representative government-第12章

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；　has　been　single。　French　history；　from　Hugh　Capet　to　Richelieu　and　Louis　XIV。；　is　a　continued　example　of　this　course　of　things。　Even　when　the　King　was　scarcely　so　powerful　as　many　of　his　chief　feudatories；　the　great　advantage　which　he　derived　from　being　but　one　has　been　recognised　by　French　historians。　To　him　the　eyes　of　all　the　locally　oppressed　were　turned；　he　was　the　object　of　hope　and　reliance　throughout　the　kingdom；　while　each　local　potentate　was　only　powerful　within　a　more　or　less　confined　space。　At　his　hands；　refuge　and　protection　were　sought　from　every　part　of　the　country；　against　first　one；　then　another；　of　the　immediate　oppressors。　His　progress　to　ascendancy　was　slow；　but　it　resulted　from　successively　taking　advantage　of　opportunities　which　offered　themselves　only　to　him。　It　was；　therefore；　sure；　and；　in　proportion　as　it　was　accomplished；　it　abated；　in　the　oppressed　portion　of　the　community；　the　habit　of　submitting　to　oppression。　The　king's　interest　lay　in　encouraging　all　partial　attempts　on　the　part　of　the　serfs　to　emancipate　themselves　from　their　masters；　and　place　themselves　in　immediate　subordination　to　himself。　Under　his　protection　numerous　communities　were　formed　which　knew　no　one　above　them　but　the　King。　Obedience　to　a　distant　monarch　is　liberty　itself　compared　with　the　dominion　of　the　lord　of　the　neighbouring　castle：　and　the　monarch　was　long　compelled　by　necessities　of　position　to　exert　his　authority　as　the　ally；　rather　than　the　master；　of　the　classes　whom　he　had　aided　in　affecting　their　liberation。　In　this　manner　a　central　power；　despotic　in　principle　though　generally　much　restricted　in　practice；　was　mainly　instrumental　in　carrying　the　people　through　a　necessary　stage　of　improvement；　which　representative　government；　if　real；　would　most　likely　have　prevented　them　from　entering　upon。　Nothing　short　of　despotic　rule；　or　a　general　massacre；　could　have　effected　the　emancipation　of　the　serfs　in　the　Russian　Empire。　　　The　same　passages　of　history　forcibly　illustrate　another　mode　in　which　unlimited　monarchy　overcomes　obstacles　to　the　progress　of　civilisation　which　representative　government　would　have　had　a　decided　tendency　to　aggravate。　One　of　the　strongest　hindrances　to　improvement；　up　to　a　rather　advanced　stage；　is　an　inveterate　spirit　of　locality。　Portions　of　mankind；　in　many　other　respects　capable　of；　and　prepared　for；　freedom；　may　be　unqualified　for　amalgamating　into　even　the　smallest　nation。　Not　only　may　jealousies　and　antipathies　repel　them　from　one　another；　and　bar　all　possibility　of　voluntary　union；　but　they　may　not　yet　have　acquired　any　of　the　feelings　or　habits　which　would　make　the　union　real；　supposing　it　to　be　nominally　accomplished。　They　may；　like　the　citizens　of　an　ancient　community；　or　those　of　an　Asiatic　village；　have　had　considerable　practice　in　exercising　their　faculties　on　village　or　town　interests；　and　have　even　realised　a　tolerably　effective　popular　government　on　that　restricted　scale；　and　may　yet　have　but　slender　sympathies　with　anything　beyond；　and　no　habit　or　capacity　of　dealing　with　interests　common　to　many　such　communities。　　　I　am　not　aware　that　history　furnishes　any　example　in　which　a　number　of　these　political　atoms　or　corpuscles　have　coalesced　into　a　body；　and　learnt　to　feel　themselves　one　people；　except　through　previous　subjection　to　a　central　authority　common　to　all。*　It　is　through　the　habit　of　deferring　to　that　authority；　entering　into　its　plans　and　subserving　its　purposes；　that　a　people　such　as　we　have　supposed　receive　into　their　minds　the　conception　of　large　interests；　common　to　a　considerable　geographical　extent。　Such　interests；　on　the　contrary；　are　necessarily　the　predominant　consideration　in　the　mind　of　the　central　ruler；　and　through　the　relations；　more　or　less　intimate；　which　he　progressively　establishes　with　the　localities；　they　become　familiar　to　the　general　mind。　The　most　favourable　concurrence　of　circumstances　under　which　this　step　in　improvement　could　be　made；　would　be　one　which　should　raise　up　representative　institutions　without　representative　government；　a　representative　body；　or　bodies；　drawn　from　the　localities；　making　itself　the　auxiliary　and　instrument　of　the　central　power；　but　seldom　attempting　to　thwart　or　control　it。　The　people　being　thus　taken；　as　it　were；　into　council；　though　not　sharing　the　supreme　power；　the　political　education　given　by　the　central　authority　is　carried　home；　much　more　effectually　than　it　could　otherwise　be；　to　the　local　chiefs　and　to　the　population　generally；　while；　at　the　same　time；　a　tradition　is　kept　up　of　government　by　general　consent；　or　at　least；　the　sanction　of　tradition　is　not　given　to　government　without　it；　which；　when　consecrated　by　custom；　has　so　often　put　a　bad　end　to　a　good　beginning；　and　is　one　of　the　most　frequent　causes　of　the　sad　fatality　which　in　most　countries　has　stopped　improvement　in　so　early　a　stage；　because　the　work　of　some　one　period　has　been　so　done　as　to　bar　the　needful　work　of　the　ages　following。　Meanwhile；　it　may　be　laid　down　as　a　political　truth；　that　by　irresponsible　monarchy　rather　than　by　representative　government　can　a　multitude　of　insignificant　political　units　be　welded　into　a　people；　with　common　feelings　of　cohesion；　power　enough　to　protect　itself　against　conquest　or　foreign　aggression；　and　affairs　sufficiently　various　and　considerable　of　its　own　to　occupy　worthily　and　expand　to　fit　proportions　the　social　and　political　intelligence　of　the　population。

　　*　Italy；　which　alone　can　be　quoted　as　an　exception；　is　only　so　in　regard　to　the　final　stage　of　its　transformation。　The　more　difficult　previous　advance　from　the　city　isolation　of　Florence；　Pisa；　or　Milan；　to　the　provincial　unity　of　Tuscany　or　Lombardy；　took　place　in　the　usual　manner。

　　For　these　several　reasons；　kingly　government；　free　from　the　control　（though　perhaps　strengthened　by　the　support）　of　representative　institutions；　is　the　most　suitable　form　of　polity　for　the　earliest　stages　of　any　community；　not　excepting　a　city…community　like　those　of　ancient　Greece：　where；　accordingly；　the　government　of　kings；　under　some　real　but　no　ostensible　or　constitutional　control　by　public　opinion；　did　historically　precede　by　an　unknown　and　probably　great　duration　all　free　institutions；　and　gave　place　at　last；　during　a　considerable　lapse　of　time；　to　oligarchies　of　a　few　families。　　　A　hundred　other　infirmities　or　short…comings　in　a　people　might　be　pointed　out；　which　pro　tanto　disqualify　them　from　making　the　best　use　of　representative　government；　but　in　regard　to　these　it　is　not　equally　obvious　that　the　government　of　One　or　a　Few　would　have　any　tendency　to　cure　or　alleviate　the　evil。　Strong　prejudices　of　any　kind；　obstinate　adherence　to　old　habits；　positive　defects　of　national　character；　or　mere　ignorance；　and　deficiency　of　mental　cultivation；　if　prevalent　in　a　people；　will　be　in　general　faithfully　reflected　in　their　representative　assemblies：　and　should　it　happen　that　the　executive　administration；　the　direct　management　of　public　affairs；　is　in　the　hands　of　persons　comparatively　free　from　these　defects；　more　good　would　frequently　be　done　by　them　when　not　hampered　by　the　necessity　of　carrying　with　them　the　voluntary　assent　of　such　bodies。　But　the　mere　position　of　the　rulers　does　not　in　these；　as　it　does　in　the　other　cases　which　we　have　examined；　of　itself　invest　them　with　interests　and　tendencies　operating　in　the　beneficial　direction。　From　the　general　weaknesses　of　the　people　or　of　the　state　of　civilisation；　the　One　and　his　counsellors；　or　the　Few；　are　not　likely　to　be　habitually　exempt；　except　in　the　case　of　their　being　foreigners；　belonging　to　a　superior　people　or　a　more　advanced　state　of　society。　Then；　indeed；　the　rulers　may　be；　to　almost　any　extent；　superior　in　civilisation　to　those　over　whom　they　rule；　and　subjection　to　a　foreign　government　of　this　description；　notwithstanding　its　inevitable　evils；　is　of　ten　of　the　greatest　advantage　to　a　people；　carrying　them　rapidly　through　several　stages　of　progress；　and　clearing　away　obstacles　to　improvement　which　might　have　lasted　indefinitely　if　the　subject　population　had　been　left　unassisted　to　its　native　tendencies　and　chances。　In　a　country　not　under　the　dominion　of　foreigners；　the　only　cause　adequate　to　producing　similar　benefits　is　the　rare　accident　of　a　monarch　of　extraordinary　genius。　There　have　been　in　history　a　few　of　these；　who；　happily　for　humanity；　have　reigned　long　enough　to　render　some　of　their　improvements　permanent；　by　leaving　them　under　the　guardianship　of　a　generation　which　had　grown　up　under　their　influence。　Charlemagne　may　be　cited　as　one　instance；　Peter　the　Great　is　another。　Such　examples　however　are　so　unfrequent　that　they　can　only　be　classed　with　the　happy　accidents　which　have　so　often　decided　at　a　critical　moment　whether　some　leading　portion　of　humanity　should　make　a　sudden　start；　or　sink　back　towards　barbarism：　chances　like　the　existence　of　Themistocles　at　the　time　of　the　Persian　invasion；　or　of　the　first　or　third　William　of　Orange。　　　It　would　be　absurd　to　construct　institutions　for　the　mere　purpose　of　taking　advantage　of　such　possibilities；　especially　as　men　of　this　calibre；　in　any　distinguished　position；　do　not　require　despotic　power　to　enable　them　to　exert　great　influence；　as　is　evidenced　by　the　three　last　mentioned。　The　case　most　requiring　consideration　in　reference　to　institutions　is　the　not　very　uncommon　one　in　which　a　small　but　leading　portion　of　the　population；　from　difference　of　race；　more　civilised　origin；　or　other　peculiarities　of　circumstance；　are　markedly　superior　in　civilisation　and　general　character　to　the　remainder。　Under　those　conditions；　government　by　the　representatives　of　the　mass　would　stand　a　chance　of　depriving　them　of　much　of　the　benefit　they　might　derive　from　the　greater　civilisation　of　the　superior　ranks；　while　government　by　the　representatives　of　those　ranks　would　probably　rivet　the　degradation　of　the　multitude；　and　leave　them　no　hope　of　decent　treatment　except　by　ridding　themselves　of　one　of　the　most　valuable　elements　of　future　advancement。　The　best　prospect　of　improvement　for　a　people　thus　composed　lies　in　the　existence　of　a　constitutionally　unlimited；　or　at　least　a　practically　preponderant；　authority　in　the　chief　ruler　of　the　dominant　class。　He　alone　has　by　his　position　an　interest　in　raising　and　improving　the　mass　of　whom　he　is　not　jealous；　as　a　counterpoise　to　his　associates　of　whom　he　is。　And　if　fortunate　circumstances　place　beside　him；　not　as　controllers　but　as　subordinates；　a　body　representative　of　the　superior　caste；　which　by　its　objections　and　questionings；　and　by　its　occasional　outbreaks　of　spirit；　keeps　alive　habits　of　collective　resistance；　and　may　admit　of　being；　in　time　and　by　degrees；　expanded　into　a　really　national　representation　（which　is　in　substance　the　history　of　the　English　Parliament）；　the　nation　has　then　the　most　favourable　prospects　of　improvement　which　can　well　occur　to　a　community　thus　circumstanced　and　constituted。　　　Among　the　tendencies　which；　without　absolutely　rendering　a　people　unfit　for　representative　government；　seriously　incapacitate　them　from　reaping　the　full　benefit　of　it；　one　deserves　particular　notice。　There　are　two　states　of　the　inclinations；　intrinsically　very　different；　but　which　have　something　in　common；　by　virtue　of　which　they　often　coincide　in　the　direct