philebus-第6章
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necessary to him who chose the life of thought and wisdom。
Pro。 Yes； certainly； we said so。
Soc。 Then he will live without pleasure； and who knows whether
this may not be the most divine of all lives？
Pro。 If so； the gods； at any rate； cannot be supposed to have either
joy or sorrow。
Soc。 Certainly not…there would be a great impropriety in the
assumption of either alternative。 But whether the gods are or are
not indifferent to pleasure is a point which may be considered
hereafter if in any way relevant to the argument； and whatever is
the conclusion we will place it to the account of mind in her
contest for the second place； should she have to resign the first。
Pro。 Just so。
Soc。 The other class of pleasures； which as we were saying is purely
mental； is entirely derived from memory。
Pro。 What do you mean？
Soc。 I must first of all analyse memory； or rather perception
which is prior to； memory； if the subject of our discussion is ever to
be properly cleared up。
Pro。 How will you proceed？
Soc。 Let us imagine affections of the body which are extinguished
before they reach the soul； and leave her unaffected； and again； other
affections which vibrate through both soul and body； and impart a
shock to both and to each of them。
Pro。 Granted。
Soc。 And the soul may be truly said to be oblivious of the first but
not of the second？
Pro。 Quite true。
Soc。 When I say oblivious； do not suppose that I mean
forgetfulness in a literal sense； for forgetfulness is the exit of
memory； which in this case has not yet entered； and to speak of the
loss of that which is not yet in existence； and never has been； is a
contradiction； do you see？
Pro。 Yes。
Soc。 Then just be so good as to change the terms。
Pro。 How shall I change them？
Soc。 Instead of the oblivion of the soul； when you are describing
the state in which she is unaffected by the shocks of the body； say
unconsciousness。
Pro。 I see。
Soc。 And the union or communion of soul and body in one feeling
and motion would be properly called consciousness？
Pro。 Most true。
Soc。 Then now we know the meaning of the word？
Pro。 Yes。
Soc。 And memory may； I think； be rightly described as the
preservation of consciousness？
Pro。 Right。
Soc。 But do we not distinguish memory from recollection？
Pro。 I think so。
Soc。 And do we not mean by recollection the power which the soul has
of recovering； when by herself； some feeling which she experienced
when in company with the body？
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 And when she recovers of herself the lost recollection of
some consciousness or knowledge； the recovery is termed recollection
and reminiscence？
Pro。 Very true。
Soc。 There is a reason why I say all this。
Pro。 What is it？
Soc。 I want to attain the plainest possible notion of pleasure and
desire； as they exist in the mind only； apart from the body； and the
previous analysis helps to show the nature of both。
Pro。 Then now； Socrates； let us proceed to the next point。
Soc。 There are certainly many things to be considered in
discussing the generation and whole complexion of pleasure。 At the
outset we must determine the nature and seat of desire。
Pro。 Ay； let us enquire into that； for we shall lose nothing。
Soc。 Nay； Protarchus； we shall surely lose the puzzle if we find the
answer。
Pro。 A fair retort； but let us proceed。
Soc。 Did we not place hunger； thirst； and the like； in the class
of desires？
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 And yet they are very different； what common nature have we
in view when we call them by a single name？
Pro。 By heavens； Socrates； that is a question which is； not easily
answered； but it must be answered。
Soc。 Then let us go back to our examples。
Pro。 Where shall we begin？
Soc。 Do we mean anything when we say 〃a man thirsts〃？
Pro。 Yes。
Soc。 We mean to say that he 〃is empty〃？
Pro。 Of course。
Soc。 And is not thirst desire？
Pro。 Yes； of drink。
Soc。 Would you say of drink； or of replenishment with drink？
Pro。 I should say； of replenishment with drink。
Soc。 Then he who is empty desires； as would appear； the opposite
of what he experiences； for he is empty and desires to be full？
Pro。 Clearly so。
Soc。 But how can a man who is empty for the first time； attain
either by perception or memory to any apprehension of replenishment；
of which he has no present or past experience？
Pro。 Impossible。
Soc。 And yet he who desires； surely desires something？
Pro。 Of course。
Soc。 He does not desire that which he experiences； for he
experiences thirst； and thirst is emptiness； but he desires
replenishment？
Pro。 True。
Soc。 Then there must be something in the thirsty man which in some
way apprehends replenishment？
Pro。 There must。
Soc。 And that cannot be the body； for the body is supposed to be
emptied？
Pro。 Yes。
Soc。 The only remaining alternative is that the soul apprehends
the replenishment by the help of memory； as is obvious； for what other
way can there be？
Pro。 I cannot imagine any other。
Soc。 But do you see the consequence？
Pro。 What is it？
Soc。 That there is no such thing as desire of the body。
Pro。 Why so？
Soc。 Why； because the argument shows that the endeavour of every
animal is to the reverse of his bodily state。
Pro。 Yes。
Soc。 And the impulse which leads him to the opposite of what he is
experiencing proves that he has a memory of the opposite state。
Pro。 True。
Soc。 And the argument； having proved that memory attracts us towards
the objects of desire； proves also that the impulses and the desires
and the moving principle in every living being have their origin in
the soul。
Pro。 Most true。
Soc。 The argument will not allow that our body either hungers or
thirsts or has any similar experience。
Pro。 Quite right。
Soc。 Let me make a further observation； the argument appears to me
to imply that there is a kind of life which consists in these
affections。
Pro。 Of what affections； and of what kind of life； are you speaking？
Soc。 I am speaking of being emptied and replenished； and of all that
relates to the preservation and destruction of living beings； as
well as of the pain which is felt in one of these states and of the
pleasure which succeeds to it。
Pro。 True。
Soc。 And what would you say of the intermediate state？
Pro。 What do you mean by 〃intermediate〃？
Soc。 I mean when a person is in actual suffering and yet remembers
past pleasures which； if they would only return； would relieve him；
but as yet he has them not。 May we not say of him； that he is in an
intermediate state？
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 Would you say that he was wholly pained or wholly pleased？
Pro。 Nay； I should say that he has two pains； in his body there is
the actual experience of pain； and in his soul longing and
expectation。
Soc。 What do you mean； Protarchus； by the two pains？ May not a man
who is empty have at one time a sure hope of being filled； and at
other times be quite in despair？
Pro。 Very true。
Soc。 And has he not the pleasure of memory when he is hoping to be
filled； and yet in that he is empty is he not at the same time in
pain？
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 Then man and the other animals have at the same time both
pleasure and pain？
Pro。 I suppose so。
Soc。 But when a man is empty and has no hope of being filled；
there will be the double experience of pain。 You observed this and
inferred that the double experience was the single case possible。
Pro。 Quite true； Socrates。
Soc。 Shall the enquiry into these states of feeling be made the
occasion of raising a question？
Pro。 What question？
Soc。 Whether we ought to say that the pleasures and pains of which
we are speaking are true or false？ or some true and some false？
Pro。 But how； Socrates； can there be false pleasures and pains？
Soc。 And how； Protarchus； can there be true and false fears； or true
and false expectations； or true and false opinions？
Pro。 I grant that opinions may be true or false； but not pleasures。
Soc。 What do you mean？ I am afraid that we are raising a very
serious enquiry。
Pro。 There I agree。
Soc。 And yet； my boy； for you are one of Philebus' boys； the point
to be considered； is； whether the enquiry is relevant to the argument。
Pro。 Surely。
Soc。 No tedious and irrelevant discussion can be allowed； what is
said should be pertinent。
Pro。 Right。
Soc。 I am always wondering at the question which has now been
raised。
Pro。 How so？
Soc。 Do you deny that some pleasures are false； and others true？
Pro。 To be sure I do。
Soc。 Would you say that no one ever seemed to rejoice and yet did
not rejoice； or seemed to feel pain and yet did not feel pain；
sleeping or waking； mad or lunatic？
Pro。 So we have always held； Socrates。
Soc。 But were you right？ Shall we enquire into the truth of your
opinion？
Pro。 I think that we should。
Soc。 Let us then put into more precise terms the question which
has arisen about pleasure and opinion。 Is there such a thing as
opinion？
Pro。 Yes。
Soc。 And such a thing as pleasure？
Pro。 Yes。
Soc。 And an opinion must of something？
Pro。 True。
Soc。 And a man must be pleased by something？
Pro。 Quite correct。
Soc。 And whether the opinion be right or wrong； makes no difference；
it will still be an opinion？
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 And he who is pleased； whether he is rightly pleased or not
will always have a real feeling of pleasure？
Pro。 Yes； that is also quite true。
Soc。 Then； how can opinion be both true and false； and pleasure true
only； although pleasure and opinion are both equally real？
Pro。 Yes； that is the question。
Soc。 You mean that opinion admits of truth and falsehood； and
hence becomes not merely opinion； but opinion of a certain quality；
and this is what you think should be examined？
Pro。 Yes。
Soc。 And further； even if we admit the existence of qualities in
other objects； may not pleasure and pain be simple and devoid of
quality？
Pro。 Clearly。
Soc。 But there is no difficulty in seeing that Pleasure and pain
as well as opinion have qualities； for they are great or small； and
have various degrees of intensity； as was indeed said long ago by us。
Pro。 Quite true。
Soc。 And if badness attaches to any of them； Protarchus； then we
should speak
