representative government-第43章

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tion　of　rural　districts　will　naturally　be　determined　by　geographical　considerations；　with　due　regard　to　those　sympathies　of　feeling　by　which　human　beings　are　so　much　aided　to　act　in　concert；　and　which　partly　follow　historical　boundaries；　such　as　those　of　counties　or　provinces；　and　partly　community　of　interest　and　occupation；　as　in　agriculture；　maritime；　manufacturing；　or　mining　districts。　Different　kinds　of　local　business　require　different　areas　of　representation。　The　Unions　of　parishes　have　been　fixed　on　as　the　most　appropriate　basis　for　the　representative　bodies　which　superintend　the　relief　of　indigence；　while；　for　the　proper　regulation　of　highways；　or　prisons；　or　police；　a　large　extent；　like　that　of　an　average　county；　is　not　more　than　sufficient。　In　these　large　districts；　therefore；　the　maxim；　that　an　elective　body　constituted　in　any　locality　should　have　authority　over　all　the　local　concerns　common　to　the　locality；　requires　modification　from　another　principle…　as　well　as　from　the　competing　consideration　of　the　importance　of　obtaining　for　the　discharge　of　the　local　duties　the　highest　qualifications　possible。　For　example；　if　it　be　necessary　（as　I　believe　it　to　be）　for　the　proper　administration　of　the　Poor　Laws　that　the　area　of　rating　should　not　be　more　extensive　than　most　of　the　present　Unions；　a　principle　which　requires　a　Board　of　Guardians　for　each　Union…　yet；　as　a　much　more　highly　qualified　class　of　persons　is　likely　to　be　obtainable　for　a　County　Board　than　those　who　compose　an　average　Board　of　Guardians；　it　may　on　that　ground　be　expedient　to　reserve　for　the　County　Boards　some　higher　descriptions　of　local　business；　which　might　otherwise　have　been　conveniently　managed　within　itself　by　each　separate　Union。　　　Besides　the　controlling　council；　or　local　sub…Parliament；　local　business　has　its　executive　department。　With　respect　to　this；　the　same　questions　arise　as　with　respect　to　the　executive　authorities　in　the　State；　and　they　may；　for　the　most　part；　be　answered　in　the　same　manner。　The　principles　applicable　to　all　public　trusts　are　in　substance　the　same。　In　the　first　place；　each　executive　officer　should　be　single；　and　singly　responsible　for　the　whole　of　the　duty　committed　to　his　charge。　In　the　next　place；　he　should　be　nominated；　not　elected。　It　is　ridiculous　that　a　surveyor；　or　a　health　officer；　or　even　a　collector　of　rates；　should　be　appointed　by　popular　suffrage。　The　popular　choice　usually　depends　on　interest　with　a　few　local　leaders；　who；　as　they　are　not　supposed　to　make　the　appointment；　are　not　responsible　for　it；　or　on　an　appeal　to　sympathy；　founded　on　having　twelve　children；　and　having　been　a　rate…payer　in　the　parish　for　thirty　years。　If　in　cases　of　this　description　election　by　the　population　is　a　farce；　appointment　by　the　local　representative　body　is　little　less　objectionable。　Such　bodies　have　a　perpetual　tendency　to　become　joint…stock　associations　for　carrying　into　effect　the　private　jobs　of　their　various　members。　Appointments　should　be　made　on　the　individual　responsibility　of　the　Chairman　of　the　body；　let　him　be　called　Mayor；　Chairman　of　Quarter　Sessions；　or　by　whatever　other　title。　He　occupies　in　the　locality　a　position　analogous　to　that　of　the　prime　minister　in　the　State；　and　under　a　well　organised　system　the　appointment　and　watching　of　the　local　officers　would　be　the　most　important　part　of　his　duty：　he　himself　being　appointed　by　the　Council　from　its　own　number；　subject　either　to　annual　re…election；　or　to　removal　by　a　vote　of　the　body。　　　From　the　constitution　of　the　local　bodies　I　now　pass　to　the　equally　important　and　more　difficult　subject　of　their　proper　attributions。　This　question　divides　itself　into　two　parts：　what　should　be　their　duties；　and　whether　they　should　have　full　authority　within　the　sphere　of　those　duties；　or　should　be　liable　to　any；　and　what；　interference　on　the　part　of　the　central　government。　　　It　is　obvious；　to　begin　with；　that　all　business　purely　local…　all　which　concerns　only　a　single　locality…　should　devolve　upon　the　local　authorities。　The　paving；　lighting；　and　cleansing　of　the　streets　of　a　town；　and　in　ordinary　circumstances　the　draining　of　its　houses；　are　of　little　consequence　to　any　but　its　inhabitants。　The　nation　at　large　is　interested　in　them　in　no　other　way　than　that　in　which　it　is　interested　in　the　private　well…being　of　all　its　individual　citizens。　But　among　the　duties　classed　as　local；　or　performed　by　local　functionaries；　there　are　many　which　might　with　equal　propriety　be　termed　national；　being　the　share；　belonging　to　the　locality；　of　some　branch　of　the　public　administration　in　the　efficiency　of　which　the　whole　nation　is　alike　interested：　the　gaols；　for　instance；　most　of　which　in　this　country　are　under　county　management；　the　local　police；　the　local　administration　of　justice；　much　of　which；　especially　in　corporate　towns；　is　performed　by　officers　elected　by　the　locality；　and　paid　from　local　funds。　None　of　these　can　be　said　to　be　matters　of　local；　as　distinguished　from　national；　importance。　It　would　not　be　a　matter　personally　indifferent　to　the　rest　of　the　country　if　any　part　of　it　became　a　nest　of　robbers　or　a　focus　of　demoralisation；　owing　to　the　maladministration　of　its　police；　or　if；　through　the　bad　regulations　of　its　gaol；　the　punishment　which　the　courts　of　justice　intended　to　inflict　on　the　criminals　confined　therein　（who　might　have　come　from；　or　committed　their　offences　in；　any　other　district）　might　be　doubled　in　intensity；　or　lowered　to　practical　impunity。　The　points；　moreover；　which　constitute　good　management　of　these　things　are　the　same　everywhere；　there　is　no　good　reason　why　police；　or　gaols；　or　the　administration　of　justice；　should　be　differently　managed　in　one　part　of　the　kingdom　and　in　another；　while　there　is　great　peril　that　in　things　so　important；　and　to　which　the　most　instructed　minds　available　to　the　State　are　not　more　than　adequate；　the　lower　average　of　capacities　which　alone　can　be　counted　on　for　the　service　of　the　localities　might　commit　errors　of　such　magnitude　as　to　be　a　serious　blot　upon　the　general　administration　of　the　country。　　　Security　of　person　and　property；　and　equal　justice　between　individuals；　are　the　first　needs　of　society；　and　the　primary　ends　of　government：　if　these　things　can　be　left　to　any　responsibility　below　the　highest；　there　is　nothing；　except　war　and　treaties；　which　requires　a　general　government　at　all。　Whatever　are　the　best　arrangements　for　securing　these　primary　objects　should　be　made　universally　obligatory；　and；　to　secure　their　enforcement；　should　be　placed　under　central　superintendence。　It　is　often　useful；　and　with　the　institutions　of　our　own　country　even　necessary；　from　the　scarcity；　in　the　localities；　of　officers　representing　the　general　government；　that　the　execution　of　duties　imposed　by　the　central　authority　should　be　entrusted　to　functionaries　appointed　for　local　purposes　by　the　locality。　But　experience　is　daily　forcing　upon　the　public　a　conviction　of　the　necessity　of　having　at　least　inspectors　appointed　by　the　general　government　to　see　that　the　local　officers　do　their　duty。　If　prisons　are　under　local　management；　the　central　government　appoints　inspectors　of　prisons　to　take　care　that　the　rules　laid　down　by　Parliament　are　observed；　and　to　suggest　others　if　the　state　of　the　gaols　shows　them　to　be　requisite：　as　there　are　inspectors　of　factories；　and　inspectors　of　schools；　to　watch　over　the　observance　of　the　Acts　of　Parliament　relating　to　the　first；　and　the　fulfilment　of　the　conditions　on　which　State　assistance　is　granted　to　the　latter。　　　But；　if　the　administration　of　justice；　police　and　gaols　included；　is　both　so　universal　a　concern；　and　so　much　a　matter　of　general　science　independent　of　local　peculiarities；　that　it　may　be；　and　ought　to　be；　uniformly　regulated　throughout　the　country；　and　its　regulation　enforced　by　more　trained　and　skilful　hands　than　those　of　purely　local　authorities…　there　is　also　business；　such　as　the　administration　of　the　poor　laws；　sanitary　regulation；　and　others；　which；　while　really　interesting　to　the　whole　country；　cannot　consistently　with　the　very　purposes　of　local　administration；　be；　managed　otherwise　than　by　the　localities。　In　regard　to　such　duties　the　question　arises；　how　far　the　local　authorities　ought　to　be　trusted　with　discretionary　power；　free　from　any　superintendence　or　control　of　the　State。　　　To　decide　this　question　it　is　essential　to　consider　what　is　the　comparative　position　of　the　central　and　the　local　authorities　as　capacity　for　the　work；　and　security　against　negligence　or　abuse。　In　the　first　place；　the　local　representative　bodies　and　their　officers　are　almost　certain　to　be　of　a　much　lower　grade　of　intelligence　and　knowledge　than　Parliament　and　the　national　executive。　Secondly；　besides　being　themselves　of　inferior　qualifications；　they　are　watched　by；　and　accountable　to；　an　inferior　public　opinion。　The　public　under　whose　eyes　they　act；　and　by　whom　they　are　criticised；　is　both　more　limited　in　extent；　and　generally　far　less　enlightened；　than　that　which　surrounds　and　admonishes　the　highest　authorities　at　the　capital；　while　the　comparative　smallness　of　the　interests　involved　causes　even　that　inferior　public　to　direct　its　thoughts　to　the　subject　less　intently；　and　with　less　solicitude。　Far　less　interference　is　exercised　by　the　press　and　by　public　discussion；　and　that　which　is　exercised　may　with　much　more　impunity　be　disregarded　in　the　proceedings　of　local　than　in　those　of　national　authorities。　　　Thus　far　the　advantage　seems　wholly　on　the　side　of　management　by　the　central　government。　But；　when　we　look　more　closely；　these　motives　of　preference　are　found　to　be　balanced　by　others　fully　as　substantial。　If　the　local　authorities　and　public　are　inferior　to　the　central　ones　in　knowledge　of　the　principles　of　administration；　they　have　the　compensating　advantage　of　a　far　more　direct　interest　in　the　result。　A　man's　neighbours　or　his　landlord　may　be　much　cleverer　than　himself；　and　not　without　an　indirect　interest　in　his　prosperity；　but　for　all　that　his　interests　will　be　better　attended　to　in　his　own　keeping　than　in　theirs。　It　is　further　to　be　remembered；　that　even　supposing　the　central　government　to　administer　through　its　own　officers；　its　officers　do　not　act　at　the　centre；　but　in　the　locality：　and　however　inferior　the　local　public　may　be　to　the　central；　it　is　the　local　public　alone　which　has　any　opportunity　of　watching　them；　and　it　is　the　local　opinion　alone　which　either　acts　directly　upon　their　own　conduct；　or　calls　the　attention　of　the　government　to　the　points　in　which　they　may　require　correction。　It　is　but　in　extreme　cases　that　the　general　opinion　of　the　country　is　brought　to　bear　at　all　upon　details　of　local　administration；　and　still　more　rarely　has　it　the　means　of　deciding　upon　them　with　any　just　appreciation　of　the　case。　Now；　the　local　opinion　necessarily　acts　far　more　forcibly　upon　purely　local　administrators。　They；　in　the　natural　course　of　things；　are　permanent　residents；　not　expecting　to　be　withdrawn　from　the　place　when　they　cease　to　exercise　authority　in　it；　and　their　authority　itself　depends；　by　supposition；　on　the　will　of　the　local　public。　I　need　not　dwell　on　the　deficiencies　of　the　central　authority　in　detailed　knowledge　of　local　persons　and　things；　and　the　too　great　engrossment　of　its　time　and　thoughts　by　other　concerns；　to　admit　of　its