the path of the law-第2章

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whether　the　law　purports　to　prohibit　it　or　to　allow　it。　　If　it　matters　
at　all；　still　speaking　from　the　bad　man's　point　of　view；　it　must　be　
because　in　one　case　and　not　in　the　other　some　further　disadvantages；　or　
at　least　some　further　consequences；　are　attached　to　the　act　by　law。　　The　
only　other　disadvantages　thus　attached　to　it　which　I　ever　have　been　able　
to　think　of　are　to　be　found　in　two　somewhat　insignificant　legal　
doctrines；　both　of　which　might　be　abolished　without　much　disturbance。　　
One　is；　that　a　contract　to　do　a　prohibited　act　is　unlawful；　and　the　
other；　that；　if　one　of　two　or　more　joint　wrongdoers　has　to　pay　all　the　
damages；　he　cannot　recover　contribution　from　his　fellows。　　And　that　I　
believe　is　all。　　You　see　how　the　vague　circumference　of　the　notion　of　
duty　shrinks　and　at　the　same　time　grows　more　precise　when　we　wash　it　
with　cynical　acid　and　expel　everything　except　the　object　of　our　study；　
the　operations　of　the　law。　　

Nowhere　is　the　confusion　between　legal　and　moral　ideas　more　manifest　
than　in　the　law　of　contract。　　Among　other　things；　here　again　the　so…
called　primary　rights　and　duties　are　invested　with　a　mystic　significance　
beyond　what　can　be　assigned　and　explained。　　The　duty　to　keep　a　contract　
at　common　law　means　a　prediction　that　you　must　pay　damages　if　you　do　not　
keep　itand　nothing　else。　　If　you　commit　a　tort；　you　are　liable　to　pay　
a　compensatory　sum。　　If　you　commit　a　contract；　you　are　liable　to　pay　a　
compensatory　sum　unless　the　promised　event　comes　to　pass；　and　that　is　
all　the　difference。　　But　such　a　mode　of　looking　at　the　matter　stinks　in　
the　nostrils　of　those　who　think　it　advantageous　to　get　as　much　ethics　
into　the　law　as　they　can。　　It　was　good　enough　for　Lord　Coke；　however；　
and　here；　as　in　many　others　cases；　I　am　content　to　abide　with　him。　　In　
Bromage　v。　　Genning；　a　prohibition　was　sought　in　the　Kings'　Bench　
against　a　suit　in　the　marches　of　Wales　for　the　specific　performance　of　a　
covenant　to　grant　a　lease；　and　Coke　said　that　it　would　subvert　the　
intention　of　the　covenantor；　since　he　intends　it　to　be　at　his　election　
either　to　lose　the　damages　or　to　make　the　lease。　　Sergeant　Harra　for　the　
plaintiff　confessed　that　he　moved　the　matter　against　his　conscience；　and　
a　prohibition　was　granted。　　This　goes　further　than　we　should　go　now；　but　
it　shows　what　I　venture　to　say　has　been　the　common　law　point　of　view　
from　the　beginning；　although　Mr。　Harriman；　in　his　very　able　little　book　
upon　Contracts　has　been　misled；　as　I　humbly　think；　to　a　different　
conclusion。　　

I　have　spoken　only　of　the　common　law；　because　there　are　some　cases　in　
which　a　logical　justification　can　be　found　for　speaking　of　civil　
liabilities　as　imposing　duties　in　an　intelligible　sense。　　These　are　the　
relatively　few　in　which　equity　will　grant　an　injunction；　and　will　
enforce　it　by　putting　the　defendant　in　prison　or　otherwise　punishing　him　
unless　he　complies　with　the　order　of　the　court。　　But　I　hardly　think　it　
advisable　to　shape　general　theory　from　the　exception；　and　I　think　it　
would　be　better　to　cease　troubling　ourselves　about　primary　rights　and　
sanctions　altogether；　than　to　describe　our　prophecies　concerning　the　
liabilities　commonly　imposed　by　the　law　in　those　inappropriate　terms。　　

I　mentioned；　as　other　examples　of　the　use　by　the　law　of　words　drawn　from　
morals；　malice；　intent；　and　negligence。　　It　is　enough　to　take　malice　as　
it　is　used　in　the　law　of　civil　liability　for　wrongs　what　we　lawyers　call　
the　law　of　tortsto　show　that　it　means　something　different　in　law　from　
what　it　means　in　morals；　and　also　to　show　how　the　difference　has　been　
obscured　by　giving　to　principles　which　have　little　or　nothing　to　do　with　
each　other　the　same　name。　　Three　hundred　years　ago　a　parson　preached　a　
sermon　and　told　a　story　out　of　Fox's　Book　of　Martyrs　of　a　man　who　had　
assisted　at　the　torture　of　one　of　the　saints；　and　afterward　died；　
suffering　compensatory　inward　torment。　　It　happened　that　Fox　was　wrong。　　
The　man　was　alive　and　chanced　to　hear　the　sermon；　and　thereupon　he　sued　
the　parson。　　Chief　Justice　Wray　instructed　the　jury　that　the　defendant　
was　not　liable；　because　the　story　was　told　innocently；　without　malice。　　
He　took　malice　in　the　moral　sense；　as　importing　a　malevolent　motive。　　
But　nowadays　no　one　doubts　that　a　man　may　be　liable；　without　any　
malevolent　motive　at　all；　for　false　statements　manifestly　calculated　to　
inflict　temporal　damage。　　In　stating　the　case　in　pleading；　we　still　
should　call　the　defendant's　conduct　malicious；　but；　in　my　opinion　at　
least；　the　word　means　nothing　about　motives；　or　even　about　the　
defendant's　attitude　toward　the　future；　but　only　signifies　that　the　
tendency　of　his　conduct　under　known　circumstances　was　very　plainly　to　
cause　the　plaintiff　temporal　harm。

In　the　law　of　contract　the　use　of　moral　phraseology　led　to　equal　
confusion；　as　I　have　shown　in　part　already；　but　only　in　part。　　Morals　
deal　with　the　actual　internal　state　of　the　individual's　mind；　what　he　
actually　intends。　　From　the　time　of　the　Romans　down　to　now；　this　mode　of　
dealing　has　affected　the　language　of　the　law　as　to　contract；　and　the　
language　used　has　reacted　upon　the　thought。　　We　talk　about　a　contract　as　
a　meeting　of　the　minds　of　the　parties；　and　thence　it　is　inferred　in　
various　cases　that　there　is　no　contract　because　their　minds　have　not　
met；　that　is；　because　they　have　intended　different　things　or　because　one　
party　has　not　known　of　the　assent　of　the　other。　　Yet　nothing　is　more　
certain　than　that　parties　may　be　bound　by　a　contract　to　things　which　
neither　of　them　intended；　and　when　one　does　not　know　of　the　other's　
assent。　　Suppose　a　contract　is　executed　in　due　form　and　in　writing　to　
deliver　a　lecture；　mentioning　no　time。　　One　of　the　parties　thinks　that　
the　promise　will　be　construed　to　mean　at　once；　within　a　week。　　The　other　
thinks　that　it　means　when　he　is　ready。　　The　court　says　that　it　means　
within　a　reasonable　time。　　The　parties　are　bound　by　the　contract　as　it　
is　interpreted　by　the　court；　yet　neither　of　them　meant　what　the　court　
declares　that　they　have　said。　　In　my　opinion　no　one　will　understand　the　
true　theory　of　contract　or　be　able　even　to　discuss　some　fundamental　
questions　intelligently　until　he　has　understood　that　all　contracts　are　
formal；　that　the　making　of　a　contract　depends　not　on　the　agreement　of　
two　minds　in　one　intention；　but　on　the　agreement　of　two　sets　of　external　
signsnot　on　the　parties'　having　meant　the　same　thing　but　on　their　
having　said　the　same　thing。　　Furthermore；　as　the　signs　may　be　addressed　
to　one　sense　or　anotherto　sight　or　to　hearingon　the　nature　of　the　
sign　will　depend　the　moment　when　the　contract　is　made。　　If　the　sign　is　
tangible；　for　instance；　a　letter；　the　contract　is　made　when　the　letter　
of　acceptance　is　delivered。　　If　it　is　necessary　that　the　minds　of　the　
parties　meet；　there　will　be　no　contract　until　the　acceptance　can　be　
read；　none；　for　example；　if　the　acceptance　be　snatched　from　the　hand　of　
the　offerer　by　a　third　person。　　

This　is　not　the　time　to　work　out　a　theory　in　detail；　or　to　answer　many　
obvious　doubts　and　questions　which　are　suggested　by　these　general　views。　　
I　know　of　none　which　are　not　easy　to　answer；　but　what　I　am　trying　to　do　
now　is　only　by　a　series　of　hints　to　throw　some　light　on　the　narrow　path　
of　legal　doctrine；　and　upon　two　pitfalls　which；　as　it　seems　to　me；　lie　
perilously　near　to　it。　　Of　the　first　of　these　I　have　said　enough。　　I　
hope　that　my　illustrations　have　shown　the　danger；　both　to　speculation　
and　to　practice；　of　confounding　morality　with　law；　and　the　trap　which　
legal　language　lays　for　us　on　that　side　of　our　way。　　For　my　own　part；　I　
often　doubt　whether　it　would　not　be　a　gain　if　every　word　of　moral　
significance　could　be　banished　from　the　law　altogether；　and　other　words　
adopted　which　should　convey　legal　ideas　uncolored　by　anything　outside　
the　law。　　We　should　lose　the　fossil　records　of　a　good　deal　of　history　
and　the　majesty　got　from　ethical　associations；　but　by　ridding　ourselves　
of　an　unnecessary　confusion　we　should　gain　very　much　in　the　clearness　of　
our　thought。　　

So　much　for　the　limits　of　the　law。　　The　next　thing　which　I　wish　to　
consider　is　what　are　the　forces　which　determine　its　content　and　its　
growth。　　You　may　assume；　with　Hobbes　and　Bentham　and　Austin；　that　all　
law　emanates　from　the　sovereign；　even　when　the　first　human　beings　to　
enunciate　it　are　the　judges；　or　you　may　think　that　law　is　the　voice　of　
the　Zeitgeist；　or　what　you　like。　　It　is　all　one　to　my　present　purpose。　　
Even　if　every　decision　required　the　sanction　of　an　emperor　with　despotic　
power　and　a　whimsical　turn　of　mind；　we　should　be　interested　none　the　
less；　still　with　a　view　to　prediction；　in　discovering　some　order；　some　
rational　explanation；　and　some　principle　of　growth　for　the　rules　which　
he　laid　down。　　In　every　system　there　are　such　explanations　and　
principles　to　be　found。　　It　is　with　regard　to　them　that　a　second　fallacy　
comes　in；　which　I　think　it　important　to　expose。　　

The　fallacy　to　which　I　refer　is　the　notion　that　the　only　force　at　work　
in　the　development　of　the　law　is　logic。　　In　the　broadest　sense；　indeed；　
that　notion　would　be　true。　　The　postulate　on　which　we　think　about　the　
universe　is　that　there　is　a　fixed　quantitative　relation　between　every　
phenomenon　and　its　antecedents　and　consequents。　　If　there　is　such　a　
thing　as　a　phenomenon　without　these　fixed　quantitative　relations；　it　is　
a　miracle。　　It　is　outside　the　law　of　cause　and　effect；　and　as　such　
transcends　our　power　of　thought；　or　at　least　is　something　to　or　from　
which　we　cannot　reason。　　The　condition　of　our　thinking　about　the　
universe　is　that　it　is　capable　of　being　thought　about　rationally；　or；　in　
other　words；　that　every　part　of　it　is　effect　and　cause　in　the　same　sense　
in　which　those　parts　are　with　which　we　are　most　familiar。　　So　in　the　
broadest　sense　it　is　true　that　the　law　is　a　logical　development；　like　
everything　else。　　The　danger　of　which　I　speak　is　not　the　admission　that　
the　principles　governing　other　phenomena　also　govern　the　law；　but　the　
notion　that　a　given　system；　ours；　for　instance；　can　be　worked　out　like　
mathematics　from　some　general　axioms　of　conduct。　　This　is　the　natural　
error　of　the　schools；　but　it　is　not　confined　to　them。　　I　once　heard　a　
very　eminent　judge　say　that　he　never　let　a　decision　go　until　he　was　
absolutely　sure　that　it　was　right。　　So　judicial　dissent　often　is　blamed；　
as　if　it　meant　simply　that　one　side　or　the　other　were　not　doing　their　
sums　right；　and　if　they　would　take　more　trouble；　agreement　inevitably　
would　come。　　

This　mode　of　thinking　is　entirely　natural。　　The　training　of　lawyers　is　a　
training　in　logic。　　The　processes　of　analogy；　discrimination；　and　
deduction　are　those　in　which　they　are　most　at　home。　　The　language　of　
judicial　decision　is　mainly　the　language　of　logic。　　And　the　logical　
method　and　form　flatter　that　longing　for　certainty　and　for　repose　which　
is　in　every　human　mind。　　But　certainty　generally　is　illusion；　and　repose　
is　not　the　destiny　of　man。　　Behind　the　logical　form　lies　a　judgment　as　
to　the　relative　worth　and　importance　of　competing　legislative　grounds；　
often　an　inarticulate　and　unconsciou