bentham-第6章
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ous dictates of worldly prudence； and outward probity and beneficence。 There is no need to expatiate on the deficiencies of a system of ethics which does not pretend to aid individuals in the formation of their own character。 which recognizes no such wish as that of self culture； we may even say no such power； as existing in human nature； and if it did recognize； could furnish little assistance to that great duty； because it overlooks the existence of about half of the whole number of mental feelings which human beings are capable of； including all those of which the direct objects are states of their own mind。 Morality consists of two parts。 One of these is self…education； the training； by the human being himself； of his affections and will。 That department is a blank in Bentham's system。 The other and co…equal part； the regulation of his outward actions； must be altogether halting and imperfect without the first； for how can we judge in what manner many an action will affect even the worldly interests of ourselves or others； unless we take in； as part of the question； its influence on the regulation of our； or their； affections and desires？ A moralist on Bentham's principles may get as far as this； that he ought not to slay； burn； or steal； but what will be his qualifications for regulating the nicer shades of human behaviour； or for laying down even the greater moralities as to those facts in human life which tend to influence the depths of the character quite independently of any influence on worldly circumstances such； for instance； as the sexual relations； or those of family in general； or any other social and sympathetic connexions of an intimate kind？ The moralities of these questions depend essentially on considerations which Bentham never so much as took into the account； and when he happened to be in the right； it was always； and necessarily； on wrong or insufficient grounds。 It is fortunate for the world that Bentham's taste lay rather in the direction of jurisprudential than of properly ethical inquiry。 Nothing expressly of the latter kind has been published under his name； except the 'Deontology' a book scarcely ever； in our experience； alluded to by any admirer of Bentham without deep regret that it ever saw the light。 We did not expect from Bentham correct systematic views of ethics； or a sound treatment of any question the moralities of which require a profound knowledge of the human heart； but we did anticipate that the greater moral questions would have been boldly plunged into； and at least a searching criticism produced of the received opinions； we did not expect that the petite morale almost alone would have been treated； and that with the most pedantic minuteness； and on the quid pro quo principles which regulate trade。 The book has not even the value which would belong to an authentic exhibition of the legitimate consequences of an erroneous line of thought； for the style proves it to have been so entirely rewritten； that it is impossible to tell how much or how little of it is Bentham's。 The collected edition； now in progress； will not； it is said； include Bentham's religious writings； these； although we think most of them of exceedingly small value； are at least his； and the world has a right to whatever light they throw upon the constitution of his mind。 But the omission of the 'Deontology' would be an act of editorial discretion which we should seem entirely justifiable。 If Bentham's theory of life can do so little for the individual； what can it do for society？ It will enable a society which has attained a certain state of spiritual development； and the maintenance of which in that state is otherwise provided for； to prescribe the rules by which it may protect its material interests。 It will do nothing （except sometimes as an instrument in the hands of a higher doctrine） for the spiritual interests of society； nor does it suffice of itself even for the material interests。 That which alone causes any material interests to exist； which alone enables any body of human beings to exist as a society； is national character： that it is； which causes one nation to succeed in what it attempts； another to fail； one nation to understand and aspire to elevated things； another to grovel in mean ones； which makes the greatness of one nation lasting； and dooms another to early and rapid decay。 The true teacher of the fitting social arrangements for England； France； or America； is the one who can point out how the English； French or American character can be improved； and how it has been made what it is。 A philosophy of laws and institutions； not founded on a philosophy of national character； is an absurdity。 But what could Bentham's opinion be worth on national character？ How could he； whose mind contained so few and so poor types of individual character； rise to that higher generalization？ All he can do is but to indicate means by which； in any given state of the national mind； the material interests of society can be protected； saving the question； of which others must judge； whether the use of those means would have； on the national character； any injurious influence。 We have arrived； then； at a sort of estimate of what a philosophy like Bentham's can do。 It can teach the means of organizing and regulating the merely business part of the social arrangements。 Whatever can be understood or whatever done without reference to moral influences； his philosophy is equal to； where those influences require to be taken into account； it is at fault。 He committed the mistake of supposing that the business part of human affairs was the whole of them； all at least that the legislator and the moralist had to do with。 Not that he disregarded moral influences when he perceived them； but his want of imagination； small experience of human feelings； and ignorance of the filiation and connexion of feelings with one another； made this rarely the case。 The business part is accordingly the only province of human affairs which Bentham has cultivated with any success； into which he had introduced any considerable number of comprehensive and luminous practical principles。 That is the field of his greatness； and there he is indeed great。 He has swept away the accumulated cobwebs of centuries he has untied knots which the efforts of the ablest thinkers； age after age； had only drawn tighter； and it is not exaggeration to say of him that over a great part of the field he was the first to shed the light of reason。 We turn with pleasure from what Bentham could not do； to what he did。 It is an ungracious task to call a great benefactor of mankind to account for not being a greater to insist upon the errors of a man who has originated more new truths； has given to the world more sound practical lessons； than it ever received； except in a few glorious instances； from any other individual。 The unpleasing part of our work is ended。 We are now to show the greatness of the man； the grasp which his intellect took of the subjects with which it was fitted to deal； the giant's task which was before him； and the hero's courage and strength with which he achieved it。 Nor let that which he did be deemed of small account because its province was limited： man has but the choice to go a little way in many paths； or a great way in only one。 The field of Bentham's labours was like the space between two parallel lines； narrow to excess in one direction； in another it reached to infinity。 Bentham's speculations； as we are already aware； began with law； and in that department he accomplished his greatest triumphs。 He found the philosophy of law a chaos； he left it a science； he found the practice of the law an Augean stable； he turned the river into it which is mining and sweeping away mound after mound of its rubbish。 Without joining in the exaggerated invectives against lawyers； which Bentham sometimes permitted to himself； or making one portion of society alone accountable for the fault of all； we may say that circumstances had made English lawyers in a peculiar degree liable to the reproach of Voltaire； who defines lawyers the 'conservators of ancient barbarous usages'。 The basis of the English law was； and still is； the feudal system。 That system； like all those which existed as custom before they were established as law； possessed a certain degree of suitableness to the wants of the society among whom it grew up that is to say； of a tribe of rude soldiers； holding a conquered people in subjection； and dividing its spoils among themselves。 Advancing civilization had； however； converted this armed encampment of barbarous warriors in the midst of enemies reduced to slavery； into an industrious； commercial； rich； and free people。 The laws which were suitable to the first of these states of society； could have no manner of relation to the circumstances of the second； which could not even have come into existence unless something had been done to adapt those laws to it。 But the adaptation was not the result of thought and design； it arose not from any comprehensive consideration of the new state of society and its exigencies。 What was done； was done by a struggle of centuries between the old barbarism and the new civilization； between the feudal aristocracy of conquerors； holding fast to the rude system they had established； and the conquered effecting their emancipation。 The last was the growing power； but was never strong enough to break its bonds； though ever and anon some weak point gave way。 Hence the law came to be like the costume of a full…grown man who had never put off the clothes made for him when he first went to school。 Band after band had burst； and； as the rent widened； then； without removing anything except what might drop off of itself； the hole was darned； or patches of fresh law were brought from the nearest shop and stuck on。 Hence all ages of English history have given one another rendezvous in English law； their several products may be seen all together； not interfused； but heaped one upon another； as many different ages of the earth may be read in some perpendicular section of its surface the deposits of each successive period not substituted but superimposed on those of the preceding。 And in the world of law no less than in the physical world； every commotion and conflict of the elements has left its mark behind in some break or irregularity of the strata： every struggle which ever rent the bosom of society is apparent in the disjointed condition of the part of the field of law which covers the spot： nay； the very traps and pitfalls which one contending party set for another are still standing； and the teeth not of hyenas only； but of foxes and all cunning animals； are imprinted on the curious remains found in these antediluvian caves。 In the English law； as in the Roman before it； the adaptations of barbarous laws to the growth of civilized society were made chiefly by stealth。 They were generally made by the courts of justice； who could not help reading the new wants of mankind in the cases between man and man which came before them； but who； having no authority to make new laws for those new wants； were obliged to do the work covertly； and evade the jealousy and opposition of an ignorant； prejudiced； and for the
