e8东的信 _作者: 美 沃伦·巴菲特-第82章
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很多股东会，但从来没有别的公司的股东像Berkshire的股东一样由高智能水准与经营者荣枯与共的股东组合。
An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting。 With the admission card； we will enclose information about parking facilities located near the Orpheum。 If you are driving； e a little early。 Nearby lots fill up quickly and you may have to walk a few blocks。
后面附有股东会开会投票的相关资料，跟各位解释如何拿到入场所许的识别证，由于开会当天会场不好停车，如果你开车过来，记得早一点到，否则附近的车位很快就会停满，你可能就必须要停远一点，再走路过来。
As usual； we will have buses to take you to Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borsheim's after the meeting and to take you from there to downtown hotels or the airport later。 I hope that you will allow plenty of time to fully explore the attractions of both stores。 Those of you arriving early can visit the Furniture Mart any day of the week； it is open from 10 a。m。 to 5：30 p。m。 on Saturdays and from noon to 5：30 p。m。 on Sundays。 While there； stop at the See's Candy Cart and find out for yourself why Charlie and I are a good bit wider than we were back in 1972 when we bought See's。
一如往年，会后我们备有巴士带大家到内布拉斯加家具店与波仙珠宝店或是到饭店与机场，我希望大家能有多一点的时间好好探索这两家店的奥妙，当然早几天到的股东也可利用假日逛逛家具店，星期六从早上10点到下午5点30分，星期日则从中午开到下午5点30分，到那里时记得到喜斯糖果摊逛逛，你就知道为何我跟查理在1972年买下喜斯之后，腰围会有如此大的变化了。
Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday but will be open for shareholders and their guests from noon to 6 p。m。 on Sunday； April 25。 Charlie and I will be in attendance； sporting our jeweler's loupes； and ready to give advice about gems to anyone foolish enough to listen。 Also available will be plenty of Cherry Cokes； See's candies； and other lesser goodies。 I hope you will join us。
波仙星期天通常不开门营业，但在股东会期间特别为股东与来宾开放，4月25日星期天从中午开到下午6点，当天查理跟我都会带着放大镜出席，预备提供任何人都知道的，如何鉴定宝石的基本常识，现场还备有樱桃可乐、喜斯糖果及其它纪念品，我希望大家都能够来参加。
一九九三
Our per…share book value increased 14。3％ during 1993。 Over the last 29 years （that is； since present management took over） book value has grown from 19 to 8；854； or at a rate of 23。3％ pounded annually。
1993年本公司的净值成长了14。3％，总计过去29年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每股净值由当初的19元成长到现在的8；854美元，年复合成长率约为23。3％。
During the year； Berkshire's net worth increased by 1。5 billion； a figure affected by two negative and two positive non…operating items。 For the sake of pleteness； I'll explain them here。 If you aren't thrilled by accounting； however； feel free to fast…forward through this discussion：
回顾过去一年，Berkshire的净值增加了15亿美元，主要受到两项负面以及两项正面非营业的因素所影响，为了做完整的表达，我将它们条列如下，若是大家对于会计有点感冒，大可直接跳过本段不看。
1。 The first negative was produced by a change in Generally Accepted Accounting Principles （GAAP） having to do with the taxes we accrue against unrealized appreciation in the securities wecarry at market value。 The old rule said that the tax rate used should be the one in effect when the appreciation took place。 Therefore； at the end of 1992； we were using a rate of 34％ on the 6。4 billion of gains generated after 1986 and 28％ on the 1。2 billion of gains generated before that。 The new rule stipulates that the current tax rate should be applied to all gains。 The rate in the first quarter of 1993； when this rule went into effect； was 34％。Applying that rate to our pre…1987 gains reduced net worth by 70 million。
1．一个负面因素是由于一般公认会计原则变动所造成，主要与帐上依照市价计算的未实现增值利益所估列的所得税有关，原来规定税率必须按照涨价所发生时点来计算，因此在1992年底，我们的未实现利益也64亿美元系按照34％计算，其余12亿则按28％计算；而新的规定则改成全部依照现行税率计算，故1993年第一季所适用的税率则为34％，包含1987年以前的未实现利得在内全部适用，此举将使得我们的净值因此减少7；000万美元。
2。 The second negative； related to the first； came about because the corporate tax rate was raised in the third quarter of 1993 to 35％。 This change required us to make an additional charge of 1％ against all of our unrealized gains； and that charge penalized net worth by 75 million。 Oddly； GAAP required both this charge and the one described above to be deducted from the earnings we report； even though the unrealized appreciation that gave rise to the charges was never included in earnings； but rather was credited directly to net worth。
2。第二个负面因素与第一个也有关，因为从1993年开始企业税率提高为35％，此举又使得我们必须为帐上未实现利得多提1％的税负，导致我们的净值又减少7；500万美元，奇怪的是一般公认会计原则要求这两项变动皆须列入损益表，却不顾当初这些未实现利得根本就从未列入盈余之内，而是直接当作是净值的增加。
3。 Another 1993 change in GAAP affects the value at which we carry the securities that we own。 In recent years； both the mon stocks and certain mon…equivalent securities held by our insurance panies have been valued at market； whereas equities held by our non…insurance subsidiaries or by the parent pany were carried at their aggregate cost or market； whichever was lower。 Now GAAP says that all mon stocks should be carried at market； a rule we began following in the fourth quarter of 1993。 This change produced a gain in Berkshire's reported net worth of about 172million。
3。1993年另外一个会计原则的变动影响的则是我们帐上持有的这些有价证券的价值，近几年来，我们保险公司所持有的不管是普通股或是约当普通股，都是按市价计算，至于母公司或是其它非保险业子公司所持有的的股票则以成本与市价孰低法计算，现在一般公认会计原则则改成全部都按市价计算，这个规定将从1993年的第四季开始实施，此举将使得Berkshire的净值增加1。72亿美元。
4。 Finally； we issued some stock last year。 In a transaction described in last year's Annual Report； we issued 3；944 shares in early January； 1993 upon the conversion of 46 million convertible debentures that we had called for redemption。 Additionally； we issued 25；203 shares when we acquired Dexter Shoe； a purchase discussed later in this report。 The overall result was that our shares outstanding increased by 29；147 and our net worth by about 478 million。 Per…share book value also grew； because the shares issued in these transactions carried a price above their book value。
4。最后去年我们又发行的一些股份，在一项去年曾提过的购并交易中，我们在1993年一月将4；600万美元的可转换债券赎回，而发行了3；944股，此外在买下Dexter鞋业时，（后面报告还会详加叙述）我们又发行了25；203股，总计一共新发行了29；147股，增加4。78亿美元的净值，每股帐面净值也因发行价格高于原先帐面每股净值而提升。
Of course； it's per…share intrinsic value； not book value； that counts。 Book value is an accounting term that measures the capital； including retained earnings； that has been put into a business。 Intrinsic value is a present…value estimate of the cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining life。 At most panies； the two values are unrelated。 Berkshire； however； is an exception： Our book value； though significantly below our intrinsic value； serves as a useful device for tracking that key figure。 In 1993； each measure grew by roughly 14％； advances that I would call satisfactory but unexciting。
当然真正重要的是每股实质价值而非帐面净值，帐面净值是一个会计名词，用来衡量一家公司所投入的资本，也包含未分配的盈余在内，实质价值则是对于一家企业终其一生所能产生现金流量的估计折现值，对大部分的公司来说，这两个数字大多不相关，不过Berkshire算是一个例外，我们的帐面净值，虽然远低于实质价值，但却是追踪实质价值相当好的一项指针，在1993年两项数值大约皆以14％左右的比率增加，这种成绩虽让人满意却不令人惊喜。
These gains； however； were outstripped by a much larger gain … 39％ … in Berkshire's market price。 Over time； of course； market price and intrinsic value will arrive at about the same destination。 But in the short run the two often diverge in a major way； a phenomenon I've discussed in the past。 Two years ago； Coca…Cola and Gillette； both large holdings of ours； enjoyed market price increases that dramatically outpaced their earnings gains。 In the 1991 Annual Report； I said that the stocks of these panies could not continuously overperform their businesses。
这些利得比起Berkshire本身股价39％的涨幅来说还是略微逊色，当然就长期而言，Berkshire的市价与实质价值将会到达相同的水平，但短期而言，两者的变化可能会有很大的差异，这种现象稍后我们会再详细讨论，两年前我们两项主要的投资可口可乐与吉列刮胡刀的股价表现远超过本身的盈余成长，在1991年的年报中，我便说过这些公司的股票市价不可能永远持续超越其本业。
From 1991 to 1993； Coke and Gillette increased their annual operating earnings per share by 38％ and 37％ respectively； but their market prices moved up only 11％ and 6％。 In other words； the panies overperformed their stocks； a result that no doubt partly reflects Wall Street's new apprehension about brand names。 Whatever the reason； what will count over time is the earnings performance of these panies。 If they prosper； Berkshire will also prosper； though not in a lock…step manner。
从1991年到1993年，可口可乐与吉列刮胡刀每股获利的增加幅度分别为38％与37％，但是同期间股票市价的涨幅却只有11％与6％，换句话说，这些公司的表现超越股票市场，主要的原因还在于华尔街对于品牌有很深的疑虑，但是不管怎样，真正重要的还是这些公司本身的获利情况，如果他们经营顺利，Berkshire也就跟着水涨船高，虽然不是依照一步步稳定的方式前进。
Let me add a lesson from history： Coke went public in 1919 at 40 per share。 By the end of 1920 the market； coldly reevaluating Coke's future prospects； had battered the stock down by more than 50％； to 19。50。 At yearend 1993； that single share； with dividends reinvested； was worth more than 2。1 million。 As Ben Graham said： 〃In the short…run； the market is a voting machine … reflecting a voter…registration test that requires only money； not intelligence or emotional stability … but in the long…run； the market is a weighing machine。〃
接着让我为各位上一次历史课，1919年可口可乐股票以每股40美元公开上市，到了1920年由于市场对于可口可乐的前景看法相当冷淡，而将股价下修一半至19。5美元，然而时至今日，1993年底，若是将收到的股利再重复投资下去，则当初股票的价值将变成210万美元，就像葛拉罕所说：「短期而言，市场是投票机器，投资人不须靠智能或情绪控制，只要有钱都可以登记参加投票，但就长期而言，股票市场却是一个体重机。」
So how should Berkshire's over…performance in the market last year be viewed？ Clearly； Berkshire was selling at a higher percentage of intrinsic value at the end of 1993 than was the case at the beginning of the year。 On the other hand； in a world of 6％ or 7％ long…term interest rates； Berkshire's market price was not inappropriate if … and you should understand that this is a huge if … Charlie Munger； Berkshire's Vice Chairman； and I can attain our long…standing goal of increasing Berkshire's per…share intrinsic value at an average annual rate of 15％。 We have not retreated from this goal。 But we again emphasize； as we have for many years； that the growth in our capital base makes 15％ an ever…more difficult target to hit。
所以我们应该如何看待Berkshire去年的股价超越本质的表现呢？ 很明显的在1993年底Berkshire的股价占实质价值比重较年初为高，另外一方面，在长期利率只有6％到7％的投资环境下，同时若是你了解查理孟格跟本人只能让Berkshire的实质价值每年达到15％的成长的话，你就知道Berkshire去年这样�
