philebus-第12章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！




anything　else。



　　Pro。　Exactly。



　　Soc。　And　did　we　not　endeavour　to　make　an　imaginary　separation　of



wisdom　and　pleasure；　assigning　to　each　a　distinct　life；　so　that



pleasure　was　wholly　excluded　from　wisdom；　and　wisdom　in　like　manner



had　no　part　whatever　in　pleasure？



　　Pro。　We　did。



　　Soc。　And　did　we　think　that　either　of　them　alone　would　be　sufficient？



　　Pro。　Certainly　not。



　　Soc。　And　if　we　erred　in　any　point；　then　let　any　one　who　will；　take



up　the　enquiry　again　and　set　us　right；　and　assuming　memory　and



wisdom　and　knowledge　and　true　opinion　to　belong　to　the　same　class；　let



him　consider　whether　he　would　desire　to　possess　or　acquire…I　will



not　say　pleasure；　however　abundant　or　intense；　if　he　has　no　real



perception　that　he　is　pleased；　nor　any　consciousness　of　what　he　feels；



nor　any　recollection；　however　momentary；　of　the　feeling；…but　would



he　desire　to　have　anything　at　all；　if　these　faculties　were　wanting



to　him？　And　about　wisdom　I　ask　the　same　question；　can　you　conceive



that　any　one　would　choose　to　have　all　wisdom　absolutely　devoid　of



pleasure；　rather　than　with　a　certain　degree　of　pleasure；　or　all



pleasure　devoid　of　wisdom；　rather　than　with　a　certain　degree　of



wisdom？



　　Pro。　Certainly　not；　Socrates；　but　why　repeat　such　questions　any



more？



　　Soc。　Then　the　perfect　and　universally　eligible　and　entirely　good



cannot　possibly　be　either　of　them？



　　Pro。　Impossible。



　　Soc。　Then　now　we　must　ascertain　the　nature　of　the　good　more　or



less　accurately；　in　order；　as　we　were　saying；　that　the　second　place



may　be　duly　assigned。



　　Pro。　Right。



　　Soc。　Have　we　not　found　a　road　which　leads　towards　the　good？



　　Pro。　What　road？



　　Soc。　Supposing　that　a　man　had　to　be　found；　and　you　could　discover　in



what　house　he　lived；　would　not　that　be　a　great　step　towards　the



discovery　of　the　man　himself？



　　Pro。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　And　now　reason　intimates　to　us；　as　at　our　first　beginning；　that



we　should　seek　the　good；　not　in　the　unmixed　life　but　in　the　mixed。



　　Pro。　True。



　　Soc。　There　is　greater　hope　of　finding　that　which　we　are　seeking　in



the　life　which　is　well　mixed　than　in　that　which　is　not？



　　Pro。　Far　greater。



　　Soc。　Then　now　let　us　mingle；　Protarchus；　at　the　same　time　offering



up　a　prayer　to　Dionysus　or　Hephaestus；　or　whoever　is　the　god　who



presides　over　the　ceremony　of　mingling。



　　Pro。　By　all　means。



　　Soc。　Are　not　we　the　cup…bearers？　and　here　are　two　fountains　which



are　flowing　at　our　side：　one；　which　is　pleasure；　may　be　likened　to　a



fountain　of　honey；　the　other；　wisdom；　a　sober　draught　in　which　no　wine



mingles；　is　of　water　unpleasant　but　healthful；　out　of　these　we　must



seek　to　make　the　fairest　of　all　possible　mixtures。



　　Pro。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　Tell　me　first；…should　we　be　most　likely　to　succeed　if　we



mingled　every　sort　of　pleasure　with　every　sort　of　wisdom？



　　Pro。　Perhaps　we　might。



　　Soc。　But　I　should　be　afraid　of　the　risk；　and　I　think　that　I　can　show



a　safer　plan。



　　Pro。　What　is　it？



　　Soc。　One　pleasure　was　supposed　by　us　to　be　truer　than　another；　and



one　art　to　be　more　exact　than　another。



　　Pro。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　There　was　also　supposed　to　be　a　difference　in　sciences；　some　of



them　regarding　only　the　transient　and　perishing；　and　others　the



permanent　and　imperishable　and　everlasting　and　immutable；　and　when



judged　by　the　standard　of　truth；　the　latter；　as　we　thought；　were　truer



than　the　former。



　　Pro。　Very　good　and　right。



　　Soc。　If；　then；　we　were　to　begin　by　mingling　the　sections　of　each



class　which　have　the　most　of　truth；　will　not　the　union　suffice　to　give



us　the　loveliest　of　lives；　or　shall　we　still　want　some　elements　of



another　kind？



　　Pro。　I　think　that　we　ought　to　do　what　you　suggest。



　　Soc。　Let　us　suppose　a　man　who　understands　justice；　and　has　reason　as



well　as　understanding　about　the　true　nature　of　this　and　of　all　other



things。



　　Pro。　We　will　suppose　such　a　man。



　　Soc。　Will　he　have　enough　of　knowledge　if　he　is　acquainted　only



with　the　divine　circle　and　sphere；　and　knows　nothing　of　our　human



spheres　and　circles；　but　uses　only　divine　circles　and　measures　in



the　building　of　a　house？



　　Pro。　The　knowledge　which　is　only　superhuman；　Socrates；　is　ridiculous



in　man。



　　Soc。　What　do　you　mean？　Do　you　mean　that　you　are　to　throw　into　the



cup　and　mingle　the　impure　and　uncertain　art　which　uses　the　false



measure　and　the　false　circle？



　　Pro。　Yes；　we　must；　if　any　of　us　is　ever　to　find　his　way　home。



　　Soc。　And　am　I　to　include　music；　which；　as；　I　was　saying　just　now；　is



full　of　guesswork　and　imitation；　and　is　wanting　in　purity？



　　Pro。　Yes；　I　think　that　you　must；　if　human　life　is　to　be　a　life　at



all。



　　Soc。　Well；　then；　suppose　that　I　give　way；　and；　like　a　doorkeeper　who



is　pushed　and　overborne　by　the　mob；　I　open　the　door　wide；　and　let



knowledge　of　every　sort　stream　in；　and　the　pure　mingle　with　the



impure？



　　Pro。　I　do　not　know；　Socrates；　that　any　great　harm　would　come　of



having　them　all；　if　only　you　have　the　first　sort。



　　Soc。　Well；　then；　shall　I　let　them　all　flow　into　what　Homer



poetically　terms　〃a　meeting　of　the　waters〃？



　　Pro。　By　all　means。



　　Soc。　There…I　have　let　him　in；　and　now　I　must　return　to　the



fountain　of　pleasure。　For　we　were　not　permitted　to　begin　by　mingling



in　a　single　stream　the　true　portions　of　both　according　to　our　original



intention；　but　the　love　of　all　knowledge　constrained　us　to　let　all　the



sciences　flow　in　together　before　the　pleasures。



　　Pro。　Quite　true。



　　Soc。　And　now　the　time　has　come　for　us　to　consider　about　the



pleasures　also；　whether　we　shall　in　like　manner　let　them　go　all　at



once；　or　at　first　only　the　true　ones。



　　Pro。　It　will　be　by　far　the　safer　course　to　let　flow　the　true　ones



first。



　　Soc。　Let　them　flow；　then；　and　now；　if　there　are　any　necessary



pleasures；　as　there　were　arts　and　sciences　necessary；　must　we　not



mingle　them？



　　Pro。　Yes；　the　necessary　pleasures　should　certainly　be　allowed　to



mingle。



　　Soc。　The　knowledge　of　the　arts　has　been　admitted　to　be　innocent



and　useful　always；　and　if　we　say　of　pleasures　in　like　manner　that



all　of　them　are　good　and　innocent　for　all　of　us　at　all　times；　we



must　let　them　all　mingle？



　　Pro。　What　shall　we　say　about　them；　and　what　course　shall　we　take？



　　Soc。　Do　not　ask　me；　Protarchus；　but　ask　the　daughters　of　pleasure



and　wisdom　to　answer　for　themselves。



　　Pro。　How？



　　Soc。　Tell　us；　O　beloved…shall　we　call　you　pleasures　or　by　some　other



name？…would　you　rather　live　with　or　without　wisdom？　I　am　of　opinion



that　they　would　certainly　answer　as　follows：



　　Pro。　How？



　　Soc。　They　would　answer；　as　we　said　before；　that　for　any　single　class



to　be　left　by　itself　pure　and　isolated　is　not　good；　nor　altogether



possible；　and　that　if　we　are　to　make　comparisons　of　one　class　with



another　and　choose；　there　is　no　better　companion　than　knowledge　of



things　in　general；　and　likewise　the　perfect　knowledge；　if　that　may　be；



of　ourselves　in　every　respect。



　　Pro。　And　our　answer　will　be：…In　that　ye　have　spoken　well。



　　Soc。　Very　true。　And　now　let　us　go　back　and　interrogate　wisdom　and



mind：　Would　you　like　to　have　any　pleasures　in　the　mixture？　And　they



will　reply：…〃What　pleasures　do　you　mean？〃



　　Pro。　Likely　enough。



　　Soc。　And　we　shall　take　up　our　parable　and　say：　Do　you　wish　to　have



the　greatest　and　most　vehement　pleasures　for　your　companions　in



addition　to　the　true　ones？　〃Why；　Socrates；〃　they　will　say；　〃how　can



we？　seeing　that　they　are　the　source　of　ten　thousand　hindrances　to



us；　they　trouble　the　souls　of　men；　which　are　our　habitation；　with



their　madness；　they　prevent　us　from　coming　to　the　birth；　and　are



commonly　the　ruin　of　the　children　which　are　born　to　us；　causing　them



to　be　forgotten　and　unheeded；　but　the　true　and　pure　pleasures；　of



which　you　spoke；　know　to　be　of　our　family；　and　also　those　pleasures



which　accompany　health　and　temperance；　and　which　every　Virtue；　like



a　goddess　has　in　her　train　to　follow　her　about　wherever　she



goes；…mingle　these　and　not　the　others；　there　would　be　great　want　of



sense　in　any　one　who　desires　to　see　a　fair　and　perfect　mixture；　and　to



find　in　it　what　is　the　highest　good　in　man　and　in　the　universe；　and　to



divine　what　is　the　true　form　of　good…there　would　be　great　want　of



sense　in　his　allowing　the　pleasures；　which　are　always　in　the　company



of　folly　and　vice；　to　mingle　with　mind　in　the　cup。〃…Is　not　this　a　very



rational　and　suitable　reply；　which　mind　has　made；　both　on　her　own



behalf；　as　well　as　on　the　behalf　of　memory　and　true　opinion？



　　Pro。　Most　certainly。



　　Soc。　And　still　there　must　be　something　more　added；　which　is　a



necessary　ingredient　in　every　mixture。



　　Pro。　What　is　that？



　　Soc。　Unless　truth　enter　into　the　composition；　nothing　can　truly　be



created　or　subsist。



　　Pro。　Impossible。



　　Soc。　Quite　impossible；　and　now　you　and　Philebus　must　tell　me　whether



anything　is　still　wanting　in　the　mixture；　for　to　my　way　of　thinking



the　argument　is　now　completed；　and　may　be　compared　to　an　incorporeal



law；　which　is　going　to　hold　fair　rule　over　a　living　body。



　　Pro。　I　agree　with　you；　Socrates。



　　Soc。　And　may　we　not　say　with　reason　that　we　are　now　at　the　vestibule



of　the　habitation　of　the　good？



　　Pro。　I　think　that　we　are。



　　Soc。　What；　then；　is　there　in　the　mixture　which　is　most　precious；　and



which　is　the　principal　cause　why　such　a　state　is　universally　beloved



by　all？　When　we　have　discovered　it；　we　will　proceed　to　ask　whether



this　omnipresent　nature　is　more　akin　to　pleasure　or　to　mind。



　　Pro。　Quite　right；　in　that　way　we　shall　be　better　able　to　judge。



　　Soc。　And　there　is　no　difficulty　in　seeing　the　cause　which　renders



any　mixture　either　of　the　highest　value　or　of　none　at　all。



　　Pro。　What　do　you　mean？



　　Soc。　Every　man　knows　it。



　　Pro。　What？



　　Soc。　He　knows　that　any　want　of　measure　and　symmetry　in　any　mixture



whatever　must　always　of　necessity　be　fatal；　both　to　the　elements　and



to　the　mixture；　which　is　then　not　a　mixture；　but　only　a　confused



medley　which　brings　confusion　on　the　possessor　of　it。



　　Pro。　Most　true。



　　Soc。　And　now　the　power　of　the　good　has　retired　into　the　region　of



the　beautiful；　for　measure　and　symmetry　are　beauty　and　virtue　all



the　world　over。



　　Pro。　True。



　　Soc。　Also　we　said　that　truth　was　to　form　an　element　in　the　mixture。



　　Pro。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　Then；　if　we　are　not　able　to　hunt　the　good　with　one　idea　only；



with　three　we　may　catch　our　prey；　Beauty；　Symmetry；　Truth　are　the



three；　and　these　taken　together　we　may　regard　as　the　single　cause　of



the　mixture；　and　the　mixture　as　being　good　by　reason　of　the　infusion



of　them。



　　Pro。　Quite　right。



　　Soc。　And　now；　Protarchus；　any　man　cou