representative government-第17章

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der　which　they　must　be　aimed　at；　will　be　better　deferred　until　we　come　to　speak　of　the　details　of　administration。　　　The　positive　evils　and　dangers　of　the　representative；　as　of　every　other　form　of　government；　may　be　reduced　to　two　heads：　first；　general　ignorance　and　incapacity；　or；　to　speak　more　moderately；　insufficient　mental　qualifications；　in　the　controlling　body；　secondly；　the　danger　of　its　being　under　the　influence　of　interests　not　identical　with　the　general　welfare　of　the　community。　　　The　former　of　these　evils；　deficiency　in　high　mental　qualifications；　is　one　to　which　it　is　generally　supposed　that　popular　government　is　liable　in　a　greater　degree　than　any　other。　The　energy　of　a　monarch；　the　steadiness　and　prudence　of　an　aristocracy；　are　thought　to　contrast　most　favourably　with　the　vacillation　and　shortsightedness　of　even　a　qualified　democracy。　These　propositions；　however；　are　not　by　any　means　so　well　founded　as　they　at　first　sight　appear。　　　Compared　with　simple　monarchy；　representative　government　is　in　these　respects　at　no　disadvantage。　Except　in　a　rude　age；　hereditary　monarchy；　when　it　is　really　such；　and　not　aristocracy　in　disguise；　far　surpasses　democracy　in　all　the　forms　of　incapacity　supposed　to　be　characteristic　of　the　last。　I　say；　except　in　a　rude　age；　because　in　a　really　rude　state　of　society　there　is　a　considerable　guarantee　for　the　intellectual　and　active　capacities　of　the　sovereign。　His　personal　will　is　constantly　encountering　obstacles　from　the　wilfulness　of　his　subjects；　and　of　powerful　individuals　among　their　number。　The　circumstances　of　society　do　not　afford　him　much　temptation　to　mere　luxurious　self…indulgence；　mental　and　bodily　activity；　especially　political　and　military；　are　his　principal　excitements；　and　among　turbulent　chiefs　and　lawless　followers　he　has　little　authority；　and　is　seldom　long　secure　even　of　his　throne；　unless　he　possesses　a　considerable　amount　of　personal　daring；　dexterity；　and　energy。　The　reason　why　the　average　of　talent　is　so　high　among　the　Henries　and　Edwards　of　our　history　may　be　read　in　the　tragical　fate　of　the　second　Edward　and　the　second　Richard；　and　the　civil　wars　and　disturbances　of　the　reigns　of　John　and　his　incapable　successor。　The　troubled　period　of　the　Reformation　also　produced　several　eminent　hereditary　monarchs；　Elizabeth；　Henri　Quatre；　Gustavus　Adolphus；　but　they　were　mostly　bred　up　in　adversity；　succeeded　to　the　throne　by　the　unexpected　failure　of　nearer　heirs；　or　had　to　contend　with　great　difficulties　in　the　commencement　of　their　reign。　Since　European　life　assumed　a　settled　aspect；　anything　above　mediocrity　in　an　hereditary　king　has　become　extremely　rare；　while　the　general　average　has　been　even　below　mediocrity；　both　in　talent　and　in　vigour　of　character。　A　monarchy　constitutionally　absolute　now　only　maintains　itself　in　existence　（except　temporarily　in　the　hands　of　some　active…minded　usurper）　through　the　mental　qualifications　of　a　permanent　bureaucracy。　The　Russian　and　Austrian　Governments；　and　even　the　French　Government　in　its　normal　condition；　are　oligarchies　of　officials；　of　whom　the　head　of　the　State　does　little　more　than　select　the　chiefs。　I　am　speaking　of　the　regular　course　of　their　administration；　for　the　will　of　the　master　of　course　determines　many　of　their　particular　acts。　　　The　governments　which　have　been　remarkable　in　history　for　sustained　mental　ability　and　vigour　in　the　conduct　of　affairs　have　generally　been　aristocracies。　But　they　have　been；　without　any　exception；　aristocracies　of　public　functionaries。　The　ruling　bodies　have　been　so　narrow；　that　each　member；　or　at　least　each　influential　member；　of　the　body；　was　able　to　make　and　did　make；　public　business　an　active　profession；　and　the　principal　occupation　of　his　life。　The　only　aristocracies　which　have　manifested　high　governing　capacities；　and　acted　on　steady　maxims　of　policy；　through　many　generations；　are　those　of　Rome　and　Venice。　But；　at　Venice；　though　the　privileged　order　was　numerous；　the　actual　management　of　affairs　was　rigidly　concentrated　in　a　small　oligarchy　within　the　oligarchy；　whose　whole　lives　were　devoted　to　the　study　and　conduct　of　the　affairs　of　the　state。　The　Roman　government　partook　more　of　the　character　of　an　open　aristocracy　like　our　own。　But　the　really　governing　body；　the　Senate；　was　in　general　exclusively　composed　of　persons　who　had　exercised　public　functions；　and　had　either　already　filled　or　were　looking　forward　to　fill　the　higher　offices　of　the　state；　at　the　peril　of　a　severe　responsibility　in　case　of　incapacity　and　failure。　When　once　members　of　the　Senate；　their　lives　were　pledged　to　the　conduct　of　public　affairs；　they　were　not　permitted　even　to　leave　Italy　except　in　the　discharge　of　some　public　trust；　and　unless　turned　out　of　the　Senate　by　the　censors　for　character　or　conduct　deemed　disgraceful；　they　retained　their　powers　and　responsibilities　to　the　end　of　life。　In　an　aristocracy　thus　constituted；　every　member　felt　his　personal　importance　entirely　bound　up　with　the　dignity　and　estimation　of　the　commonwealth　which　he　administered；　and　with　the　part　he　was　able　to　play　in　its　councils。　This　dignity　and　estimation　were　quite　different　things　from　the　prosperity　or　happiness　of　the　general　body　of　the　citizens；　and　were　often　wholly　incompatible　with　it。　But　they　were　closely　linked　with　the　external　success　and　aggrandisement　of　the　State：　and　it　was；　consequently；　in　the　pursuit　of　that　object　almost　exclusively　that　either　the　Roman　or　the　Venetian　aristocracies　manifested　the　systematically　wise　collective　policy；　and　the　great　individual　capacities　for　government；　for　which　history　has　deservedly　given　them　credit。　　　It　thus　appears　that　the　only　governments；　not　representative；　in　which　high　political　skill　and　ability　have　been　other　than　exceptional；　whether　under　monarchical　or　aristocratic　forms；　have　been　essentially　bureaucracies。　The　work　of　government　has　been　in　the　hands　of　governors　by　profession；　which　is　the　essence　and　meaning　of　bureaucracy。　Whether　the　work　is　done　by　them　because　they　have　been　trained　to　it；　or　they　are　trained　to　it　because　it　is　to　be　done　by　them；　makes　a　great　difference　in　many　respects；　but　none　at　all　as　to　the　essential　character　of　the　rule。　Aristocracies；　on　the　other　hand；　like　that　of　England；　in　which　the　class　who　possessed　the　power　derived　it　merely　from　their　social　position；　without　being　specially　trained　or　devoting　themselves　exclusively　to　it　（and　in　which；　therefore；　the　power　was　not　exercised　directly；　but　through　representative　institutions　oligarchically　constituted）　have　been；　in　respect　to　intellectual　endowments；　much　on　a　par　with　democracies；　that　is；　they　have　manifested　such　qualities　in　any　considerable　degree　only　during　the　temporary　ascendancy　which　great　and　popular　talents；　united　with　a　distinguished　position；　have　given　to　some　one　man。　Themistocles　and　Pericles；　Washington　and　Jefferson；　were　not　more　completely　exceptions　in　their　several　democracies；　and　were　assuredly　much　more　splendid　exceptions；　than　the　Chathams　and　Peels　of　the　representative　aristocracy　of　Great　Britain；　or　even　the　Sullys　and　Colberts　of　the　aristocratic　monarchy　of　France。　A　great　minister；　in　the　aristocratic　governments　of　modern　Europe；　is　almost　as　rare　a　phenomenon　as　a　great　king。　　　The　comparison；　therefore；　as　to　the　intellectual　attributes　of　a　government；　has　to　be　made　between　a　representative　democracy　and　a　bureaucracy；　all　other　governments　may　be　left　out　of　the　account。　And　here　it　must　be　acknowledged　that　a　bureaucratic　government　has；　in　some　important　respects；　greatly　the　advantage。　It　accumulates　experience；　acquires　well…tried　and　well…considered　traditional　maxims；　and　makes　provision　for　appropriate　practical　knowledge　in　those　who　have　the　actual　conduct　of　affairs。　But　it　is　not　equally　favourable　to　individual　energy　of　mind。　The　disease　which　afflicts　bureaucratic　governments；　and　which　they　usually　die　of；　is　routine。　They　perish　by　the　immutability　of　their　maxims；　and；　still　more；　by　the　universal　law　that　whatever　becomes　a　routine　loses　its　vital　principle；　and　having　no　longer　a　mind　acting　within　it；　goes　on　revolving　mechanically　though　the　work　it　is　intended　to　do　remains　undone。　A　bureaucracy　always　tends　to　become　a　pedantocracy。　When　the　bureaucracy　is　the　real　government；　the　spirit　of　the　corps　（as　with　the　Jesuits）　bears　down　the　individuality　of　its　more　distinguished　members。　In　the　profession　of　government；　as　in　other　professions；　the　sole　idea　of　the　majority　is　to　do　what　they　have　been　taught；　and　it　requires　a　popular　government　to　enable　the　conceptions　of　the　man　of　original　genius　among　them　to　prevail　over　the　obstructive　spirit　of　trained　mediocrity。　Only　in　a　popular　government　（setting　apart　the　accident　of　a　highly　intelligent　despot）　could　Sir　Rowland　Hill　have　been　victorious　over　the　Post　Office。　A　popular　government　installed　him　in　the　Post　Office；　and　made　the　body；　in　spite　of　itself；　obey　the　impulse　given　by　the　man　who　united　special　knowledge　with　individual　vigour　and　originality。　That　the　Roman　aristocracy　escaped　this　characteristic　disease　of　a　bureaucracy　was　evidently　owing　to　its　popular　element。　All　special　offices；　both　those　which　gave　a　seat　in　the　Senate　and　those　which　were　sought　by　senators；　were　conferred　by　popular　election。　The　Russian　government　is　a　characteristic　exemplification　of　both　the　good　and　bad　side　of　bureaucracy；　its　fixed　maxims；　directed　with　Roman　perseverance　to　the　same　unflinchingly…pursued　ends　from　age　to　age；　the　remarkable　skill　with　which　those　ends　are　generally　pursued；　the　frightful　internal　corruption；　and　the　permanent　organised　hostility　to　improvements　from　without；　which　even　the　autocratic　power　of　a　vigorous…minded　Emperor　is　seldom　or　never　sufficient　to　overcome；　the　patient　obstructiveness　of　the　body　being　in　the　long　run　more　than　a　match　for　the　fitful　energy　of　one　man。　The　Chinese　Government；　a　bureaucracy　of　Mandarins；　is；　as　far　as　known　to　us；　another　apparent　example　of　the　same　qualities　and　defects。　　　In　all　human　affairs　conflicting　influences　are　required　to　keep　one　another　alive　and　efficient　even　for　their　own　proper　uses；　and　the　exclusive　pursuit　of　one　good　object；　apart　from　some　other　which　should　accompany　it；　ends　not　in　excess　of　one　and　defect　of　the　other；　but　in　the　decay　and　loss　even　of　that　which　has　been　exclusively　cared　for。　Government　by　trained　officials　cannot　do；　for　a　country；　the　things　which　can　be　done　by　a　free　government；　but　it　might　be　supposed　capable　of　doing　some　things　which　free　government；　of　itself；　cannot　do。　We　find；　however；　that　an　outside　element　of　freedom　is　necessary　to　enable　it　to　do　effectually　or　permanently　even　its　own　business。　And　so；　also；　freedom　cannot　produce　its　best　effects；　and　often　breaks　down　altogether；　unless　means　can　be　found　of　combining　it　with　trained　and　skilled　administration。　There　could　not　be　a　moment's　hesitation　between　representative　government；　among　a　people　in　any　degree　ripe　for　it；　and　the　most　perfect　imaginable　bureaucracy。　But　it　is；　at　the　same　time；　one　of　the　most　important　ends　of　political　institutions；　to　attain　as　many　of　the　qualities　of　the　one　as　are　consistent　with　the　other；　to　secure；　as　far　as　they　can　be　made　c