philebus-第2章
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decided； and the right determination of them is very helpful。
Pro。 Then； Socrates； let us begin by clearing up these questions。
Soc。 That is what I should wish。
Pro。 And I am sure that all my other friends will be glad to hear
them discussed； Philebus； fortunately for us； is not disposed to move；
and we had better not stir him up with questions。
Soc。 Good； and where shall we begin this great and multifarious
battle； in which such various points are at issue？ Shall begin thus？
Pro。 How？
Soc。 We say that the one and many become identified by thought；
and that now； as in time past； they run about together； in and out
of every word which is uttered； and that this union of them will never
cease； and is not now beginning； but is； as I believe； an
everlasting quality of thought itself； which never grows old。 Any
young man； when he first tastes these subtleties； is delighted； and
fancies that he has found a treasure of wisdom； in the first
enthusiasm of his joy he leaves no stone； or rather no thought
unturned； now rolling up the many into the one； and kneading them
together； now unfolding and dividing them； he puzzles himself first
and above all； and then he proceeds to puzzle his neighbours；
whether they are older or younger； or of his own age…that makes no
difference； neither father nor mother does he spare； no human being
who has ears is safe from him； hardly even his dog； and a barbarian
would have no chance of escaping him； if an interpreter could only
be found。
Pro。 Considering； Socrates； how many we are； and that all of us
are young men； is there not a danger that we and Philebus may all
set upon you； if you abuse us？ We understand what you mean； but is
there no charm by which we may dispel all this confusion； no more
excellent way of arriving at the truth？ If there is； we hope that
you will guide us into that way； and we will do our best to follow；
for the enquiry in which we are engaged； Socrates； is not unimportant。
Soc。 The reverse of unimportant； my boys； as Philebus calls you； and
there neither is nor ever will be a better than my own favourite
way； which has nevertheless already often deserted me and left me
helpless in the hour of need。
Pro。 Tell us what that is。
Soc。 One which may be easily pointed out； but is by no means easy of
application； it is the parent of all the discoveries in the arts。
Pro。 Tell us what it is。
Soc。 A gift of heaven； which； as I conceive； the gods tossed among
men by the hands of a new Prometheus； and therewith a blaze of
light； and the ancients； who were our betters and nearer the gods than
we are； handed down the tradition； that whatever things are said to be
are composed of one and many； and have the finite； and infinite
implanted in them： seeing； then； that such is the order of the
world； we too ought in every enquiry to begin by laying down one
idea of that which is the subject of enquiry； this unity we shall find
in everything。 Having found it； we may next proceed to look for two；
if there be two； or； if not； then for three or some other number；
subdividing each of these units； until at last the unity with which we
began is seen not only to be one and many and infinite； but also a
definite number； the infinite must not be suffered to approach the
many until the entire number of the species intermediate between unity
and infinity has been discovered…then； and not till then； we may； rest
from division； and without further troubling ourselves about the
endless individuals may allow them to drop into infinity。 This； as I
was saying； is the way of considering and learning and teaching one
another； which the gods have handed down to us。 But the wise men of
our time are either too quick or too slow； in conceiving plurality
in unity。 Having no method； they make their one and many anyhow； and
from unity pass at once to infinity； the intermediate steps never
occur to them。 And this； I repeat； is what makes the difference
between the mere art of disputation and true dialectic。
Pro。 I think that I partly understand you Socrates； but I should
like to have a clearer notion of what you are saying。
Soc。 I may illustrate my meaning by the letters of the alphabet；
Protarchus； which you were made to learn as a child。
Pro。 How do they afford an illustration？
Soc。 The sound which passes through the lips whether of an
individual or of all men is one and yet infinite。
Pro。 Very true。
Soc。 And yet not by knowing either that sound is one or that sound
is infinite are we perfect in the art of speech； but the knowledge
of the number and nature of sounds is what makes a man a grammarian。
Pro。 Very true。
Soc。 And the knowledge which makes a man a musician is of the same
kind。
Pro。 How so？
Soc。 Sound is one in music as well as in grammar？
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 And there is a higher note and a lower note； and a note of
equal pitch：…may we affirm so much？
Pro。 Yes。
Soc。 But you would not be a real musician if this was all that you
knew； though if you did not know this you would know almost nothing of
music。
Pro。 Nothing。
Soc。 But when you have learned what sounds are high and what low；
and the number and nature of the intervals and their limits or
proportions； and the systems compounded out of them； which our fathers
discovered； and have handed down to us who are their descendants under
the name of harmonies； and the affections corresponding to them in the
movements of the human body； which when measured by numbers ought；
as they say； to be called rhythms and measures； and they tell us
that the same principle should be applied to every one and many；…when；
I say； you have learned all this； then； my dear friend； you are
perfect； and you may be said to understand any other subject； when you
have a similar grasp of it。 But the； infinity of kinds and the
infinity of individuals which there is in each of them； when not
classified； creates in every one of us a state of infinite
ignorance； and he who never looks for number in anything； will not
himself be looked for in the number of famous men。
Pro。 I think that what Socrates is now saying is excellent；
Philebus。
Phi。 I think so too； but how do his words bear upon us and upon
the argument？
Soc。 Philebus is right in asking that question of us； Protarchus。
Pro。 Indeed he is； and you must answer him。
Soc。 I will； but you must let me make one little remark first
about these matters； I was saying； that he who begins with any
individual unity； should proceed from that； not to infinity； but to
a definite number； and now I say conversely； that he who has to
begin with infinity should not jump to unity； but he should look about
for some number； representing a certain quantity； and thus out of
all end in one。 And now let us return for an illustration of our
principle to the case of letters。
Pro。 What do you mean？
Soc。 Some god or divine man； who in the Egyptian legend is said to
have been Theuth； observing that the human voice was infinite； first
distinguished in this infinity a certain number of vowels； and then
other letters which had sound； but were not pure vowels （i。e。； the
semivowels）； these too exist in a definite number； and lastly； he
distinguished a third class of letters which we now call mutes；
without voice and without sound； and divided these； and likewise the
two other classes of vowels and semivowels； into the individual
sounds； told the number of them； and gave to each and all of them
the name of letters； and observing that none of us could learn any one
of them and not learn them all； and in consideration of this common
bond which in a manner united them； he assigned to them all a single
art； and this he called the art of grammar or letters。
Phi。 The illustration； Protarchus； has assisted me in
understanding the original statement； but I still feel the defect of
which I just now complained。
Soc。 Are you going to ask； Philebus； what this has to do with the
argument？
Phi。 Yes； that is a question which Protarchus and I have been long
asking。
Soc。 Assuredly you have already arrived at the answer to the
question which； as you say； you have been so long asking？
Phi。 How so？
Soc。 Did we not begin by enquiring into the comparative
eligibility of pleasure and wisdom？
Phi。 Certainly。
Soc。 And we maintain that they are each of them one？
Phi。 True。
Soc。 And the precise question to which the previous discussion
desires an answer is； how they are one and also many ＇i。e。； how they
have one genus and many species＇； and are not at once infinite； and
what number of species is to be assigned to either of them before they
pass into infinity。
Pro。 That is a very serious question； Philebus； to which Socrates
has ingeniously brought us round； and please to consider which of us
shall answer him； there may be something ridiculous in my being unable
to answer； and therefore imposing the task upon you； when I have
undertaken the whole charge of the argument； but if neither of us were
able to answer； the result methinks would be still more ridiculous。
Let us consider； then； what we are to do：…Socrates； if I understood
him rightly； is asking whether there are not kinds of pleasure； and
what is the number and nature of them； and the same of wisdom。
Soc。 Most true； O son of Callias； and the previous argument showed
that if we are not able to tell the kinds of everything that has
unity； likeness； sameness； or their opposites； none of us will be of
the smallest use in any enquiry。
Pro。 That seems to be very near the truth； Socrates。 Happy would the
wise man be if he knew all things； and the next best thing for him
is that he should know himself。 Why do I say so at this moment？ I will
tell you。 You； Socrates； have granted us this opportunity of
conversing with you； and are ready to assist us in determining what is
the best of human goods。 For when Philebus said that pleasure and
delight and enjoyment and the like were the chief good； you
answered…No； not those； but another class of goods； and we are
constantly reminding ourselves of what you said； and very properly； in
order that we may not forget to examine and compare the two。 And these
goods； which in your opinion are to be designated as superior to
pleasure； and are the true objects of pursuit； are mind and
knowledge and understanding and art and the like。 There was a
dispute about which were the best； and we playfully threatened that
you should not be allowed to go home until the question was settl
