philebus-第9章
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Pro。 That description is very true to nature。
Soc。 And in these sorts of mixtures the pleasures and pains are
sometimes equal； and sometimes one or other of them predominates？
Pro。 True。
Soc。 Of cases in which the pain exceeds the pleasure； an example
is afforded by itching； of which we were just now speaking； and by the
tingling which we feel when the boiling and fiery element is within；
and the rubbing and motion only relieves the surface； and does not
reach the parts affected； then if you put them to the fire； and as a
last resort apply cold to them； you may often produce the most intense
pleasure or pain in the inner parts； which contrasts and mingles
with the pain or pleasure； as the case may be； of the outer parts； and
this is due to the forcible separation of what is united； or to the
union of what is separated； and to the juxtaposition of pleasure and
pain。
Pro。 Quite so。
Soc。 Sometimes the element of pleasure prevails in a man； and the
slight undercurrent of pain makes him tingle； and causes a gentle
irritation； or again； the excessive infusion of pleasure creates an
excitement in him；…he even leaps for joy； he assumes all sorts of
attitudes； he changes all manner of colours； he gasps for breath；
and is quite amazed； and utters the most irrational exclamations。
Pro。 Yes； indeed。
Soc。 He will say of himself； and others will of him； that he is
dying with these delights； and the more dissipated and
good…for…nothing he is； the more vehemently he pursues them in every
way； of all pleasures he declares them to be the greatest； and he
reckons him who lives in the most constant enjoyment of them to be the
happiest of mankind。
Pro。 That； Socrates； is a very true description of the opinions of
the majority about pleasures。
Soc。 Yes； Protarchus； quite true of the mixed pleasures； which arise
out of the communion of external and internal sensations in the
body； there are also cases in which the mind contributes an；
opposite element to the body； whether of pleasure or pain； and the two
unite and form one mixture。 Concerning these I have already
remarked； that when a man is empty he desires to be full； and has
pleasure in hope and pain in vacuity。 But now I must further add
what I omitted before； that in all these and similar emotions in which
body and mind are opposed （and they are innumerable）； pleasure and
pain coalesce in one。
Pro。 I believe that to be quite true。
Soc。 There still remains one other sort of admixture of pleasures
and pains。
Pro。 What is that？
Soc。 The union which； as we were saying； the mind often
experiences of purely mental feelings。
Pro。 What do you mean？
Soc。 Why； do we not speak of anger； fear； desire； sorrow； love；
emulation； envy； and the like； as pains which belong to the soul only？
Pro。 Yes。
Soc。 And shall we not find them also full of the most wonderful
pleasures？ need I remind you of the anger
Which stirs even a wise man to violence；
And is sweeter than honey and the honeycomb？
And you remember how pleasures mingle with pains in lamentation and
bereavement？
Pro。 Yes； there is a natural connection between them。
Soc。 And you remember also how at the sight of tragedies the
spectators smile through their tear？
Pro。 Certainly I do。
Soc。 And are you aware that even at a comedy the soul experiences
a mixed feeling of pain and pleasure？
Pro。 I do not quite understand you。
Soc。 I admit； Protarchus； that there is some difficulty in
recognizing this mixture of feelings at a comedy。
Pro。 There is； I think。
Soc。 And the greater the obscurity of the case the more desirable
the examination of it because the difficulty in detecting other
cases of mixed pleasures and pains will be less。
Pro。 Proceed。
Soc。 I have just mentioned envy； would you not call that a pain of
the soul？
Pro。 Yes
Soc。 And yet the envious man finds something in the misfortunes of
his neighbours at which he is pleased？
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 And ignorance； and what is termed clownishness； are surely an
evil？
Pro。 To be sure。
Soc。 From these considerations learn to know the nature of the
ridiculous。
Pro。 Explain。
Soc。 The ridiculous is in short the specific name which is used to
describe the vicious form of a certain habit； and of vice in general
it is that kind which is most at variance with the inscription at
Delphi。
Pro。 You mean； Socrates； 〃Know thyself。〃
Soc。 I do； and the opposite would be； 〃Know not thyself。〃
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 And now； O Protarchus； try to divide this into three。
Pro。 Indeed I am afraid that I cannot。
Soc。 Do you mean to say that I must make the division for you？
Pro。 Yes； and what is more； I beg that you will。
Soc。 Are there not three ways in which ignorance of self may be
shown？
Pro。 What are they？
Soc。 In the first place； about money； the ignorant may fancy himself
richer than he is。
Pro。 Yes； that is a very common error。
Soc。 And still more often he will fancy that he is taller or
fairer than he is； or that he has some other advantage of person which
he really has not。
Pro。 Of course。
Soc。 And yet surely by far the greatest number err about the goods
of the mind； they imagine themselves to be much better men than they
are。
Pro。 Yes； that is by far the commonest delusion。
Soc。 And of all the virtues； is not wisdom the one which the mass of
mankind are always claiming； and which most arouses in them a spirit
of contention and lying conceit of wisdom？
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 And may not all this be truly called an evil condition？
Pro。 Very evil。
Soc But we must pursue the division a step further； Protarchus； if
we would see in envy of the childish sort a singular mixture of
pleasure and pain。
Pro。 How can we make the further division which you suggest？
Soc。 All who are silly enough to entertain this lying conceit of
themselves may of course be divided； like the rest of mankind； into
two classes…one having power and might； and the other the reverse。
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 Let this； then； be the principle of division； those of them who
are weak and unable to revenge themselves； when they are laughed at；
may be truly called ridiculous； but those who can defend themselves
may be more truly described as strong and formidable； for ignorance in
the powerul is hateful and horrible； because hurtful to others both in
reality and in fiction； but powerless ignorance may be reckoned； and
in truth is； ridiculous。
Pro。 That is very true； but I do not as yet see where is the
admixture of pleasures and pains。
Soc。 Well； then； let us examine the nature of envy。
Pro。 Proceed。
Soc。 Is not envy an unrighteous pleasure； and also an unrighteous
pain？
Pro。 Most true。
Soc。 There is nothing envious or wrong in rejoicing at the
misfortunes of enemies？
Pro。 Certainly not。
Soc。 But to feel joy instead of sorrow at the sight of our
friends' misfortunes…is not that wrong？
Pro。 Undoubtedly。
Soc。 Did we not say that ignorance was always an evil？
Pro。 True。
Soc。 And the three kinds of vain conceit in our friends which we
enumerated…the vain conceit of beauty； of wisdom； and of wealth； are
ridiculous if they are weak； and detestable when they are powerful：
May we not say； as I was saying before； that our friends who are in
this state of mind； when harmless to others； are simply ridiculous？
Pro。 They are ridiculous。
Soc。 And do we not acknowledge this ignorance of theirs to be a
misfortune？
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 And do we feel pain or pleasure in laughing at it？
Pro。 Clearly we feel pleasure。
Soc。 And was not envy the source of this pleasure which we feel at
the misfortunes of friends？
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 Then the argument shows that when we laugh at the folly of
our friends； pleasure； in mingling with envy； mingles with pain； for
envy has been acknowledged by us to be mental pain； and laughter is
pleasant； and so we envy and laugh at the same instant。
Pro。 True。
Soc。 And the argument implies that there are combinations of
pleasure and pain in lamentations； and in tragedy and comedy； not only
on the stage； but on the greater stage of human life； and so in
endless other cases。
Pro。 I do not see how any one can deny what you say； Socrates；
however eager he may be to assert the opposite opinion。
Soc。 I mentioned anger； desire； sorrow； fear； love； emulation； envy；
and similar emotions； as examples in which we should find a mixture of
the two elements so often named； did I not？
Pro。 Yes。
Soc。 We may observe that our conclusions hitherto have had reference
only to sorrow and envy and anger。
Pro。 I see。
Soc。 Then many other cases still remain？
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 And why do you suppose me to have pointed out to you the
admixture which takes place in comedy？ Why but to convince you that
there was no difficulty in showing the mixed nature of fear and love
and similar affections； and I thought that when I had given you the
illustration； you would have let me off； and have acknowledged as a
general truth that the body without the soul； and the soul without the
body； as well as the two united； are susceptible of all sorts of
admixtures of pleasures and pains； and so further discussion would
have been unnecessary。 And now I want to know whether I may depart； or
will you keep me here until midnight？ I fancy that I may obtain my
release without many words；…if I promise that to…morrow I will give
you an account of all these cases。 But at present I would rather
sail in another direction； and go to other matters which remain to
be settled； before the judgment can be given which Philebus demands。
Pro。 Very good； Socrates； in what remains take your own course。
Soc。 Then after the mixed pleasures the unmixed should have their
turn； this is the natural and necessary order。
Pro。 Excellent。
Soc。 These； in turn； then； I will now endeavour to indicate； for
with the maintainers of the opinion that all pleasures are a cessation
of pain； I do not agree； but； as I was saying； I use them as
witnesses； that there are pleasures which seem only and are not； and
there are others again which have great power and appear in many
forms； yet are intermingled with pains； and are partly alleviations of
agony and distress； both of body and mind。
Pro。 Then what pleasures； Socrates； should we be right in conceiving
