on the improvement of the understanding(提高阅读能力)-第5章
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we wished to conceive the existence； for example； of Adam； simply by
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means of existence in general； it would be the same as if； in order to
conceive his existence； we went back to the nature of being； so as to define
Adam as a being。 （2） Thus； the more existence is conceived generally；
the more is it conceived confusedly and the more easily can it be ascribed
to a given object。 （55：3） Contrariwise； the more it is conceived particularly；
the more is it understood clearly； and the less liable is it to be ascribed；
through negligence of Nature's order； to anything save its proper object。
（4） This is worthy of remark。
＇56＇ （1） We now proceed to consider those cases which are
commonly called fictions； though we clearly understood that the thing is
not as we imagine it。 （2） For instance； I know that the earth is round； but
nothing prevents my telling people that it is a hemisphere； and that it is
like a half apple carved in relief on a dish； or； that the sun moves round the
earth； and so on。 （56：3） However； examination will show us that there is
nothing here inconsistent with what has been said； provided we first admit
that we may have made mistakes； and be now conscious of them； and；
further； that we can hypothesize； or at least suppose； that others are under
the same mistake as ourselves； or can； like us； fall under it。 （4） We can；
I repeat； thus hypothesize so long as we see no impossibility。 （56：5） Thus；
when I tell anyone that the earth is not round； &c。； I merely recall the error
which I perhaps made myself； or which I might have fallen into； and
afterwards I hypothesize that the person to whom I tell it； is still； or may
still fall under the same mistake。 （6） This I say； I can feign so long as I do
not perceive any impossibility or necessity； if I truly understood either one
or the other I should not be able to feign； and I should be reduced to
saying that I had made the attempt。
＇57＇ （1） It remains for us to consider hypotheses made in problems；
which sometimes involve impossibilities。 （2） For instance； when we say
… let us assume that this burning candle is not burning； or； let us assume
that it burns in some imaginary space； or where there are no physical
objects。 （3） Such assumptions are freely made； though the last is clearly
seen to be impossible。 （4） But； though this be so； there is no fiction in
the case。 （57：5） For； in the first case； I have merely recalled to memory；
＇x＇ another candle not burning； or conceived the candle before me as
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without a flame； and then I understand as applying to the latter； leaving its
flame out of the question； all that I think of the former。 （6） In the second
case； I have merely to abstract my thoughts from the objects surrounding
the candle； for the mind to devote itself to the contemplation of the candle
singly looked at in itself only； I can then draw the conclusion that the
candle contains in itself no causes for its own destruction； so that if there
were no physical objects the candle； and even the flame； would remain
unchangeable； and so on。 （7） Thus there is here no fiction； but； ＇y＇ true
and bare assertions。
＇58＇ （1） Let us now pass on to the fictions concerned with essences
only； or with some reality or existence simultaneously。 （2） Of these we
must specially observe that in proportion as the mind's understanding is
smaller； and its experience multiplex； so will its power of coining fictions
be larger； whereas as its understanding increases； its capacity for
entertaining fictitious ideas becomes less。 （58：3） For instance； in the
same way as we are unable； while we are thinking； to feign that we are
thinking or not thinking； so； also； when we know the nature of body we
cannot imagine an infinite fly； or； when we know the nature of the soul； ＇z＇
we cannot imagine it as square； though anything may be expressed
verbally。 （4） But； as we said above； the less men know of nature the
more easily can they coin fictitious ideas； such as trees speaking； men
instantly changed into stones； or into fountains； ghosts appearing in
mirrors； something issuing from nothing； even gods changed into beasts
and men and infinite other absurdities of the same kind。
＇59＇ （1） Some persons think； perhaps； that fiction is limited by fiction；
and not by understanding； in other words； after I have formed some
fictitious idea； and have affirmed of my own free will that it exists under a
certain form in nature； I am thereby precluded from thinking of it under
any other form。 （2） For instance； when I have feigned （to repeat their
argument） that the nature of body is of a certain kind； and have of my own
free will desired to convince myself that it actually exists under this form；
I am no longer able to hypothesize that a fly； for example； is infinite； so；
when I have hypothesized the essence of the soul； I am not able to think of
it as square； &c。
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＇60＇ （1） But these arguments demand further inquiry。 （2） First； their
upholders must either grant or deny that we can understand anything。 If
they grant it； then necessarily the same must be said of understanding； as
is said of fiction。 （3） If they deny it； let us； who know that we do know
something； see what they mean。 （4） They assert that the soul can be
conscious of； and perceive in a variety of ways； not itself nor things which
exist； but only things which are neither in itself nor anywhere else； in other
words； that the soul can； by its unaided power； create sensations or ideas
unconnected with things。 （5） In fact； they regard the soul as a sort of god。
（60：6） Further； they assert that we or our soul have such freedom that we
can constrain ourselves； or our soul； or even our soul's freedom。 （7） For；
after it has formed a fictitious idea； and has given its assent thereto； it
cannot think or feign it in any other manner； but is constrained by the first
fictitious idea to keep all its other thoughts in harmony therewith。 （8）
Our opponents are thus driven to admit； in support of their fiction； the
absurdities which I have just enumerated； and which are not worthy of
rational refutation。
＇61＇ （1） While leaving such persons in their error； we will take care
to derive from our argument with them a truth serviceable for our purpose；
namely； ＇61a＇ that the mind； in paying attention to a thing hypothetical or
false； so as to meditate upon it and understand it； and derive the proper
conclusions in due order therefrom； will readily discover its falsity； and if
the thing hypothetical be in its nature true； and the mind pays attention
to it； so as to understand it； and deduce the truths which are derivable from
it； the mind will proceed with an uninterrupted series of apt conclusions；
in the same way as it would at once discover （as we showed just now） the
absurdity of a false hypothesis； and of the conclusions drawn from it。
＇62＇ （1） We need； therefore； be in no fear of forming hypotheses； so
long as we have a clear and distinct perception of what is involved。 （2）
For； if we were to assert； haply； that men are suddenly turned into beasts；
the statement would be extremely general； so general that there would be
no conception； that is； no idea or connection of subject and predicate； in
our mind。 （3） If there were such a conception we should at the same time
be aware of the means and the causes whereby the event took place。 （4）
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Moreover； we pay no attention to the nature of the subject and the
predicate。
＇63＇ （1） Now； if the first idea be not fictitious； and if all the other
ideas be deduced therefrom； our hurry to form fictitious ideas will
gradually subside。 （2） Further； as a fictitious idea cannot be clear and
distinct； but is necessarily confused； and as all confusion arises from the
fact that the mind has only partial knowledge of a thing either simple or
complex； and does not distinguish between the known and the unknown；
and； again； that it directs its attention promiscuously to all parts of an
object at once without making distinctions； it follows； first； that if the idea
be of something very simple； it must necessarily be clear and distinct。 （3）
For a very simple object cannot be known in part； it must either be known
altogether or not at all。
＇64＇ （1） Secondly； it follows that if a complex object be divided by
thought into a number of simple component parts； and if each be regarded
separately； all confusion will disappear。 （2） Thirdly； it follows that
fiction cannot be simple； but is made up of the blending of several
confused ideas of diverse objects or actions existent in nature； or rather is
composed of attention directed to all such ideas at once； ＇64b＇ and
unaccompanied by any mental assent。 （64：3） Now a fiction that was
simple would be clear and distinct； and therefore true； also a fiction
composed only of distinct ideas would be clear and distinct； and therefore
true。 （4） For instance； when we know the nature of the circle and the
square； it is impossible for us to blend toge
