representative government-第33章

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t　of　the　member's　promissory　declaration；　that　all　sums　expended　by　him　in　the　place；　or　for　any　purpose　connected　with　it　or　with　any　of　its　inhabitants　（with　the　exception　perhaps　of　his　own　hotel　expenses）；　should　pass　through　the　hands　of　the　election　auditor；　and　be　by　him　（and　not　by　the　member　himself　or　his　friends）　applied　to　its　declared　purpose。　　　The　principle　of　making　all　lawful　expenses　of　a　charge　not　upon　the　candidate；　but　upon　the　locality；　was　upheld　by　two　of　the　best　witnesses　（pp。　20；　65…70；　277）。

　　There　is　scarcely　any　mode　in　which　political　institutions　are　more　morally　mischievous…work　greater　evil　through　their　spirit…than　by　representing　political　functions　as　a　favour　to　be　conferred；　a　thing　which　the　depositary　is　to　ask　for　as　desiring　it　for　himself；　and　even　pay　for　as　if　it　were　designed　for　his　pecuniary　benefit。　Men　are　not　fond　of　paying　large　sums　for　leave　to　perform　a　laborious　duty。　Plato　had　a　much　juster　view　of　the　conditions　of　good　government　when　he　asserted　that　the　persons　who　should　be　sought　out　to　be　invested　with　political　power　are　those　who　are　personally　most　averse　to　it；　and　that　the　only　motive　which　can　be　relied　on　for　inducing　the　fittest　men　to　take　upon　themselves　the　toils　of　government　is　the　fear　of　being　governed　by　worse　men。　What　must　an　elector　think；　when　he　sees　three　or　four　gentlemen；　none　of　them　previously　observed　to　be　lavish　of　their　money　on　projects　of　disinterested　beneficence；　vying　with　one　another　in　the　sums　they　expend　to　be　enabled　to　write　M。P。　after　their　names？　Is　it　likely　he　will　suppose　that　it　is　for　his　interest　they　incur　all　this　cost？　And　if　he　form　an　uncomplimentary　opinion　of　their　part　in　the　affair；　what　moral　obligation　is　he　likely　to　feel　as　to　his　own？　Politicians　are　fond　of　treating　it　as　the　dream　of　enthusiasts　that　the　electoral　body　will　ever　be　uncorrupt：　truly　enough；　until　they　are　willing　to　become　so　themselves：　for　the　electors；　assuredly；　will　take　their　moral　tone　from　the　candidates。　So　long　as　the　elected　member；　in　any　shape　or　manner；　pay　for　his　seat；　all　endeavours；　will　fail　to　make　the　business　of　election　anything　but　a　selfish　bargain　on　all　sides。　〃So　long　as　the　candidate　himself；　and　the　customs　of　the　world；　seem　to　regard　the　function　of　a　member　of　Parliament　less　as　a　duty　to　be　discharged　than　a　personal　favour　to　be　solicited；　no　effort　will　avail　to　implant　in　an　ordinary　voter　the　feeling　that　the　election　of　a　member　of　Parliament　is　also　a　matter　of　duty；　and　that　he　is　not　at　liberty　to　bestow　his　vote　on　any　other　consideration　than　that　of　personal　fitness。〃　　　The　same　principle　which　demands　that　no　payment　of　money　for　election　purposes　should　be　either　required　or　tolerated　on　the　part　of　the　person　elected　dictates　another　conclusion；　apparently　of　contrary　tendency；　but　really　directed　to　the　same　object。　It　negatives　what　has　often　been　proposed　as　a　means　of　rendering　Parliament　accessible　to　persons　of　all　ranks　and　circumstances；　the　payment　of　members　of　Parliament。　If；　as　in　some　of　our　colonies；　there　are　scarcely　any　fit　persons　who　can　afford　to　attend　to　an　unpaid　occupation；　the　payment　should　be　an　indemnity　for　loss　of　time　or　money；　not　a　salary。　The　greater　latitude　of　choice　which　a　salary　would　give　is　an　illusory　advantage。　No　remuneration　which　any　one　would　think　of　attaching　to　the　post　would　attract　to　it　those　who　were　seriously　engaged　in　other　lucrative　professions　with　a　prospect　of　succeeding　in　them。　The　business　of　a　member　of　Parliament　would　therefore　become　an　occupation　in　itself；　carried　on；　like　other　professions；　with　a　view　chiefly　to　its　pecuniary　returns；　and　under　the　demoralising　influences　of　an　occupation　essentially　precarious。　It　would　become　an　object　of　desire　to　adventurers　of　a　low　class；　and　658　persons　in　possession；　with　ten　or　twenty　times　as　many　in　expectancy；　would　be　incessantly　bidding　to　attract　or　retain　the　suffrages　of　the　electors；　by　promising　all　things；　honest　or　dishonest；　possible　or　impossible；　and　rivalling　each　other　in　pandering　to　the　meanest　feelings　and　most　ignorant　prejudices　of　the　vulgarest　part　of　the　crowd。　The　auction　between　Cleon　and　the　sausage…seller　in　Aristophanes　is　a　fair　caricature　of　what　would　be　always　going　on。　Such　an　institution　would　be　a　perpetual　blister　applied　to　the　most　peccant　parts　of　human　nature。　It　amounts　to　offering　658　prizes　for　the　most　successful　flatterer；　the　most　adroit　misleader；　of　a　body　of　his　fellow…countrymen。　Under　no　despotism　has　there　been　such　an　organised　system　of　tillage　for　raising　a　rich　crop　of　vicious　courtiership。*　When；　by　reason　of　pre…eminent　qualifications　（as　may　at　any　time　happen　to　be　the　case）；　it　is　desirable　that　a　person　entirely　without　independent　means；　either　derived　from　property　or　from　a　trade　or　profession；　should　be　brought　into　Parliament　to　render　services　which　no　other　person　accessible　can　render　as　well；　there　is　the　resource　of　a　public　subscription；　he　may　be　supported　while　in　Parliament；　like　Andrew　Marvell；　by　the　contributions　of　his　constituents。　This　mode　is　unobjectionable　for　such　an　honour　will　never　be　paid　to　mere　subserviency：　bodies　of　men　do　not　care　so　much　for　the　difference　between　one　sycophant　and　another　as　to　go　to　the　expense　of　his　maintenance　in　order　to　be　flattered　by　that　particular　individual。　Such　a　support　will　only　be　given　in　consideration　of　striking　and　impressive　personal　qualities；　which；　though　no　absolute　proof　of　fitness　to　be　a　national　representative；　are　some　presumption　of　it；　and；　at　all　events；　some　guarantee　for　the　possession　of　an　independent　opinion　and　will。

　　*　〃As　Mr。　Lorimer　remarks；　by　creating　a　pecuniary　inducement　to　persons　of　the　lowest　class　to　devote　themselves　to　public　affairs；　the　calling　of　the　demagogue　would　be　formally　inaugurated。　Nothing　is　more　to　be　deprecated　than　making　it　the　private　interest　of　a　number　of　active　persons　to　urge　the　form　of　government　in　the　direction　of　its　natural　perversion。　The　indications　which　either　a　multitude　or　an　individual　can　give；　when　merely　left　to　their　own　weaknesses；　afford　but　a　faint　idea　of　what　those　weaknesses　would　become　when　played　upon　by　a　thousand　flatterers。　If　there　were　658　places　of　certain；　however　moderate；　emolument；　to　be　gained　by　persuading　the　multitude　that　ignorance　is　as　good　as　knowledge；　and　better；　it　is　terrible　odds　that　they　would　believe　and　act　upon　the　lesson。〃…　（Article　in　Fraser's　Magazine　for　April　1859；　headed　〃Recent　Writers　on　Reform。〃）　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　11　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　the　Duration　of　Parliaments。

　　AFTER　HOW　long　a　term　should　members　of　Parliament　be　subject　to　re…election？　The　principles　involved　are　here　very　obvious；　the　difficulty　lies　in　their　application。　On　the　one　hand；　the　member　ought　not　to　have　so　long　a　tenure　of　his　seat　as　to　make　him　forget　his　responsibility；　take　his　duties　easily；　conduct　them　with　a　view　to　his　own　personal　advantage；　or　neglect　those　free　and　public　conferences　with　his　constituents　which；　whether　he　agrees　or　differs　with　them；　are　one　of　the　benefits　of　representative　government。　On　the　other　hand；　he　should　have　such　a　term　of　office　to　look　forward　to　as　will　enable　him　to　be　judged；　not　by　a　single　act；　but　by　his　course　of　action。　It　is　important　that　he　should　have　the　greatest　latitude　of　individual　opinion　and　discretion　compatible　with　the　popular　control　essential　to　free　government；　and　for　this　purpose　it　is　necessary　that　the　control　should　be　exercised；　as　in　any　case　it　is　best　exercised；　after　sufficient　time　has　been　given　him　to　show　all　the　qualities　he　possesses；　and　to　prove　that　there　is　some　other　way　than　that　of　a　mere　obedient　voter　and　advocate　of　their　opinions；　by　which　he　can　render　himself　in　the　eyes　of　his　constituents　a　desirable　and　creditable　representative。　　　It　is　impossible　to　fix；　by　any　universal　rule；　the　boundary　between　these　principles。　Where　the　democratic　power　in　the　constitution　is　weak　or　over…passive；　and　requires　stimulation；　where　the　representative；　on　leaving　his　constituents；　enters　at　once　into　a　courtly　or　aristocratic　atmosphere；　whose　influences　all　tend　to　deflect　his　course　into　a　different　direction　from　the　popular　one；　to　tone　down　any　democratic　feelings　which　he　may　have　brought　with　him；　and　make　him　forget　the　wishes　and　grow　cool　to　the　interests　of　those　who　chose　him…　the　obligation　of　a　frequent　return　to　them　for　a　renewal　of　his　commission　is　indispensable　to　keeping　his　temper　and　character　up　to　the　right　mark。　Even　three　years；　in　such　circumstances；　are　almost　too　long　a　period；　and　any　longer　term　is　absolutely　inadmissible。　Where；　on　the　contrary；　democracy　is　the　ascendant　power；　and　still　tends　to　increase；　requiring　rather　to　be　moderated　in　its　exercise　than　encouraged　to　any　abnormal　activity；　where　unbounded　publicity；　and　an　ever…present　newspaper　press；　give　the　representative　assurance　that　his　every　act　will　be　immediately　known；　discussed；　and　judged　by　his　constituents；　and　that　he　is　always　either　gaining　or　losing　ground　in　the　estimation；　while　by　the　same　means　the　influence　of　their　sentiments；　and　all　other　democratic　influences；　are　kept　constantly　alive　and　active　in　his　own　mind…less　than　five　years　would　hardly　be　a　sufficient　period　to　prevent　timid　subserviency。　The　change　which　has　taken　place　in　English　politics　as　to　all　these　features　explains　why　annual　Parliaments；　which　forty　years　ago　stood　prominently　in　front　of　the　creed　of　the　more　advanced　reformers；　are　so　little　cared　for　and　so　seldom　heard　of　at　present。　It　deserves　consideration　that；　whether　the　term　is　short　or　long；　during　the　last　year　of　it　the　members　are　in　position　in　which　they　would　always　be　if　Parliaments　were　annual：　so　that　if　the　term　were　very　brief；　there　would　virtually　be　annual　Parliaments　during　a　great　proportion　of　all　time。　As　things　now　are；　the　period　of　seven　years；　though　of　unnecessary　length；　is　hardly　worth　altering　for　any　benefit　likely　to　be　produced；　especially　since　the　possibility；　always　impending；　of　an　earlier　dissolution　keeps　the　motives　for　standing　well　with　constituents　always　before　the　member's　eyes。　　　Whatever　may　be　the　term　most　eligible　for　the　duration　of　the　mandate；　it　might　seem　natural　that　the　individual　member　should　vacate　his　seat　at　the　expiration　of　that　term　from　the　day　of　his　election；　and　that　there　should　be　no　general　renewal　of　the　whole　House。　A　great　deal　might　be　said　for　this　system　if　there　were　any　practical　object　in　recommending　it。　But　it　is　condemned　by　much　stronger　reasons　than　can　be　alleged　in　its　support。　One　is；　that　there　would　be　no　means　of　promptly　getting　rid　of　a　majority　which　had　pursued　a　course　offensive　to　the　nation。　The　certainty　of　a　general　election　after　a　limited；　which　would　often　be　a　nearly　expired；　period；　and　the　possibility　of　it　at　any　time　when　the　minister　either　desires　it　for　his　own　sake；　or　thinks　that　it　would　make　him　popular　with　the　country；　tend　to　prevent　that　wide　divergence　between　the　feelings　of　the　assembly　and　those　of　the　constituency；　which　might　subsist　indefinitely　if　the　majority　of　the　House　had　always　se