马基雅维里 君主论英文prince-第8章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！



ruined　in　the　usual　way。



And　if　it　be　urged　that　whoever　is　armed　will　act　in　the　same　way；

whether　mercenary　or　not；　I　reply　that　when　arms　have　to　be　resorted　to；

either　by　a　prince　or　a　republic；　then　the　prince　ought　to　go　in　person

and　perform　the　duty　of　captain；　the　republic　has　to　send　its　citizens；

and　when　one　is　sent　who　does　not　turn　out　satisfactorily；　it　ought　to

recall　him；　and　when　one　is　worthy；　to　hold　him　by　the　laws　so　that　he

does　not　leave　the　mand。　And　experience　has　shown　princes　and

republics；　single…handed；　making　the　greatest　progress；　and　mercenaries

doing　nothing　except　damage；　and　it　is　more　difficult　to　bring　a

republic；　armed　with　its　own　arms；　under　the　sway　of　one　of　its　citizens

than　it　is　to　bring　one　armed　with　foreign　arms。　Rome　and　Sparta　stood

for　many　ages　armed　and　free。　The　Switzers　are　pletely　armed　and

quite　free。



Of　ancient　mercenaries；　for　example；　there　are　the　Carthaginians；　who

were　oppressed　by　their　mercenary　soldiers　after　the　first　war　with　the

Romans；　although　the　Carthaginians　had　their　own　citizens　for　captains。

After　the　death　of　Epaminondas；　Philip　of　Macedon　was　made　captain　of

their　soldiers　by　the　Thebans；　and　after　victory　he　took　away　their

liberty。



Duke　Filippo　being　dead；　the　Milanese　enlisted　Francesco　Sforza　against

the　Venetians；　and　he；　having　overe　the　enemy　at　Caravaggio；　allied

himself　with　them　to　crush　the　Milanese；　his　masters。　His　father；

Sforza；　having　been　engaged　by　Queen　Johanna　of　Naples；　left　her

unprotected；　so　that　she　was　forced　to　throw　herself　into　the　arms　of

the　King　of　Aragon；　in　order　to　save　her　kingdom。　And　if　the　Venetians

and　Florentines　formerly　extended　their　dominions　by　these　arms；　and　yet

their　captains　did　not　make　themselves　princes；　but　have　defended　them；

I　reply　that　the　Florentines　in　this　case　have　been　favoured　by　chance；

for　of　the　able　captains；　of　whom　they　might　have　stood　in　fear；　some

have　not　conquered；　some　have　been　opposed；　and　others　have　turned　their

ambitions　elsewhere。　One　who　did　not　conquer　was　Giovanni　Acuto；　＇2＇　and

since　he　did　not　conquer　his　fidelity　cannot　be　proved；　but　every　one

will　acknowledge　that；　had　he　conquered；　the　Florentines　would　have

stood　at　his　discretion。　Sforza　had　the　Bracceschi　always　against　him；

so　they　watched　each　other。　Francesco　turned　his　ambition　to　Lombardy；

Braccio　against　the　Church　and　the　kingdom　of　Naples。　But　let　us　e　to

that　which　happened　a　short　while　ago。　The　Florentines　appointed　as

their　captain　Paolo　Vitelli；　a　most　prudent　man；　who　from　a　private

position　had　risen　to　the　greatest　renown。　If　this　man　had　taken　Pisa；

nobody　can　deny　that　it　would　have　been　proper　for　the　Florentines　to

keep　in　with　him；　for　if　he　became　the　soldier　of　their　enemies　they　had

no　means　of　resisting；　and　if　they　held　to　him　they　must　obey　him。　The

Venetians；　if　their　achievements　are　considered；　will　be　seen　to　have

acted　safely　and　gloriously　so　long　as　they　sent　to　war　their　own　men；

when　with　armed　gentlemen　and　plebeians　they　did　valiantly。　This　was

before　they　turned　to　enterprises　on　land；　but　when　they　began　to　fight

on　land　they　forsook　this　virtue　and　followed　the　custom　of　Italy。　And

in　the　beginning　of　their　expansion　on　land；　through　not　having　much

territory；　and　because　of　their　great　reputation；　they　had　not　much　to

fear　from　their　captains；　but　when　they　expanded；　as　under　Carmignola；

they　had　a　taste　of　this　mistake；　for；　having　found　him　a　most　valiant

man　（they　beat　the　Duke　of　Milan　under　his　leadership）；　and；　on　the

other　hand；　knowing　how　lukewarm　he　was　in　the　war；　they　feared　they

would　no　longer　conquer　under　him；　and　for　this　reason　they　were　not

willing；　nor　were　they　able；　to　let　him　go；　and　so；　not　to　lose　again

that　which　they　had　acquired；　they　were　pelled；　in　order　to　secure

themselves；　to　murder　him。　They　had　afterwards　for　their　captains

Bartolomeo　da　Bergamo；　Roberto　da　San　Severino；　the　Count　of　Pitigliano；

and　the　like；　under　whom　they　had　to　dread　loss　and　not　gain；　as

happened　afterwards　at　Vaila；　where　in　one　battle　they　lost　that　which

in　eight　hundred　years　they　had　acquired　with　so　much　trouble。　Because

from　such　arms　conquests　e　but　slowly；　long　delayed　and

inconsiderable；　but　the　losses　sudden　and　portentous。



And　as　with　these　examples　I　have　reached　Italy；　which　has　been　ruled

for　many　years　by　mercenaries；　I　wish　to　discuss　them　more　seriously；　in

order　that；　having　seen　their　rise　and　progress；　one　may　be　better

prepared　to　counteract　them。　You　must　understand　that　the　empire　has

recently　e　to　be　repudiated　in　Italy；　that　the　Pope　has　acquired　more

temporal　power；　and　that　Italy　has　been　divided　up　into　more　states；　for

the　reason　that　many　of　the　great　cities　took　up　arms　against　their

nobles；　who；　formerly　favoured　by　the　emperor；　were　oppressing　them；

whilst　the　Church　was　favouring　them　so　as　to　gain　authority　in　temporal

power：　in　many　others　their　citizens　became　princes。　From　this　it　came

to　pass　that　Italy　fell　partly　into　the　hands　of　the　Church　and　of

republics；　and；　the　Church　consisting　of　priests　and　the　republic　of

citizens　unaccustomed　to　arms；　both　menced　to　enlist　foreigners。



The　first　who　gave　renown　to　this　soldiery　was　Alberigo　da　Conio；　a

native　of　the　Romagna。　From　the　school　of　this　man　sprang；　among　others；

Braccio　and　Sforza；　who　in　their　time　were　the　arbiters　of　Italy。　After

these　came　all　the　other　captains　who　till　now　have　directed　the　arms　of

Italy；　and　the　end　of　all　their　valour　has　been；　that　she　has　been

overrun　by　Charles；　robbed　by　Louis；　ravaged　by　Ferdinand；　and　insulted

by　the　Switzers。　The　principle　that　has　guided　them　has　been；　first；　to

lower　the　credit　of　infantry　so　that　they　might　increase　their　own。　They

did　this　because；　subsisting　on　their　pay　and　without　territory；　they

were　unable　to　support　many　soldiers；　and　a　few　infantry　did　not　give

them　any　authority；　so　they　were　led　to　employ　cavalry；　with　a　moderate

force　of　which　they　were　maintained　and　honoured；　and　affairs　were

brought　to　such　a　pass　that；　in　an　army　of　twenty　thousand　soldiers；

there　were　not　to　be　found　two　thousand　foot　soldiers。　They　had；　besides

this；　used　every　art　to　lessen　fatigue　and　danger　to　themselves　and

their　soldiers；　not　killing　in　the　fray；　but　taking　prisoners　and

liberating　without　ransom。　They　did　not　attack　towns　at　night；　nor　did

the　garrisons　of　the　towns　attack　encampments　at　night；　they　did　not

surround　the　camp　either　with　stockade　or　ditch；　nor　did　they　campaign

in　the　winter。　All　these　things　were　permitted　by　their　military　rules；

and　devised　by　them　to　avoid；　as　I　have　said；　both　fatigue　and　dangers；

thus　they　have　brought　Italy　to　slavery　and　contempt。



1。　With　which　to　chalk　up　the　billets　for　his　soldiers。



2。　As　Sir　John　Hawkwood；　the　English　leader　of　mercenaries；　was　called

by　the　Italians。



CHAPTER　XIII



CONCERNING　AUXILIARIES；　MIXED　SOLDIERY；　AND　ONE'S　OWN



AUXILIARIES；　which　are　the　other　useless　arm；　are　employed　when　a　prince

is　called　in　with　his　forces　to　aid　and　defend；　as　was　done　by　Pope

Julius　in　the　most　recent　times；　for　he；　having；　in　the　enterprise

against　Ferrara；　had　poor　proof　of　his　mercenaries；　turned　to

auxiliaries；　and　stipulated　with　Ferdinand；　King　of　Spain；　for　his

assistance　with　men　and　arms。　These　arms　may　be　useful　and　good　in

themselves；　but　for　him　who　calls　them　in　they　are　always

disadvantageous；　for　losing；　one　is　undone；　and　winning；　one　is　their

captive。



And　although　ancient　histories　may　be　full　of　examples；　I　do　not　wish　to

leave　this　recent　one　of　Pope　Julius　II；　the　peril　of　which　cannot　fall

to　be　perceived；　for　he；　wishing　to　get　Ferrara；　threw　himself　entirely

into　the　hands　of　the　foreigner。　But　his　good　fortune　brought　about　a

third　event；　so　that　he　did　not　reap　the　fruit　of　his　rash　choice；

because；　having　auxiliaries　routed　at　Ravenna；　and　the　Switzers　having

risen　and　driven　out　the　conquerors　（against　all　expectation；　both　his

and　others）；　it　so　came　to　pass　that　he　did　not　bee　prisoner　to　his

enemies；　they　having　fled；　nor　to　his　auxiliaries；　he　having　conquered

by　other　arms　than　theirs。



The　Florentines；　being　entirely　without　arms；　sent　ten　thousand

Frenchmen　to　take　Pisa；　whereby　they　ran　more　danger　than　at　any　other

time　of　their　troubles。



The　Emperor　of　Constantinople；　to　oppose　his　neighbours；　sent　ten

thousand　Turks　into　Greece；　who；　on　the　war　being　finished；　were　not

willing　to　quit；　this　was　the　beginning　of　the　servitude　of　Greece　to

the　infidels。



Therefore；　let　him　who　has　no　desire　to　conquer　make　use　of　these　arms；

for　they　are　much　more　hazardous　than　mercenaries；　because　with　them　the

ruin　is　ready　made；　they　are　all　united；　all　yield　obedience　to　others；

but　with　mercenaries；　when　they　have　conquered；　more　time　and　better

opportunities　are　needed　to　injure　you；　they　are　not　all　of　one

munity；　they　are　found　and　paid　by　you；　and　a　third　party；　which　you

have　made　their　head；　is　not　able　all　at　once　to　assume　enough　authority

to　injure　you。　In　conclusion；　in　mercenaries　dastardy　is　most　dangerous；

in　auxiliaries；　valour。　The　wise　prince；　therefore；　has　always　avoided

these　arms　and　turned　to　his　own；　and　has　been　willing　rather　to　lose

with　them　than　to　conquer　with　others；　not　deeming　that　a　real　victory

which　is　gained　with　the　arms　of　others。



I　shall　never　hesitate　to　cite　Cesare　Borgia　and　his　actions。　This　duke

entered　the　Romagna　with　auxiliaries；　taking　there　only　French　soldiers；

and　with　them　he　captured　Imola　and　Forli；　but　afterwards；　such　forces

not　appearing　to　him　reliable；　he　turned　to　mercenaries；　discerning　less

danger　in　them；　and　enlisted　the　Orsini　and　Vitelli；　whom　presently；　on

handling　and　finding　them　doubtful；　unfaithful；　and　dangerous；　he

destroyed　and　turned　to　his　own　men。　And　the　difference　between　one　and

the　other　of　these　forces　can　easily　be　seen　when　one　considers　the

difference　there　was　in　the　reputation　of　the　duke；　when　he　had　the

French；　when　he　had　the　Orsini　and　Vitelli；　and　when　he　relied　on　his

own　soldiers；　on　whose　fidelity　he　could　always　count　and　found　it　ever

increasing；　he　was　never　esteemed　more　highly　than　when　every　one　saw

that　he　was　plete　master　of　his　own　forces。



I　was　not　intending　to　go　beyond　Italian　and　recent　examples；　but　I　am

unwilling　to　leave　out　Hiero；　the　Syracusan；　he　being　one　of　those　I

have　named　above。　This　man；　as　I　have　said；　made　head　of　the　army　by　the

Syracusans；　soon　found　out　that　a　mercenary　soldiery；　constituted　like

our　Italian　condottieri；　was　of　no　use；　and　it　appearing　to　him　that　he

could　neither　keep　them　nor　let　them　go；　he　had　them　all　cut　to　pieces；

and　afterwards　made　war　with　his　own　forces　and　not　with　aliens。



I　wish　also　to　recall　to　memory　an　instance　from　the　Old　Testament

applicable　to　this　subje