philebus-第11章

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　　Soc。　Let　us　separate　the　superior　or　dominant　elements　in　each　of



them。



　　Pro。　What　are　they；　and　how　do　you　separate　them？



　　Soc。　I　mean　to　say；　that　if　arithmetic；　mensuration；　and　weighing　be



taken　away　from　any　art；　that　which　remains　will　not　be　much。



　　Pro。　Not　much；　certainly。



　　Soc。　The　rest　will　be　only　conjecture；　and　the　better　use　of　the



senses　which　is　given　by　experience　and　practice；　in　addition　to　a



certain　power　of　guessing；　which　is　commonly　called　art；　and　is



perfected　by　attention　and　pains。



　　Pro。　Nothing　more；　assuredly。



　　Soc。　Music；　for　instance；　is　full　of　this　empiricism；　for　sounds　are



harmonized；　not　by　measure；　but　by　skilful　conjecture；　the　music　of



the　flute　is　always　trying　to　guess　the　pitch　of　each　vibrating



note；　and　is　therefore　mixed　up　with　much　that　is　doubtful　and　has



little　which　is　certain。



　　Pro。　Most　true。



　　Soc。　And　the　same　will　be　found　to　hold　good　of　medicine　and



husbandry　and　piloting　and　generalship。



　　Pro。　Very　true。



　　Soc。　The　art　of　the　builder；　on　the　other　hand；　which　uses　a



number　of　measures　and　instruments；　attains　by　their　help　to　a　greater



degree　of　accuracy　than　the　other　arts。



　　Pro。　How　is　that？



　　Soc。　In　ship…building　and　house…building；　and　in　other　branches　of



the　art　of　carpentering；　the　builder　has　his　rule；　lathe；　compass；



line；　and　a　most　ingenious　machine　for　straightening　wood。



　　Pro。　Very　true；　Socrates。



　　Soc。　Then　now　let　us　divide　the　arts　of　which　we　were　speaking



into　two　kinds…the　arts　which；　like　music；　are　less　exact　in　their



results；　and　those　which；　like　carpentering；　are　more　exact。



　　Pro。　Let　us　make　that　division。



　　Soc。　Of　the　latter　class；　the　most　exact　of　all　are　those　which　we



just　now　spoke　of　as　primary。



　　Pro。　I　see　that　you　mean　arithmetic；　and　the　kindred　arts　of



weighing　and　measuring。



　　Soc。　Certainly；　Protarchus；　but　are　not　these　also　distinguishable



into　two　kinds？



　　Pro。　What　are　the　two　kinds？



　　Soc。　In　the　first　place；　arithmetic　is　of　two　kinds；　one　of　which　is



popular；　and　the　other　philosophical。



　　Pro。　How　would　you　distinguish　them？



　　Soc。　There　is　a　wide　difference　between　them；　Protarchus；　some



arithmeticians　reckon　unequal　units；　as　for　example；　two　armies；　two



oxen；　two　very　large　things　or　two　very　small　things。　The　party　who



are　opposed　to　them　insist　that　every　unit　in　ten　thousand　must　be　the



same　as　every　other　unit。



　　Pro。　Undoubtedly　there　is；　as　you　say；　a　great　difference　among



the　votaries　of　the　science；　and　there　may　be　reasonably　supposed　to



be　two　sorts　of　arithmetic。



　　Soc。　And　when　we　compare　the　art　of　mensuration　which　is　used　in



building　with　philosophical　geometry；　or　the　art　of　computation



which　is　used　in　trading　with　exact　calculation；　shall　we　say　of



either　of　the　pairs　that　it　is　one　or　two？



　　Pro。　On　the　analogy　of　what　has　preceded；　I　should　be　of　opinion



that　they　were　severally　two。



　　Soc。　Right；　but　do　you　understand　why　I　have　discussed　the　subject？



　　Pro。　I　think　so；　but　I　should　like　to　be　told　by　you。



　　Soc。　The　argument　has　all　along　been　seeking　a　parallel　to　pleasure；



and　true　to　that　original　design；　has　gone　on　to　ask　whether　one



sort　of　knowledge　is　purer　than　another；　as　one　pleasure　is　purer　than



another。



　　Pro。　Clearly；　that　was　the　intention。



　　Soc。　And　has　not　the　argument　in　what　has　preceded；　already　shown



that　the　arts　have　different　provinces；　and　vary　in　their　degrees　of



certainty？



　　Pro。　Very　true。



　　Soc。　And　just　now　did　not　the　argument　first　designate　a



particular　art　by　a　common　term；　thus　making　us　believe　in　the　unity



of　that　art；　and　then　again；　as　if　speaking　of　two　different　things；



proceed　to　enquire　whether　the　art　as　pursed　by　philosophers；　or　as



pursued　by　non　philosophers；　has　more　of　certainty　and　purity？



　　Pro。　That　is　the　very　question　which　the　argument　is　asking。





　　Soc。　And　how；　Protarchus；　shall　we　answer　the　enquiry？



　　Pro。　O　Socrates；　we　have　reached　a　point　at　which　the　difference



of　clearness　in　different　kinds　of　knowledge　is　enormous。



　　Soc。　Then　the　answer　will　be　the　easier。



　　Pro。　Certainly；　and　let　us　say　in　reply；　that　those　arts　into



which　arithmetic　and　mensuration　enter；　far　surpass　all　others；　and



that　of　these　the　arts　or　sciences　which　are　animated　by　the　pure



philosophic　impulse　are　infinitely　superior　in　accuracy　and　truth。



　　Soc。　Then　this　is　your　judgment；　and　this　is　the　answer　which；



upon　your　authority；　we　will　give　to　all　masters　of　the　art　of



misinterpretation？



　　Pro。　What　answer？



　　Soc。　That　there　are　two　arts　of　arithmetic；　and　two　of



mensuration；　and　also　several　other　arts　which　in　like　manner　have



this　double　nature；　and　yet　only　one　name。



　　Pro。　Let　us　boldly　return　this　answer　to　the　masters　of　whom　you



speak；　Socrates；　and　hope　for　good　luck。



　　Soc。　We　have　explained　what　we　term　the　most　exact　arts　or　sciences。



　　Pro。　Very　good。



　　Soc。　And　yet；　Protarchus；　dialectic　will　refuse　to　acknowledge　us；



if　we　do　not　award　to　her　the　first　place。



　　Pro。　And　pray；　what　is　dialectic？



　　Soc。　Clearly　the　science　which　has　to　do　with　all　that　knowledge



of　which　we　are　now　speaking；　for　I　am　sure　that　all　men　who　have　a



grain　of　intelligence　will　admit　that　the　knowledge　which　has　to　do



with　being　and　reality；　and　sameness　and　unchangeableness；　is　by　far



the　truest　of　all。　But　how　would　you　decide　this　question；　Protarchus？



　　Pro。　I　have　often　heard　Gorgias　maintain；　Socrates；　that　the　art



of　persuasion　far　surpassed　every　other；　this；　as　he　says；　is　by　far



the　best　of　them　all；　for　to　it　all　things　submit；　not　by



compulsion；　but　of　their　own　free　will。　Now；　I　should　not　like　to



quarrel　either　with　you　or　with　him。



　　Soc。　You　mean　to　say　that　you　would　like　to　desert；　if　you　were



not　ashamed？



　　Pro。　As　you　please。



　　Soc。　May　I　not　have　led　you　into　a　misapprehension？



　　Pro。　How？



　　Soc。　Dear　Protarchus；　I　never　asked　which　was　the　greatest　or　best



or　usefullest　of　arts　or　sciences；　but　which　had　clearness　and



accuracy；　and　the　greatest　amount　of　truth；　however　humble　and



little　useful　an　art。　And　as　for　Gorgias；　if　you　do　not　deny　that



his　art　has　the　advantage　in　usefulness　to　mankind；　he　will　not



quarrel　with　you　for　saying　that　the　study　of　which　I　am　speaking　is



superior　in　this　particular　of　essential　truth；　as　in　the　comparison



of　white　colours；　a　little　whiteness；　if　that　little　be　only　pure；　was



said　to　be　superior　in　truth　to　a　great　mass　which　is　impure。　And



now　let　us　give　our　best　attention　and　consider　well；　not　the



comparative　use　or　reputation　of　the　sciences；　but　the　power　or



faculty；　if　there　be　such；　which　the　soul　has　of　loving　the　truth；　and



of　doing　all　things　for　the　sake　of　it；　let　us　search　into　the　pure



element　of　mind　and　intelligence；　and　then　we　shall　be　able　to　say



whether　the　science　of　which　I　have　been　speaking　is　most　likely　to



possess　the　faculty；　or　whether　there　be　some　other　which　has　higher



claims。



　　Pro。　Well；　I　have　been　considering；　and　I　can　hardly　think　that



any　other　science　or　art　has　a　firmer　grasp　of　the　truth　than　this。



　　Soc。　Do　you　say　so　because　you　observe　that　the　arts　in　general



and　those　engaged　in　them　make　use　of　opinion；　and　are　resolutely



engaged　in　the　investigation　of　matters　of　opinion？　Even　he　who



supposes　himself　to　be　occupied　with　nature　is　really　occupied　with



the　things　of　this　world；　how　created；　how　acting　or　acted　upon。　Is



not　this　the　sort　of　enquiry　in　which　his　life　is　spent？



　　Pro。　True。



　　Soc。　He　is　labouring；　not　after　eternal　being；　but　about　things



which　are　becoming；　or　which　will　or　have　become。



　　Pro。　Very　true。



　　Soc。　And　can　we　say　that　any　of　these　things　which　neither　are　nor



have　been　nor　will　be　unchangeable；　when　judged　by　the　strict　rule



of　truth；　ever　become　certain？



　　Pro。　Impossible。



　　Soc。　How　can　anything　fixed　be　concerned　with　that　which　has　no



fixedness？



　　Pro。　How　indeed？



　　Soc。　Then　mind　and　science　when　employed　about　such　changing



things　do　not　attain　the　highest　truth？



　　Pro。　I　should　imagine　not。



　　Soc。　And　now　let　us　bid　farewell；　a　long　farewell；　to　you　or　me　or



Philebus　or　Gorgias；　and　urge　on　behalf　of　the　argument　a　single



point。



　　Pro。　What　point？



　　Soc。　Let　us　say　that　the　stable　and　pure　and　true　and　unalloyed



has　to　do　with　the　things　which　are　eternal　and　unchangeable　and



unmixed；　or　if　not；　at　any　rate　what　is　most　akin　to　them　has；　and



that　all　other　things　are　to　be　placed　in　a　second　or　inferior　class。



　　Pro。　Very　true。



　　Soc。　And　of　the　names　expressing　cognition；　ought　not　the　fairest　to



be　given　to　the　fairest　things？



　　Pro。　That　is　natural。



　　Soc。　And　are　not　mind　and　wisdom　the　names　which　are　to　be



honoured　most？



　　Pro。　Yes。



　　Soc。　And　these　names　may　be　said　to　have　their　truest；　and　most



exact　application　when　the　mind　is　engaged　in　the　contemplation　of



true　being？



　　Pro。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　And　these　were　the　names　which　I　adduced　of　the　rivals　of



pleasure？



　　Pro。　Very　true；　Socrates。



　　Soc。　In　the　next　place；　as　to　the　mixture；　here　are　the　ingredients；



pleasure　and　wisdom；　and　we　may　be　compared　to　artists　who　have



their　materials　ready　to　their　hands。



　　Pro。　Yes。



　　Soc。　And　now　we　must　begin　to　mix　them？



　　Pro。　By　all　means。



　　Soc。　But　had　we　not　better　have　a　preliminary　word　and　refresh　our



memories？



　　Pro。　Of　what？



　　Soc。　Of　that　which　I　have　already　mentioned。　Well　says　the



proverb；　that　we　ought　to　repeat　twice　and　even　thrice　that　which　is



good。



　　Pro。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　Well　then；　by　Zeus；　let　us　proceed；　and　I　will　make　what　I



believe　to　be　a　fair　summary　of　the　argument。



　　Pro。　Let　me　hear。



　　Soc。　Philebus　says　that　pleasure　is　the　true　end　of　all　living



beings；　at　which　all　ought　to　aim；　and　moreover　that　it　is　the　chief



good　of　all；　and　that　the　two　names　〃good〃　and　〃pleasant〃　are



correctly　given　to　one　thing　and　one　nature；　Socrates；　on　the　other



hand；　begins　by　denying　this；　and　further　says；　that　in　nature　as　in



name　they　are　two；　and　that　wisdom　partakes　more　than　pleasure　of



the　good。　Is　not　and　was　not　this　what　we　were　saying；　Protarchus？



　　Pro。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　And　is　there　not　and　was　there　not　a　further　point　which　was



conceded　between　us？



　　Pro。　What　was　it？



　　Soc。　That　the　good　differs　from　all　other　things。



　　Pro。　In　what　respect？



　　Soc。　In　that　the　being　who　possesses　good　always　everywhere　and　in



all　things　has　the　most　perfect　sufficiency；　and　is　never　in　need　of



anything　else。



　　Pro。　Exact