philebus-第10章
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agony and distress； both of body and mind。
Pro。 Then what pleasures； Socrates； should we be right in conceiving
to be true？
Soc。 True pleasures are those which are given by beauty of colour
and form； and most of of those which arise from smells； those of
sound； again； and in general those of which the want is painless and
unconscious； and of which the fruition is palpable to sense and
pleasant and unalloyed with pain。
Pro。 Once more； Socrates； I must ask what you mean。
Soc。 My meaning is certainly not obvious； and I will endeavour to be
plainer。 I do not mean by beauty of form such beauty as that of
animals or pictures； which the many would suppose to be my meaning；
but； says the argument； understand me to mean straight lines and
circles； and the plane solid figures which are formed out of them by
turning…lathes and rulers and measurers of angles； for these I
affirm to be not only relatively beautiful； like other things； but
they are eternally and absolutely beautiful； and they have peculiar
pleasures； quite unlike the pleasures of scratching。 And there are
colours which are of the same character； and have similar pleasures；
now do you understand my meaning？
Pro。 I am trying to understand； Socrates； and I hope that you will
try to make your meaning dearer。
Soc。 When sounds are smooth and clear； and have a single pure
tone； then I mean to say that they are not relatively but absolutely
beautiful； and have natural pleasures associated with them。
Pro。 Yes； there are such pleasures。
Soc。 The pleasures of smell are of a less ethereal sort； but they
have no necessary admixture of pain； and all pleasures； however and
wherever experienced； which are unattended by pains； I assign to an
analogous class。 Here then are two kinds of pleasures。
Pro。 I understand。
Soc。 To these may be added the pleasures of knowledge； if no
hunger of knowledge and no pain caused by such hunger precede them。
Pro。 And this is the case。
Soc。 Well； but if a man who is full of knowledge loses his
knowledge； are there not pains of forgetting？
Pro。 Not necessarily； but there may be times of reflection； when
he feels grief at the loss of his knowledge。
Soc。 Yes； my friend； but at present we are enumerating only the
natural perceptions； and have nothing to do with reflection。
Pro。 In that case you are right in saying that the loss of knowledge
is not attended with pain。
Soc。 These pleasures of knowledge； then； are unmixed with pain；
and they are not the pleasures of the many but of a very few。
Pro。 Quite true。
Soc。 And now； having fairly separated the pure pleasures and those
which may be rightly termed impure； let us further add to our
description of them； that the pleasures which are in excess have no
measure； but that those which are not in excess have measure； the
great； the excessive； whether more or less frequent； we shall be right
in referring to the class of the infinite； and of the more and less；
which pours through body and soul alike； and the others we shall refer
to the class which has measure。
Pro。 Quite right； Socrates。
Soc。 Still there is something more to be considered about pleasures。
Pro。 What is it？
Soc。 When you speak of purity and clearness； or of excess；
abundance； greatness and sufficiency； in what relation do these
terms stand to truth？
Pro。 Why do you ask； Socrates？
Soc。 Because； Protarchus； I should wish to test pleasure and
knowledge in every possible way； in order that if there be a pure
and impure element in either of them； I may present the pure element
for judgment； and then they will be more easily judged of by you and
by me and by all of us。
Pro。 Most true。
Soc。 Let us investigate all the pure kinds； first selecting for
consideration a single instance。
Pro。 What instance shall we select？
Soc。 Suppose that we first of all take whiteness。
Pro。 Very good。
Soc。 How can there be purity in whiteness； and what purity？ Is
that purest which is greatest or most in quantity； or that which is
most unadulterated and freest from any admixture of other colours？
Pro。 Clearly that which is most unadulterated。
Soc。 True； Protarchus； and so the purest white； and not the greatest
or largest in quantity； is to be deemed truest and most beautiful？
Pro。 Right。
Soc。 And we shall be quite right in saying that a little pure
white is whiter and fairer and truer than a great deal that is mixed。
Pro。 Perfectly right。
Soc。 There is no need of adducing many similar examples in
illustration of the argument about pleasures； one such is sufficient
to prove to us that a small pleasure or a small amount of pleasure； if
pure or unalloyed with pain。 is always pleasanter and truer and fairer
than a great pleasure or a great amount of pleasure of another kind。
Pro。 Assuredly； and the instance you have given is quite sufficient。
Soc。 But what do you say of another question：…have we not heard that
pleasure is always a generation； and has no true being？ Do not certain
ingenious philosophers teach this doctrine； and ought not we to be
grateful to them？
Pro。 What do they mean？
Soc。 I will explain to you； my dear Protarchus； what they mean； by
putting a question。
Pro。 Ask； and I will answer。
Soc。 I assume that there are two natures； one self…existent； and the
other ever in want of something。
Pro。 What manner of natures are they？
Soc。 The one majestic ever； the other inferior。
Pro。 You speak riddles。
Soc。 You have seen loves good and fair； and also brave lovers of
them。
Pro。 I should think so。
Soc。 Search the universe for two terms which are like these two
and are present everywhere。
Pro。 Yet a third time I must say； Be a little plainer； Socrates。
Soc。 There is no difficulty； Protarchus； the argument is only in
play； and insinuates that some things are for the sake of something
else （relatives）； and that other things are the ends to which the
former class subserve （absolutes）。
Pro。 Your many repetitions make me slow to understand。
Soc。 As the argument proceeds； my boy； I dare say that the meaning
will become clearer。
Pro。 Very likely。
Soc。 Here are two new principles。
Pro。 What are they？
Soc。 One is the generation of all things； and the other is essence。
Pro。 I readily accept from you both generation and essence。
Soc。 Very right； and would you say that generation is for the sake
of essence； or essence for the sake of generation？
Pro。 You want to know whether that which is called essence is；
properly speaking； for the sake of generation？
Soc。 Yes。
Pro。 By the gods； I wish that you would repeat your question。
Soc。 I mean； O my Protarchus； to ask whether you would tell me
that ship…building is for the sake of ships； or ships for the sake
of ship…building？ and in all similar cases I should ask the same
question。
Pro。 Why do you not answer yourself； Socrates？
Soc。 I have no objection； but you must take your part。
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 My answer is； that all things instrumental； remedial； material；
are given to us with a view to generation； and that each generation is
relative to； or for the sake of； some being or essence； and that the
whole of generation is relative to the whole of essence。
Pro。 Assuredly。
Soc。 Then pleasure； being a generation； must surely be for the
sake of some essence？
Pro。 True。
Soc。 And that for the sake of which something else is done must be
placed in the class of good； and that which is done for the sake of
something else； in some other class； my good friend。
Pro。 Most certainly。
Soc。 Then pleasure； being a generation； will be rightly placed in
some other class than that of good？
Pro。 Quite right。
Soc。 Then； as I said at first； we ought to be very grateful to him
who first pointed out that pleasure was a generation only； and had
no true being at all； for he is clearly one who laughs at the notion
of pleasure being a good。
Pro。 Assuredly。
Soc。 And he would surely laugh also at those who make generation
their highest end。
Pro。 Of whom are you speaking； and what do they mean？
Soc。 I am speaking of those who when they are cured of hunger or
thirst or any other defect by some process of generation are delighted
at the process as if it were pleasure； and they say that they would
not wish to live without these and other feelings of a like kind which
might be mentioned。
Pro。 That is certainly what they appear to think。
Soc。 And is not destruction universally admitted to be the
opposite of generation？
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 Then he who chooses thus； would choose generation and
destruction rather than that third sort of life； in which； as we
were saying； was neither pleasure nor pain； but only the purest
possible thought。
Pro。 He who would make us believe pleasure to be a good is
involved in great absurdities； Socrates。
Soc。 Great； indeed； and there is yet another of them。
Pro。 What is it？
Soc。 Is there not an absurdity in arguing that there is nothing good
or noble in the body； or in anything else； but that good is in the
soul only； and that the only good of the soul is pleasure； and that
courage or temperance or understanding； or any other good of the soul；
is not really a good？…and is there not yet a further absurdity in
our being compelled to say that he who has a feeling of pain and not
of pleasure is bad at the time when he is suffering pain； even
though he be the best of men； and again； that he who has a feeling
of pleasure； in so far as he is pleased at the time when he is
pleased； in that degree excels in virtue？
Pro。 Nothing； Socrates； can be more irrational than all this。
Soc。 And now； having subjected pleasure to every sort of test； let
us not appear to be too sparing of mind and knowledge： let us ring
their metal bravely； and see if there be unsoundness in any part；
until we have found out what in them is of the purest nature； and then
the truest elements both of pleasure and knowledge may be brought up
for judgment。
Pro。 Right。
Soc。 Knowledge has two parts…the one productive； and the other
educational？
Pro。 True。
Soc。 And in the productive or handicraft arts； is not one part
more akin to knowledge； and the other less； and may not the one part
be regarded as the pure； and the other as the impure？
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 Let us separate the superior or dominant elements in each of
them。
Pro。 What are they； and how do you se
