马基雅维里 君主论英文prince-第2章
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did the persuasions of Philip ever induce the Romans to be his friends
without first humbling him; nor did the influence of Antiochus make them
agree that he should retain any lordship over the country。 Because the
Romans did in these instances what all prudent princes ought to do; who
have to regard not only present troubles; but also future ones; for
which they must prepare with every energy; because; when foreseen; it is
easy to remedy them; but if you wait until they approach; the medicine
is no longer in time because the malady has bee incurable; for it
happens in this; as the physicians say it happens in hectic fever; that
in the beginning of the malady it is easy to cure but difficult to
detect; but in the course of time; not having been either detected or
treated in the beginning; it bees easy to detect but difficult to
cure。 Thus it happens in affairs of state; for when the evils that arise
have been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise man to see); they
can be quickly redressed; but when; through not having been foreseen;
they have been permitted to grow in a way that every one can see them。
there is no longer a remedy。 Therefore; the Romans; foreseeing troubles;
dealt with them at once; and; even to avoid a war; would not let them
e to a head; for they knew that war is not to be avoided; but is only
put off to the advantage of others; moreover they wished to fight with
Philip and Antiochus in Greece so as not to have to do it in Italy; they
could have avoided both; but this they did not wish; nor did that ever
please them which is for ever in the mouths of the wise ones of our
time: Let us enjoy the benefits of the time but rather the benefits of
their own valour and prudence; for time drives everything before it; and
is able to bring with it good as well as evil; and evil as well as good。
But let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any of the
things mentioned。 I will speak of Louis 'XII' (and not of Charles
'VIII') as the one whose conduct is the better to be observed; he having
held possession of Italy for the longest period; and you will see that
he has done the opposite to those things which ought to be done to
retain a state posed of divers elements。
King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians; who
desired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his intervention。 I will
not blame the course taken by the king; because; wishing to get a
foothold in Italy; and having no friends there seeing rather that
every door was shut to him owing to the conduct of Charles he was
forced to accept those friendships which he could get; and he would have
succeeded very quickly in his design if in other matters he had not made
some mistakes。 The king; however; having acquired Lombardy; regained at
once the authority which Charles had lost: Genoa yielded; the
Florentines became his friends; the Marquess of Mantua; the Duke of
Ferrara; the Bentivoglio; my lady of Forli; the Lords of Faenza; of
Pesaro; of Rimini; of Camerino; of Piombino; the Lucchesi; the Pisans;
the Sienese everybody made advances to him to bee his friend。 Then
could the Venetians realize the rashness of the course taken by them;
which; in order that they might secure two towns in Lombardy; had made
the king master of two…thirds of Italy。
Let any one now consider with what little difficulty the king could have
maintained his position in Italy had he observed the rules above laid
down; and kept all his friends secure and protected; for although they
were numerous they were both weak and timid; some afraid of the Church;
some of the Venetians; and thus they would always have been forced to
stand in with him; and by their means he could easily have made himself
secure against those who remained powerful。 But he was no sooner in
Milan than he did the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander to occupy the
Romagna。 It never occurred to him that by this action he was weakening
himself; depriving himself of friends and those who had thrown
themselves into his lap; whilst he aggrandized the Church by adding much
temporal power to the spiritual; thus giving it great authority。 And
having mitted this prime error; he was obliged to follow it up; so
much so that; to put an end to the ambition of Alexander; and to prevent
his being the master of Tuscany; he was himself forced to e into
Italy。
And as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church; and
deprived himself friends; he; wishing to have the kingdom of Naples;
divides it with the King of Spain; and where he was the prime arbiter of
Italy he takes an associate; so that the ambitious of that country and
the malcontents of his own should have where to shelter; and whereas he
could have left in the kingdom his own pensioner as king; he drove him
out; to put one there who was able to drive him; Louis; out in turn。
The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and mon; and men always
do so when they can; and for this they will be praised not blamed; but
when they cannot do so; yet wish to do so by any means; then there is
folly and blame。 Therefore; if France could have attacked Naples with
her own forces she ought to have done so; if she could not; then she
ought not to have divided it。 And if the partition which she made with
the Venetians in Lombardy was justified by the excuse that by it she got
a foothold in Italy; this other partition merited blame; for it had not
the excuse of that necessity。
Therefore Louis made these five errors: he destroyed the minor powers;
he increased the strength of one of the greater powers in Italy; he
brought in a foreign power; he did not settle in the country; he did not
send colonies。 Which errors; if he had lived; were not enough to injure
him had he not made a sixth by taking away their dominions from the
Venetians; because; had he not aggrandized the Church; nor brought Spain
into Italy; it would have been very reasonable and necessary to humble
them; but having first taken these steps; he ought never to have
consented to their ruin; for they; being powerful; would always have
kept off others from designs on Lombardy; to which the Venetians would
never have consented except to bee masters themselves there; also
because the others would not wish to take Lombardy from France in order
to give it to the Venetians; and to run counter to both they would not
have had the courage。
And if any one should say: King Louis yielded the Romagna to Alexander
and the kingdom to Spain to avoid war; I answer for the reasons given
above that a blunder ought never be perpetrated to avoid war; because it
is not to be avoided; but is only deferred to your disadvantage。 And if
another should allege the pledge which the king had given to the Pope
that he would assist him in the enterprise; in exchange for the
dissolution of his marriage and for the hat to Rouen; to that I reply
what I shall write later on concerning the faith of princes; and how it
ought to be kept。
Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the
conditions observed by those who have taken possession of countries and
wished to retain them。 Nor is there any miracle in this; but much that
is reasonable and quite natural。 And on these matters I spoke at Nantes
with Rouen; when Valentino; '1' as Cesare Borgia; the son of Pope
Alexander; was usually called; occupied the Romagna; and on Cardinal
Rouen observing to me that the Italians did not understand war; I
replied to him that the French did not understand statecraft; meaning
that otherwise they would not have allowed the Church to reach such
greatness。 And in fact it has been seen that the greatness of the Church
and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France; and her ruin may be
attributed to them。 From this a general rule is drawn which never or
rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another being powerful is
ruined; because that predominancy has been brought about either by
astuteness or else by force; and both are distrusted by him who has been
raised to power。
1。 So called in Italian from the duchy of Valentinois; conferred
on him by Louis XII。
CHAPTER IV
WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS; CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER; DID NOT REBEL AGAINST
THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH
CONSIDERING the difficulties which men have had to hold a newly acquired
state; some might wonder how; seeing that Alexander the Great became the
master of Asia in a few years; and died whilst it was yet scarcely
settled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole empire would
have rebelled); nevertheless his successors maintained themselves; and
had to meet no other difficulty than that which arose among themselves
from their own ambitions。
I answer that the principalities of which one has record are found to be
governed in two different ways: either by a prince; with a body of
servants; who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his
favour and permission; or by a prince and barons; who hold that dignity
by antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince。 Such barons
have states and their own subjects; who recognize them as lords and hold
them in natural affection。 Those states that are governed by a prince
and his servants hold their prince in more consideration; because in all
the country there is no one who is recognized as superior to him; and if
they yield obedience to another they do it as to a minister and
official; and they do not bear him any particular affection。
The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the
King of France。 The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one lord;
the others are his servants; and; dividing his kingdom into sanjaks; he
sends there different administrators; and shifts and changes them as he
chooses。 But the King of France is placed in the midst of an ancient
body of lords; acknowledged by their own subjects; and beloved by them;
they have their own prerogatives; nor can the king take these away
except at his peril。 Therefore; he who considers both of these states
will recognize great difficulties in seizing the state of the Turk; but;
once it is conquered; great ease in holding it。 The causes of the
difficulties in seizing the kingdom of the Turk are that the usurper
cannot be called in by the princes of the kingdom; nor can he hope to be
assisted in his designs by the revolt of those whom the lord has around
him。 This arises from the reasons given above; for his ministers; being
all slaves and bondmen; can only be corrupted with great difficulty; and
one can expect little advantage from them when they have been corrupted;
as they cannot carry the people with them; for the reasons assigned。
Hence; he who attacks the Turk must bear in mind that he will find him
united; and he will have to rely more on his own strength than on the
revolt of others; but; if once t