on the improvement of the understanding(提高阅读能力)-第8章
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its singularity； as appears from the example of the comedy just cited。
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（83：7） Further； a thing is remembered more easily in proportion to its
intelligibility； therefore we cannot help remember that which is extremely
singular and sufficiently intelligible。
＇84＇ （1） Thus； then； we have distinguished between a true idea and
other perceptions； and shown that ideas fictitious； false； and the rest；
originate in the imagination … that is； in certain sensations fortuitous （so to
speak） and disconnected； arising not from the power of the mind； but from
external causes； according as the body； sleeping or waking； receives
various motions。 （2） But one may take any view one likes of the
imagination so long as one acknowledges that it is different from the
understanding； and that the soul is passive with regard to it。 （3） The view
taken is immaterial； if we know that the imagination is something
indefinite； with regard to which the soul is passive； and that we can by
some means or other free ourselves therefrom with the help of the
understanding。 （4） Let no one then be astonished that before proving the
existence of body； and other necessary things； I speak of imagination of
body； and of its composition。 （5） The view taken is； I repeat； immaterial；
so long as we know that imagination is something indefinite； &c。
＇85＇ （1） As regards as a true idea； we have shown that it is simple or
compounded of simple ideas； that it shows how and why something is or
has been made； and that its subjective effects in the soul correspond to the
actual reality of its object。 （2） This conclusion is identical with the
saying of the ancients； that true proceeds from cause to effect； though the
ancients； so far as I know； never formed the conception put forward here
that the soul acts according to fixed laws； and is as it were an immaterial
automaton。
＇86＇ （1） Hence； as far as is possible at the outset； we have acquired a
knowledge of our understanding； and such a standard of a true idea that we
need no longer fear confounding truth with falsehood and fiction。 （2）
Neither shall we wonder why we understand some things which in nowise
fall within the scope of the imagination； while other things are in the
imagination but wholly opposed to the understanding； or others； again；
which agree therewith。 （3） We now know that the operations； whereby
the effects of imagination are produced； take place under other laws quite
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different from the laws of the understanding； and that the mind is entirely
passive with regard to them。
＇87＇ （1） Whence we may also see how easily men may fall into grave
errors through not distinguishing accurately between the imagination and
the understanding； such as believing that extension must be localized； that
it must be finite； that its parts are really distinct one from the other； that it
is the primary and single foundation of all things； that it occupies more
space at one time than at another and other similar doctrines； all entirely
opposed to truth； as we shall duly show。
＇88＇ （1） Again； since words are a part of the imagination … that is； since
we form many conceptions in accordance with confused arrangements of
words in the memory； dependent on particular bodily conditions； … there is
no doubt that words may； equally with the imagination； be the cause of
many and great errors； unless we strictly on our guard。
＇89＇ （1） Moreover； words are formed according to popular fancy and
intelligence； and are； therefore； signs of things as existing in the
imagination； not as existing in the understanding。 （2） This is evident
from the fact that to all such things as exist only in the understanding； not
in the imagination； negative names are often given； such as incorporeal；
infinite； &c。 （3） So； also； many conceptions really affirmative are
expressed negatively； and vice versa； such as uncreate； independent；
infinite； immortal； &c。； inasmuch as their contraries are much more easily
imagined； and； therefore； occurred first to men； and usurped positive
names。 （89：4） Many things we affirm and deny； because the nature of
words allows us to do so； though the nature of things does not。 （5） While
we remain unaware of this fact； we may easily mistake falsehood for truth。
＇90＇ （1） Let us also beware of another great cause of confusion； which
prevents the understanding from reflecting on itself。 （2） Sometimes； while
making no distinction between the imagination and the intellect； we think
that what we more readily imagine is clearer to us； and also we think that
what we imagine we understand。 （3） Thus； we put first that which should
be last： the true order of progression is reversed； and no legitimate
conclusion is drawn。
＇91＇ ＇91e＇ （1） Now； in order at length to pass on to the second part of
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this method； I shall first set forth the object aimed at； and next the means
for its attainment。 （2） The object aimed at is the acquisition of clear and
distinct ideas； such as are produced by the pure intellect； and not by
chance physical motions。 （3） In order that all ideas may be reduced to
unity； we shall endeavor so to associate and arrange them that our mind
may； as far as possible； reflect subjectively the reality of nature； both as a
whole and as parts。
＇92＇ （1） As for the first point； it is necessary （as we have said） for our
purpose that everything should be conceived； either solely through its
essence； or through its proximate cause。 （2） If the thing be self…existent；
or； as is commonly said； the cause of itself； it must be understood through
its essence only； if it be not self…existent； but requires a cause for its
existence； it must be understood through its proximate cause。 （3） For； in
reality； the knowledge； ＇92f＇ of an effect is nothing else than the
acquisition of more perfect knowledge of its cause。
＇93＇ （1） Therefore； we may never； while we are concerned with
inquiries into actual things； draw any conclusion from abstractions； we
shall be extremely careful not to confound that which is only in the
understanding with that which is in the thing itself。 （2） The best basis for
drawing a conclusion will be either some particular affirmative essence； or
a true and legitimate definition。 （93：3） For the understanding cannot
descend from universal axioms by themselves to particular things； since
axioms are of infinite extent； and do not determine the understanding to
contemplate one particular thing more than another。
＇94＇ （1） Thus the true method of discovery is to form thoughts from
some given definition。 （2） This process will be the more fruitful and easy
in proportion as the thing given be better defined。 （3） Wherefore； the
cardinal point of all this second part of method consists in the knowledge
of the conditions of good definition； and the means of finding them。 （4） I
will first treat of the conditions of definition。
＇95＇ （1） A definition； if it is to be called perfect； must explain the
inmost essence of a thing； and must take care not to substitute for this any
of its properties。 （2） In order to illustrate my meaning； without taking an
example which would seem to show a desire to expose other people's
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errors； I will choose the case of something abstract； the definition of which
is of little moment。 （95：3） Such is a circle。 （4） If a circle be defined as
a figure； such that all straight lines drawn from the center to the
circumference are equal； every one can see that such a definition does not
in the least explain the essence of a circle； but solely one of its properties。
（5） Though； as I have said； this is of no importance in the case of figures
and other abstractions； it is of great importance in the case of physical
beings and realities： for the properties of things are not understood so long
as their essences are unknown。 （6） If the latter be passed over； there is
necessarily a perversion of the succession of ideas which should reflect the
succession of nature； and we go far astray from our object。
＇96＇ In order to be free from this fault； the following rules should be
observed in definition：… I。 （1） If the thing in question be created； the
definition must （as we have said） comprehend the proximate cause。
（2） For instance； a circle should； according to this rule； be defined as
follows： the figure described by any line whereof one end is fixed and
the other free。 （3） This definition clearly comprehends the proximate
cause。 II。 （4） A conception or definition of a thing should be such
that all the properties of that thing； in so far as it is considered by
itself； and not in conjunction with other things； can be deduced from it；
as may be seen in the definition given of a circle： for from that it
clearly follows that all straight lines drawn from the center to the
circumference are equal。 （5） That this is a necessary characteristic of
a def
