the path of the law-第3章

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to　the　relative　worth　and　importance　of　competing　legislative　grounds；　
often　an　inarticulate　and　unconscious　judgment；　it　is　true；　and　yet　the　
very　root　and　nerve　of　the　whole　proceeding。　　You　can　give　any　
conclusion　a　logical　form。　　You　always　can　imply　a　condition　in　a　
contract。　　But　why　do　you　imply　it？　　It　is　because　of　some　belief　as　to　
the　practice　of　the　community　or　of　a　class；　or　because　of　some　opinion　
as　to　policy；　or；　in　short；　because　of　some　attitude　of　yours　upon　a　
matter　not　capable　of　exact　quantitative　measurement；　and　therefore　not　
capable　of　founding　exact　logical　conclusions。　　Such　matters　really　are　
battle　grounds　where　the　means　do　not　exist　for　the　determinations　that　
shall　be　good　for　all　time；　and　where　the　decision　can　do　no　more　than　
embody　the　preference　of　a　given　body　in　a　given　time　and　place。　　We　do　
not　realize　how　large　a　part　of　our　law　is　open　to　reconsideration　upon　
a　slight　change　in　the　habit　of　the　public　mind。　　No　concrete　
proposition　is　self　evident；　no　matter　how　ready　we　may　be　to　accept　it；　
not　even　Mr。　Herbert　Spencer's　〃Every　man　has　a　right　to　do　what　he　
wills；　provided　he　interferes　not　with　a　like　right　on　the　part　of　his　
neighbors。〃

Why　is　a　false　and　injurious　statement　privileged；　if　it　is　made　
honestly　in　giving　information　about　a　servant？　　It　is　because　it　has　
been　thought　more　important　that　information　should　be　given　freely；　
than　that　a　man　should　be　protected　from　what　under　other　circumstances　
would　be　an　actionable　wrong。　　Why　is　a　man　at　liberty　to　set　up　a　
business　which　he　knows　will　ruin　his　neighborhood？　　It　is　because　the　
public　good　is　supposed　to　be　best　subserved　by　free　competition。　　
Obviously　such　judgments　of　relative　importance　may　vary　in　different　
times　and　places。　　Why　does　a　judge　instruct　a　jury　that　an　employer　is　
not　liable　to　an　employee　for　an　injury　received　in　the　course　of　his　
employment　unless　he　is　negligent；　and　why　do　the　jury　generally　find　
for　the　plaintiff　if　the　case　is　allowed　to　go　to　them？　　It　is　because　
the　traditional　policy　of　our　law　is　to　confine　liability　to　cases　where　
a　prudent　man　might　have　foreseen　the　injury；　or　at　least　the　danger；　
while　the　inclination　of　a　very　large　part　of　the　community　is　to　make　
certain　classes　of　persons　insure　the　safety　of　those　with　whom　they　
deal。　　Since　the　last　words　were　written；　I　have　seen　the　requirement　of　
such　insurance　put　forth　as　part　of　the　programme　of　one　of　the　best　
known　labor　organizations。　　There　is　a　concealed；　half　conscious　battle　
on　the　question　of　legislative　policy；　and　if　any　one　thinks　that　it　can　
be　settled　deductively；　or　once　for　all；　I　only　can　say　that　I　think　he　
is　theoretically　wrong；　and　that　I　am　certain　that　his　conclusion　will　
not　be　accepted　in　practice　semper　ubique　et　ab　omnibus。

Indeed；　I　think　that　even　now　our　theory　upon　this　matter　is　open　to　
reconsideration；　although　I　am　not　prepared　to　say　how　I　should　decide　
if　a　reconsideration　were　proposed。　　Our　law　of　torts　comes　from　the　old　
days　of　isolated；　ungeneralized　wrongs；　assaults；　slanders；　and　the　
like；　where　the　damages　might　be　taken　to　lie　where　they　fell　by　legal　
judgment。　　But　the　torts　with　which　our　courts　are　kept　busy　today　are　
mainly　the　incidents　of　certain　well　known　businesses。　　They　are　
injuries　to　person　or　property　by　railroads；　factories；　and　the　like。　　
The　liability　for　them　is　estimated；　and　sooner　or　later　goes　into　the　
price　paid　by　the　public。　　The　public　really　pays　the　damages；　and　the　
question　of　liability；　if　pressed　far　enough；　is　really　a　question　how　
far　it　is　desirable　that　the　public　should　insure　the　safety　of　one　
whose　work　it　uses。　　It　might　be　said　that　in　such　cases　the　chance　of　a　
jury　finding　for　the　defendant　is　merely　a　chance；　once　in　a　while　
rather　arbitrarily　interrupting　the　regular　course　of　recovery；　most　
likely　in　the　case　of　an　unusually　conscientious　plaintiff；　and　
therefore　better　done　away　with。　　On　the　other　hand；　the　economic　value　
even　of　a　life　to　the　community　can　be　estimated；　and　no　recovery；　it　
may　be　said；　ought　to　go　beyond　that　amount。　　It　is　conceivable　that　
some　day　in　certain　cases　we　may　find　ourselves　imitating；　on　a　higher　
plane；　the　tariff　for　life　and　limb　which　we　see　in　the　Leges　
Barbarorum。　　

I　think　that　the　judges　themselves　have　failed　adequately　to　recognize　
their　duty　of　weighing　considerations　of　social　advantage。　　The　duty　is　
inevitable；　and　the　result　of　the　often　proclaimed　judicial　aversion　to　
deal　with　such　considerations　is　simply　to　leave　the　very　ground　and　
foundation　of　judgments　inarticulate；　and　often　unconscious；　as　I　have　
said。　　When　socialism　first　began　to　be　talked　about；　the　comfortable　
classes　of　the　community　were　a　good　deal　frightened。　　I　suspect　that　
this　fear　has　influenced　judicial　action　both　here　and　in　England；　yet　
it　is　certain　that　it　is　not　a　conscious　factor　in　the　decisions　to　
which　I　refer。　　I　think　that　something　similar　has　led　people　who　no　
longer　hope　to　control　the　legislatures　to　look　to　the　courts　as　
expounders　of　the　constitutions；　and　that　in　some　courts　new　principles　
have　been　discovered　outside　the　bodies　of　those　instruments；　which　may　
be　generalized　into　acceptance　of　the　economic　doctrines　which　prevailed　
about　fifty　years　ago；　and　a　wholesale　prohibition　of　what　a　tribunal　of　
lawyers　does　not　think　about　right。　　I　cannot　but　believe　that　if　the　
training　of　lawyers　led　them　habitually　to　consider　more　definitely　and　
explicitly　the　social　advantage　on　which　the　rule　they　lay　down　must　be　
justified；　they　sometimes　would　hesitate　where　now　they　are　confident；　
and　see　that　really　they　were　taking　sides　upon　debatable　and　often　
burning　questions。　　

So　much　for　the　fallacy　of　logical　form。　　Now　let　us　consider　the　
present　condition　of　the　law　as　a　subject　for　study；　and　the　ideal　
toward　which　it　tends。　　We　still　are　far　from　the　point　of　view　which　I　
desire　to　see　reached。　　No　one　has　reached　it　or　can　reach　it　as　yet。　　
We　are　only　at　the　beginning　of　a　philosophical　reaction；　and　of　a　
reconsideration　of　the　worth　of　doctrines　which　for　the　most　part　still　
are　taken　for　granted　without　any　deliberate；　conscious；　and　systematic　
questioning　of　their　grounds。　　The　development　of　our　law　has　gone　on　
for　nearly　a　thousand　years；　like　the　development　of　a　plant；　each　
generation　taking　the　inevitable　next　step；　mind；　like　matter；　simply　
obeying　a　law　of　spontaneous　growth。　　It　is　perfectly　natural　and　right　
that　it　should　have　been　so。　　Imitation　is　a　necessity　of　human　nature；　
as　has　been　illustrated　by　a　remarkable　French　writer；　M。　Tard；　in　an　
admirable　book；　Les　Lois　de　l'Imitation。　　Most　of　the　things　we　do；　we　
do　for　no　better　reason　than　that　our　fathers　have　done　them　or　that　our　
neighbors　do　them；　and　the　same　is　true　of　a　larger　part　than　we　suspect　
of　what　we　think。　　The　reason　is　a　good　one；　because　our　short　life　
gives　us　no　time　for　a　better；　but　it　is　not　the　best。　　It　does　not　
follow；　because　we　all　are　compelled　to　take　on　faith　at　second　hand　
most　of　the　rules　on　which　we　base　our　action　and　our　thought；　that　each　
of　us　may　not　try　to　set　some　corner　of　his　world　in　the　order　of　
reason；　or　that　all　of　us　collectively　should　not　aspire　to　carry　reason　
as　far　as　it　will　go　throughout　the　whole　domain。　　In　regard　to　the　law；　
it　is　true；　no　doubt；　that　an　evolutionist　will　hesitate　to　affirm　
universal　validity　for　his　social　ideals；　or　for　the　principles　which　he　
thinks　should　be　embodied　in　legislation。　　He　is　content　if　he　can　prove　
them　best　for　here　and　now。　　He　may　be　ready　to　admit　that　he　knows　
nothing　about　an　absolute　best　in　the　cosmos；　and　even　that　he　knows　
next　to　nothing　about　a　permanent　best　for　men。　　Still　it　is　true　that　a　
body　of　law　is　more　rational　and　more　civilized　when　every　rule　it　
contains　is　referred　articulately　and　definitely　to　an　end　which　it　
subserves；　and　when　the　grounds　for　desiring　that　end　are　stated　or　are　
ready　to　be　stated　in　words。　　

At　present；　in　very　many　cases；　if　we　want　to　know　why　a　rule　of　law　has　
taken　its　particular　shape；　and　more　or　less　if　we　want　to　know　why　it　
exists　at　all；　we　go　to　tradition。　　We　follow　it　into　the　Year　Books；　
and　perhaps　beyond　them　to　the　customs　of　the　Salian　Franks；　and　
somewhere　in　the　past；　in　the　German　forests；　in　the　needs　of　Norman　
kings；　in　the　assumptions　of　a　dominant　class；　in　the　absence　of　
generalized　ideas；　we　find　out　the　practical　motive　for　what　now　best　is　
justified　by　the　mere　fact　of　its　acceptance　and　that　men　are　accustomed　
to　it。　　The　rational　study　of　law　is　still　to　a　large　extent　the　study　
of　history。　　History　must　be　a　part　of　the　study；　because　without　it　we　
cannot　know　the　precise　scope　of　rules　which　it　is　our　business　to　know。　　
It　is　a　part　of　the　rational　study；　because　it　is　the　first　step　toward　
an　enlightened　scepticism；　that　is；　towards　a　deliberate　reconsideration　
of　the　worth　of　those　rules。　　When　you　get　the　dragon　out　of　his　cave　on　
to　the　plain　and　in　the　daylight；　you　can　count　his　teeth　and　claws；　and　
see　just　what　is　his　strength。　　But　to　get　him　out　is　only　the　first　
step。　　The　next　is　either　to　kill　him；　or　to　tame　him　and　make　him　a　
useful　animal。　　For　the　rational　study　of　the　law　the　blackletter　man　
may　be　the　man　of　the　present；　but　the　man　of　the　future　is　the　man　of　
statistics　and　the　master　of　economics。　　It　is　revolting　to　have　no　
better　reason　for　a　rule　of　law　than　that　so　it　was　laid　down　in　the　
time　of　Henry　IV。　　It　is　still　more　revolting　if　the　grounds　upon　which　
it　was　laid　down　have　vanished　long　since；　and　the　rule　simply　persists　
from　blind　imitation　of　the　past。　　I　am　thinking　of　the　technical　rule　
as　to　trespass　ab　initio；　as　it　is　called；　which　I　attempted　to　explain　
in　a　recent　Massachusetts　case。　　

Let　me　take　an　illustration；　which　can　be　stated　in　a　few　words；　to　show　
how　the　social　end　which　is　aimed　at　by　a　rule　of　law　is　obscured　and　
only　partially　attained　in　consequence　of　the　fact　that　the　rule　owes　
its　form　to　a　gradual　historical　development；　instead　of　being　reshaped　
as　a　whole；　with　conscious　articulate　reference　to　the　end　in　view。　　We　
think　it　desirable　to　prevent　one　man's　property　being　misappropriated　
by　another；　and　so　we　make　larceny　a　crime。　　The　evil　is　the　same　
whether　the　misappropriation　is　made　by　a　man　into　whose　hands　the　owner　
has　put　the　property；　or　by　one　who　wrongfully　takes　it　away。　　But　
primitive　law　in　its　weakness　did　not　get　much　beyond　an　effort　to　
prevent　violence；　and　very　naturally　made　a　wrongful　taking；　a　trespass；　
part　of　its　definition　of　the　crime。　　In　modem　times　the　judges　enlarged　
the　definition　a　little　by　holding　that；　if　the　wrong…doer　gets　
possession　by　a　trick　or　device；　the　crime　is　committed。　　This　really　
was　giving　up　the　requirement　of　trespass；　and　it　would　have　been　more　
logical；　as　well　as　truer　to　the　present　object　of　the　law；　to　abandon　
the　requirement　altogether。　　That；　however；　would　have　seemed　too　bold；　
and　was　left　to　statute。　　Statutes　were　passed　making