philebus-第8章
按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
Soc。 And suppose you part off from pleasures and pains the element
which makes them appear to be greater or less than they really are：
you will acknowledge that this element is illusory； and you will never
say that the corresponding excess or defect of pleasure or pain is
real or true。
Pro。 Certainly not。
Soc。 Next let us see whether in another direction we may not find
pleasures and pains existing and appearing in living beings； which are
still more false than these。
Pro。 What are they； and how shall we find them？
Soc。 If I am not mistaken； I have often repeated that pains and
aches and suffering and uneasiness of all sorts arise out of a
corruption of nature caused by concretions； and dissolutions； and
repletions； and evacuations； and also by growth and decay？
Pro。 Yes； that has been often said。
Soc。 And we have also agreed that the restoration of the natural
state is pleasure？
Pro。 Right。
Soc。 But now let us suppose an interval of time at which the body
experiences none of these changes。
Pro。 When can that be； Socrates？
Soc。 Your question； Protarchus； does not help the argument。
Pro。 Why not； Socrates？
Soc。 Because it does not prevent me from repeating mine。
Pro。 And what was that？
Soc。 Why； Protarchus； admitting that there is no such interval； I
may ask what would be the necessary consequence if there were？
Pro。 You mean； what would happen if the body were not changed either
for good or bad？
Soc。 Yes。
Pro。 Why then； Socrates； I should suppose that there would be
neither pleasure nor pain。
Soc。 Very good； but still； if I am not mistaken； you do assert
that we must always be experiencing one of them； that is what the wise
tell us； for； say they； all things are ever flowing up and down。
Pro。 Yes； and their words are of no mean authority。
Soc。 Of course； for they are no mean authorities themselves； and I
should like to avoid the brunt of their argument。 Shall I tell you how
I mean to escape from them？ And you shall be the partner of my flight。
Pro。 How？
Soc。 To them we will say： 〃Good； but are we； or living things in
general； always conscious of what happens to us…for example； of our
growth； or the like？ Are we not； on the contrary； almost wholly
unconscious of this and similar phenomena？〃 You must answer for them。
Pro。 The latter alternative is the true one。
Soc。 Then we were not right in saying； just now； that motions
going up and down cause pleasures and pains？
Pro。 True。
Soc。 A better and more unexceptionable way of speaking will be…
Pro。 What？
Soc。 If we say that the great changes produce pleasures and pains；
but that the moderate and lesser ones do neither。
Pro。 That； Socrates； is the more correct mode of speaking。
Soc。 But if this be true； the life to which I was just now referring
again appears。
Pro。 What life？
Soc。 The life which we affirmed to be devoid either of pain or of
joy。
Pro。 Very true。
Soc。 We may assume then that there are three lives； one pleasant；
one painful； and the third which is neither； what say you？
Pro。 I should say as you do that there are three of them。
Soc。 But if so； the negation of pain will not be the same with
pleasure。
Pro。 Certainly not。
Soc。 Then when you hear a person saying； that always to live without
pain is the pleasantest of all things； what would you understand him
to mean by that statement？
Pro。 I think that by pleasure he must mean the negative of pain。
Soc。 Let us take any three things； or suppose that we embellish a
little and call the first gold； the second silver； and there shall
be a third which is neither。
Pro。 Very good。
Soc。 Now； can that which is neither be either gold or silver？
Pro。 Impossible。
Soc。 No more can that neutral or middle life be rightly or
reasonably spoken or thought of as pleasant or painful。
Pro。 Certainly not。
Soc。 And yet； my friend； there are； as we know； persons who say
and think so。
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 And do they think that they have pleasure when they are free
from pain？
Pro。 They say so。
Soc。 And they must think or they would not say that they have
pleasure。
Pro。 I suppose not。
Soc。 And yet if pleasure and the negation of pain are of distinct
natures； they are wrong。
Pro。 But they are undoubtedly of distinct natures。
Soc。 Then shall we take the view that they are three； as we were
just now saying； or that they are two only…the one being a state of
pain； which is an evil； and the other a cessation of pain； which is of
itself a good； and is called pleasant？
Pro。 But why； Socrates； do we ask the question at all？ I do not
see the reason。
Soc。 You； Protarchus； have clearly never heard of certain enemies of
our friend Philebus。
Pro。 And who may they be？
Soc。 Certain persons who are reputed to be masters in natural
philosophy； who deny the very existence of pleasure。
Pro。 Indeed。
Soc。 They say that what the school of Philebus calls pleasures are
all of them only avoidances of pain。
Pro。 And would you； Socrates； have us agree with them？
Soc。 Why； no； I would rather use them as a sort of diviners； who
divine the truth； not by rules of art； but by an instinctive
repugnance and extreme detestation which a noble nature has of the
power of pleasure； in which they think that there is nothing sound；
and her seductive influence is declared by them to be witchcraft；
and not pleasure。 This is the use which you may make of them。 And when
you have considered the various grounds of their dislike； you shall
hear from me what I deem to be true pleasures。 Having thus examined
the nature of pleasure from both points of view； we will bring her
up for judgment。
Pro。 Well said。
Soc。 Then let us enter into an alliance with these philosophers
and follow in the track of their dislike。 I imagine that they would
say something of this sort； they would begin at the beginning； and ask
whether； if we wanted to know the nature of any quality； such as
hardness； we should be more likely to discover it by looking at the
hardest things； rather than at the least hard？ You； Protarchus；
shall answer these severe gentlemen as you answer me。
Pro。 By all means； and I reply to them； that you should look at
the greatest instances。
Soc。 Then if we want to see the true nature of pleasures as a class；
we should not look at the most diluted pleasures； but at the most
extreme and most vehement？
Pro。 In that every one will agree。
Soc。 And the obvious instances of the greatest pleasures； as we have
often said； are the pleasures of the body？
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 And are they felt by us to be or become greater； when we are
sick or when we are in health？ And here we must be careful in our
answer； or we shall come to grief。
Pro。 How will that be？
Soc。 Why； because we might be tempted to answer； 〃When we are in
health。〃
Pro。 Yes； that is the natural answer。
Soc。 Well； but are not those pleasures the greatest of which mankind
have the greatest desires？
Pro。 True。
Soc。 And do not people who are in a fever； or any similar illness；
feel cold or thirst or other bodily affections more intensely？ Am I
not right in saying that they have a deeper want and greater
pleasure in the satisfaction of their want？
Pro。 That is obvious as soon as it is said。
Soc。 Well； then； shall we not be right in saying； that if a person
would wish to see the greatest pleasures he ought to go and look；
not at health； but at discase？ And here you must distinguish：…do not
imagine that I mean to ask whether those who are very ill have more
pleasures than those who are well； but understand that I am speaking
of the magnitude of pleasure； I want to know where pleasures are found
to be most intense。 For； as I say； we have to discover what is
pleasure； and what they mean by pleasure who deny her very existence。
Pro。 I think I follow you。
Soc。 You will soon have a better opportunity of showing whether
you do or not； Protarchus。 Answer now； and tell me whether you see；
I will not say more； but more intense and excessive pleasures in
wantonness than in temperance？ Reflect before you speak。
Pro。 I understand you； and see that there is a great difference
between them； the temperate are restrained by the wise man's
aphorism of 〃Never too much；〃 which is their rule； but excess of
pleasure possessing the minds of fools and wantons becomes madness and
makes them shout with delight。
Soc。 Very good； and if this be true； then the greatest pleasures and
pains will clearly be found in some vicious state of soul and body；
and not in a virtuous state。
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 And ought we not to select some of these for examination； and
see what makes them the greatest？
Pro。 To be sure we ought。
Soc。 Take the case of the pleasures which arise out of certain
disorders。
Pro。 What disorders？
Soc。 The pleasures of unseemly disorders； which our severe friends
utterly detest。
Pro。 What pleasures？
Soc。 Such； for example； as the relief of itching and other
ailments by scratching； which is the only remedy required。 For what in
Heaven's name is the feeling to be called which is thus produced in
us？…Pleasure or pain？
Pro。 A villainous mixture of some kind； Socrates； I should say。
Soc。 I did not introduce the argument； O Protarchus； with any
personal reference to Philebus； but because； without the consideration
of these and similar pleasures； we shall not be able to determine
the point at issue。
Pro。 Then we had better proceed to analyze this family of pleasures。
Soe。 You mean the pleasures which are mingled with pain？
Pro。 Exactly。
Soc。 There are some mixtures which are of the body； and only in
the body； and others which are of the soul； and only in the soul；
while there are other mixtures of pleasures with pains； common both to
soul and body； which in their composite state are called sometimes
pleasures and sometimes pains。
Pro。 How is that？
Soc。 Whenever； in the restoration or in the derangement of nature； a
man experiences two opposite feelings； for example； when he is cold
and is growing warm； or again； when he is hot and is becoming cool；
and he wants to have the one and be rid of the other；…the sweet has
a bitter； as the common saying is； and both together fasten upon him
and create irritation and in time drive him to distraction。
Pro。 That description is very true to nature。
Soc。 And in t
