我们经营Berkshire的企业原则所揭示的，我们不会只是因为还有其它更有利的资金用途，就随便将已被列为永恒的事业或主要投资出售，（当然之前我们也确实卖了一些媒体股，不过规模相对较小）。
The intrinsic value losses that we have suffered have been moderated because the Buffalo News； under Stan Lipsey's leadership； has done far better than most newspapers and because both Cap Cities and Washington Post are exceptionally well…managed。 In particular； these panies stayed on the sidelines during the late 1980's period in which purchasers of media properties regularly paid irrational prices。 Also； the debt of both Cap Cities and Washington Post is small and roughly offset by cash that they hold。 As a result； the shrinkage in the value of their assets has not been accentuated by the effects of leverage。 Among publicly…owned media panies； our two investees are about the only ones essentially free of debt。 Most of the other panies； through a bination of the aggressive acquisition policies they pursued and shrinking earnings； find themselves with debt equal to five or more times their current net ine。
还好我们的实质价值受到损害的情况尚称轻微，因为水牛城日报在Stan Lipsey的领导之下，表现远比其它报纸同业要来的优秀，另一方面资本城与华盛顿邮报的经营也都很上轨道，特别是在1980年代许多媒体公司以高价大举并购同业时，我们的投资事业都只是做壁上观，而资本城与华盛顿邮报两家公司的负债也都很少，甚至于手上的现金就足以清偿所有的债务，因此公司资产的缩水并没有因为杠杆而扩大，所以现在在所有主要的媒体事业当中，大概就只有我们投资的这两家公司可以免于债务所苦，而早期那些透过大量购并的同业，除了盈余大幅缩水之外，还同时背负着至少相当于年度获利能力五倍以上的负债。
The strong balance sheets and strong managements of Cap Cities and Washington Post leave us more fortable with these investments than we would be with holdings in any other media panies。 Moreover； most media properties continue to have far better economic characteristics than those possessed by the average American business。 But gone are the days of bullet…proof franchises and cornucopian economics。
总而言之，资本城及华盛顿邮报超强的资产负债表与管理阶层，持有它们的股份使得我们比持有别家公司的股份感到更放心，而且就现阶段而言，媒体事业还是比其它一般美国企业要来的有竞争力，只是不再像过去拥有金刚不坏之身与诱人的暴利而已。
Twenty Years in a Candy Store二十年的糖果店
We've just passed a milestone： Twenty years ago； on January 3； 1972； Blue Chip Stamps （then an affiliate of Berkshire and later merged into it） bought control of See's Candy Shops； a West Coast manufacturer and retailer of boxed…chocolates。 The nominal price that the sellers were asking … calculated on the 100％ ownership we ultimately attained … was 40 million。 But the pany had 10 million of excess cash； and therefore the true offering price was 30 million。 Charlie and I； not yet fully appreciative of the value of an economic franchise； looked at the pany's mere 7 million of tangible net worth and said 25 million was as high as we would go （and we meant it）。 Fortunately； the sellers accepted our offer。
我们刚刚跨过历史性的一页，二十年前也就是1972年1月3日，蓝筹邮票公司（原为Berkshire的分支机构，后来并入Berkshire），买下喜斯糖果…西岸的一家盒装巧克力制造与销售厂商，当时卖方所提的报价，以最后取得的100％股权换算约为4；000万美元，但当时光是公司帐上就有1；000万美元的现金，所以认真算起来真正出的资金只有3；000万美金，不过当时查理跟我还不是那么了解一家特许事业所拥有的真正价值，所以在看过帐面净值只有700万美元的报表之后，竟向对方表示2；500万是我们可以出的最高上限（当时我们确实是这样子认为），很幸运的是卖方接受了我们的报价。
The sales of trading stamps by Blue Chip thereafter declined from 102。5 million in 1972 to 1。2 million in 1991。 But See's candy sales in the same period increased from 29 million to 196 million。 Moreover； profits at See's grew even faster than sales； from 4。2 million pre…tax in 1972 to 42。4 million last year。
之后蓝筹邮票公司的邮票买卖收入从1972年的1亿美元下滑到1991年的1；200万美元，�
