the ethics(part iv)-第6章
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to reason； necessarily do only such things as are necessarily good for
human nature； and consequently for each individual man （IV：xxxi。Coroll。）；
in other words； such things as are in harmony with each man's nature。
Therefore； men in so far as they live in obedience to reason； necessarily
live always in harmony one with another。 Q。E。D。
Corollary I … There is no individual thing in nature； which is
more useful to man； than a man who lives in obedience to reason。 For that
thing is to man most useful； which is most in harmony with his nature
（IV：xxxi。Coroll。）； that is； obviously； man。 But man acts absolutely
according to the laws of his nature； when he lives in obedience to reason
（III：Def。ii。）； and to this extent only is always necessarily in harmony
with the nature of another man （by the last Prop。）； wherefore among
individual things nothing is more useful to man； than a man who lives in
obedience to reason。 Q。E。D。
Corollary II。… As every man seeks most that which is useful to him； so are
men most useful one to another。 For the more a man seeks what is useful to
him and endeavours to preserve himself； the more is he endowed with virtue
（IV：xx。）； or； what is the same thing （IV：Def。viii。）； the more is he endowed
with power to act according to the laws of his own nature； that is to live
in obedience to reason。 But men are most in natural harmony； when they live
in obedience to reason （by the last Prop。）； therefore （by the foregoing
Coroll。） men will be most useful one to another； when each seeks most that
which is useful to him。 Q。E。D。
Note。… What we have just shown is attested by experience so conspicuously；
that it is in the mouth of nearly everyone： 〃Man is to man a God。〃 Yet it
rarely happens that men live in obedience to reason； for things are so
ordered among them； that they are generally envious and troublesome one to
another。 Nevertheless they are scarcely able to lead a solitary life；
so that the definition of man as a social animal has met with general
assent； in fact； men do derive from social life much more convenience than
injury。 Let satirists then laugh their fill at human affairs； let
theologians rail； and let misanthropes praise to their utmost the life of
untutored rusticity； let them heap contempt on men and praises on beasts；
when all is said； they will find that men can provide for their wants much
more easily by mutual help； and that only by uniting their forces can they
escape from the dangers that on every side beset them： not to say how much
more excellent and worthy of our knowledge it is； to study the actions of
men than the actions of beasts。 But I will treat of this more at
length elsewhere。
Prop。 XXXVI。 The highest good of those
who follow virtue is common to all；
and therefore all can equally rejoice
therein。
Proof。… To act virtuously is to act in obedience with reason （IV：xxiv。）；
and whatsoever we endeavour to do in obedience to reason is to understand
（IV：xxvi。）； therefore （IV：xxviii。） the highest good for those who follow
after virtue is to know God； that is （II：xlvii。&Note） a good which is
common to all and can be possessed。 by all men equally； in so far as they
are of the same nature。 Q。E。D。
Note。… Someone may ask how it would be； if the highest good of those who
follow after virtue were not common to all？ Would it not then follow； as
above （IV：xxxiv。）； that men living in obedience to reason； that is
（IV：xxxv。）； men in so far as they agree in nature； would be at variance
one with another？ To such an inquiry； I make answer； that it follows not
accidentally but from the very nature of reason； that main's highest good
is common to all； inasmuch as it is deduced from the very essence of man；
in so far as defined by reason； and that a man could neither be； nor be
conceived without the power of taking pleasure in this highest good。 For
it belongs to the essence of the human mind （II：xlvii。）； to have an
adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God。
Prop。 XXXVII。 The good which every man；
who follows after virtue； desires for
himself he will also desire for other
men； and so much the more； in proportion
as he has a greater knowledge of God。
Proof。… Men； in so far as they live in obedience to reason； are most
useful to their fellow men （IV：xxxv；Coroll。i。）； therefore （IV：xix。）；
we shall in obedience to reason necessarily endeavour to bring about that
men should live in obedience to reason。 But the good which every man； in
so far as he is guided by reason； or； in other words； follows after virtue；
desires for himself； is to understand （IV：xxvi。）； wherefore the good； which
each follower of virtue seeks for himself； he will desire also for others。
Again； desire； in so far as it is referred to the mind； is the very
essence of the mind （Def。 of the Emotions； i。）； now the essence of the
mind consists in knowledge （III：xi。）； which involves the knowledge of God
（II：xlvii。）； and without it （I：xv。）； can neither be； nor be conceived；
therefore； in proportion as the mind's essence involves a greater knowledge
of God； so also will be greater the desire of the follower of virtue； that
other men should possess that which he seeks as good for himself。 Q。E。D。
Another Proof。… The good； which a man desires for himself and loves； he
will love more constantly； if he sees that others love it also （III：xxxi。）；
he will therefore endeavour that others should love it also； and as the
good in question is common to all； and therefore all can rejoice therein；
he will endeavour； for the same reason； to bring about that all should
rejoice therein； and this he will do the more （III：xxxvii。）； in proportion
as his own enjoyment of the good is greater。
Note 1… He who； guided by emotion only； endeavours to cause others to love
what he loves himself； and to make the rest of the world live according to
his own fancy； acts solely by impulse； and is； therefore； hateful；
especially； to those who take delight in something different； and
accordingly study and； by similar impulse； endeavour； to make men live in
accordance with what pleases themselves。 Again； as the highest good sought
by men under the guidance of emotion is often such； that it can only be
possessed by a single individual； it follows that those who love it are not
consistent in their intentions； but； while they delight to sing its praises；
fear to be believed。 But he； who endeavours to lead men by reason； does not
act by impulse but courteously and kindly； and his intention is always
consistent。 Again； whatsoever we desire and do； whereof we are the cause
in so far as we possess the idea of God； or know God； I set down to
Religion。 The desire of well…doing； which is engendered by a life
according to reason； I call piety。 Further； the desire； whereby a
man living according to reason is bound to associate others with
himself in friendship； I call honour （Honestas）； by honourable I mean
that which is praised by men living according to reason； and by base
I mean that which is repugnant to the gaining of friendship。 I have also
shown in addition what are the foundations of a state； and the difference
between true ；virtue and infirmity may be readily gathered from what I
have said； namely； that true virtue is nothing else but living in
accordance with reason； while infirmity is nothing else but man's
allowing himself to be led by things which are external to himself；
and to be by them determined to act in a manner demanded by the general
disposition of things rather than by his own nature considered solely
in itself。
Such are the matters which I engaged to prove in IV：xviii。； whereby it
is plain that the law against the slaughtering of animals is founded rather
on vain superstition and womanish pity than on sound reason。 The rational
quest of what is useful to us further teaches us the necessity of
associating ourselves with our fellow men； but … not with beasts； or things；
whose nature is different from our own； we have the same rights in respect
to them as they have in respect to us。 Nay； as everyone's right is defined
by his virtue； or power； men have far greater rights over beasts than
beasts have over men。 Still I do not deny that beasts feel： what I deny is；
that we may not consult our own advantage and use them as we please；
treating them in the way which best suits us； for their nature is not like
ours； and their emotions are naturally different from human emotions
（III：Ivii。Note）。 It remains for me to explain what I mean by； just and
unjust； sin and merit。 On these points see the following note。
Note II。… In the Appendix to Part I。 I undertook to explain praise and
blame； merit and sin； justice and injustice。
Concerning praise and blame I have spoken in III：xxix。Note： the time
has now come to treat of the remaining terms。 But I must first say a few
words concerning man in the state of nature and in society。
Every man exists by sovereign natural right； and； consequently； by
sovereign natural right performs those actions which follow from the
necessity of his own nature； therefore by sovereign natural right every man
judges what is good and what is bad； takes care of his own advantage
according to his own disposition （IV：xix。 and IV：xx。）； avenges the wrongs
done to him （III：xl。Coroll。 ii。）； and endeavours to preserve that which he
loves and to destroy … that which he hates （III：xxviii。）。 Now； if men lived
under the guidance of reason； everyone would remain in possession of this
his right； without any injury being done to his neighbour V：xxxv。Coroll。i。）。
But seeing that they are a prey to their emotions； which far surpass human
power or virtue （IV：vi。）； they are often drawn in different directions； and
being at variance one with another （IV：xxxiii。； xxxiv。）； stand in need of
mutual help （IV：xxxv。Note）。 Wherefore； in order that men may live together
in harmony； and may aid one another； it is necessary that they should
forego their natural right； and； for the sake of security； refrain from
all actions which can injure their fellow…men。 The way in which this end
can be obtained； so that men who are necessarily a prey to their emotions
（IV：iv。Coroll。）； inconstant； and diverse； should be able to render each
other mutually secure； and feel mutual trust； is evident from IV：vii。 and
III：xxxix。 It is there shown； that an emotion can only be restrained by an
emotion stronger than； and contrary to itself； an
