on the improvement of the understanding(提高阅读能力)-第6章
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square； it is impossible for us to blend together these two figures； and to
hypothesize a square circle； any more than a square soul； or things of that
kind。
＇65＇ （1） Let us shortly come to our conclusion； and again repeat that
we need have no fear of confusing with true ideas that which is only a
fiction。 （2） As for the first sort of fiction of which we have already
spoken； when a thing is clearly conceived； we saw that if the existence of a
that thing is in itself an eternal trut fiction can have no part in it； but if the
existence of the conceived be not an eternal truth； we have only to be
careful such existence be compared to the thing's essence； and to
consider the order of nature。 （64：3） As for the second sort of fiction； which
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we stated to be the result of simultaneously directing the attention； without
the assent of the intellect； to different confused ideas representing different
things and actions existing in nature； we have seen that an absolutely
simple thing cannot be feigned； but must be understood； and that a
complex thing is in the same case if we regard separately the simple parts
whereof it is composed； we shall not even be able to hypothesize any
untrue action concerning such objects； for we shall be obliged to consider
at the same time the causes and manner of such action。
＇66＇ （1） These matters being thus understood； let us pass on to
consider the false idea； observing the objects with which it is concerned；
and the means of guarding ourselves from falling into false perceptions。
（2） Neither of these tasks will present much difficulty； after our inquiry
concerning fictitious ideas。 （3） The false idea only differs from the
fictitious idea in the fact of implying a mental assent … that is； as we have
already remarked； while the representations are occurring； there are no
causes present to us； wherefrom； as in fiction； we can conclude that such
representations do not arise from external objects： in fact； it is much the
same as dreaming with our eyes open； or while awake。 （67：4） Thus； a
false idea is concerned with； or （to speak more correctly） is attributable to；
the existence of a thing whereof the essence is known； or the essence itself；
in the same way as a fictitious idea。
＇67＇ （1） If attributable to the existence of the thing； it is corrected in
the same way as a fictitious idea under similar circumstances。 （2） If
attributable to the essence； it is likewise corrected in the same way as a
fictitious idea。 （67：3） For if the nature of the thing known implies
necessary existence； we cannot possible be in error with regard to its
existence； but if the nature of the thing be not an eternal truth； like its
essence； but contrariwise the necessity or impossibility of its existence
depends on external causes； then we must follow the same course as we
adopted in the of fiction； for it is corrected in the same manner。
＇68＇ （1） As for false ideas concerned with essences； or even with
actions； such perceptions are necessarily always confused； being
compounded of different confused perceptions of things existing in nature；
as； for instance； when men are persuaded that deities are present in woods；
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in statues； in brute beasts； and the like； that there are bodies which； by
their composition alone； give rise to intellect； that corpses reason； walk
about； and speak； that God is deceived； and so on。 （68：2） But ideas
which are clear and distinct can never be false： for ideas of things clearly
and distinctly conceived are either very simple themselves； or are
compounded from very simple ideas； that is； are deduced therefrom。 （3）
The impossibility of a very simple idea being false is evident to everyone
who understands the nature of truth or understanding and of falsehood。
＇69＇ （1） As regards that which constitutes the reality of truth； it is
certain that a true idea is distinguished from a false one； not so much by its
extrinsic object as by its intrinsic nature。 （2） If an architect conceives a
building properly constructed； though such a building may never have
existed； and amy never exist； nevertheless the idea is true； and the idea
remains the same； whether it be put into execution or not。 （69：3） On the
other hand； if anyone asserts； for instance； that Peter exists； without
knowing whether Peter really exists or not； the assertion； as far as its
asserter is concerned； is false； or not true； even though Peter actually does
exist。 （4） The assertion that Peter exists is true only with regard to him
who knows for certain that Peter does exist。
＇70＇ （1） Whence it follows that there is in ideas something real；
whereby the true are distinguished from the false。 （2） This reality must
be inquired into； if we are to find the best standard of truth （we have said
that we ought to determine our thoughts by the given standard of a true
idea； and that method is reflective knowledge）； and to know the properties
of our understanding。 （70：3） Neither must we say that the difference
between true and false arises from the fact； that true knowledge consists in
knowing things through their primary causes； wherein it is totally different
from false knowledge； as I have just explained it： for thought is said to be
true； if it involves subjectively the essence of any principle which has no
cause； and is known through itself and in itself。
＇71＇ （1） Wherefore the reality （forma） of true thought must exist in
the thought itself； without reference to other thoughts； it does not
acknowledge the object as its cause； but must depend on the actual power
and nature of the understanding。 （2） For； if we suppose that the
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understanding has perceived some new entity which has never existed； as
some conceive the understanding of God before He created thing （a
perception which certainly could not arise any object）； and has
legitimately deduced other thoughts from said perception； all such
thoughts would be true； without being determined by any external object；
they would depend solely on the power and nature of the understanding。
（71：3） Thus； that which constitutes the reality of a true thought must be
sought in the thought itself； and deduced from the nature of the
understanding。
＇72＇ （1） In order to pursue our investigation； let us confront
ourselves with some true idea； whose object we know for certain to be
dependent on our power of thinking； and to have nothing corresponding to
it in nature。 （2） With an idea of this kind before us； we shall； as appears
from what has just been said； be more easily able to carry on the research
we have in view。 （72：3） For instance； in order to form the conception of a
sphere； I invent a cause at my pleasure … namely； a semicircle revolving
round its center； and thus producing a sphere。 （4） This is indisputably a
true idea； and； although we know that no sphere in nature has ever actually
been so formed； the perception remains true； and is the easiest manner of
conceiving a sphere。 （72：5） We must observe that this perception asserts
the rotation of a semicircle … which assertion would be false； if it were not
associated with the conception of a sphere； or of a cause determining a
motion of the kind； or absolutely； if the assertion were isolated。 （6） The
mind would then only tend to the affirmation of the sole motion of a
semicircle； which is not contained in the conception of a semicircle； and
does not arise from the conception of any cause capable of producing such
motion。 （72：7） Thus falsity consists only in this； that something is
affirmed of a thing； which is not contained in the conception we have
formed of that thing； as motion or rest of a semicircle。 （8） Whence it
follows that simple ideas cannot be other than true … e。g。； the simple idea
of a semicircle； of motion； of rest； of quantity； &c。 （72：9）
Whatsoever affirmation such ideas contain is equal to the concept formed；
and does not extend further。 （10） Wherefore we form as many simple
ideas as we please； without any fear of error。
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＇73＇ （1） It only remains for us to inquire by what power our mind
can form true ideas； and how far such power extends。 （2） It is certain
that such power cannot extend itself infinitely。 （3） For when we affirm
somewhat of a thing； which is not contained in the concept we have
formed of that thing； such an affirmation shows a defect of our perception；
or that we have formed fragmentary or mutilated ideas。 （4） Thus we
have seen that the notion of a semicircle is false when it is isolated in the
mind； but true when it is associated with the concept of a sphere； or of
some cause determining such a motion。 （73：5） But if it be the nature of a
thinking being； as seems； prima facie； to be the case； to
