bentham-第2章
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lone was found with sufficient moral sensibility and self…reliance to say to himself that these things； however profitable they might be； were frauds； and that between them and himself there should be a gulf fixed。 To this rare union of self…reliance and moral sensibility we are indebted for all that Bentham has done。 Sent to Oxford by his father at the unusually early age of fifteen required； on admission； to declare his belief in the Thirty…nine Articles he felt it necessary to examine them； and the examination suggested scruples； which he sought to get removed； but instead of the satisfaction he expected was told that it was not for boys like him to set up their judgment against the great men of the Church。 After a struggle； he signed； but the impression that he had done an immoral act； never left him； he considered himself to have committed a falsehood； and throughout life he never relaxed in his indignant denunciations of all laws which command such falsehoods； all institutions which attach rewards to them。 By thus carrying the war of criticism and refutation； the conflict with falsehood and absurdity； into the field of practical evils； Bentham； even if he had done nothing else； would have earned an important place in the history of intellect。 He carried on the warfare without intermission。 To this； not only many of his most piquant chapters； but some of the most finished of his entire works； are entirely devoted： the 'Defence of Usury'。 the 'Book of Fallacies'； and the onslaught upon Blackstone； published anonymously under the title of ' A Fragment on Government'； which； though a first production； and of a writer afterwards so much ridiculed for his style； excited the highest admiration no less for its composition than for its thoughts； and was attributed by turns to Lord Mansfield； to Lord Camden； and （by Dr。 Johnson） to Dunning； one of the greatest masters of style among the lawyers of his day。 These writings are altogether original； though of the negative school； they resemble nothing previously produced by negative philosophers； and would have sufficed to create for Bentham； among the subversive thinkers of modern Europe； a place peculiarly his own。 But it is not these writings that constitute the real distinction between him and them。 There was a deeper difference。 It was that they were purely negative thinkers； he was positive： they only assailed error； he made it a point of conscience not to do so until he thought he could plant instead the corresponding truth。 Their character was exclusively analytic； his was synthetic。 They took for their starting…point the received opinion on any subject； dug round it with their logical implements； pronounced its foundations defective； and condemned it： he began de novo； laid his own foundations deeply and firmly； built up his own structure； and bade mankind compare the two； it was when he had solved the problem himself； or thought he had done so； that he declared all other solutions to be erroneous。 Hence； what they produced will not last； it must perish； much of it has already perished； with the errors which it exploded： what he did has its own value； by which it must outlast all errors to which it is opposed。 Though we may reject； as we often must； his practical conclusions； yet his premises； the collections of facts and observations from which his conclusions were drawn； remain for ever； a part of the materials of philosophy。 A place； therefore； must be assigned to Bentham among the masters of wisdom； the great teachers and permanent intellectual ornaments of the human race。 He is among those who have enriched mankind with imperishable gifts； and although these do not transcend all other gifts； nor entitle him to those honours 'above all Greek； above all Roman fame'； which by a natural reaction against the neglect and contempt of the ignorant； many of his admirers were once disposed to accumulate upon him； yet to refuse an admiring recognition of what he was； on account of what he was not； is a much worse error； and one which； pardonable in
the vulgar； is no longer permitted to any cultivated and instructed mind。 If we were asked to say； in the fewest possible words； what we conceive to be Bentham's place among these great intellectual benefactors of humanity； what he was； and what he was not； what kind of service he did and did not render to truth； we should say he was not a great philosopher； but he was a great reformer in philosophy。 He brought into philosophy something which it greatly needed； and for want of which it was at a stand。 It was not his doctrines which did this； it was his mode of arriving at them。 He introduced into morals and politics those habits of thought and modes of investigation； which are essential to the idea of science； and the absence of which made those departments of inquiry； as physics had been before Bacon； a field of interminable discussion； leading to no result。 It was not his opinions； in short； but his method； that constituted the novelty and the value of what he did； a value beyond all price； even though we should reject the whole； as we unquestionably must a large part； of the opinions themselves。 Bentham's method may be shortly described as the method of detail； of treating wholes by separating them into their parts； abstractions by resolving them into Things； classes and generalities by distinguishing them into the individuals of which they are made up； and breaking every question into pieces before attempting to solve it。 The precise amount of originality of this process； considered as a logical conception its degree of connexion with the methods of physical science； or with the previous labours of Bacon； Hobbes or Locke is not an essential consideration in this pace。 Whatever originality there was in the method in the subjects he applied it to； and in the rigidity with which he adhered to it； there was the greatest。 Hence his interminable classifications。 Hence his elaborate demonstrations of the most acknowledged truths。 That murder； incendiarism； robbery； are mischievous actions； he will not take for granted without proof； let the thing appear ever so self…evident； he will know the why and the how of it with the last degree of precision； he will distinguish all the different mischiefs of a crime； whether of the first； the second or the third order； namely； 1。 the evil to the sufferer； and to his personal connexions； 2。 the danger from example； and the alarm or painful feeling of insecurity； and 3。 the discouragement to industry and useful pursuits arising from the alarm； and the trouble and resources which must be expended in warding off the danger。 After this enumeration； he will prove from the laws of human feeling； that even the first of these evils； the sufferings of the immediate victim； will on the average greatly outweigh the pleasure reaped by the offender； much more when all the other evils are taken into account。 Unless this could be proved； he would account the infliction of punishment unwarrantable； and for taking the trouble to prove it formally； his defence is； 'there are truths which it is necessary to prove； not for their own sakes； because they are acknowledged； but that an opening may be made for the reception of other truths which depend upon them。 It is in this manner we provide for the reception of first principles； which； once received； prepare the way for admission of all other truths。' To which may be added； that in this manner also we discipline the mind for practising the same sort of dissection upon questions more complicated and of more doubtful issue。 It is a sound maxim； and one which all close thinkers have felt； but which no one before Bentham ever so consistently applied； that error lurks in generalities： that the human mind is not capable of embracing a complex whole； until it has surveyed and catalogued the parts of which that whole is made up； that abstractions are not realities per se； but an abridged mode of expressing facts； and that the only practical mode of dealing with them is to trace them back to the facts （whether of experience or of consciousness） of which they are the expression。 Proceeding on this principle； Bentham makes short work with the ordinary modes of moral and political reasoning。 These； it appeared to him； when hunted to their source； for the most part terminated in phrases。 In politics； liberty； social order； constitution； law of nature； social compact； etc。； were the catchwords： ethics had its analogous ones。 Such were the arguments on which the gravest questions of morality and policy were made to turn； not reasons； but allusions to reasons； sacramental expressions； by which a summary appeal was made to some general sentiment of mankind； or to some maxim in familiar use； which might be true or not； but the limitations of which no one had ever critically examined。 And this satisfied other people； but not Bentham。 He required something more than opinion as a reason for opinion。 Whenever he found a phrase used as an argument for or against anything； he insisted upon knowing what it meant； whether it appealed to any standard； or gave intimation of any matter of fact relevant to the question； and if he could not find that it did either； he treated it as an attempt on the part of the disputant to impose his own individual sentiment on other people； without giving them a reason for it； a ' contrivance for avoiding the obligation of appealing to any external standard； and for prevailing upon the reader to accept of the author's sentiment and opinion as a reason； and that a sufficient one； for itself。 Bentham shall speak for himself on this subject： the passage is from his first systematic work； 'Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation'； and we could scarcely quote anything more strongly exemplifying both the strength and weakness of his mode of philosophizing。
It is curious enough to observe the variety of inventions men have hit upon； and the variety of phrases they have brought forward； in order to conceal from the world； and； if possible； from themselves； this very general and therefore very pardonable self…sufficiency。 1。 One man says； he has a thing made on purpose to tell him what is right and what is wrong； and that is called a 'moral sense'。。 and then he goes to work at his ease； and says； such a thing is right； and such a thing is wrong why？ 'Because my moral sense tells me it is。' 2。 Another man comes and alters the phrase： leaving out moral； and putting in common in the room of it。 He then tells you that his common sense tells him what is right and wrong； as surely as the other's moral sense did； meaning by common sense a sense of some kind or other； which； he says； is possessed by all mankind： the sense of those whose sense is not the same as the author's being struck out as not worth taking。 This contrivance does better than the other； for a moral sense being a new thing； a man may feel about him a good while without being able to find it out： but common sense is as old as the creation； and there is no man but would be ashamed to be thought not to have as much of it as his neighbours。 It has another great advantage： by appearing to share power； it lessens envy； for when a man gets up upon this ground； in order to anathematiz
