representative government-第22章

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　in　addition　to　their　own。　　　Of　all　modes　in　which　a　national　representation　can　possibly　be　constituted；　this　one　affords　the　best；　security　for　the　intellectual　qualifications　desirable　in　the　representatives。　At　present；　by　universal　admission；　it　is　becoming　more　and　more　difficult　for　any　one　who　has　only　talents　and　character　to　gain　admission　into　the　House　of　Commons。　The　only　persons　who　can　get　elected　are　those　who　possess　local　influence；　or　make　their　way　by　lavish　expenditure；　or　who；　on　the　invitation　of　three　or　four　tradesmen　or　attorneys；　are　sent　down　by　one　of　the　two　great　parties　from　their　London　clubs；　as　men　whose　votes　the　party　can　depend　on　under　all　circumstances。　On　Mr。　Hare's　system；　those　who　did　not　like　the　local　candidates；　or　who　could　not　succeed　in　carrying　the　local　candidate　they　preferred；　would　have　the　power　to　fill　up　their　voting　papers　by　a　selection　from　all　the　persons　of　national　reputation；　on　the　list　of　candidates；　with　whose　general　political　principles　they　were　in　sympathy。　Almost　every　person；　therefore；　who　had　made　himself　in　any　way　honourably　distinguished；　though　devoid　of　local　influence；　and　having　sworn　allegiance　to　no　political　party；　would　have　a　fair　chance　of　making　up　the　quota；　and　with　this　encouragement　such　persons　might　be　expected　to　offer　themselves；　in　numbers　hitherto　undreamt　of。　Hundreds　of　able　men　of　independent　thought；　who　would　have　no　chance　whatever　of　being　chosen　by　the　majority　of　any　existing　constituency；　have　by　their　writings；　or　their　exertions　in　some　field　of　public　usefulness；　made　themselves　known　and　approved　by　a　few　persons　in　almost　every　district　of　the　kingdom；　and　if　every　vote　that　would　be　given　for　them　in　every　place　could　be　counted　for　their　election；　they　might　be　able　to　complete　the　number　of　the　quota。　In　no　other　way　which　it　seems　possible　to　suggest　would　Parliament　be　so　certain　of　containing　the　very　elite　of　the　country。　　　And　it　is　not　solely　through　the　votes　of　minorities　that　this　system　of　election　would　raise　the　intellectual　standard　of　the　House　of　Commons。　Majorities　would　be　compelled　to　look　out　for　members　of　a　much　higher　calibre。　When　the　individuals　composing　the　majority　would　no　longer　be　reduced　to　Hobson's　choice；　of　either　voting　for　the　person　brought　forward　by　their　local　leaders　or　not　voting　at　all；　when　the　nominee　of　the　leaders　would　have　to　encounter　the　competition　not　solely　of　the　candidate　of　the　minority；　but　of　all　the　men　of　established　reputation　in　the　country　who　were　willing　to　serve；　it　would　be　impossible　any　longer　to　foist　upon　the　electors　the　first　person　who　presents　himself　with　the　catchwords　of　the　party　in　his　mouth　and　three　or　four　thousand　pounds　in　his　pocket。　The　majority　would　insist　on　having　a　candidate　worthy　of　their　choice；　or　they　would　carry　their　votes　somewhere　else；　and　the　minority　would　prevail。　The　slavery　of　the　majority　to　the　least　estimable　portion　of　their　number　would　be　at　an　end：　the　very　best　and　most　capable　of　the　local　notabilities　would　be　put　forward　by　preference；　if　possible；　such　as　were　known　in　some　advantageous　way　beyond　the　locality；　that　their　local　strength　might　have　a　chance　of　being　fortified　by　stray　votes　from　elsewhere。　Constituencies　would　become　competitors　for　the　best　candidates；　and　would　vie　with　one　another　in　selecting　from　among　the　men　of　local　knowledge　and　connections　those　who　were　most　distinguished　in　every　other　respect。　　　The　natural　tendency　of　representative　government；　as　of　modern　civilisation；　is　towards　collective　mediocrity：　and　this　tendency　is　increased　by　all　reductions　and　extensions　of　the　franchise；　their　effect　being　to　place　the　principal　power　in　the　hands　of　classes　more　and　more　below　the　highest　level　of　instruction　in　the　community。　But　though　the　superior　intellects　and　characters　will　necessarily　be　outnumbered；　it　makes　a　great　difference　whether　or　not　they　are　heard。　In　the　false　democracy　which；　instead　of　giving　representation　to　all　gives　it　only　to　the　local　majorities；　the　voice　of　the　instructed　minority　may　have　no　organs　at　all　in　the　representative　body。　It　is　an　admitted　fact　that　in　the　American　democracy；　which　is　constructed　on　this　faulty　model；　the　highly…cultivated　members　of　the　community；　except　such　of　them　as　are　willing　to　sacrifice　their　own　opinions　and　modes　of　judgment；　and　become　the　servile　mouthpieces　of　their　inferiors　in　knowledge；　seldom　even　offer　themselves　for　Congress　or　the　State　Legislatures；　so　little　likelihood　have　they　of　being　returned。　　　Had　a　plan　like　Mr。　Hare's　by　good　fortune　suggested　itself　to　the　enlightened　and　patriotic　founders　of　the　American　Republic；　the　Federal　and　State　Assemblies　would　have　contained　many　of　these　distinguished　men；　and　democracy　would　have　been　spared　its　greatest　reproach　and　one　of　its　most　formidable　evils。　Against　this　evil　the　system　of　personal　representation；　proposed　by　Mr。　Hare；　is　almost　a　specific。　The　minority　of　instructed　minds　scattered　through　the　local　constituencies　would　unite　to　return　a　number；　proportioned　to　their　own　numbers；　of　the　very　ablest　men　the　country　contains。　They　would　be　under　the　strongest　inducement　to　choose　such　men；　since　in　no　other　mode　could　they　make　their　small　numerical　strength　tell　for　anything　considerable。　The　representatives　of　the　majority；　besides　that　they　would　themselves　be　improved　in　quality　by　the　operation　of　the　system；　would　no　longer　have　the　whole　field　to　themselves。　They　would　indeed　outnumber　the　others；　as　much　as　the　one　class　of　electors　outnumbers　the　other　in　the　country：　they　could　always　out　vote　them；　but　they　would　speak　and　vote　in　their　presence；　and　subject　to　their　criticism。　When　any　difference　arose；　they　would　have　to　meet　the　arguments　of　the　instructed　few　by　reasons；　at　least　apparently；　as　cogent；　and　since　they　could　not；　as　those　do　who　are　speaking　to　persons　already　unanimous；　simply　assume　that　they　are　in　the　right；　it　would　occasionally　happen　to　them　to　become　convinced　that　they　were　in　the　wrong。　As　they　would　in　general　be　well…meaning　（for　thus　much　may　reasonably　be　expected　from　a　fairly…chosen　national　representation）；　their　own　minds　would　be　insensibly　raised　by　the　influence　of　the　minds　with　which　they　were　in　contact；　or　even　in　conflict。　The　champions　of　unpopular　doctrines　would　not　put　forth　their　arguments　merely　in　books　and　periodicals；　read　only　by　their　own　side；　the　opposing　ranks　would　meet　face　to　face　and　hand　to　hand；　and　there　would　be　a　fair　comparison　of　their　intellectual　strength　in　the　presence　of　the　country。　It　would　then　be　found　out　whether　the　opinion　which　prevailed　by　counting　votes　would　also　prevail　if　the　votes　were　weighed　as　well　as　counted。　　　The　multitude　have　often　a　true　instinct　for　distinguishing　an　able　man；　when　he　has　the　means　of　displaying　his　ability　in　a　fair　field　before　them。　If　such　a　man　fails　to　obtain　at　least　some　portion　of　his　just　weight；　it　is　through　institutions　or　usages　which　keep　him　out　of　sight。　In　the　old　democracies　there　were　no　means　of　keeping　out　of　sight　any　able　man：　the　bema　was　open　to　him；　he　needed　nobody's　consent　to　become　a　public　adviser。　It　is　not　so　in　a　representative　government；　and　the　best　friends　of　representative　democracy　can　hardly　be　without　misgivings　that　the　Themistocles　or　Demosthenes；　whose　counsels　would　have　saved　the　nation；　might　be　unable　during　his　whole　life　ever　to　obtain　a　seat。　But　if　the　presence　in　the　representative　assembly　can　be　insured　of　even　a　few　of　the　first　minds　in　the　country；　though　the　remainder　consist　only　of　average　minds；　the　influence　of　these　leading　spirits　is　sure　to　make　itself　sensibly　felt　in　the　general　deliberations；　even　though　they　be　known　to　be；　in　many　respects；　opposed　to　the　tone　of　popular　opinion　and　feeling。　I　am　unable　to　conceive　any　mode　by　which　the　presence　of　such　minds　can　be　so　positively　insured　as　by　that　proposed　by　Mr。　Hare。　　　This　portion　of　the　Assembly　would　also　be　the　appropriate　organ　of　a　great　social　function；　for　which　there　is　no　provision　in　any　existing　democracy；　but　which　in　no　government　can　remain　permanently　unfulfilled　without　condemning　that　government　to　infallible　degeneracy　and　decay。　This　may　be　called　the　function　of　Antagonism。　In　every　government　there　is　some　power　stronger　than　all　the　rest；　and　the　power　which　is　strongest　tends　perpetually　to　become　the　sole　power。　Partly　by　intention；　and　partly　unconsciously；　it　is　ever　striving　to　make　all　other　things　bend　to　itself；　and　is　not　content　while　there　is　anything　which　makes　permanent　head　against　it；　any　influence　not　in　agreement　with　its　spirit。　Yet　if　it　succeeds　in　suppressing　all　rival　influences；　and　moulding　everything　after　its　own　model；　improvement；　in　that　country；　is　at　an　end；　and　decline　commences。　Human　improvement　is　a　product　of　many　factors；　and　no　power　ever　yet　constituted　among　mankind　includes　them　all：　even　the　most　beneficent　power　only　contains　in　itself　some　of　the　requisites　of　good；　and　the　remainder；　if　progress　is　to　continue；　must　be　derived　from　some　other　source。　No　community　has　ever　long　continued　progressive；　but　while　a　conflict　was　going　on　between　the　strongest　power　in　the　community　and　some　rival　power；　between　the　spiritual　and　temporal　authorities；　the　military　or　territorial　and　the　industrious　classes；　the　king　and　the　people；　the　orthodox　and　religious　reformers。　When　the　victory　on　either　side　was　so　complete　as　to　put　an　end　to　the　strife；　and　no　other　conflict　took　its　place；　first　stagnation　followed；　and　then　decay。　The　ascendancy　of　the　numerical　majority　is　less　unjust；　and　on　the　whole　less　mischievous；　than　many　others；　but　it　is　attended　with　the　very　same　kind　of　dangers；　and　even　more　certainly；　for　when　the　government　is　in　the　hands　of　One　or　a　Few；　the　Many　are　always　existent　as　a　rival　power；　which　may　not　be　strong　enough　ever　to　control　the　other；　but　whose　opinion　and　sentiment　are　a　moral；　and　even　a　social；　support　to　all　who；　either　from　conviction　or　contrariety　of　interest；　are　opposed　to　any　of　the　tendencies　of　the　ruling　authority。　But　when　the　Democracy　is　supreme；　there　is　no　One　or　Few　strong　enough　for　dissentient　opinions　and　injured　or　menaced　interests　to　lean　upon。　The　great　difficulty　of　democratic　government　has　hitherto　seemed　to　be；　how　to　provide；　in　a　democratic　society；　what　circumstances　have　provided　hitherto　in　all　the　societies　which　have　maintained　themselves　ahead　of　others…　a　social　support；　a　point　d'appui；　for　individual　resistance　to　the　tendencies　of　the　ruling　power；　a　protection；　a　rallying　point；　for　opinions　and　interests　which　the　ascendant　public　opinion　views　with　disfavour。　For　want　of　such　a　point　d'appui；　the　older　societies；　and　all　but　a　few　modern　ones；　either　fell　into　dissolution　or　became　stationary　（which　means　slow　deterioration）　through　the　exclusive　predominance　of　a　part　only　of　the　conditions　of　social　and　mental　well…being。　　　Now；　this　great　want　the　system　of　Personal　Representation　is　fitted　to　supply　in　the　most　perfect　manner　which　the　circumstances　of　modern　society　admit　of。　The　only　quarter　in　which　to　look　for　a　supplement；　or　completing　corre