representative government-第29章

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g　them　a　vote　at　all　is　defeated：　the　political　function　to　which　they　are　called　fails　of　developing　public　spirit　and　political　intelligence；　of　making　public　affairs　an　object　of　interest　to　their　feelings　and　of　exercise　to　their　faculties。　The　supposition；　moreover；　involves　inconsistent　conditions；　for　if　the　voter　feels　no　interest　in　the　final　result；　how　or　why　can　he　be　expected　to　feel　any　in　the　process　which　leads　to　it？　To　wish　to　have　a　particular　individual　for　his　representative　in　parliament　is　possible　to　a　person　of　a　very　moderate　degree　of　virtue　and　intelligence；　and　to　wish　to　choose　an　elector　who　will　elect　that　individual　is　a　natural　consequence：　but　for　a　person　does　not　care　who　is　elected；　or　feels　bound　to　put　that　consideration　in　abeyance；　to　take　any　interest　whatever　in　merely　naming　the　worthiest　person　to　elect　another　according　to　his　own　judgment；　implies　a　zeal　for　what　is　right　in　the　abstract；　an　habitual　principle　of　duty　for　the　sake　of　duty；　which　is　possible　only　to　persons　of　a　rather　high　grade　of　cultivation；　who；　by　the　very　possession　of　it；　show　that　they　may　be；　and　deserve　to　be；　trusted　with　political　power　in　a　more　direct　shape。　Of　all　public　functions　which　it　is　possible　to　confer　on　the　poorer　members　of　the　community　this　surely　is　the　least　calculated　to　kindle　their　feelings；　and　holds　out　least　natural　inducement　to　care　for　it；　other　than　a　virtuous　determination　to　discharge　conscientiously　whatever　duty　one　has　to　perform：　and　if　the　mass　of　electors　cared　enough　about　political　affairs　to　set　any　value　on　so　limited　a　participation　in　them；　they　would　not　be　likely　to　be　satisfied　without　one　much　more　extensive。　　　In　the　next　place；　admitting　that　a　person　who；　from　his　narrow　range　of　cultivation；　cannot　judge　well　of　the　qualifications　of　a　candidate　for　parliament　may　be　a　sufficient　judge　of　the　honesty　and　general　capacity　of　somebody　whom　he　may　depute　to　choose　a　member　of　Parliament　for　him；　I　may　remark；　that　if　the　voter　acquiesces　in　this　estimate　of　his　capabilities；　and　really　wishes　to　have　the　choice　made　for　him　by　a　person　in　whom　he　places　reliance；　there　is　no　need　of　any　constitutional　provision　for　the　purpose；　he　has　only　to　ask　this　confidential　person　privately　what　candidate　he　had　better　vote　for。　In　that　case　the　two　modes　of　election　coincide　in　their　result；　and　every　advantage　of　indirect　election　is　obtained　under　direct。　The　systems　only　diverge　in　their　operation；　if　we　suppose　that　the　voter　would　prefer　to　use　his　own　judgment　in　the　choice　of　a　representative；　and　only　lets　another　choose　for　him　because　the　law　does　not　allow　him　a　more　direct　mode　of　action。　But　if　this　be　his　state　of　mind；　if　his　will　does　not　go　along　with　the　limitation　which　the　law　imposes；　and　he　desires　to　make　a　direct　choice；　he　can　do　so　notwithstanding　the　law。　He　has　only　to　choose　as　elector　a　known　partisan　of　the　candidate　he　prefers；　or　some　one　who　will　pledge　himself　to　vote　for　that　candidate。　And　this　is　so　much　the　natural　working　of　election　by　two　stages　that；　except　in　a　condition　of　complete　political　indifference；　it　can　scarcely　be　expected　to　act　otherwise。　It　is　in　this　way　that　the　election　of　the　President　of　the　United　States　practically　takes　place。　Nominally；　the　election　is　indirect：　the　population　at　large　does　not　vote　for　the　President；　it　votes　for　electors　who　choose　the　President。　But　the　electors　are　always　chosen　under　an　express　engagement　to　vote　for　a　particular　candidate：　nor　does　a　citizen　ever　vote　for　an　elector　because　of　any　preference　for　the　man；　he　votes　for　the　Lincoln　ticket；　or　the　Breckenridge　ticket。　It　must　be　remembered　that　the　electors　are　not　chosen　in　order　that　they　may　search　the　country　and　find　the　fittest　person　in　it　to　be　President；　or　to　be　a　member　of　Parliament。　There　would　be　something　to　be　said　for　the　practice　if　this　were　so：　but　it　is　not　so；　nor　ever　will　be　until　mankind　in　general　are　of　opinion；　with　Plato；　that　the　proper　person　to　be　entrusted　with　power　is　the　person　most　unwilling　to　accept　it。　The　electors　are　to　make　choice　of　one　of　those　who　have　offered　themselves　as　candidates：　and　those　who　choose　the　electors　already　know　who　these　are。　If　there　is　any　political　activity　in　the　country；　all　electors；　who　care　to　vote　at　all；　have　made　up　their　minds　which　of　these　candidates　they　would　like　to　have；　and　will　make　that　the　sole　consideration　in　giving　their　vote。　The　partisans　of　each　candidate　will　have　their　list　of　electors　ready；　all　pledged　to　vote　for　that　individual；　and　the　only　question　practically　asked　of　the　primary　elector　will　be　which　of　these　lists　he　will　support。　　　The　case　in　which　election　by　two　stages　answers　well　in　practice　is　when　the　electors　are　not　chosen　solely　as　electors；　but　have　other　important　functions　to　discharge；　which　precludes　their　being　selected　solely　as　delegates　to　give　a　particular　vote。　This　combination　of　circumstances　exemplifies　itself　in　another　American　institution；　the　Senate　of　the　United　States。　That　assembly；　the　Upper　House；　as　it　were；　of　Congress；　is　considered　to　represent　not　the　people　directly；　but　the　States　as　such；　and　to　be　the　guardian　of　that　portion　of　their　sovereign　rights　which　they　have　not　alienated。　As　the　internal　sovereignty　of　each　State　is；　by　the　nature　of　an　equal　federation；　equally　sacred　whatever　be　the　size　or　importance　of　the　State；　each　returns　to　the　Senate　the　same　number　of　members　（two）；　whether　it　be　little　Delaware　or　the　〃Empire　State〃　of　New　York。　These　members　are　not　chosen　by　the　population；　but　by　the　State　Legislatures；　themselves　elected　by　the　people　of　each　State；　but　as　the　whole　ordinary　business　of　a　legislative　assembly；　internal　legislation　and　the　control　of　the　executive；　devolves　upon　these　bodies；　they　are　elected　with　a　view　to　those　objects　more　than　to　the　other；　and　in　naming　two　persons　to　represent　the　State　in　the　Federal　Senate　they　for　the　most　part　exercise　their　own　judgment；　with　only　that　general　reference　to　public　opinion　necessary　in　all　acts　of　the　government　of　a　democracy。　The　elections；　thus　made；　have　proved　eminently　successful；　and　are　conspicuously　the　best　of　all　the　elections　in　the　United　States；　the　Senate　invariably　consisting　of　the　most　distinguished　men　among　those　who　have　made　themselves　sufficiently　known　in　public　life。　　　After　such　an　example；　it　cannot　be　said　that　indirect　popular　election　is　never　advantageous。　Under　certain　conditions　it　is　the　very　best　system　that　can　be　adopted。　But　those　conditions　are　hardly　to　be　obtained　in　practice；　except　in　a　federal　government　like　that　of　the　United　States；　where　the　election　can　be　entrusted　to　local　bodies　whose　other　functions　extend　to　the　most　important　concerns　of　the　nation。　The　only　bodies　in　any　analogous　position　which　exist；　or　are　likely　to　exist；　in　this　country　are　the　municipalities；　or　any　other　boards　which　have　been　or　may　be　created　for　similar　local　purposes。　Few　persons；　however；　would　think　it　any　improvement　in　our　parliamentary　constitution　if　the　members　for　the　City　of　London　were　chosen　by　the　Aldermen　and　Common　Council；　and　those　for　the　borough　of　Marylebone　avowedly；　as　they　already　are　virtually；　by　the　vestries　of　the　component　parishes。　Even　if　those　bodies；　considered　merely　as　local　boards；　were　far　less　objectionable　than　they　are；　the　qualities　that　would　fit　them　for　the　limited　and　peculiar　duties　of　municipal　or　parochial　aedileship　are　no　guarantee　of　any　special　fitness　to　judge　of　the　comparative　qualifications　of　candidates　for　a　seat　in　Parliament。　They　probably　would　not　fulfil　this　duty　any　better　than　it　is　fulfilled　by　the　inhabitants　voting　directly；　while；　on　the　other　hand；　if　fitness　for　electing　members　of　Parliament　had　to　be　taken　into　consideration　in　selecting　persons　for　the　office　of　vestrymen　or　town　councillors；　many　of　those　who　are　fittest　for　that　more　limited　duty　would　inevitably　be　excluded　from　it；　if　only　by　the　necessity　there　would　be　of　choosing　persons　whose　sentiments　in　general　politics　agreed　with　those　of　the　voters　who　elected　them。　The　mere　indirect　political　influence　of　town…councils　has　already　led　to　a　considerable　perversion　of　municipal　elections　from　their　intended　purpose；　by　making　them　a　matter　of　party　politics。　If　it　were　part　of　the　duty　of　a　man's　book…keeper　or　steward　to　choose　his　physician；　he　would　not　be　likely　to　have　a　better　medical　attendant　than　if　he　chose　one　for　himself；　while　he　would　be　restricted　in　his　choice　of　a　steward　or　book…keeper　to　such　as　might　without　too　great　danger　to　his　health　be　entrusted　with　the　other　office。　　　It　appears；　therefore；　that　every　benefit　of　indirect　election　which　is　attainable　at　all　is　attainable　under　direct；　that　such　of　the　benefits　expected　from　it；　as　would　not　be　obtained　under　direct　election；　will　just　as　much　fail　to　be　obtained　under　indirect；　while　the　latter　has　considerable　disadvantages　peculiar　to　itself。　The　mere　fact　that　it　is　an　additional　and　superfluous　wheel　in　the　machinery　is　no　trifling　objection。　Its　decided　inferiority　as　a　means　of　cultivating　public　spirit　and　political　intelligence　has　already　been　dwelt　upon：　and　if　it　had　any　effective　operation　at　all…　that　is；　if　the　primary　electors　did　to　any　extent　leave　to　their　nominees　the　selection　of　their　parliamentary　representative…　the　voter　would　be　prevented　from　identifying　himself　with　his　member　of　Parliament；　and　the　member　would　feel　a　much　less　active　sense　of　responsibility　to　his　constituents。　In　addition　to　all　this；　the　comparatively　small　number　of　persons　in　whose　hands；　at　last；　the　election　of　a　member　of　Parliament　would　reside；　could　not　but　afford　great　additional　facilities　to　intrigue；　and　to　every　form　of　corruption　compatible　with　the　station　in　life　of　the　electors。　The　constituencies　would　universally　be　reduced；　in　point　of　conveniences　for　bribery；　to　the　condition　of　the　small　boroughs　at　present。　It　would　be　sufficient　to　gain　over　a　small　number　of　persons　to　be　certain　of　being　returned。　If　it　be　said　that　the　electors　would　be　responsible　to　those　who　elected　them；　the　answer　is　obvious；　that；　holding　no　permanent　office；　or　position　in　the　public　eye；　they　would　risk　nothing　by　a　corrupt　vote　except　what　they　would　care　little　for；　not　to　be　appointed　electors　again：　and　the　main　reliance　must　still　be　on　the　penalties　for　bribery；　the　insufficiency　of　which　reliance；　in　small　constituencies；　experience　has　made　notorious　to　all　the　world。　The　evil　would　be　exactly　proportional　to　the　amount　of　discretion　left　to　the　chosen　electors。　The　only　case　in　which　they　would　probably　be　afraid　to　employ　their　vote　for　the　promotion　of　their　personal　interest　would　be　when　they　were　elected　under　an　express　pledge；　as　mere　delegates；　to　carry；　as　it　were；　the　votes　of　their　constituents　to　the　hustings。　The　moment　the　double　stage　of　election　began　to　have　any　effect；　it　would　begin　to　have　a　bad　effect。　And　this　we　shall　find　true　of　the　principle　of　indirect　election　however　applied；　except　in　circumstances　similar　to　those　of　the　election　of　Senators　in　the　United　States。　　　The　best　which　could　be　said　for　this　political　contrivan