representative government-第11章

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r　benefit　to　be　for　his　benefit。　Where　this　school　of　public　spirit　does　not　exist；　scarcely　any　sense　is　entertained　that　private　persons；　in　no　eminent　social　situation；　owe　any　duties　to　society；　except　to　obey　the　laws　and　submit　to　the　government。　There　is　no　unselfish　sentiment　of　identification　with　the　public。　Every　thought　or　feeling；　either　of　interest　or　of　duty；　is　absorbed　in　the　individual　and　in　the　family。　The　man　never　thinks　of　any　collective　interest；　of　any　objects　to　be　pursued　jointly　with　others；　but　only　in　competition　with　them；　and　in　some　measure　at　their　expense。　A　neighbour；　not　being　an　ally　or　an　associate；　since　he　is　never　engaged　in　any　common　undertaking　for　joint　benefit；　is　therefore　only　a　rival。　Thus　even　private　morality　suffers；　while　public　is　actually　extinct。　Were　this　the　universal　and　only　possible　state　of　things；　the　utmost　aspirations　of　the　lawgiver　or　the　moralist　could　only　stretch　to　make　the　bulk　of　the　community　a　flock　of　sheep　innocently　nibbling　the　grass　side　by　side。　　　From　these　accumulated　considerations　it　is　evident　that　the　only　government　which　can　fully　satisfy　all　the　exigencies　of　the　social　state　is　one　in　which　the　whole　people　participate；　that　any　participation；　even　in　the　smallest　public　function；　is　useful；　that　the　participation　should　everywhere　be　as　great　as　the　general　degree　of　improvement　of　the　community　will　allow；　and　that　nothing　less　can　be　ultimately　desirable　than　the　admission　of　all　to　a　share　in　the　sovereign　power　of　the　state。　But　since　all　cannot；　in　a　community　exceeding　a　single　small　town；　participate　personally　in　any　but　some　very　minor　portions　of　the　public　business；　it　follows　that　the　ideal　type　of　a　perfect　government　must　be　representative。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　4　　　Under　what　Social　Conditions　Representative　Government　is　Inapplicable。

　　WE　HAVE　recognised　in　representative　government　the　ideal　type　of　the　most　perfect　polity；　for　which；　in　consequence；　any　portion　of　mankind　are　better　adapted　in　proportion　to　their　degree　of　general　improvement。　As　they　range　lower　and　lower　in　development；　that　form　of　government　will　be；　generally　speaking；　less　suitable　to　them；　though　this　is　not　true　universally：　for　the　adaptation　of　a　people　to　representative　government　does　not　depend　so　much　upon　the　place　they　occupy　in　the　general　scale　of　humanity　as　upon　the　degree　in　which　they　possess　certain　special　requisites；　requisites；　however；　so　closely　connected　with　their　degree　of　general　advancement；　that　any　variation　between　the　two　is　rather　the　exception　than　the　rule。　Let　us　examine　at　what　point　in　the　descending　series　representative　government　ceases　altogether　to　be　admissible；　either　through　its　own　unfitness；　or　the　superior　fitness　of　some　other　regimen。　　　First；　then；　representative；　like　any　other　government；　must　be　unsuitable　in　any　case　in　which　it　cannot　permanently　subsist…　i。e。　in　which　it　does　not　fulfil　the　three　fundamental　conditions　enumerated　in　the　first　chapter。　These　were…　1。　That　the　people　should　be　willing　to　receive　it。　2。　That　they　should　be　willing　and　able　to　do　what　is　necessary　for　its　preservation。　3。　That　they　should　be　willing　and　able　to　fulfil　the　duties　and　discharge　the　functions　which　it　imposes　on　them。　　　The　willingness　of　the　people　to　accept　representative　government　only　becomes　a　practical　question　when　an　enlightened　ruler；　or　a　foreign　nation　or　nations　who　have　gained　power　over　the　country；　are　disposed　to　offer　it　the　boon。　To　individual　reformers　the　question　is　almost　irrelevant；　since；　if　no　other　objection　can　be　made　to　their　enterprise　than　that　the　opinion　of　the　nation　is　not　yet　on　their　side；　they　have　the　ready　and　proper　answer；　that　to　bring　it　over　to　their　side　is　the　very　end　they　aim　at。　When　opinion　is　really　adverse；　its　hostility　is　usually　to　the　fact　of　change；　rather　than　to　representative　government　in　itself。　The　contrary　case　is　not　indeed　unexampled；　there　has　sometimes　been　a　religious　repugnance　to　any　limitation　of　the　power　of　a　particular　line　of　rulers；　but；　in　general；　the　doctrine　of　passive　obedience　meant　only　submission　to　the　will　of　the　powers　that　be；　whether　monarchical　or　popular。　In　any　case　in　which　the　attempt　to　introduce　representative　government　is　at　all　likely　to　be　made；　indifference　to　it；　and　inability　to　understand　its　processes　and　requirements；　rather　than　positive　opposition；　are　the　obstacles　to　be　expected。　These；　however；　are　as　fatal；　and　may　be　as　hard　to　be　got　rid　of；　as　actual　aversion；　it　being　easier；　in　most　cases；　to　change　the　direction　of　an　active　feeling；　than　to　create　one　in　a　state　previously　passive。　When　a　people　have　no　sufficient　value　for；　and　attachment　to；　a　representative　constitution；　they　have　next　to　no　chance　of　retaining　it。　In　every　country；　the　executive　is　the　branch　of　the　government　which　wields　the　immediate　power；　and　is　in　direct　contact　with　the　public；　to　it；　principally；　the　hopes　and　fears　of　individuals　are　directed；　and　by　it　both　the　benefits；　and　the　terrors　and　prestige；　of　government　are　mainly　represented　to　the　public　eye。　Unless；　therefore；　the　authorities　whose　office　it　is　to　check　the　executive　are　backed　by　an　effective　opinion　and　feeling　in　the　country；　the　executive　has　always　the　means　of　setting　them　aside；　or　compelling　them　to　subservience；　and　is　sure　to　be　well　supported　in　doing　so。　Representative　institutions　necessarily　depend　for　permanence　upon　the　readiness　of　the　people　to　fight　for　them　in　case　of　their　being　endangered。　If　too　little　valued　for　this；　they　seldom　obtain　a　footing　at　all；　and　if　they　do；　are　almost　sure　to　be　overthrown；　as　soon　as　the　head　of　the　government；　or　any　party　leader　who　can　muster　force　for　a　coup　de　main；　is　willing　to　run　some　small　risk　for　absolute　power。　　　These　considerations　relate　to　the　first　two　causes　of　failure　in　a　representative　government。　The　third　is；　when　the　people　want　either　the　will　or　the　capacity　to　fulfil　the　part　which　belongs　to　them　in　a　representative　constitution。　When　nobody；　or　only　some　small　fraction；　feels　the　degree　of　interest　in　the　general　affairs　of　the　State　necessary　to　the　formation　of　a　public　opinion；　the　electors　will　seldom　make　any　use　of　the　right　of　suffrage　but　to　serve　their　private　interest；　or　the　interest　of　their　locality；　or　of　some　one　with　whom　they　are　connected　as　adherents　or　dependents。　The　small　class　who；　in　this　state　of　public　feeling；　gain　the　command　of　the　representative　body；　for　the　most　part　use　it　solely　as　a　means　of　seeking　their　fortune。　if　the　executive　is　weak；　the　country　is　distracted　by　mere　struggles　for　place；　if　strong；　it　makes　itself　despotic；　at　the　cheap　price　of　appeasing　the　representatives；　or　such　of　them　as　are　capable　of　giving　trouble；　by　a　share　of　the　spoil；　and　the　only　fruit　produced　by　national　representation　is；　that　in　addition　to　those　who　really　govern；　there　is　an　assembly　quartered　on　the　public；　and　no　abuse　in　which　a　portion　of　the　assembly　are　interested　is　at　all　likely　to　be　removed。　When；　however；　the　evil　stops　here；　the　price　may　be　worth　paying；　for　the　publicity　and　discussion　which；　though　not　an　invariable；　are　a　natural　accompaniment　of　any；　even　nominal；　representation。　In　the　modern　Kingdom　of　Greece；　for　example；*　it　can　hardly　be　doubted；　that　the　placehunters　who　chiefly　compose　the　representative　assembly；　though　they　contribute　little　or　nothing　directly　to　good　government；　nor　even　much　temper　the　arbitrary　power　of　the　executive；　yet　keep　up　the　idea　of　popular　rights；　and　conduce　greatly　to　the　real　liberty　of　the　press　which　exists　in　that　country。　This　benefit；　however；　is　entirely　dependent　on　the　co…existence　with　the　popular　body　of　an　hereditary　king。　If；　instead　of　struggling　for　the　favours　of　the　chief　ruler；　these　selfish　and　sordid　factions　struggled　for　the　chief　place　itself；　they　would　certainly；　as　in　Spanish　America；　keep　the　country　in　a　state　of　chronic　revolution　and　civil　war。　A　despotism；　not　even　legal；　but　of　illegal　violence；　would　be　alternately　exercised　by　a　succession　of　political　adventurers；　and　the　name　and　forms　of　representation　would　have　no　effect　but　to　prevent　despotism　from　attaining　the　stability　and　security　by　which　alone　its　evils　can　be　mitigated；　or　its　few　advantages　realised。

　*　Written　before　the　salutary　revolution　of　1862；　which；　provoked　by　popular　disgust　at　the　system　of　governing　by　corruption；　and　the　general　demoralisation　of　political　men；　has　opened　to　that　rapidly　improving　people　a　new　and　hopeful　chance　of　real　constitutional　government。

　　The　preceding　are　the　cases　in　which　representative　government　cannot　permanently　exist。　There　are　others　in　which　it　possibly　might　exist；　but　in　which　some　other　form　of　government　would　be　preferable。　These　are　principally　when　the　people；　in　order　to　advance　in　civilisation；　have　some　lesson　to　learn；　some　habit　not　yet　acquired；　to　the　acquisition　of　which　representative　government　is　likely　to　be　an　impediment。　　　The　most　obvious　of　these　cases　is　the　one　already　considered；　in　which　the　people　have　still　to　learn　the　first　lesson　of　civilisation；　that　of　obedience。　A　race　who　have　been　trained　in　energy　and　courage　by　struggles　with　Nature　and　their　neighbours；　but　who　have　not　yet　settled　down　into　permanent　obedience　to　any　common　superior；　would　be　little　likely　to　acquire　this　habit　under　the　collective　government　of　their　own　body。　A　representative　assembly　drawn　from　among　themselves　would　simply　reflect　their　own　turbulent　insubordination。　It　would　refuse　its　authority　to　all　proceedings　which　would　impose；　on　their　savage　independence；　any　improving　restraint。　The　mode　in　which　such　tribes　are　usually　brought　to　submit　to　the　primary　conditions　of　civilised　society　is　through　the　necessities　of　warfare；　and　the　despotic　authority　indispensable　to　military　command。　A　military　leader　is　the　only　superior　to　whom　they　will　submit；　except　occasionally　some　prophet　supposed　to　be　inspired　from　above；　or　conjurer　regarded　as　possessing　miraculous　power。　These　may　exercise　a　temporary　ascendancy；　but　as　it　is　merely　personal；　it　rarely　effects　any　change　in　the　general　habits　of　the　people；　unless　the　prophet；　like　Mahomet；　is　also　a　military　chief；　and　goes　forth　the　armed　apostle　of　a　new　religion；　or　unless　the　military　chiefs　ally　themselves　with　his　influence；　and　turn　it　into　a　prop　for　their　own　government。　　　A　people　are　no　less　unfitted　for　representative　government　by　the　contrary　fault　to　that　last　specified；　by　extreme　passiveness；　and　ready　submission　to　tyranny。　If　a　people　thus　prostrated　by　character　and　circumstances　could　obtain　representative　institutions；　they　would　inevitably　choose　their　tyrants　as　their　representatives；　and　the　yoke　would　be　made　heavier　on　them　by　the　contrivance　which　prima　facie　might　be　expected　to　lighten　it。　On　the　contrary；　many　a　people　has　gradually　emerged　from　this　condition　by　the　aid　of　a　central　authority；　whose　position　has　made　it　the　rival；　and　has　ended　by　making　it　the　master；　of　the　local　despots；　and　which；　above　all；　has　been　single。　French　history；　from　Hugh　Capet　to　Richelieu　and　Louis　XIV。；　is　a　continued　examp