representative government-第37章

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he　mode　in　which；　to　the　best　of　my　judgment；　a　balance　of　forces　might　most　advantageously　be　established　there。　I　have　also　pointed　out；　that　even　if　the　numerical　majority　were　allowed　to　exercise　complete　predominance　by　means　of　a　corresponding　majority　in　Parliament；　yet　if　minorities　also　are　permitted　to　enjoy　the　equal　right　due　to　them　on　strictly　democratic　principles；　of　being　represented　proportionally　to　their　numbers；　this　provision　will　ensure　the　perpetual　presence　in　the　House　by　the　same　popular　title　as　its　other　members；　of　so　many　of　the　first　intellects　in　the　country；　that　without　being　in　any　way　banded　apart；　or　invested　with　any　invidious　prerogative；　this　portion　of　the　national　representation　will　have　a　personal　weight　much　more　than　in　proportion　to　its　numerical　strength；　and　will　afford；　in　a　most　effective　form；　the　moral　centre　of　resistance　which　is　needed。　A　Second　Chamber；　therefore；　is　not　required　for　this　purpose；　and　would　not　contribute　to　it；　but　might　even；　in　some　conceivable　modes　impede　its　attainment。　If；　however；　for　the　other　reasons　already　mentioned；　the　decision　were　taken　that　there　should　be　such　a　Chamber；　it　is　desirable　that　it　should　be　composed　of　elements　which；　without　being　open　to　the　imputation　of　class　interests　adverse　to　the　majority；　would　incline　it　to　oppose　itself　to　the　class　interests　of　the　majority；　and　qualify　it　to　raise　its　voice　with　authority　against　their　errors　and　weaknesses。　These　conditions　evidently　are　not　found　in　a　body　constituted　in　the　manner　of　our　House　of　Lords。　So　soon　as　conventional　rank　and　individual　riches　no　longer　overawe　the　democracy；　a　House　of　Lords　becomes　insignificant。　　　Of　all　principles　on　which　a　wisely　conservative　body；　destined　to　moderate　and　regulate　democratic　ascendancy；　could　possibly　be　constructed；　the　best　seems　to　be　that　exemplified　in　the　Roman　Senate；　itself　the　most　consistently　prudent　and　sagacious　body　that　ever　administered　public　affairs。　The　deficiencies　of　a　democratic　assembly；　which　represents　the　general　public；　are　the　deficiencies　of　the　public　itself；　want　of　special　training　and　knowledge。　The　appropriate　corrective　is　to　associate　with　it　a　body　of　which　special　training　and　knowledge　should　be　the　characteristics。　If　one　House　represents　popular　feeling；　the　other　should　represent　personal　merit；　tested　and　guaranteed　by　actual　public　service；　and　fortified　by　practical　experience。　If　one　is　the　People's　Chamber；　the　other　should　be　the　Chamber　of　Statesmen；　a　council　composed　of　all　living　public　men　who　have　passed　through　important　political　offices　or　employments。　Such　a　Chamber　would　be　fitted　for　much　more　than　to　be　a　merely　moderating　body。　It　would　not　be　exclusively　a　check；　but　also　an　impelling　force。　In　its　hands　the　power　of　holding　the　people　back　would　be　vested　in　those　most　competent；　and　who　would　generally　be　most　inclined；　to　lead　them　forward　in　any　right　course。　The　council　to　whom　the　task　would　be　entrusted　of　rectifying　the　people's　mistakes　would　not　represent　a　class　believed　to　be　opposed　to　their　interest；　but　would　consist　of　their　own　natural　leaders　in　the　path　of　progress。　No　mode　of　composition　could　approach　to　this　in　giving　weight　and　efficacy　to　their　function　of　moderators。　It　would　be　impossible　to　cry　down　a　body　always　foremost　in　promoting　improvements　as　a　mere　obstructive　body；　whatever　amount　of　mischief　it　might　obstruct。　　　Were　the　place　vacant　in　England　for　such　a　Senate　（I　need　scarcely　say　that　this　is　a　mere　hypothesis）；　it　might　be　composed　of　some　such　elements　as　the　following。　All　who　were　or　had　been　members　of　the　Legislative　Commission　described　in　a　former　chapter；　and　which　I　regard　as　an　indispensable　ingredient　in　a　well…constituted　popular　government。　All　who　were　or　had　been　Chief　justices；　or　heads　of　any　of　the　superior　courts　of　law　or　equity。　All　who　had　for　five　years　filled　the　office　of　puisne　judge。　All　who　had　held　for　two　years　any　Cabinet　office：　but　these　should　also　be　eligible　to　the　House　of　Commons；　and　if　elected　members　of　it；　their　peerage　or　senatorial　office　should　be　held　in　suspense。　The　condition　of　time　is　needed　to　prevent　persons　from　being　named　Cabinet　Ministers　merely　to　give　them　a　seat　in　the　Senate；　and　the　period　of　two　years　is　suggested；　that　the　same　term　which　qualifies　them　for　a　pension　might　entitle　them　to　a　senatorship。　All　who　had　filled　the　office　of　Commander…in…Chief；　and　all　who；　having　commanded　an　army　or　a　fleet；　had　been　thanked　by　Parliament　for　military　or　naval　successes。　All　who　had　held；　during　ten　years；　first…class　diplomatic　appointments。　All　who　had　been　Governors…General　of　India　or　British　America；　and　all　who　had　held　for　ten　years　any　Colonial　Governorships。　The　permanent　civil　service　should　also　be　represented；　all　should　be　senators　who　had　filled；　during　ten　years；　the　important　offices　of　Under…Secretary　to　the　Treasury；　permanent　Under…Secretary　of　State；　or　any　others　equally　high　and　responsible。　If；　along　with　the　persons　thus　qualified　by　practical　experience　in　the　administration　of　public　affairs；　any　representation　of　the　speculative　class　were　to　be　included…　a　thing　in　itself　desirable…　it　would　be　worth　consideration　whether　certain　professorships；　in　certain　national　institutions；　after　a　tenure　of　a　few　years；　might　confer　a　seat　in　the　Senate。　Mere　scientific　and　literary　eminence　are　too　indefinite　and　disputable：　they　imply　a　power　of　selection；　whereas　the　other　qualifications　speak　for　themselves；　if　the　writings　by　which　reputation　has　been　gained　are　unconnected　with　politics；　they　are　no　evidence　of　the　special　qualities　required；　while　if　political；　they　would　enable　successive　Ministries　to　deluge　the　House　with　party　tools。　　　The　historical　antecedents　of　England　render　it　all　but　certain　that；　unless　in　the　improbable　case　of　a　violent　subversion　of　the　existing　Constitution；　any　Second　Chamber　which　could　possibly　exist　would　have　to　be　built　on　the　foundation　of　the　House　of　Lords。　It　is　out　of　the　question　to　think　practically　of　abolishing　that　assembly；　to　replace　it　by　such　a　Senate　as　I　have　sketched；　or　by　any　other；　but　there　might　not　be　the　same　insuperable　difficulty　in　aggregating　the　classes　or　categories　just　spoken　of　to　the　existing　body；　in　the　character　of　Peers　for　life。　An　ulterior；　and　perhaps；　on　this　supposition；　a　necessary　step；　might　be；　that　the　hereditary　Peerage　should　be　present　in　the　House　by　their　representatives　instead　of　personally：　a　practice　already　established　in　the　case　of　the　Scotch　and　Irish　Peers；　and　which　the　mere　multiplication　of　the　order　will　probably　at　some　time　or　other　render　inevitable。　An　easy　adaptation　of　Mr。　Hare's　plan　would　prevent　the　representative　Peers　from　representing　exclusively　the　party　which　has　the　majority　in　the　Peerage。　If；　for　example；　one　representative　were　allowed　for　every　ten　Peers；　any　ten　might　be　admitted　to　choose　a　representative；　and　the　Peers　might　be　free　to　group　themselves　for　that　purpose　as　they　pleased。　The　election　might　be　thus　conducted：　All　Peers　who　were　candidates　for　the　representation　of　their　order　should　be　required　to　declare　themselves　such；　and　enter　their　names　in　a　list。　A　day　and　place　should　be　appointed　at　which　Peers　desirous　of　voting　should　be　present；　either　in　person；　or；　in　the　usual　parliamentary　manner；　by　their　proxies。　The　votes　should　be　taken；　each　Peer　voting　for　only　one。　Every　candidate　who　had　as　many　as　ten　votes　should　be　declared　elected。　If　any　one　had　more；　all　but　ten　should　be　allowed　to　withdraw　their　votes；　or　ten　of　the　number　should　be　selected　by　lot。　These　ten　would　form　his　constituency；　and　the　remainder　of　his　voters　would　be　set　free　to　give　their　votes　over　again　for　some　one　else。　This　process　should　be　repeated　until　（so　far　as　possible）　every　Peer　present　either　personally　or　by　proxy　was　represented。　When　a　number　less　than　ten　remained　over；　if　amounting　to　five　they　might　still　be　allowed　to　agree　on　a　representative；　if　fewer　than　five；　their　votes　must　be　lost；　or　they　might　be　permitted　to　record　them　in　favour　of　somebody　already　elected。　With　this　inconsiderable　exception；　every　representative　Peer　would　represent　ten　members　of　the　Peerage；　all　of　whom　had　not　only　voted　for　him；　but　selected　him　as　the　one；　among　all　open　to　their　choice；　by　whom　they　were　most　desirous　to　be　represented。　As　a　compensation　to　the　Peers　who　were　not　chosen　representatives　of　their　order；　they　should　be　eligible　to　the　House　of　Commons；　a　justice　now　refused　to　Scotch　Peers；　and　to　Irish　Peers　in　their　own　part　of　the　kingdom；　while　the　representation　in　the　House　of　Lords　of　any　but　the　most　numerous　party　in　the　Peerage　is　denied　equally　to　both。　　　The　mode　of　composing　a　Senate；　which　has　been　here　advocated；　not　only　seems　the　best　in　itself；　but　is　that　for　which　historical　precedent；　and　actual　brilliant　success；　can　to　the　greatest　extent　be　pleaded。　It　is　not；　however；　the　only　feasible　plan　that　might　be　proposed。　Another　possible　mode　of　forming　a　Second　Chamber　would　be　to　have　it　elected　by　the　First；　subject　to　the　restriction　that　they　should　not　nominate　any　of　their　own　members。　Such　an　assembly；　emanating　like　the　American　Senate　from　popular　choice；　only　once　removed；　would　not　be　considered　to　clash　with　democratic　institutions；　and　would　probably　acquire　considerable　popular　influence。　From　the　mode　of　its　nomination　it　would　be　peculiarly　unlikely　to　excite　the　jealousy　of；　to　come　into　hostile　collision　with；　the　popular　House。　It　would；　moreover　（due　provision　being　made　for　the　representation　of　the　minority）；　be　almost　sure　to　be　well　composed；　and　to　comprise　many　of　that　class　of　highly　capable　men；　who；　either　from　accident　or　for　want　of　showy　qualities；　had　been　unwilling　to　seek；　or　unable　to　obtain；　the　suffrages　of　a　popular　constituency。　　　The　best　constitution　of　a　Second　Chamber　is　that　which　embodies　the　greatest　number　of　elements　exempt　from　the　class　interests　and　prejudices　of　the　majority；　but　having　in　themselves　nothing　offensive　to　democratic　feeling。　I　repeat；　however；　that　the　main　reliance　for　tempering　the　ascendancy　of　the　majority　can　be　placed　in　a　Second　Chamber　of　any　kind。　The　character　of　a　representative　government　is　fixed　by　the　constitution　of　the　popular　House。　Compared　with　this；　all　other　questions　relating　to　the　form　of　government　are　insignificant。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　14　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　the　Executive　in　a　Representative　Government。

　　IT　WOULD　be　out　of　place；　in　this　treatise；　to　discuss　the　question　into　what　departments　or　branches　the　executive　business　of　government　may　most　conveniently　be　divided。　In　this　respect　the　exigencies　of　different　governments　are　different；　and　there　is　little　probability　that　any　great　mistake　will　be　made　in　the　classification　of　the　duties　when　men　are　willing　to　begin　at　the　beginning；　and　do　not　hold　themselves　bound　by　the　series　of　accidents　which；　in　an　old　government　like　ours；　has　produced　the　existing　division　of　the　public　business。　It　may　be　sufficient　to　say　that　the　classification　of　functionaries　should　correspond　to　that　of　subjects；　and　that　there　should　not　be　several　depa