the essays of montaigne, v16-第7章

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only　rouse　and　exercise；　me。　We　evade　correction；　whereas　we　ought　to
offer　and　present　ourselves　to　it；　especially　when　it　appears　in　the　form
of　conference；　and　not　of　authority。　　At　every　opposition；　we　do　not
consider　whether　or　no　it　be　dust；　but；　right　or　wrong；　how　to　disengage
ourselves：　instead　of　extending　the　arms；　we　thrust　out　our　claws。　　I
could　suffer　myself　to　be　rudely　handled　by　my　friend；　so　much　as　to　tell
me　that　I　am　a　fool；　and　talk　I　know　not　of　what。　　I　love　stout
expressions　amongst　gentle　men；　and　to　have　them　speak　as　they　think；　we
must　fortify　and　harden　our　hearing　against　this　tenderness　of　the
ceremonious　sound　of　words。　I　love　a　strong　and　manly　familiarity　and
conversation：　a　friendship　that　pleases　itself　in　the　sharpness　and
vigour　of　its　communication；　like　love　in　biting　and　scratching：　it　is
not　vigorous　and　generous　enough；　if　it　be　not　quarrelsome；　if　it　be
civilised　and　artificial；　if　it　treads　nicely　and　fears　the　shock：

　　　　　　　〃Neque　enim　disputari　sine　reprehensione　potest。〃

　　　　　＇〃Neither　can　a　man　dispute；　but　he　must　contradict。〃
　　　　　（Or：）　〃Nor　can　people　dispute　without　reprehension。〃
　　　　　　Cicero；　De　Finib。；　i。　8。＇

When　any　one　contradicts　me；　he　raises　my　attention；　not　my　anger：　I
advance　towards　him　who　controverts；　who　instructs　me；　the　cause　of　truth
ought　to　be　the　common　cause　both　of　the　one　and　the　other。　　What　will
the　angry　man　answer？　　Passion　has　already　confounded　his　judgment；
agitation　has　usurped　the　place　of　reason。　　It　were　not　amiss　that　the
decision　of　our　disputes　should　pass　by　wager：　that　there　might　be　a
material　mark　of　our　losses；　to　the　end　we　might　the　better　remember
them；　and　that　my　man　might　tell　me：　〃Your　ignorance　and　obstinacy　cost
you　last　year；　at　several　times；　a　hundred　crowns。〃　　I　hail　and　caress
truth　in　what　quarter　soever　I　find　it；　and　cheerfully　surrender　myself；
and　open　my　conquered　arms　as　far　off　as　I　can　discover　it；　and；　provided
it　be　not　too　imperiously；　take　a　pleasure　in　being　reproved；　and
accommodate　myself　to　my　accusers；　very　often　more　by　reason　of　civility
than　amendment；　loving　to　gratify　and　nourish　the　liberty　of　admonition
by　my　facility　of　submitting　to　it；　and　this　even　at　my　own　expense。

Nevertheless；　it　is　hard　to　bring　the　men　of　my　time　to　it：　they　have　not
the　courage　to　correct；　because　they　have　not　the　courage　to　suffer
themselves　to　be　corrected；　and　speak　always　with　dissimulation　in　the
presence　of　one　another：　I　take　so　great　a　pleasure　in　being　judged　and
known；　that　it　is　almost　indifferent　to　me　in　which　of　the　two　forms　I　am
so：　my　imagination　so　often　contradicts　and　condemns　itself；　that　'tis
all　one　to　me　if　another　do　it；　especially　considering　that　I　give　his
reprehension　no　greater　authority　than　I　choose；　but　I　break　with　him；
who　carries　himself　so　high；　as　I　know　of　one　who　repents　his　advice；
if　not　believed；　and　takes　it　for　an　affront　if　it　be　not　immediately
followed。　　That　Socrates　always　received　smilingly　the　contradictions
offered　to　his　arguments；　a　man　may　say　arose　from　his　strength　of
reason；　and　that；　the　advantage　being　certain　to　fall　on　his　side；　he
accepted　them　as　a　matter　of　new　victory。　　But　we　see；　on　the　contrary；
that　nothing　in　argument　renders　our　sentiment　so　delicate；　as　the
opinion　of　pre…eminence；　and　disdain　of　the　adversary；　and　that；　in
reason；　'tis　rather　for　the　weaker　to　take　in　good　part　the　oppositions
that　correct　him　and　set　him　right。　　In　earnest；　I　rather　choose　the
company　of　those　who　ruffle　me　than　of　those　who　fear　me；　'tis　a　dull　and
hurtful　pleasure　to　have　to　do　with　people　who　admire　us　and　approve　of
all　we　say。　　Antisthenes　commanded　his　children　never　to　take　it　kindly
or　for　a　favour；　when　any　man　commended　them。　　I　find　I　am　much　prouder
of　the　victory　I　obtain　over　myself；　when；　in　the　very　ardour　of　dispute；
I　make　myself　submit　to　my　adversary's　force　of　reason；　than　I　am　pleased
with　the　victory　I　obtain　over　him　through　his　weakness。　　In　fine；　I
receive　and　admit　of　all　manner　of　attacks　that　are　direct；　how　weak
soever；　but　I　am　too　impatient　of　those　that　are　made　out　of　form。　　I
care　not　what　the　subject　is；　the　opinions　are　to　me　all　one；　and　I　am
almost　indifferent　whether　I　get　the　better　or　the　worse。　　I　can
peaceably　argue　a　whole　day　together；　if　the　argument　be　carried　on　with
method；　I　do　not　so　much　require　force　and　subtlety　as　order；　I　mean　the
order　which　we　every　day　observe　in　the　wranglings　of　shepherds　and　shop…
boys；　but　never　amongst　us：　if　they　start　from　their　subject；　'tis　out　of
incivility；　and　so　'tis　with　us；　but　their　tumult　and　impatience　never
put　them　out　of　their　theme；　their　argument　still　continues　its　course；
if　they　interrupt；　and　do　not　stay　for　one　another；　they　at　least
understand　one　another。　　Any　one　answers　too　well　for　me；　if　he　answers
what　I　say：　when　the　dispute　is　irregular　and　disordered；　I　leave　the
thing　itself；　and　insist　upon　the　form　with　anger　and　indiscretion；
falling　into　wilful；　malicious；　and　imperious　way　of　disputation；　of
which　I　am　afterwards　ashamed。　　'Tis　impossible　to　deal　fairly　with　a
fool：　my　judgment　is　not　only　corrupted　under　the　hand　of　so　impetuous　a
master；　but　my　conscience　also。

Our　disputes　ought　to　be　interdicted　and　punished　as　well　as　other　verbal
crimes：　what　vice　do　they　not　raise　and　heap　up；　being　always　governed
and　commanded　by　passion？　　We　first　quarrel　with　their　reasons；　and　then
with　the　men。　　We　only　learn　to　dispute　that　we　may　contradict；　and　so；
every　one　contradicting　and　being　contradicted；　it　falls　out　that　the
fruit　of　disputation　is　to　lose　and　annihilate　truth。　　Therefore　it　is
that　Plato　in　his　Republic　prohibits　this　exercise　to　fools　and　ill…bred
people。　　To　what　end　do　you　go　about　to　inquire　of　him；　who　knows　nothing
to　the　purpose？　　A　man　does　no　injury　to　the　subject；　when　he　leaves　it
to　seek　how　he　may　treat　it；　I　do　not　mean　by　an　artificial　and
scholastic　way；　but　by　a　natural　one；　with　a　sound　understanding。　　What
will　it　be　in　the　end？　　One　flies　to　the　east；　the　other　to　the　west；
they　lose　the　principal；　dispersing　it　in　the　crowd　of　incidents　after　an
hour　of　tempest；　they　know　not　what　they　seek：　one　is　low；　the　other
high；　and　a　third　wide。　　One　catches　at　a　word　and　a　simile；　another　is
no　longer　sensible　of　what　is　said　in　opposition　to　him；　and　thinks　only
of　going　on　at　his　own　rate；　not　of　answering　you：　another；　finding
himself　too　weak　to　make　good　his　rest；　fears　all；　refuses　all；　at　the
very　beginning；　confounds　the　subject；　or；　in　the　very　height　of　the
dispute；　stops　short　and　is　silent；　by　a　peevish　ignorance　affecting　a
proud　contempt　or　a　foolishly　　modest　avoidance　of　further　debate：
provided　this　man　strikes；　he　cares　not　how　much　he　lays　himself　open；
the　other　counts　his　words；　and　weighs　them　for　reasons；　another　only
brawls；　and　uses　the　advantage　of　his　lungs。　　Here's　one　who　learnedly
concludes　against　himself；　and　another　who　deafens　you　with　prefaces　and
senseless　digressions：　an　other　falls　into　downright　railing；　and　seeks　a
quarrel　after　the　German　fashion；　to　disengage　himself　from　a　wit　that
presses　too　hard　upon　him：　and　a　last　man　sees　nothing　into　the　reason　of
the　thing；　but　draws　a　line　of　circumvallation　about　you　of　dialectic
clauses；　and　the　formulas　of　his　art。

Now；　who　would　not　enter　into　distrust　of　sciences；　and　doubt　whether　he
can　reap　from　them　any　solid　fruit　for　the　service　of　life；　considering
the　use　we　put　them　to？

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　〃Nihil　sanantibus　litteris。〃

　　　　　　　　　　＇〃Letters　which　cure　nothing。〃Seneca；　Ep。；　59。＇

Who　has　got　understanding　by　his　logic？　　Where　are　all　her　fair　promises？

　　　　　　　　　　〃Nec　ad　melius　vivendum；　nec　ad　commodius　disserendum。〃

　　　　　　　　　　＇〃It　neither　makes　a　man　live　better　nor　talk　better。〃
　　　　　　　　　　Cicero；　De　Fin。；　i。　19。＇

Is　there　more　noise　or　confusion　in　the　scolding　of　herring…wives　than　in
the　public　disputes　of　men　of　this　profession？　　I　had　rather　my　son
should　learn　in　a　tap…house　to　speak；　than　in　the　schools　to　prate。　　Take
a　master　of　arts；　and　confer　with　him：　why　does　he　not　make　us　sensible
of　this　artificial　excellence？　and　why　does　he　not　captivate　women　and
ignoramuses；　as　we　are；　with　admiration　at　the　steadiness　of　his　reasons
and　the　beauty　of　his　order？　why　does　he　not　sway　and　persuade　us　to　what
he　will？　why　does　a　man；　who　has　so　much　advantage　in　matter　and
treatment；　mix　railing；　indiscretion；　and　fury　in　his　disputations？
Strip　him　of　his　gown；　his　hood；　and　his　Latin；　let　him　not　batter　our
ears　with　Aristotle；　pure　and　simple；　you　will　take　him　for　one　of　us；
or　worse。　　Whilst　they　torment　us　with　this　complication　and　confusion　of
words；　it　fares　with　them；　methinks；　as　with　jugglers；　their　dexterity
imposes　upon　our　senses；　but　does　not　at　all　work　upon　our　belief　this
legerdemain　excepted；　they　perform　nothing　that　is　not　very　ordinary　and
mean：　for　being　the　more　learned；　they　are　none　the　less　fools。

　　　　　＇So　Hobbes　said　that　if　he　had　read　as　much　as　the　academical
　　　　　pedants　he　should　have　known　as　little。＇

I　love　and　honour　knowledge　as　much　as　they　that　have　it；　and　in　its　true
use　'tis　the　most　noble　and　the　greatest　acquisition　of　men；　but　in　such
as　I　speak　of　（and　the　number　of　them　is　infinite）；　who　build　their
fundamental　sufficiency　and　value　upon　it；　who　appeal　from　their
understanding　to　their　memory：

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　〃Sub　aliena　umbra　latentes；〃

　　　　　＇〃Sheltering　under　the　shadow　of　others。〃Seneca；　Ep。；　33。＇

and　who　can　do　nothing　but　by　book；　I　hate　it；　if　I　dare　to　say　so；　worse
than　stupidity。　　In　my　country；　and　in　my　time；　learning　improves
fortunes　enough；　but　not　minds；　if　it　meet　with　those　that　are　dull　and
heavy；　it　overcharges　and　suffocates　them；　leaving　them　a　crude　and
undigested　mass；　if　airy　and　fine；　it　purifies；　clarifies；　and　subtilises
them；　even　to　exinanition。　　'Tis　a　thing　of　almost　indifferent　quality；
a　very　useful　accession　to　a　well…born　soul；　but　hurtful　and　pernicious
to　others；　or　rather　a　thing　of　very　precious　use；　that　will　not　suffer
itself　to　be　purchased　at　an　under　rate；　in　the　hand　of　some　'tis　a
sceptre；　in　that　of　others　a　fool's　bauble。

But　let　us　proceed。　　What　greater　victory　do　you　expect　than　to　make　your
enemy　see　and　know　that　he　is　not　able　to　encounter　you？　　When　you　get
the　better　of　your　argument；　'tis　truth　that　wins；　when　you　get　the
advantage　of　form　and　method；'tis　then　you　who　win。　　I　am　of　opinion　that
in；　Plato　and　Xenophon　Socrates　disputes　more　in　favour　of　the　disputants
than　in　favour　of　the　dispute；　and　more　to　instruct　Euthydemus　and
Protagoras　in　the；　knowledge　of　their　impertinence；　than　in　the
impertinence　of　their　art。　　He　takes　hold　of　the　first　subject　like　one
who　has　a　more　profitable　end　than　to　explain　itnamely；　to　clear　the
understandings　that　he　takes　upon　him　to　instruct　and　exercise。　　To　hunt
after　truth　is　properly　our　business；　and　we　are　inexcusable　if　we　carry
on　the　chase　impertinently　and　ill；　to　fail　of　seizing　it　is　another
thing；　for　we　are　born　to　inquire　after　truth：　it　belongs　to　a　greater
power　to　possess　it。　　I