representative government-第34章

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ose　of　the　constituency；　which　might　subsist　indefinitely　if　the　majority　of　the　House　had　always　several　years　of　their　term　still　to　run…　if　it　received　new　infusions　drop　by　drop；　which　would　be　more　likely　to　assume　than　to　modify　the　qualities　of　the　mass　they　were　joined　to。　It　is　as　essential　that　the　general　sense　of　the　House　should　accord　in　the　main　with　that　of　the　nation　as　is　that　distinguished　individuals　should　be　forfeiting　their　seats；　to　give　free　utterance　to　the　most　unpopular　sentiments。　There　is　another　reason；　of　much　weight；　against　the　gradual　and　partial　renewal　of　a　representative　assembly。　It　is　useful　that　there　should　be　a　periodical　general　muster　of　opposing　forces；　to　gauge　the　state　of　the　national　mind；　and　ascertain；　beyond　dispute；　the　relative　strength　of　different　parties　and　opinions。　This　is　not　done　conclusively　by　any　partial　renewal；　even　where；　as　in　some　of　the　French　constitutions；　a　large　fraction；　a　fifth　or　a　third；　go　out　at　once。　　　The　reasons　for　allowing　to　the　executive　the　power　of　dissolution　will　be　considered　in　a　subsequent　chapter；　relating　to　the　constitution　and　functions　of　the　Executive　in　a　representative　government。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　12　　　　　　　Ought　Pledges　to　be　Required　from　Members　of　Parliament？

　　SHOULD　A　member　of　the　legislature　be　bound　by　the　instructions　of　his　constituents？　Should　he　be　the　organ　of　their　sentiments；　or　of　his　own？　their　ambassador　to　a　congress；　or　their　professional　agent；　empowered　not　only　to　act　for　them；　but　to　judge　for　them　what　ought　to　be　done？　These　two　theories　of　the　duty　of　a　legislator　in　a　representative　government　have　each　its　supporters；　and　each　is　the　recognised　doctrine　of　some　representative　governments。　In　the　Dutch　United　Provinces；　the　members　of　the　States　General　were　mere　delegates；　and　to　such　a　length　was　the　doctrine　carried；　that　when　any　important　question　arose　which　had　not　been　provided　for　in　their　instructions；　they　had　to　refer　back　to　their　constituents；　exactly　as　an　ambassador　does　to　the　government　from　which　he　is　accredited。　In　this　and　most　other　countries　which　possess　representative　constitutions；　law　and　custom　warrant　a　member　of　Parliament　in　voting　according　to　his　opinion　of　right；　however　different　from　that　of　his　constituents：　but　there　is　a　floating　notion　of　the　opposite　kind；　which　has　considerable　practical　operation　on　many　minds；　even　of　members　of　Parliament；　and　often　makes　them；　independently　of　desire　for　popularity；　or　concern　for　their　re…election；　feel　bound　in　conscience　to　let　their　conduct；　on　questions　on　which　their　constituents　have　a　decided　opinion；　be　the　expression　of　that　opinion　rather　than　of　their　own。　Abstractedly　from　positive　law；　and　from　the　historical　traditions　of　any　particular　people；　which　of　these　notions　of　the　duty　of　a　representative　is　the　true　one？　　　Unlike　the　questions　which　we　have　hitherto　treated；　this　is　not　a　question　of　constitutional　legislation；　but　of　what　may　more　properly　be　called　constitutional　morality…　the　ethics　of　representative　government。　It　does　not　so　much　concern　institutions；　as　the　temper　of　mind　which　the　electors　ought　to　bring　to　the　discharge　of　their　functions；　the　ideas　which　should　prevail　as　to　the　moral　duties　of　an　elector。　For　let　the　system　of　representation　be　what　it　may；　it　will　be　converted　into　one　of　mere　delegation　if　the　electors　so　choose。　As　long　as　they　are　free　not　to　vote；　and　free　to　vote　as　they　like；　they　cannot　be　prevented　from　making　their　vote　depend　on　any　condition　they　think　fit　to　annex　to　it。　By　refusing　to　elect　any　one　who　will　not　pledge　himself　to　all　their　opinions；　and　even；　if　they　please；　to　consult　with　them　before　voting　on　any　important　subject　not　foreseen；　they　can　reduce　their　representative　to　their　mere　mouthpiece；　or　compel　him　in　honour；　when　no　longer　willing　to　act　in　that　capacity；　to　resign　his　seat。　And　since　they　have　the　power　of　doing　this；　the　theory　of　the　Constitution　ought　to　suppose　that　they　will　wish　to　do　it；　since　the　very　principle　of　constitutional　government　requires　it　to　be　assumed　that　political　power　will　be　abused　to　promote　the　particular　purposes　of　the　holder；　not　because　it　always　is　so；　but　because　such　is　the　natural　tendency　of　things；　to　guard　against　which　is　the　especial　use　of　free　institutions。　However　wrong；　therefore；　or　however　foolish；　we　may　think　it　in　the　electors　to　convert　their　representative　into　a　delegate；　that　stretch　of　the　electoral　privilege　being　a　natural　and　not　improbable　one；　the　same　precautions　ought　to　be　taken　as　if　it　were　certain。　We　may　hope　that　the　electors　will　not　act　on　this　notion　of　the　use　of　the　suffrage；　but　a　representative　government　needs　to　be　so　framed　that；　even　if　they　do；　they　shall　not　be　able　to　effect　what　ought　not　to　be　in　the　power　of　any　body　of　persons…　class　legislation　for　their　own　benefit。　　　When　it　is　said　that　the　question　is　only　one　of　political　morality；　this　does　not　extenuate　its　importance。　Questions　of　constitutional　morality　are　of　no　less　practical　moment　than　those　relating　to　the　constitution　itself。　The　very　existence　of　some　governments；　and　all　that　renders　others　endurable；　rests　on　the　practical　observance　of　doctrines　of　constitutional　morality；　traditional　notions　in　the　minds　of　the　several　constituted　authorities；　which　modify　the　use　that　might　otherwise　be　made　of　their　powers。　In　unbalanced　governments…　pure　monarchy；　pure　aristocracy；　pure　democracy…　such　maxims　are　the　only　barrier　which　restrains　the　government　from　the　utmost　excesses　in　the　direction　of　its　characteristic　tendency。　In　imperfectly　balanced　governments；　where　some　attempt　is　made　to　set　constitutional　limits　to　the　impulses　of　the　strongest　power；　but　where　that　power　is　strong　enough　to　overstep　them　with　at　least　temporary　impunity；　it　is　only　by　doctrines　of　constitutional　morality；　recognised　and　sustained　by　opinion；　that　any　regard　at　all　is　preserved　for　the　checks　and　limitations　of　the　constitution。　In　well…balanced　governments；　in　which　the　supreme　power　is　divided；　and　each　sharer　is　protected　against　the　usurpations　of　the　others　in　the　only　manner　possible…　namely；　by　being　armed　for　defence　with　weapons　as　strong　as　the　others　can　wield　for　attack…　the　government　can　only　be　carried　on　by　forbearance　on　all　sides　to　exercise　those　extreme　powers；　unless　provoked　by　conduct　equally　extreme　on　the　part　of　some　other　sharer　of　power：　and　in　this　case　we　may　truly　say　that　only　by　the　regard　paid　to　maxims　of　constitutional　morality　is　the　constitution　kept　in　existence。　The　question　of　pledges　is　not　one　of　those　which　vitally　concern　the　existence　of　representative　governments；　but　it　is　very　material　to　their　beneficial　operation。　The　laws　cannot　prescribe　to　the　electors　the　principles　by　which　they　shall　direct　their　choice；　but　it　makes　a　great　practical　difference　by　what　principles　they　think　they　ought　to　direct　it。　And　the　whole　of　that　great　question　is　involved　in　the　inquiry　whether　they　should　make　it　a　condition　that　the　representative　shall　adhere　to　certain　opinions　laid　down　for　him　by　his　constituents。　　　No　reader　of　this　treatise　can　doubt　what　conclusion；　as　to　this　matter；　results　from　the　general　principles　which　it　professes。　We　have　from　the　first　affirmed；　and　unveryingly　kept　in　view；　the　co…equal　importance　of　two　great　requisites　of　government：　responsibility　to　those　for　whose　benefit　political　power　ought　to　be；　and　always　professes　to　be；　employed；　and　jointly　therewith　to　obtain；　in　the　greatest　measure　possible；　for　the　function　of　government　the　benefits　of　superior　intellect；　trained　by　long　meditation　and　practical　discipline　to　that　special　task。　If　this　second　purpose　is　worth　attaining；　it　is　worth　the　necessary　price。　Superior　powers　of　mind　and　profound　study　are　of　no　use　if　they　do　not　sometimes　lead　a　person　to　different　conclusions　from　those　which　are　formed　by　ordinary　powers　of　mind　without　study：　and　if　it　be　an　object　to　possess　representatives　in　any　intellectual　respect　superior　to　average　electors；　it　must　be　counted　upon　that　the　representative　will　sometimes　differ　in　opinion　from　the　majority　of　his　constituents；　and　that　when　he　does；　his　opinion　will　be　the　oftenest　right　of　the　two。　It　follows　that　the　electors　will　not　do　wisely　if　they　insist　on　absolute　conformity　to　their　opinions　as　the　condition　of　his　retaining　his　seat。　　　The　principle　is；　thus　far；　obvious；　but　there　are　real　difficulties　in　its　application：　and　we　will　begin　by　stating　them　in　their　greatest　force。　If　it　is　important　that　the　electors　should　choose　a　representative　more　highly　instructed　than　themselves；　it　is　no　less　necessary　that　this　wiser　man　should　be　responsible　to　them；　in　other　words；　they　are　the　judges　of　the　manner　in　which　he　fulfils　his　trust：　and　how　are　they　to　judge；　except　by　the　standard　of　their　own　opinions？　How　are　they　even　to　select　him　in　the　first　instance　but　by　the　same　standard？　It　will　not　do　to　choose　by　mere　brilliancy…　by　superiority　of　showy　talent。　The　tests　by　which　an　ordinary　man　can　judge　beforehand　of　mere　ability　are　very　imperfect：　such　as　they　are；　they　have　almost　exclusive　reference　to　the　arts　of　expression；　and　little　or　none　to　the　worth　of　what　is　expressed。　The　latter　cannot　be　inferred　from　the　former；　and　if　the　electors　are　to　put　their　own　opinions　in　abeyance；　what　criterion　remains　to　them　of　the　ability　to　govern　well？　Neither；　if　they　could　ascertain；　even　infallibly；　the　ablest　man；　ought　they　to　allow　him　altogether　to　judge　for　them；　without　any　reference　to　their　own　opinions。　The　ablest　candidate　may　be　a　Tory　and　the　electors　Liberals；　or　a　Liberal　and　they　may　be　Tories。　The　political　questions　of　the　day　may　be　Church　questions；　and　he　may　be　a　High　Churchman　or　a　Rationalist；　while　they　may　be　Dissenters　or　Evangelicals；　and　vice　versa。　His　abilities；　in　these　cases；　might　only　enable　him　to　go　greater　lengths；　and　act　with　greater　effect；　in　what　they　may　conscientiously　believe　to　be　a　wrong　course；　and　they　may　be　bound；　by　their　sincere　convictions；　to　think　it　more　important　that　their　representative　should　be　kept；　on　these　points；　to　what　they　deem　the　dictate　of　duty；　than　that　they　should　be　represented　by　a　person　of　more　than　average　abilities。　They　may　also　have　to　consider；　not　solely　how　they　can　be　most　ably　represented；　but　how　their　particular　moral　position　and　mental　point　of　view　shall　be　represented　at　all。　　　The　influence　of　every　mode　of　thinking　which　is　shared　by　numbers　ought　to　be　felt　in　the　legislature：　and　the　constitution　being　supposed　to　have　made　due　provision　that　other　and　conflicting　modes　of　thinking　shall　be　represented　likewise；　to　secure　the　proper　representation　for　their　own　mode　may　be　the　most　important　matter　which　the　electors　on　the　particular　occasion　have　to　attend　to。　In　some　cases；　too；　it　may　be　necessary　that　the　representative　should　have　his　hands　tied；　to　keep　him　true　to　their　interest；　or　rather　to　the　public　interest　as　they　conceive　it。　This　would　not　be　needful　under　a　political　system　which　assured　them　an　indefinite　choice　of　honest　and　unprejudiced　candidates；　but　under　the　existing　system；　in