bentham-第3章
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ng to share power； it lessens envy； for when a man gets up upon this ground； in order to anathematize those who differ from him； it is not by a sic volo sic jubeo； but by a velitis jubeatis。 3。 Another man comes； and says； that as to a moral sense indeed； he cannot find that he has any such thing： that； however； he has an understanding； which will do quite as well。 This understanding； he says； is the standard of right and wrong： it tells him so and so。 All good and wise men understand as he does： if other men's understandings differ in any part from his； so much the worse for them： it is a sure sign they are either defective or corrupt。 4。 Another man says； that there is an eternal and immutable Rule of Right： that the rule of right dictates so and so： and then he begins giving you his sentiments upon anything that comes uppermost： and these sentiments （you are to take for granted） are so many branches of the eternal rule of right。 5。 Another man； or perhaps the same man （it is nO matter）； says that there are certain practices conformable and others repugnant； to the Fitness of Things； and then he tells you； at his leisure； what practices are conformable； and what repugnant： just as he happens to like a practice or dislike it。 6。 A great multitude of people are continually talking of the Law of Nature； and then they go on giving you their sentiments about what is right and what is wrong： and these sentiments； you are to understand； are so many chapters and sections of the Law of Nature。 7。 Instead of the phrase； Law of Nature； you have sometimes Law of Reason； Right Reason； Natural Justice； Natural Equity； Good Order。 Any of them will do equally well。 This latter is most used in politics。 The three last are much more tolerable than the others； because they do not very explicitly claim to be anything more than phrases： they insist but feebly upon their being looked upon as so many positive standards of themselves； and seem content to be taken； upon occasion； for phrases expressive of the conformity of the thing in question to the proper standards； whatever that may be。 On most occasions； however； it will be better to say utility。 utility is clearer as referring more explicitly to pain and pleasure。 8。 We have one philosopher； who says； there is no harm in anything in the world but in telling a lie； and that if； for example； you were to murder your own father； this would only be a particular way of saying； he was not your father。 Of course when this philosopher sees anything that he does not like； he says； it is a particular way of telling a lie。 It is saying； that the act ought to be done； or may be done； when； in truth； it ought not be done。 9。 The fairest and openest of them all is that sort of man who speaks out； and says； I am of the number of the Elect： now God himself takes care to inform the Elect what is right： and that with so good effect； and let them strive ever so； they cannot help not only knowing it but practising it。 If therefore a man wants to know what is right and what is wrong； he has nothing to do but to come to me。
Few will contend that this is a perfectly fair representation of the animus of those who employ the various phrases so amusingly animadverted on； but that the phrases contain no argument； save what is grounded on the very feelings they are adduced to justify； is a truth which Bentham had the eminent merit of first pointing out。 It is the introduction into the philosophy of human conduct； of this method of detail of this practice of never reasoning about wholes until they have been resolved into their parts； nor about abstractions until they have been translated into realities that constitutes the originality of Bentham in philosophy； and makes him the great reformer of the moral and political branch of it。 To what he terms the 'exhaustive method of classification'； which is but one branch of this more general method； he himself ascribes everything original in the systematic and elaborate work from which we have quoted。 The generalities of his philosophy itself have little or no novelty： to ascribe any to the doctrine that general utility is the foundation of morality； would imply great ignorance of the history of philosophy； of general literature； and of Bentham's own writings。 He derived the idea； as he says himself； from Helvetius； and it was the doctrine no less； of the religious philosophers of that age； prior to Reid and Beattie。 We never saw an abler defence of the doctrine of utility than in a book written in refutation of Shaftesbury； and now little read Brown's 'Essays on the Characteristics'； and in Johnson's celebrated review of Soame Jenyns； the same doctrine is set forth as that both of the author and of the reviewer。 In all ages of philosophy one of its schools has been utilitarian not only from the time of Epicurus； but long before。 It was by mere accident that this opinion became connected in Bentham with his peculiar method。 The utilitarian philosophers antecedent to him had no more claims to the method than their antagonists。 To refer； for instance； to the Epicurean philosophy； according to the most complete view we have of the moral part of it； by the most accomplished scholar of antiquity； Cicero； we ask any one who has read his philosophical writings； the 'De Finibus' for instance； whether the arguments of the Epicureans do not； just as much as those of the Stoics or Platonists； consist of mere rhetorical appeals to common notions； to eikita and simeia instead of tekmiria； notions picked up as it were casually； and when true at all； never so narrowly looked into as to ascertain in what sense and under what limitations they are true。 The application of a real inductive philosophy to the problems of ethics； is as unknown to the Epicurean moralists as to any of the other schools； they never take a question to pieces； and join issue on a definite point。 Bentham certainly did not learn his sifting and anatomizing method from them。 This method Bentham has finally installed in philosophy； has made it henceforth imperative on philosophers of all schools。 By it he has formed the intellects of many thinkers； who either never adopted； or have abandoned； many of his peculiar opinions。 He has taught the method to men of the most opposite schools to his； he has made them perceive that if they do not test their doctrines by the method of detail； their adversaries will。 He has thus； it is not too much to say； for the first time introduced precision of thought into moral and political philosophy。 Instead of taking up their opinions by intuition； or by ratiocination from premises adopted on a mere rough view； and couched in language so vague that it is impossible to say exactly whether they are true or false； philosophers are now forced to understand one another； to break down the generality of their propositions； and join a precise issue in every dispute。 This is nothing less than a revolution in philosophy。 Its effect is gradually becoming evident in the writings of English thinkers of every variety of opinion； and will be felt more and more in proportion as Bentham's writings are diffused； and as the number of minds to whose formation they contribute is multiplied。 It will naturally be presumed that of the fruits of this great philosophical improvement some portion at least will have been reaped by its author。 Armed with such a potent instrument； and wielding it with such singleness of aim； cultivating the field of practical philosophy with such unwearied and such consistent use of a method right in itself； and not adopted by his predecessors； it cannot he but that Bentham by his own inquiries must have accomplished something considerable。 And so； it will be found； he has； something not only considerable； but extraordinary； though but little compared with what he has left undone； and far short of what his sanguine and almost boyish fancy made him flatter himself that he had accomplished。 His peculiar method； admirably calculated to make clear thinkers； and sure ones to the extent of their materials； has not equal efficacy for making those materials complete。 It is a security for accuracy； but not for comprehensiveness； or rather； it is a security for one sort of comprehensiveness； but not for another。 Bentham's method of laying out his subject is admirable as a preservative against one kind of narrow and partial views。 He begins by placing before himself the whole of the field of inquiry to which the particular question belongs； and divides down till he arrives at the thing he is in search of； and thus by successively rejecting all which is not the thing； he gradually works out a definition of what it is。 This； which he calls the exhaustive method； is as old as philosophy itself。 Plato owes everything to it； and does everything by it； and the use made of it by that great man in his Dialogues； Bacon； in one of those pregnant logical hints scattered through his writings； and so much neglected by most of his pretended followers； pronounces to be the nearest approach to a true inductive method in the ancient philosophy。 Bentham was probably not aware that Plato had anticipated him in the process to which he too declared that he owed everything。 By the practice of it； his speculations are rendered eminently systematic and consistent； no question； with him； is ever an insulated one； he sees every subject in connexion with all the other subjects with which in his view it is related； and from which it requires to be distinguished； and as all that he knows； in the least degree allied to the subject； has been marshalled in an orderly manner before him； he does not； like people who use a looser method； forget and overlook a thing on one occasion to remember it on another。 Hence there is probably no philosopher of so wide a range； in whom there are so few inconsistencies。 If any of the truths which he did not see； had come to be seen by him； he would have remembered it everywhere and at all times； and would have adjusted his whole system to it。 And this is another admirable quality which he has impressed upon the best of the minds trained in his habits of thought： when those minds open to admit new truths； they digest them as fast as they receive them。 But this system； excellent for keeping before the mind of the thinker all that he knows； does not make him know enough； it does not make a knowledge of some of the properties of a thing suffice for the whole of it； nor render a rooted habit of surveying a complex object （though ever so carefully） in only one of its aspects； tantamount to the power of contemplating it in all。 To give this last power； other qualities are required： whether Bentham possessed those other qualities we now have to see。 Bentham's mind； as we have already said； was eminently synthetical。 He begins all his inquiries by supposing nothing to he known on the subject； and reconstructs all philosophy ab initio； without reference to the opinions of his predecessors。 But to build either a philosophy or anything else； there must be materials。 For the philosophy of matter； the materials are the properties of matter； for moral and political philosophy； the properties of man； and of man's position in the world。 The knowledge which any inquirer possesses
