e8东的信 _作者: 美 沃伦·巴菲特-第85章
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ng her because he had only a single silver dollar and she was interested solely in millionaires。 Dejected； Abner took his problem to Old Man Mose； the font of all knowledge in Dogpatch。 Said the sage： Double your money 20 times and Appassionatta will be yours （1； 2； 4； 8 。 。 。 。 1；048；576）。
经由我个人最喜爱的漫画短片，Li'l Abner，我有机会可以体会到延迟支付所得税的好处，虽然当时我没有好好地利用那次机会，为了让他的读者觉得自己很优越，Li'l Abner一直快乐地维持单身，直到他为纽约一位女演员Appassionatta深深地着迷，但由于她只对百万富翁有兴趣，因此一贫如洗的Abner可以说是一点希望都没有，在遭到拒绝之后，Abner跑去智能老人Mose那里请他指点迷津，结果这位圣贤对Abner说，很简单你只要能够将身上仅有的一块钱，复制20次，Appassionatta自然就会投入到你的怀抱（1；2；4；8；…。；1；048；576）。
My last memory of the strip is Abner entering a roadhouse； dropping his dollar into a slot machine； and hitting a jackpot that spilled money all over the floor。 Meticulously following Mose's advice； Abner picked up two dollars and went off to find his next double。 Whereupon I dumped Abner and began reading Ben Graham。
我记得这段漫画的最后一段是Abner跑到一家旅馆，将他仅有的一块钱投入吃角子老虎中，结果竟然中了七星，一时之间奖金掉满地，没想到他老兄一丝不苟遵照Mose老人的旨意，只捡起了其中的两块钱之后，就出发去寻找下一次复制的机会，看到这里我便舍弃了Abner，并开始研读葛拉汉的理论。
Mose clearly was overrated as a guru： Besides failing to anticipate Abner's slavish obedience to instructions； he also forgot about taxes。 Had Abner been subject； say； to the 35％ federal tax rate that Berkshire pays； and had he managed one double annually； he would after 20 years only have accumulated 22；370。 Indeed； had he kept on both getting his annual doubles and paying a 35％ tax on each； he would have needed 7 1/2 years more to reach the 1 million required to win Appassionatta。
Mose很显然地不配当他人的精神导师，除了低估Abner对于他的指示过于盲从的程度，他也忘了考虑到可能的税负，假设今天Abner也像Berkshire一样必须负担高达35％的联邦所得税的话，而且他每年只能成功地复制一次的话，就算连续20年都如他所愿，他也只能累积到22；370元，当然若是他能持之以恒地保持这样的记录的话，他则还须多等上七年半，才能累积到所需的100万以赢得Appassionatta的芳心。
But what if Abner had instead put his dollar in a single investment and held it until it doubled the same 27 1/2 times？ In that case； he would have realized about 200 million pre…tax or； after paying a 70 million tax in the final year； about 130 million after…tax。 For that； Appassionatta would have crawled to Dogpatch。 Of course； with 27 1/2 years having passed； how Appassionatta would have looked to a fellow sitting on 130 million is another question。
然而要是Abner只将资金放在单一不变的投资之上，同时连续27年半都能保持每年倍数成长的记录的话，这样到最后，他在税前可以累积高达二亿美元的获利，或是在扣除7；000万美元的所得税之后，得到税后1亿3；000万美元的利益，届时可能会换做是Appassionatta爬着来求他了，当然等到27年后，一个坐拥1亿多美元的富翁会怎么看待年华老去的Appassionatta，则又是另外一回事了。
What this little tale tells us is that tax…paying investors will realize a far； far greater sum from a single investment that pounds internally at a given rate than from a succession of investments pounding at the same rate。 But I suspect many Berkshire shareholders figured that out long ago。
这宗小故事告诉我们必须负担税负的投资人从每年固定以一个比率成长的单一投资上，可以获得比每年更换投资对象所得的多的多，即便是两者成长的幅度一样也是如此，不过我怀疑许多Berkshire的股东老早就已经知道这个道理了。
Insurance Operations保险事业营运
At this point in the report we've customarily provided you with a table showing the annual 〃bined ratio〃 of the insurance industry for the preceding decade。 This ratio pares total insurance costs （losses incurred plus expenses） to revenue from premiums。 For many years； the ratio has been above 100； a level indicating an underwriting loss。 That is； the industry has taken in less money each year from its policyholders than it has had to pay for operating expenses and for loss events that occurred during the year。
接下来到这里我们通常会准备一张表来说明保险业过去十多年来的综合比率，综合比率代表保险的总成本（理赔损失加上费用）占保费收入的比例，多年以来，比率在100以下代表有承保的损失，也就是说，保险业者当年度从客户那里收到的保费，不足以支应必须支付给保户的理赔款以及营运所需的费用开支。
Offsetting this grim equation is a happier fact： Insurers get to hold on to their policyholders' money for a time before paying it out。 This happens because most policies require that premiums be prepaid and； more importantly； because it often takes time to resolve loss claims。 Indeed； in the case of certain lines of insurance； such as product liability or professional malpractice； many years may elapse between the loss event and payment。
当然若是两者能够相等，将会是一个很令人高兴的结局，因为保险业者在真正支付给客户理赔金之前，通常有一段时间可以将这笔钱好好地运用，因为大部分的保单都是先向客户收取保费，更重要的是，通常得花上一段时间才会将损失理赔款给付出去，尤其是像产品责任险或是专门职业执行业务不当等保险，通常要花上好几年的时间，才能将理赔损失定案。
To oversimplify the matter somewhat； the total of the funds prepaid by policyholders and the funds earmarked for incurred…but…not…yet…paid claims is called 〃the float。〃 In the past； the industry was able to suffer a bined ratio of 107 to 111 and still break even from its insurance writings because of the earnings derived from investing this float。
再讲白一点，这些保户预付的保险费加上那些已经发生但还未理赔的资金统称为保险浮存金，在过去，利用这些浮存金创造投资收益，使得整个保险业即使面临高达107到111的综合比率，却依然可以维持损益两平。
As interest rates have fallen； however； the value of float has substantially declined。 Therefore； the data that we have provided in the past are no longer useful for year…to…year parisons of industry profitability。 A pany writing at the same bined ratio now as in the 1980's today has a far less attractive business than it did then。
不过随着利率下滑，保险浮存金的价值大幅滑落，因此过去我们提供的比率已经无法用来衡量保险业者每年的获利状况比较，今天一家拥有相同综合比率的保险公司比起1980年代来说，已无法同日而语。
Only by making an analysis that incorporates both underwriting results and the current risk…free earnings obtainable from float can one evaluate the true economics of the business that a property…casualty insurer writes。 Of course； the actual investment results that an insurer achieves from the use of both float and stockholders' funds is also of major importance and should be carefully examined when an investor is assessing managerial performance。 But that should be a separate analysis from the one we are discussing here。 The value of float funds … in effect； their transfer price as they move from the insurance operation to the investment operation … should be determined simply by the risk…free； long…term rate of interest。
我们认为只有将保险业的承保结果与保险浮存金可以获得的无风险盈余做分析，才有办法正确地评估一家产物意外险公司真正的价值，当然一家保险公司利用其浮存金与股东资金所能创造的投资收益也相当重要，这点也是投资人在该公司的经营表现时，必须特别注意的，只不过那需要分开另外分析，而不是我们现在要讨论的主题。事实上，保险浮存金的价值，关键在于其从保险营运移转至投资营运的转拨价格，这点可以简单的以长期无风险的资金利率作为标准。
On the next page we show the numbers that count in an evaluation of Berkshire's insurance business。 We calculate our float … which we generate in exceptional amounts relative to our premium volume … by adding loss reserves； loss adjustment reserves and unearned premium reserves and then subtracting agent's balances； prepaid acquisition costs and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance。 Our cost of float is determined by our underwriting loss or profit。 In those years when we have had an underwriting profit； which includes 1993； our cost of float has been negative； and we have determined our insurance earnings by adding underwriting profit to float ine。
下一页我们将会列出如何计算出Berkshire保险事业价值，首先先计算浮存金总额…相对于我们的保费收入总额，我们的浮存金部位算是相当大的，将所有的损失准备、损失费用调整准备与未赚取保费加总后，再扣除应付佣金、预付购并成本及相关再保递延费用，至于浮存金的成本则决定于所发生的承保损失或利益而定，在某些年度由于我们有承保利益，所以换句话说，我们的资金成本甚至是负的，此时我们的保险事业盈余等于是由原先从浮存金获取的利益再加上承保利益。
（1） （2） Yearend Yield
Underwriting Approximate on Long…TermLoss Average Float Cost of Funds Govt。 Bonds （In Millions） （Ratio of 1 to 2）
1967 profit 17。3 less than zero 5。50％ 1981 profit 228。4 less than zero 13。61％
1968 profit 19。9 less than zero 5。90％ 1982 21。56 220。6 9。77％ 10。64％
1969 profit 23。4 less than zero 6。79％ 1983 33。87 231。3 14。64％ 11。84％
1970 0。37 32。4 1。14％ 6。25％ 1984 48。06 253。2 18。98％ 11。58％
1971 profit 52。5 less than zero 5。81％ 1985 44。23 390。2 11。34％ 9。34％
1972 profit 69。5 less than zero 5。82％ 1986 55。84 797。5 7。00％ 7。60％
1973 profit 73。3 less than zero 7。27％ 1987 55。43 1；266。7 4。38％ 8。95％
1974 7。36 79。1 9。30％ 8。13％ 1988 11。08 1；497。7 0。74％ 9。00％
1975 11。35 87。6 12。96％ 8。03％ 1989 24。40 1；541。3 1。58％ 7。97％
1976 profit 102。6 less than zero 7。30％ 1990 26。65 1；637。3 1。63％ 8。24％
1977 profit 139。0 less than zero 7。97％ 1991 119。59 1；895。0 6。31％ 7。40％
1978 profit 190。4 less than zero 8。93％ 1992 108。96 2；290。4 4。76％ 7。39％
1979 profit 227。3 less than zero 10。08％ 1993 profit 2；624。7 less than zero 6。35％
1980 profit 237。0 less than zero 11。94％
As you can see； in our insurance operation last year we had the use of 2。6 billion at no cost； in fact we were paid 31 million； our underwriting profit； to hold these funds。 This sounds good … is good … but is far from as good as it sounds。
大家应该看得出，去年我们保险事业的营运结果，等于是让我们可以免费利用26亿美元的浮存金，而事实上，应该还要再加上3；100万美元的承保利益，这看起来相当不错，不过实际上并没有想象中的那么好。
We temper our enthusiasm because we write a large volume of 〃super…cat〃 policies （which other insurance and reinsurance panies buy to recover part of the losses they suffer from mega…catastrophes） and because last year we had no losses of consequence from this activity。 As that suggests； the truly catastrophic Midwestern floods of 1993 did not trigger super…cat losses； the reason being that very few flood policies are purchased from private insurers。
我们试着大家冷静一下，因为我们接下的生意其中有一大部分属于霹雳猫保单 （这是其它保险公司或再保公司专门买来分担他们在发生重大意外灾害时，所可能造成的损失），同时去年这类的业务并没有出现重大的损失，意思是说，就连发生在1993年真正严重的中西部水灾也没有触及霹雳猫损失理赔的门槛，原因在于很少有私人保险公司会去购买水灾险。
It would be fallacious； however； to conclude from this single…year result that the super…cat business is a wonderful one； or even a satisfactory one。 A simple example will illustrate the fallacy： Suppose there is an event that occurs 25 times in every century。 If you annually give 5…for…1 odds against its occurrence that year； you will have many more winning years than losers。 Indeed； you may go a straight six； seven or more years without loss。 You also will eventually go broke。
这样很容易会产生错觉，并做出单一年度霹雳猫的成绩是相当不错且令人满意的一年，一个简单的例子足以说明一切，假设每个世纪平均都会发生25次重大的意外事件，而你每年都以以一赔五的比率赌它今年不会发生�
