representative government-第32章

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m　to　dwell　on；　and　make　him　best　able　to　estimate。　A　great　number　of　the　electors　will　have　two　sets　of　preferences…　those　on　private　and　those　on　public　grounds。　The　last　are　the　only　ones　which　the　elector　would　like　to　avow。　The　best　side　of　their　character　is　that　which　people　are　anxious　to　show；　even　to　those　who　are　no　better　than　themselves。　People　will　give　dishonest　or　mean　votes　from　lucre；　from　malice；　from　pique；　from　personal　rivalry；　even　from　the　interests　or　prejudices　of　class　or　sect；　more　readily　in　secret　than　in　public。　And　cases　exist…　they　may　come　to　be　more　frequent…　in　which　almost　the　only　restraint　upon　a　majority　of　knaves　consists　in　their　involuntary　respect　for　the　opinion　of　an　honest　minority。　In　such　a　case　as　that　of　the　repudiating　States　of　North　America；　is　there　not　some　check　to　the　unprincipled　voter　in　the　shame　of　looking　an　honest　man　in　the　face？　Since　all　this　good　would　be　sacrificed　by　the　ballot；　even　in　the　circumstances　most　favourable　to　it；　a　much　stronger　case　is　requisite　than　can　now　be　made　out　for　its　necessity　（and　the　case　is　continually　becoming　still　weaker）　to　make　its　adoption　desirable。〃*

　　*　Thoughts　on　Parliamentary　Reform；　2nd　ed。　pp　32…36。

　　On　the　other　debateable　points　connected　with　the　mode　of　voting　it　is　not　necessary　to　expend　so　many　words。　The　system　of　personal　representation；　as　organised　by　Mr。　Hare；　renders　necessary　the　employment　of　voting　papers。　But　it　appears　to　me　indispensable　that　the　signature　of　the　elector　should　be　affixed　to　the　paper　at　a　public　polling　place；　or　if　there　be　no　such　place　conveniently　accessible；　at　some　office　open　to　all　the　world；　and　in　the　presence　of　a　responsible　public　officer。　The　proposal　which　has　been　thrown　out　of　allowing　the　voting　papers　to　be　filled　up　at　the　voter's　own　residence；　and　sent　by　the　post；　or　called　for　by　a　public　officer；　I　should　regard　as　fatal。　The　act　would　be　done　in　the　absence　of　the　salutary　and　the　presence　of　all　the　pernicious　influences。　The　briber　might；　in　the　shelter　of　privacy；　behold　with　his　own　eyes　his　bargain　fulfilled；　and　the　intimidator　could　see　the　extorted　obedience　rendered　irrevocably　on　the　spot；　while　the　beneficent　counter…influence　of　the　presence　of　those　who　knew　the　voter's　real　sentiments；　and　the　inspiring　effect　of　the　sympathy　of　those　of　his　own　party　or　opinion；　would　be　shut　out。*

　　*　〃This　expedient　has　been　recommended；　both　on　the　score　of　saving　expense；　and　on　that　of　obtaining　the　votes　of　many　electors　who　otherwise　would　not　vote；　and　who　are　regarded　by　the　advocates　of　the　plan　as　a　particularly　desirable　class　of　voters。　The　scheme　has　been　carried　into　practice　in　the　election　of　poor…law　guardians；　and　its　success　in　that　instance　is　appealed　to　in　favour　of　adopting　it　in　the　more　important　case　of　voting　for　a　member　of　the　Legislature。　But　the　two　cases　appear　to　me　to　differ　in　the　point　on　which　the　benefits　of　the　expedient　depend。　In　a　local　election　for　a　special　kind　of　administrative　business；　which　consists　mainly　in　the　dispensation　of　a　public　fund；　it　is　an　object　to　prevent　the　choice　from　being　exclusively　in　the　hands　of　those　who　actively　concern　themselves　about　it；　for　the　public　interest　which　attaches　to　the　election　being　of　a　limited　kind；　and　in　most　cases　not　very　great　in　degree；　the　disposition　to　make　themselves　busy　in　the　matter　is　apt　to　be　in　a　great　measure　confined　to　persons　who　hope　to　turn　their　activity　to　their　own　private　advantage；　and　it　may　be　very　desirable　to　render　the　intervention　of　other　people　as　little　onerous　to　them　as　possible；　if　only　for　the　purpose　of　swamping　these　private　interests。　But　when　the　matter　in　hand　is　the　great　business　of　national　government；　in　which　every　one　must　take　an　interest　who　cares　for　anything　out　of　himself；　or　who　cares　even　for　himself　intelligently；　it　is　much　rather　an　object　to　prevent　those　from　voting　who　are　indifferent　to　the　subject；　than　to　induce　them　to　vote　by　any　other　means　than　that　of　awakening　their　dormant　minds。　The　voter　who　does　not　care　enough　about　the　election　to　go　to　the　poll；　is　the　very　man　who；　if　he　can　vote　without　that　small　trouble；　will　give　his　vote　to　the　first　person　who　asks　for　it；　or　on　the　most　trifling　or　frivolous　inducement。　A　man　who　does　not　care　whether　he　votes；　is　not　likely　to　care　much　which　way　he　votes；　and　he　who　is　in　that　state　of　mind　has　no　moral　right　to　vote　at　all；　since；　if　he　does　so；　a　vote　which　is　not　the　expression　of　a　conviction；　counts　for　as　much；　and　goes　as　far　in　determining　the　result；　as　one　which　represents　the　thoughts　and　purposes　of　a　life。〃…　Thoughts；　etc。；　p。　39。

　　The　polling　places　should　be　so　numerous　as　to　be　within　easy　reach　of　every　voter；　and　no　expenses　of　conveyance；　at　the　cost　of　the　candidate；　should　be　tolerated　under　any　pretext。　The　infirm；　and　they　only　on　medical　certificate；　should　have　the　right　of　claiming　suitable　carriage　conveyance；　at　the　cost　of　the　State；　or　of　the　locality。　Hustings；　poll　clerks；　and　all　the　necessary　machinery　of　elections；　should　be　at　the　public　charge。　Not　only　the　candidate　should　not　be　required；　he　should　not　be　permitted；　to　incur　any　but　a　limited　and　trifling　expense　for　his　election。　Mr。　Hare　thinks　it　desirable　that　a　sum　of　L50　should　be　required　from　every　one　who　places　his　name　on　the　list　of　candidates；　to　prevent　persons　who　have　no　chance　of　success；　and　no　real　intention　of　attempting　it；　from　becoming　candidates　in　wantonness　or　from　mere　love　of　notoriety；　and　perhaps　carrying　off　a　few　votes　which　are　needed　for　the　return　of　more　serious　aspirants。　There　is　one　expense　which　a　candidate　or　his　supporters　cannot　help　incurring；　and　which　it　can　hardly　be　expected　that　the　public　should　defray　for　every　one　who　may　choose　to　demand　it；　that　of　making　his　claims　known　to　the　electors；　by　advertisements；　placards；　and　circulars。　For　all　necessary　expenses　of　this　kind　the　L50　proposed　by　Mr。　Hare；　if　allowed　to　be　drawn　upon　for　these　purposes　（it　might　be　made　L100　if　requisite）；　ought　to　be　sufficient。　If　the　friends　of　the　candidate　choose　to　go　to　expense　for　committees　and　canvassing　there　are　no　means　of　preventing　them；　but　such　expenses　out　of　the　candidates's　own　pocket；　or　any　expenses　whatever　beyond　the　deposit　of　L50　（or　L100）；　should　be　illegal　and　punishable。　If　there　appeared　any　likelihood　that　opinion　would　refuse　to　connive　at　falsehood；　a　declaration　on　oath　or　honour　should　be　required　from　every　member　on　taking　his　seat　that　he　had　not　expended；　nor　would　expend；　money　or　money's　worth　beyond　the　L50；　directly　or　indirectly；　for　the　purposes　of　his　election；　and　if　the　assertion　were　proved　to　be　false　or　the　pledge　to　have　been　broken；　he　should　be　liable　to　the　penalties　of　perjury。　　　It　is　probable　that　those　penalties；　by　showing　that　the　Legislature　was　in　earnest；　would　turn　the　course　of　opinion　in　the　same　direction；　and　would　hinder　it　from　regarding；　as　has　hitherto　done；　this　most　serious　crime　against　society　as　a　venial　peccadillo。　When　once　this　effect　has　been　produced；　there　need　be　no　doubt　that　the　declaration　on　oath　or　honour　would　be　considered　binding。*　〃Opinion　tolerates　a　false　disclaimer；　only　when　it　already　tolerates　the　thing　disclaimed。〃　This　is　notoriously　the　case　with　regard　to　electoral　corruption。　There　has　never　yet　been；　among　political　men；　any　real　and　serious　attempt　to　prevent　bribery；　because　there　has　been　no　real　desire　that　elections　should　not　be　costly。　Their　costliness　is　an　advantage　to　those　who　can　afford　the　expense；　by　excluding　a　multitude　of　competitors；　and　anything；　however　noxious；　is　cherished　as　having　a　conservative　tendency　if　it　limits　the　access　to　Parliament　to　rich　men。　This　is　a　rooted　feeling　among　our　legislators　of　both　political　parties；　and　is　almost　the　only　point　on　which　I　believe　them　to　be　really　ill…intentioned。　They　care　comparatively　little　who　votes；　as　long　as　they　feel　assured　that　none　but　persons　of　their　own　class　can　be　voted　for。　They　know　that　they　can　rely　on　the　fellow…feeling　of　one　of　their　class　with　another；　while　the　subservience　of　nouveaux　enrichis；　who　are　knocking　at　the　door　of　the　class；　is　a　still　surer　reliance；　and　that　nothing　very　hostile　to　the　class　interests　or　feelings　of　the　rich　need　be　apprehended　under　the　most　democratic　suffrage　as　long　as　democratic　persons　can　be　prevented　from　being　elected　to　Parliament。　But；　even　from　their　own　point　of　view；　this　balancing　of　evil　by　evil；　instead　of　combining　good　with　good；　is　a　wretched　policy。　The　object　should　be　to　bring　together　the　best　members　of　both　classes；　under　such　a　tenure　as　shall　induce　them　to　lay　aside　their　class　preferences；　and　pursue　jointly　the　path　traced　by　the　common　interest；　instead　of　allowing　the　class　feelings　of　the　Many　to　have　full　swing　in　the　constituencies；　subject　to　the　impediment　of　having　to　act　through　persons　imbued　with　the　class　feelings　of　the　Few。

　　*　Several　of　the　witnesses　before　the　Committee　of　the　House　of　Commons　in　1860；　on　the　operation　of　the　Corrupt　Practices　Prevention　Act；　some　of　them　of　great　practical　experience　in　election　matters；　were　favourable　（either　absolutely　or　as　a　last　resort）　to　the　principle　of　requiring　a　declaration　from　members　of　Parliament；　and　were　of　opinion　that；　if　supported　by　penalties；　it　would　be；　to　a　great　degree；　effectual。　（Evidence；　pp。　46；　54…57；　67；　123；　198…202；　208。）　The　Chief　Commissioner　of　the　Wakefield　Inquiry　said　（in　reference　certainly　to　a　different　proposal）；　〃If　they　see　that　the　Legislature　is　earnest　upon　the　subject；　the　machinery　will　work。。。。　I　am　quite　sure　that　if　some　personal　stigma　were　applied　upon　conviction　of　bribery；　it　would　change　the　current　of　public　opinion〃　（pp。　26　and　32）。　A　distinguished　member　of　the　Committee　（and　of　the　present　Cabinet）　seemed　to　think　it　very　objectionable　to　attach　the　penalties　of　perjury　to　a　merely　promissory　as　distinguished　from　an　assertory　oath；　but　he　was　reminded；　that　the　oath　taken　by　a　witness　in　a　court　of　justice　is　a　promissory　oath：　and　the　rejoinder　（that　the　witness's　promise　relates　to　an　act　to　be　done　at　once；　while　the　member's　would　be　a　promise　for　all　future　time）　would　only　be　to　the　purpose；　if　it　could　be　supposed　that　the　swearer　might　forget　the　obligation　he　had　entered　into；　or　could　possibly　violate　it　unawares：　contingencies　which；　in　a　case　like　the　present；　are　out　of　the　question。　　　A　more　substantial　difficulty　is　that　one　of　the　forms　most　frequently　assumed　by　election　expenditure　is　that　of　subscriptions　to　local　charities；　or　other　local　objects；　and　it　would　be　a　strong　measure　to　enact　that　money　should　not　be　given　in　charity；　within　a　place；　by　the　member　for　it。　When　such　subscriptions　are　bona　fide；　the　popularity　which　may　be　derived　from　them　is　an　advantage　which　it　seems　hardly　possible　to　deny　to　superior　riches。　But　the　greatest　part　of　the　mischief　consists　in　the　fact　that　money　so　contributed　is　employed　in　bribery；　under　the　euphemistic　name　of　keeping　up　the　member's　interest。　To　guard　against　this；　it　should　be　part　of　the　member's　promissory　declaration；　that　all　sums　expended　by　him　in　the　place；　or　for　any　pur