representative government-第26章

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ore；　should　in　all　cases　accompany　universal　suffrage；　and　it　would；　after　a　few　years；　exclude　none　but　those　who　cared　so　little　for　the　privilege；　that　their　vote；　if　given；　would　not　in　general　be　an　indication　of　any　real　political　opinion。　　　It　is　also　important；　that　the　assembly　which　votes　the　taxes；　either　general　or　local；　should　be　elected　exclusively　by　those　who　pay　something　towards　the　taxes　imposed。　Those　who　pay　no　taxes；　disposing　by　their　votes　of　other　people's　money；　have　every　motive　to　be　lavish　and　none　to　economise。　As　far　as　money　matters　are　concerned；　any　power　of　voting　possessed　by　them　is　a　violation　of　the　fundamental　principle　of　free　government；　a　severance　of　the　power　of　control　from　the　interest　in　its　beneficial　exercise。　It　amounts　to　allowing　them　to　put　their　hands　into　other　people's　pockets　for　any　purpose　which　they　think　fit　to　call　a　public　one；　which　in　some　of　the　great　towns　of　the　United　States　is　known　to　have　produced　a　scale　of　local　taxation　onerous　beyond　example；　and　wholly　borne　by　the　wealthier　classes。　That　representation　should　be　co…extensive　with　taxation；　not　stopping　short　of　it；　but　also　not　going　beyond　it；　is　in　accordance　with　the　theory　of　British　institutions。　But　to　reconcile　this；　as　a　condition　annexed　to　the　representation；　with　universality；　it　is　essential；　as　it　is　on　many　other　accounts　desirable；　that　taxation；　in　a　visible　shape；　should　descend　to　the　poorest　class。　In　this　country；　and　in　most　others；　there　is　probably　no　labouring　family　which　does　not　contribute　to　the　indirect　taxes；　by　the　purchase　of　tea；　coffee；　sugar；　not　to　mention　narcotics　or　stimulants。　But　this　mode　of　defraying　a　share　of　the　public　expenses　is　hardly　felt：　the　payer；　unless　a　person　of　education　and　reflection；　does　not　identify　his　interest　with　a　low　scale　of　public　expenditure　as　closely　as　when　money　for　its　support　is　demanded　directly　from　himself；　and　even　supposing　him　to　do　so；　he　would　doubtless　take　care　that；　however　lavish　an　expenditure　he　might；　by　his　vote；　assist　in　imposing　upon　the　government；　it　should　not　be　defrayed　by　any　additional　taxes　on　the　articles　which　he　himself　consumes。　It　would　be　better　that　a　direct　tax；　in　the　simple　form　of　a　capitation；　should　be　levied　on　every　grown　person　in　the　community；　or　that　every　such　person　should　be　admitted　an　elector　on　allowing　himself　to　be　rated　extra　ordinem　to　the　assessed　taxes；　or　that　a　small　annual　payment；　rising　and　falling　with　the　gross　expenditure　of　the　country；　should　be　required　from　every　registered　elector；　that　so　everyone　might　feel　that　the　money　which　he　assisted　in　voting　was　partly　his　own；　and　that　he　was　interested　in　keeping　down　its　amount。　　　However　this　may　be；　I　regard　it　as　required　by　first　principles；　that　the　receipt　of　parish　relief　should　be　a　peremptory　disqualification　for　the　franchise。　He　who　cannot　by　his　labour　suffice　for　his　own　support　has　no　claim　to　the　privilege　of　helping　himself　to　the　money　of　others。　By　becoming　dependent　on　the　remaining　members　of　the　community　for　actual　subsistence；　he　abdicates　his　claim　to　equal　rights　with　them　in　other　respects。　Those　to　whom　he　is　indebted　for　the　continuance　of　his　very　existence　may　justly　claim　the　exclusive　management　of　those　common　concerns；　to　which　he　now　brings　nothing；　or　less　than　he　takes　away。　As　a　condition　of　the　franchise；　a　term　should　be　fixed；　say　five　years　previous　to　the　registry；　during　which　the　applicant's　name　has　not　been　on　the　parish　books　as　a　recipient　of　relief。　To　be　an　uncertified　bankrupt；　or　to　have　taken　the　benefit　of　the　Insolvent　Act；　should　disqualify　for　the　franchise　until　the　person　has　paid　his　debts；　or　at　least　proved　that　he　is　not　now；　and　has　not　for　some　long　period　been；　dependent　on　eleemosynary　support。　Non…payment　of　taxes；　when　so　long　persisted　in　that　it　cannot　have　arisen　from　inadvertence；　should　disqualify　while　it　lasts。　These　exclusions　are　not　in　their　nature　permanent。　They　exact　such　conditions　only　as　all　are　able；　or　ought　to　be　able；　to　fulfil　if　they　choose。　They　leave　the　suffrage　accessible　to　all　who　are　in　the　normal　condition　of　a　human　being：　and　if　any　one　has　to　forego　it；　he　either　does　not　care　sufficiently　for　it　to　do　for　its　sake　what　he　is　already　bound　to　do；　or　he　is　in　a　general　condition　of　depression　and　degradation　in　which　this　slight　addition；　necessary　for　security　of　others；　would　be　unfelt；　and　on　emerging　from　which；　this　mark　of　inferiority　would　disappear　with　the　rest。　　　In　the　long　run；　therefore　（supposing　no　restrictions　to　exist　but　those　of　which　we　have　now　treated）；　we　might　expect　that　all；　except　that　（it　is　to　be　hoped）　progressively　diminishing　class；　the　recipients　of　parish　relief；　would　be　in　possession　of　votes；　so　that　the　suffrage　would　be；　with　that　slight　abatement；　universal。　That　it　should　be　thus　widely　expanded　is；　as　we　have　seen；　absolutely　necessary　to　an　enlarged　and　elevated　conception　of　good　government。　Yet　in　this　state　of　things；　the　great　majority　of　voters；　in　most　countries；　and　emphatically　in　this；　would　be　manual　labourers；　and　the　twofold　danger；　that　of　too　low　a　standard　of　political　intelligence；　and　that　of　class　legislation；　would　still　exist　in　a　very　perilous　degree。　It　remains　to　be　seen　whether　any　means　exist　by　which　these　evils　can　be　obviated。　　　They　are　capable　of　being　obviated；　if　men　sincerely　wish　it；　not　by　any　artificial　contrivance；　but　by　carrying　out　the　natural　order　of　human　life；　which　recommends　itself　to　every　one　in　things　in　which　he　has　no　interest　or　traditional　opinion　running　counter　to　it。　In　all　human　affairs；　every　person　directly　interested；　and　not　under　positive　tutelage；　has　an　admitted　claim　to　a　voice；　and　when　his　exercise　of　it　is　not　inconsistent　with　the　safety　of　the　whole；　cannot　justly　be　excluded　from　it。　But　though　every　one　ought　to　have　a　voice…　that　every　one　should　have　an　equal　voice　is　a　totally　different　proposition。　When　two　persons　who　have　a　joint　interest　in　any　business　differ　in　opinion；　does　justice　require　that　both　opinions　should　be　held　of　exactly　equal　value？　If；　with　equal　virtue；　one　is　superior　to　the　other　in　knowledge　and　intelligence…　or　if；　with　equal　intelligence；　one　excels　the　other　in　virtue…　the　opinion；　the　judgment；　of　the　higher　moral　or　intellectual　being　is　worth　more　than　that　of　the　inferior：　and　if　the　institutions　of　the　country　virtually　assert　that　they　are　of　the　same　value；　they　assert　a　thing　which　is　not。　One　of　the　two；　as　the　wiser　or　better　man；　has　a　claim　to　superior　weight：　the　difficulty　is　in　ascertaining　which　of　the　two　it　is；　a　thing　impossible　as　between　individuals；　but；　taking　men　in　bodies　and　in　numbers；　it　can　be　done　with　a　certain　approach　to　accuracy。　There　would　be　no　pretence　for　applying　this　doctrine　to　any　case　which　could　with　reason　be　considered　as　one　of　individual　and　private　right。　In　an　affair　which　concerns　only　one　of　two　persons；　that　one　is　entitled　to　follow　his　own　opinion；　however　much　wiser　the　other　may　be　than　himself。　But　we　are　speaking　of　things　which　equally　concern　them　both；　where；　if　the　more　ignorant　does　not　yield　his　share　of　the　matter　to　the　guidance　of　the　wiser　man；　the　wiser　man　must　resign　his　to　that　of　the　more　ignorant。　Which　of　these　modes　of　getting　over　the　difficulty　is　most　for　the　interest　of　both；　and　most　conformable　to　the　general　fitness　of　things？　If　it　be　deemed　unjust　that　either　should　have　to　give　way；　which　injustice　is　greatest？　that　the　better　judgment　should　give　way　to　the　worse；　or　the　worse　to　the　better？　　　Now；　national　affairs　are　exactly　such　a　joint　concern；　with　the　difference；　that　no　one　needs　ever　be　called　upon　for　a　complete　sacrifice　of　his　own　opinion。　It　can　always　be　taken　into　the　calculation；　and　counted　at　a　certain　figure；　a　higher　figure　being　assigned　to　the　suffrages　of　those　whose　opinion　is　entitled　to　greater　weight。　There　is　not；　in　this　arrangement；　anything　necessarily　invidious　to　those　to　whom　it　assigns　the　lower　degrees　of　influence。　Entire　exclusion　from　a　voice　in　the　common　concerns　is　one　thing：　the　concession　to　others　of　a　more　potential　voice；　on　the　ground　of　greater　capacity　for　the　management　of　the　joint　interests；　is　another。　The　two　things　are　not　merely　different；　they　are　incommensurable。　Every　one　has　a　right　to　feel　insulted　by　being　made　a　nobody；　and　stamped　as　of　no　account　at　all。　No　one　but　a　fool；　and　only　a　fool　of　a　peculiar　description；　feels　offended　by　the　acknowledgment　that　there　are　others　whose　opinion；　and　even　whose　wish；　is　entitled　to　a　greater　amount　of　consideration　than　his。　To　have　no　voice　in　what　are　partly　his　own　concerns　is　a　thing　which　nobody　willingly　submits　to；　but　when　what　is　partly　his　concern　is　also　partly　another's；　and　he　feels　the　other　to　understand　the　subject　better　than　himself；　that　the　other's　opinion　should　be　counted　for　more　than　his　own　accords　with　his　expectations；　and　with　the　course　of　things　which　in　all　other　affairs　of　life　he　is　accustomed　to　acquiese　in。　It　is　only　necessary　that　this　superior　influence　should　be　assigned　on　grounds　which　he　can　comprehend；　and　of　which　he　is　able　to　perceive　the　justice。　　　I　hasten　to　say　that　I　consider　it　entirely　inadmissible；　unless　as　a　temporary　makeshift；　that　the　superiority　of　influence　should　be　conferred　in　consideration　of　property。　I　do　not　deny　that　property　is　a　kind　of　test；　education　in　most　countries；　though　anything　but　proportional　to　riches；　is　on　the　average　better　in　the　richer　half　of　society　than　in　the　poorer。　But　the　criterion　is　so　imperfect；　accident　has　so　much　more　to　do　than　merit　with　enabling　men　to　rise　in　the　world；　and　it　is　so　impossible　for　any　one；　by　acquiring　any　amount　of　instruction；　to　make　sure　of　the　corresponding　rise　in　station；　that　this　foundation　of　electoral　privilege　is　always；　and　will　continue　to　be；　supremely　odious。　To　connect　plurality　of　votes　with　any　pecuniary　qualification　would　be　not　only　objectionable　in　itself；　but　a　sure　mode　of　discrediting　the　principle；　and　making　its　permanent　maintenance　impracticable。　The　Democracy；　at　least　of　this　country；　are　not　at　present　jealous　of　personal　superiority；　but　they　are　naturally　and　must　justly　so　of　that　which　is　grounded　on　mere　pecuniary　circumstances。　The　only　thing　which　can　justify　reckoning　one　person's　opinion　as　equivalent　to　more　than　one　is　individual　mental　superiority；　and　what　is　wanted　is　some　approximate　means　of　ascertaining　that。　If　there　existed　such　a　thing　as　a　really　national　education　or　a　trustworthy　system　of　general　examination；　education　might　be　tested　directly。　In　the　absence　of　these；　the　nature　of　a　person's　occupation　is　some　test。　An　employer　of　labour　is　on　the　average　more　intelligent　than　a　labourer；　for　he　must　labour　with　his　head；　and　not　solely　with　his　hands。　A　foreman　is　generally　more　intelligent　than　an　ordinary　labourer；　and　a　labourer　in　the　skilled　trades　than　in　the　unskilled。　A　banker；　merchant；　or　manufacturer　is　likely　to　be　more　intelligent　than　a　tradesman；　because　he　has　larger　and　more　complicated　interests　to　manage。　　　In　all　these　cases　it　is　not　the　having　merely　undertaken　the　superior　function；　but　t