马基雅维里 君主论英文prince-第6章

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himself　with　new　civil　and　military　ordinances；　in　such　a　way　that；　in

the　year　during　which　he　held　the　principality；　not　only　was　he　secure

in　the　city　of　Fermo；　but　he　had　bee　formidable　to　all　his

neighbours。　And　his　destruction　would　have　been　as　difficult　as　that　of

Agathocles　if　he　had　not　allowed　himself　to　be　overreached　by　Cesare

Borgia；　who　took　him　with　the　Orsini　and　Vitelli　at　Sinigaglia；　as　was

stated　above。　Thus　one　year　after　he　had　mitted　this　parricide；　he

was　strangled；　together　with　Vitellozzo；　whom　he　had　made　his　leader　in

valour　and　wickedness。



Some　may　wonder　how　it　can　happen　that　Agathocles；　and　his　like；　after

infinite　treacheries　and　cruelties；　should　live　for　long　secure　in　his

country；　and　defend　himself　from　external　enemies；　and　never　be

conspired　against　by　his　own　citizens；　seeing　that　many　others；　by　means

of　cruelty；　have　never　been　able　even　in　peaceful　times　to　hold　the

state；　still　less　in　the　doubtful　times　of　war。　I　believe　that　this

follows　from　severities　being　badly　or　properly　used。　Those　may　be

called　properly　used；　if　of　evil　it　is　lawful　to　speak　well；　that　are

applied　at　one　blow　and　are　necessary　to　one's　security；　and　that　are

not　persisted　in　afterwards　unless　they　can　be　turned　to　the　advantage

of　the　subjects。　The　badly　employed　are　those　which；　notwithstanding

they　may　be　few　in　the　mencement；　multiply　with　time　rather　than

decrease。　Those　who　practise　the　first　system　are　able；　by　aid　of　God　or

man；　to　mitigate　in　some　degree　their　rule；　as　Agathocles　did。　It　is

impossible　for　those　who　follow　the　other　to　maintain　themselves。



Hence　it　is　to　be　remarked　that；　in　seizing　a　state；　the　usurper　ought

to　examine　closely　into　all　those　injuries　which　it　is　necessary　for　him

to　inflict；　and　to　do　them　all　at　one　stroke　so　as　not　to　have　to　repeat

them　daily；　and　thus　by　not　unsettling　men　he　will　be　able　to　reassure

them；　and　win　them　to　himself　by　benefits。　He　who　does　otherwise；　either

from　timidity　or　evil　advice；　is　always　pelled　to　keep　the　knife　in

his　hand；　neither　can　he　rely　on　his　subjects；　nor　can　they　attach

themselves　to　him；　owing　to　their　continued　and　repeated　wrongs。　For

injuries　ought　to　be　done　all　at　one　time；　so　that；　being　tasted　less；

they　offend　less；　benefits　ought　to　be　given　little　by　little；　so　that

the　flavour　of　them　may　last　longer。



And　above　all　things；　a　prince　ought　to　live　amongst　his　people　in　such

a　way　that　no　unexpected　circumstances；　whether　of　good　or　evil；　shall

make　him　change；　because　if　the　necessity　for　this　es　in　troubled

times；　you　are　too　late　for　harsh　measures；　and　mild　ones　will　not　help

you；　for　they　will　be　considered　as　forced　from　you；　and　no　one　will　be

under　any　obligation　to　you　for　them。



CHAPTER　IX



CONCERNING　A　CIVIL　PRINCIPALITY



BUT　ing　to　the　other　point　　where　a　leading　citizen　bees　the

prince　of　his　country；　not　by　wickedness　or　any　intolerable　violence；

but　by　the　favour　of　his　fellow　citizens　　this　may　be　called　a　civil

principality：　nor　is　genius　or　fortune　altogether　necessary　to　attain　to

it；　but　rather　a　happy　shrewdness。　I　say　then　that　such　a　principality

is　obtained　either　by　the　favour　of　the　people　or　by　the　favour　of　the

nobles。　Because　in　all　cities　these　two　distinct　parties　are　found；　and

from　this　it　arises　that　the　people　do　not　wish　to　be　ruled　nor

oppressed　by　the　nobles；　and　the　nobles　wish　to　rule　and　oppress　the

people；　and　from　these　two　opposite　desires　there　arises　in　cities　one

of　three　results；　either　a　principality；　self…government；　or　anarchy。



A　principality　is　created　either　by　the　people　or　by　the　nobles；

accordingly　as　one　or　other　of　them　has　the　opportunity；　for　the　nobles；

seeing　they　cannot　withstand　the　people；　begin　to　cry　up　the　reputation

of　one　of　themselves；　and　they　make　him　a　prince；　so　that　under　his

shadow　they　can　give　vent　to　their　ambitions。　The　people；　finding　they

cannot　resist　the　nobles；　also　cry　up　the　reputation　of　one　of

themselves；　and　make　him　a　prince　so　as　to　be　defended　by　his　authority。

He　who　obtains　sovereignty　by　the　assistance　of　the　nobles　maintains

himself　with　more　difficulty　than　he　who　es　to　it　by　the　aid　of　the

people；　because　the　former　finds　himself　with　many　around　him　who

consider　themselves　his　equals；　and　because　of　this　he　can　neither　rule

nor　manage　them　to　his　liking。　But　he　who　reaches　sovereignty　by　popular

favour　finds　himself　alone；　and　has　none　around　him；　or　few；　who　are　not

prepared　to　obey　him。



Besides　this；　one　cannot　by　fair　dealing；　and　without　injury　to　others；

satisfy　the　nobles；　but　you　can　satisfy　the　people；　for　their　object　is

more　righteous　than　that　of　the　nobles；　the　latter　wishing　to　oppress；

whilst　the　former　only　desire　not　to　be　oppressed。　It　is　to　be　added

also　that　a　prince　can　never　secure　himself　against　a　hostile　people；

because　of　their　being　too　many；　whilst　from　the　nobles　he　can　secure

himself；　as　they　are　few　in　number。　The　worst　that　a　prince　may　expect

from　a　hostile　people　is　to　be　abandoned　by　them；　but　from　hostile

nobles　he　has　not　only　to　fear　abandonment；　but　also　that　they　will　rise

against　him；　for　they；　being　in　these　affairs　more　far…seeing　and

astute；　always　e　forward　in　time　to　save　themselves；　and　to　obtain

favours　from　him　whom　they　expect　to　prevail。　Further；　the　prince　is

pelled　to　live　always　with　the　same　people；　but　he　can　do　well

without　the　same　nobles；　being　able　to　make　and　unmake　them　daily；　and

to　give　or　take　away　authority　when　it　pleases　him。



Therefore；　to　make　this　point　clearer；　I　say　that　the　nobles　ought　to　be

looked　at　mainly　in　two　ways：　that　is　to　say；　they　either　shape　their

course　in　such　a　way　as　binds　them　entirely　to　your　fortune；　or　they　do

not。　Those　who　so　bind　themselves；　and　are　not　rapacious；　ought　to　be

honoured　and　loved；　those　who　do　not　bind　themselves　may　be　dealt　with

in　two　ways；　they　may　fail　to　do　this　through　pusillanimity　and　a

natural　want　of　courage；　in　which　case　you　ought　to　make　use　of　them；

especially　of　those　who　are　of　good　counsel；　and　thus；　whilst　in

prosperity　you　honour　yourself；　in　adversity　you　have　not　to　fear　them。

But　when　for　their　own　ambitious　ends　they　shun　binding　themselves；　it

is　a　token　that　they　are　giving　more　thought　to　themselves　than　to　you；

and　a　prince　ought　to　guard　against　such；　and　to　fear　them　as　if　they

were　open　enemies；　because　in　adversity　they　always　help　to　ruin　him。



Therefore；　one　who　bees　a　prince　through　the　favour　of　the　people

ought　to　keep　them　friendly；　and　this　he　can　easily　do　seeing　they　only

ask　not　to　be　oppressed　by　him。　But　one　who；　in　opposition　to　the

people；　bees　a　prince　by　the　favour　of　the　nobles；　ought；　above

everything；　to　seek　to　win　the　people　over　to　himself；　and　this　he　may

easily　do　if　he　takes　them　under　his　protection。　Because　men；　when　they

receive　good　from　him　of　whom　they　were　expecting　evil；　are　bound　more

closely　to　their　benefactor；　thus　the　people　quickly　bee　more　devoted

to　him　than　if　he　had　been　raised　to　the　principality　by　their　favours；

and　the　prince　can　win　their　affections　in　many　ways；　but　as　these　vary

according　to　the　circumstances　one　cannot　give　fixed　rules；　so　I　omit

them；　but；　I　repeat；　it　is　necessary　for　a　prince　to　have　the　people

friendly；　otherwise　he　has　no　security　in　adversity。



Nabis；　Prince　of　the　Spartans；　sustained　the　attack　of　all　Greece；　and

of　a　victorious　Roman　army；　and　against　them　he　defended　his　country　and

his　government；　and　for　the　overing　of　this　peril　it　was　only

necessary　for　him　to　make　himself　secure　against　a　few；　but　this　would

not　have　been　sufficient　if　the　people　had　been　hostile。　And　do　not　let

any　one　impugn　this　statement　with　the　trite　proverb　that　'He　who　builds

on　the　people；　builds　on　the　mud；'　for　this　is　true　when　a　private

citizen　makes　a　foundation　there；　and　persuades　himself　that　the　people

will　free　him　when　he　is　oppressed　by　his　enemies　or　by　the　magistrates；

wherein　he　would　find　himself　very　often　deceived；　as　happened　to　the

Gracchi　in　Rome　and　to　Messer　Giorgio　Scali　in　Florence。　But　granted　a

prince　who　has　established　himself　as　above；　who　can　mand；　and　is　a

man　of　courage；　undismayed　in　adversity；　who　does　not　fail　in　other

qualifications；　and　who；　by　his　resolution　and　energy；　keeps　the　whole

people　encouraged　　such　a　one　will　never　find　himself　deceived　in

them；　and　it　will　be　shown　that　he　has　laid　his　foundations　well。



These　principalities　are　liable　to　danger　when　they　are　passing　from　the

civil　to　the　absolute　order　of　government；　for　such　princes　either　rule

personally　or　through　magistrates。　In　the　latter　case　their　government

is　weaker　and　more　insecure；　because　it　rests　entirely　on　the　goodwill

of　those　citizens　who　are　raised　to　the　magistracy；　and　who；　especially

in　troubled　times；　can　destroy　the　government　with　great　ease；　either　by

intrigue　or　open　defiance；　and　the　prince　has　not　the　chance　amid

tumults　to　exercise　absolute　authority；　because　the　citizens　and

subjects；　accustomed　to　receive　orders　from　magistrates；　are　not　of　a

mind　to　obey　him　amid　these　confusions；　and　there　will　always　be　in

doubtful　times　a　scarcity　of　men　whom　he　can　trust。　For　such　a　prince

cannot　rely　upon　what　he　observes　in　quiet　times；　when　citizens　had　need

of　the　state；　because　then　every　one　agrees　with　him；　they　all　promise；

and　when　death　is　far　distant　they　all　wish　to　die　for　him；　but　in

troubled　times；　when　the　state　has　need　of　its　citizens；　then　he　finds

but　few。　And　so　much　the　more　is　this　experiment　dangerous；　inasmuch　as

it　can　only　be　tried　once。　Therefore　a　wise　prince　ought　to　adopt　such　a

course　that　his　citizens　will　always　in　every　sort　and　kind　of

circumstance　have　need　of　the　state　and　of　him；　and　then　he　will　always

find　them　faithful。



CHAPTER　X



CONCERNING　THE　WAY　IN　WHICH　THE　STRENGTH　OF　ALL　PRINCIPALITIES　OUGHT　TO

BE　MEASURED



IT　IS　necessary　to　consider　another　point　in　examining　the　character　of

these　principalities：　that　is；　whether　a　prince　has　such　power　that；　in

case　of　need；　he　can　support　himself　with　his　own　resources；　or　whether

he　has　always　need　of　the　assistance　of　others。　And　to　make　this　quite

clear　I　say　that　I　consider　those　are　able　to　support　themselves　by

their　own　resources　who　can；　either　by　abundance　of　men　or　money；　raise

a　sufficient　army　to　join　battle　against　any　one　who　es　to　attack

them；　and　I　consider　those　always　to　have　need　of　others　who　cannot　show

themselves　against　the　enemy　in　the　field；　but　are　forced　to　defend

themselves　by　sheltering　behind　walls。　The　first　case　has　been

discussed；　but　we　will　speak　of　it　again　should　it　recur。　In　the　second

case　one　can　say　nothing　except　to　encourage　such　princes　to　provision

and　fortify　their　towns；　and　not　on　any　account　to　defend　the　country。

And　whoever　shall　fortify　his　town　well；　and　s