representative government-第42章

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ve　bodies　does　not　present　much　difficulty。　The　principles　which　apply　to　it　do　not　differ　in　any　respect　from　those　applicable　to　the　national　representation。　The　same　obligation　exists；　as　in　the　case　of　the　more　important　function；　for　making　the　bodies　elective；　and　the　same　reasons　operate　as　in　that　case；　but　with　still　greater　force；　for　giving　them　a　widely　democratic　basis：　the　dangers　being　less；　and　the　advantages；　in　point　of　popular　education　and　cultivation；　in　some　respects　even　greater。　As　the　principal　duty　of　the　local　bodies　consists　of　the　imposition　and　expenditure　of　local　taxation；　the　electoral　franchise　should　vest　in　all　who　contribute　to　the　local　rates；　to　the　exclusion　of　all　who　do　not。　I　assume　that　there　is　no　indirect　taxation；　no　octroi　duties；　or　that　if　there　are；　they　are　supplementary　only；　those　on　whom　their　burden　falls　being　also　rated　to　a　direct　assessment。　The　representation　of　minorities　should　be　provided　for　in　the　same　manner　as　in　the　national　Parliament；　and　there　are　the　same　strong　reasons　for　plurality　of　votes。　Only；　there　is　not　so　decisive　an　objection；　in　the　inferior　as　in　the　higher　body；　to　making　the　plural　voting　depend　（as　in　some　of　the　local　elections　of　our　own　country）　on　a　mere　money　qualification：　for　the　honest　and　frugal　dispensation　of　money　forms　so　much　larger　a　part　of　the　business　of　the　local　than　of　the　national　body；　that　there　is　more　justice　as　well　as　policy　in　allowing　a　greater　proportional　influence　to　those　who　have　a　larger　money　interest　at　stake。　　　In　the　most　recently　established　of　our　local　representative　institutions；　the　Boards　of　Guardians；　the　justices　of　peace　of　the　district　sit　ex　officio　along　with　the　elected　members；　in　number　limited　by　law　to　a　third　of　the　whole。　In　the　peculiar　constitution　of　English　society　I　have　no　doubt　of　the　beneficial　effect　of　this　provision。　It　secures　the　presence；　in　these　bodies；　of　a　more　educated　class　than　it　would　perhaps　be　practicable　to　attract　thither　on　any　other　terms；　and　while　the　limitation　in　number　of　the　ex　officio　members　precludes　them　from　acquiring　predominance　by　mere　numerical　strength；　they；　as　a　virtual　representation　of　another　class；　having　sometimes　a　different　interest　from　the　rest；　are　a　check　upon　the　class　interests　of　the　farmers　or　petty　shopkeepers　who　form　the　bulk　of　the　elected　Guardians。　A　similar　commendation　cannot　be　given　to　the　constitution　of　the　only　provincial　boards　we　possess；　the　Quarter　Sessions；　consisting　of　the　justices　of　peace　alone；　on　whom；　over　and　above　their　judicial　duties；　some　of　the　most　important　parts　of　the　administrative　business　of　the　country　depend　for　their　performance。　The　mode　of　formation　of　these　bodies　is　most　anomalous；　they　being　neither　elected；　nor；　in　any　proper　sense　of　the　term；　nominated；　but　holding　their　important　functions；　like　the　feudal　lords　to　whom　they　succeeded；　virtually　by　right　of　their　acres：　the　appointment　vested　in　the　Crown　（or；　speaking　practically；　in　one　of　themselves；　the　Lord　Lieutenant）　being　made　use　of　only　as　a　means　of　excluding　any　one　who　it　is　thought　would　do　discredit　to　the　body；　or；　now　and　then；　one　who　is　on　the　wrong　side　in　politics。　The　institution　is　the　most　aristocratic　in　principle　which　now　remains　in　England；　far　more　so　than　the　House　of　Lords；　for　it　grants　public　money　and　disposes　of　important　public　interests；　not　in　conjunction　with　a　popular　assembly；　but　alone。　It　is　clung　to　with　proportionate　tenacity　by　our　aristocratic　classes；　but　is　obviously　at　variance　with　all　the　principles　which　are　the　foundation　of　representative　government。　In　a　County　Board　there　is　not　the　same　justification　as　in　Boards　of　Guardians；　for　even　an　admixture　of　ex　officio　with　elected　members：　since　the　business　of　a　county　being　on　a　sufficiently　large　scale　to　be　an　object　of　interest　and　attraction　to　country　gentlemen；　they　would　have　no　more　difficulty　in　getting　themselves　elected　to　the　Board　than　they　have　in　being　returned　to　Parliament　as　county　members。　In　regard　to　the　proper　circumscription　of　the　constituencies　which　elect　the　local　representative　bodies；　the　principle　which；　when　applied　as　an　exclusive　and　unbending　rule　to　parliamentary　representation；　is　inappropriate；　namely　community　of　local　interests；　is　here　the　only　just　and　applicable　one。　The　very　object　of　having　a　local　representation　is　in　order　that　those　who　have　any　interest　in　common；　which　they　do　not　share　with　the　general　body　of　their　countrymen；　may　manage　that　joint　interest　by　themselves：　and　the　purpose　is　contradicted　if　the　distribution　of　the　local　representation　follows　any　other　rule　than　the　grouping　of　those　joint　interests。　There　are　local　interests　peculiar　to　every　town；　whether　great　or　small；　and　common　to　all　its　inhabitants：　every　town；　therefore；　without　distinction　of　size；　ought　to　have　its　municipal　council。　It　is　equally　obvious　that　every　town　ought　to　have　but　one。　The　different　quarters　of　the　same　town　have　seldom　or　never　any　material　diversities　of　local　interest；　they　all　require　to　have　the　same　things　done；　the　same　expenses　incurred；　and；　except　as　to　their　churches；　which　it　is　probably　desirable　to　leave　under　simply　parochial　management；　the　same　arrangements　may　be　made　to　serve　for　all。　Paving；　lighting；　water　supply；　drainage；　port　and　market　regulations；　cannot　without　great　waste　and　inconvenience　be　different　for　different　quarters　of　the　same　town。　The　subdivision　of　London　into　six　or　seven　independent　districts；　each　with　its　separate　arrangements　for　local　business　（several　of　them　without　unity　of　administration　even　within　themselves）；　prevents　the　possibility　of　consecutive　or　well　regulated　cooperation　for　common　objects；　precludes　any　uniform　principle　for　the　discharge　of　local　duties；　compels　the　general　government　to　take　things　upon　itself　which　would　be　best　left　to　local　authorities　if　there　were　any　whose　authority　extended　to　the　entire　metropolis；　and　answers　no　purpose　but　to　keep　up　the　fantastical　trappings　of　that　union　of　modern　jobbing　and　antiquated　foppery；　the　Corporation　of　the　City　of　London。　　　Another　equally　important　principle　is；　that　in　each　local　circumscription　there　should　be　but　one　elected　body　for　all　local　business；　not　different　bodies　for　different　parts　of　it。　Division　of　labour　does　not　mean　cutting　up　every　business　into　minute　fractions；　it　means　the　union　of　such　operations　as　are　fit　to　be　performed　by　the　same　persons；　and　the　separation　of　such　as　can　be　better　performed　by　different　persons。　The　executive　duties　of　the　locality　do　indeed　require　to　be　divided　into　departments；　for　the　same　reason　as　those　of　the　State；　because　they　are　of　diverse　kinds；　each　requiring　knowledge　peculiar　to　itself；　and　needing；　for　its　due　performance；　the　undivided　attention　of　a　specially　qualified　functionary。　But　the　reasons　for　subdivision　which　apply　to　the　execution　do　not　apply　to　the　control。　The　business　of　the　elective　body　is　not　to　do　the　work；　but　to　see　that　it　is　properly　done；　and　that　nothing　necessary　is　left　undone。　This　function　can　be　fulfilled　for　all　departments　by　the　same　superintending　body；　and　by　a　collective　and　comprehensive　far　better　than　by　a　minute　and　microscopic　view。　It　is　as　absurd　in　public　affairs　as　it　would　be　in　private　that　every　workman　should　be　looked　after　by　a　superintendent　to　himself。　The　Government　of　the　Crown　consists　of　many　departments；　and　there　are　many　ministers　to　conduct　them；　but　those　ministers　have　not　a　Parliament　apiece　to　keep　them　to　their　duty。　The　local；　like　the　national　Parliament；　has　for　its　proper　business　to　consider　the　interest　of　the　locality　as　a　whole；　composed　of　parts　all　of　which　must　be　adapted　to　one　another；　and　attended　to　in　the　order　and　ratio　of　their　importance。　　　There　is　another　very　weighty　reason　for　uniting　the　control　of　all　the　business　of　a　locality　under　one　body。　The　greatest　imperfection　of　popular　local　institutions；　and　the　chief　cause　of　the　failure　which　so　often　attends　them；　is　the　low　calibre　of　the　men　by　whom　they　are　almost　always　carried　on。　That　these　should　be　of　a　very　miscellaneous　character　is；　indeed；　part　of　the　usefulness　of　the　institution；　it　is　that　circumstance　chiefly　which　renders　it　a　school　of　political　capacity　and　general　intelligence。　But　a　school　supposes　teachers　as　well　as　scholars；　the　utility　of　the　instruction　greatly　depends　on　its　bringing　inferior　minds　into　contact　with　superior；　a　contact　which　in　the　ordinary　course　of　life　is　altogether　exceptional；　and　the　want　of　which　contributes　more　than　anything　else　to　keep　the　generality　of　mankind　on　one　level　of　contented　ignorance。　The　school；　moreover；　is　worthless；　and　a　school　of　evil　instead　of　good；　if　through　the　want　of　due　surveillance；　and　of　the　presence　within　itself　of　a　higher　order　of　characters；　the　action　of　the　body　is　allowed；　as　it　so　often　is；　to　degenerate　into　an　equally　unscrupulous　and　stupid　pursuit　of　the　self…interest　of　its　members。　Now　it　is　quite　hopeless　to　induce　persons　of　a　high　class；　either　socially　or　intellectually；　to　take　a　share　of　local　administration　in　a　corner　by　piece…meal；　as　members　of　a　Paving　Board　or　a　Drainage　Commission。　The　entire　local　business　of　their　town　is　not　more　than　a　sufficient　object　to　induce　men　whose　tastes　incline　them　and　whose　knowledge　qualifies　them　for　national　affairs　to　become　members　of　a　mere　local　body；　and　devote　to　it　the　time　and　study　which　are　necessary　to　render　their　presence　anything　more　than　a　screen　for　the　jobbing　of　inferior　persons　under　the　shelter　of　their　responsibility。　A　mere　Board　of　Works；　though　it　comprehend　the　entire　metropolis；　is　sure　to　be　composed　of　the　same　class　of　persons　as　the　vestries　of　the　London　parishes；　nor　is　it　practicable；　or　even　desirable；　that　such　should　not　form　the　majority；　but　it　is　important　for　every　purpose　which　local　bodies　are　designed　to　serve；　whether　it　be　the　enlightened　and　honest　performance　of　their　special　duties；　or　the　cultivation　of　the　political　intelligence　of　the　nation；　that　every　such　body　should　contain　a　portion　of　the　very　best　minds　of　the　locality：　who　are　thus　brought　into　perpetual　contact；　of　the　most　useful　kind；　with　minds　of　a　lower　grade；　receiving　from　them　what　local　or　professional　knowledge　they　have　to　give；　and　in　return　inspiring　them　with　a　portion　of　their　own　more　enlarged　ideas；　and　higher　and　more　enlightened　purposes。　　　A　mere　village　has　no　claim　to　a　municipal　representation。　By　a　village　I　mean　a　place　whose　inhabitants　are　not　markedly　distinguished　by　occupation　or　social　relations　from　those　of　the　rural　districts　adjoining；　and　for　whose　local　wants　the　arrangements　made　for　the　surrounding　territory　will　suffice。　Such　small　places　have　rarely　a　sufficient　public　to　furnish　a　tolerable　municipal　council：　if　they　contain　any　talent　or　knowledge　applicable　to　public　business；　it　is　apt　to　be　all　concentrated　in　some　one　man；　who　thereby　becomes　the　dominator　of　the　place。　It　is　better　that　such　places　should　be　merged　in　a　larger　circumscription。　The　local　representation　of　rural　districts　will　naturally　be　determined　by　geographical　considerations；　with　due　regard