representative government-第47章

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e　as　to　enable　the　foreign　policy　of　both　to　be　shaped　according　to　a　single　will。　　　Under　the　more　perfect　mode　of　federation；　where　every　citizen　of　each　particular　State　owes　obedience　to　two　Governments；　that　of　his　own　state　and　that　of　the　federation；　it　is　evidently　necessary　not　only　that　the　constitutional　limits　of　the　authority　of　each　should　be　precisely　and　clearly　defined；　but　that　the　power　to　decide　between　them　in　any　case　of　dispute　should　not　reside　in　either　of　the　Governments；　or　in　any　functionary　subject　to　it；　but　in　an　umpire　independent　of　both。　There　must　be　a　Supreme　Court　of　justice；　and　a　system　of　subordinate　Courts　in　every　State　of　the　Union；　before　whom　such　questions　shall　be　carried；　and　whose　judgment　on　them；　in　the　last　stage　of　appeal；　shall　be　final。　Every　State　of　the　Union；　and　the　Federal　Government　itself；　as　well　as　every　functionary　of　each；　must　be　liable　to　be　sued　in　those　Courts　for　exceeding　their　powers；　or　for　non…performance　of　their　federal　duties；　and　must　in　general　be　obliged　to　employ　those　Courts　as　the　instrument　for　enforcing　their　federal　rights。　This　involves　the　remarkable　consequence；　actually　realised　in　the　United　States；　that　a　Court　of　justice；　the　highest　federal　tribunal；　is　supreme　over　the　various　Governments；　both　State　and　Federal；　having　the　right　to　declare　that　any　law　made；　or　act　done　by　them；　exceeds　the　powers　assigned　to　them　by　the　Federal　Constitution；　and；　in　consequence；　has　no　legal　validity。　It　was　natural　to　feel　strong　doubts；　before　trial　had　been　made；　how　such　a　provision　would　work；　whether　the　tribunal　would　have　the　courage　to　exercise　its　constitutional　power；　if　it　did；　whether　it　would　exercise　it　wisely　and　whether　the　Governments　would　consent　to　submit　peaceably　to　its　decision。　The　discussions　on　the　American　Constitution；　before　its　final　adoption；　give　evidence　that　these　natural　apprehensions　were　strongly　felt；　but　they　are　now　entirely　quieted；　since；　during　the　two　generations　and　more　which　have　subsequently　elapsed；　nothing　has　occurred　to　verify　them；　though　there　have　at　times　been　disputes　of　considerable　acrimony；　and　which　became　the　badges　of　parties；　respecting　the　limits　of　the　authority　of　the　Federal　and　State　Governments。　　　The　eminently　beneficial　working　of　so　singular　a　provision　is　probably；　as　M。　de　Tocqueville　remarks；　in　a　great　measure　attributable　to　the　peculiarity　inherent　in　a　Court　of　justice　acting　as　such…　namely；　that　it　does　not　declare　the　law　eo　nomine　and　in　the　abstract；　but　waits　until　a　case　between　man　and　man　is　brought　before　it　judicially　involving　the　point　in　dispute：　from　which　arises　the　happy　effect　that　its　declarations　are　not　made　in　a　very　early　stage　of　the　controversy；　that　much　popular　discussion　usually　precedes　them；　that　the　Court　decides　after　hearing　the　point　fully　argued　on　both　sides　by　lawyers　of　reputation；　decides　only　as　much　of　the　question　at　a　time　as　is　required　by　the　case　before　it；　and　its　decision；　instead　of　being　volunteered　for　political　purposes；　is　drawn　from　it　by　the　duty　which　it　cannot　refuse　to　fulfil；　of　dispensing　justice　impartially　between　adverse　litigants。　Even　these　grounds　of　confidence　would　not　have　sufficed　to　produce　the　respectful　submission　with　which　all　authorities　have　yielded　to　the　decisions　of　the　Supreme　Court　on　the　interpretation　of　the　Constitution；　were　it　not　that　complete　reliance　has　been　felt；　not　only　on　the　intellectual　pre…eminence　of　the　judges　composing　that　exalted　tribunal；　but　on　their　entire　superiority　over　either　private　or　sectional　partialities。　This　reliance　has　been　in　the　main　justified；　but　there　is　nothing　which　more　vitally　imports　the　American　people　than　to　guard　with　the　most　watchful　solicitude　against　everything　which　has　the　remotest　tendency　to　produce　deterioration　in　the　quality　of　this　great　national　institution。　The　confidence　on　which　depends　the　stability　of　federal　institutions　was　for　the　first　time　impaired　by　the　judgment　declaring　slavery　to　be　of　common　right；　and　consequently　lawful　in　the　Territories　while　not　yet　constituted　as　States；　even　against　the　will　of　a　majority　of　their　inhabitants。　This　memorable　decision　has　probably　done　more　than　anything　else　to　bring　the　sectional　division　to　the　crisis　which　has　issued　in　civil　war。　The　main　pillar　of　the　American　Constitution　is　scarcely　strong　enough　to　bear　many　more　such　shocks。　　　The　tribunals　which　act　as　umpires　between　the　Federal　and　the　State　Governments　naturally　also　decide　all　disputes　between　two　States；　or　between　a　citizen　of　one　State　and　the　government　of　another。　The　usual　remedies　between　nations；　war　and　diplomacy；　being　precluded　by　the　federal　union；　it　is　necessary　that　a　judicial　remedy　should　supply　their　place。　The　Supreme　Court　of　the　Federation　dispenses　international　law；　and　is　the　first　great　example　of　what　is　now　one　of　the　most　prominent　wants　of　civilised　society；　a　real　International　Tribunal。　　　The　powers　of　a　Federal　Government　naturally　extend　not　only　to　peace　and　war；　and　all　questions　which　arise　between　the　country　and　foreign　governments；　but　to　making　any　other　arrangements　which　are；　in　the　opinion　of　the　States；　necessary　to　their　enjoyment　of　the　full　benefits　of　union。　For　example；　it　is　a　great　advantage　to　them　that　their　mutual　commerce　should　be　free；　without　the　impediment　of　frontier　duties　and　custom…houses。　But　this　internal　freedom　cannot　exist　if　each　State　has　the　power　of　fixing　the　duties　on　interchange　of　commodities　between　itself　and　foreign　countries；　since　every　foreign　product　let　in　by　one　State　would　be　let　into　all　the　rest。　And　hence　all　custom　duties　and　trade　regulations；　in　the　United　States；　are　made　or　repealed　by　the　Federal　Government　exclusively。　Again；　it　is　a　great　convenience　to　the　States　to　have　but　one　coinage；　and　but　one　system　of　weights　and　measures；　which　can　only　be　ensured　if　the　regulation　of　these　matters　is　entrusted　to　the　Federal　Government。　The　certainty　and　celerity　of　Post　Office　communication　is　impeded；　and　its　expense　increased；　if　a　letter　has　to　pass　through　half　a　dozen　sets　of　public　offices；　subject　to　different　supreme　authorities：　it　is　convenient；　therefore；　that　all　Post　Offices　should　be　under　the　Federal　Government。　But　on　such　questions　the　feelings　of　different　communities　are　liable　to　be　different。　One　of　the　American　States；　under　the　guidance　of　a　man　who　has　displayed　powers　as　a　speculative　political　thinker　superior　to　any　who　has　appeared　in　American　politics　since　the　authors　of　the　Federalist；*　claimed　a　veto　for　each　State　on　the　custom　laws　of　the　Federal　Congress：　and　that　statesman；　in　a　posthumous　work　of　great　ability；　which　has　been　printed　and　widely　circulated　by　the　legislature　of　South　Carolina；　vindicated　this　pretension　on　the　general　principle　of　limiting　the　tyranny　of　the　majority；　and　protecting　minorities　by　admitting　them　to　a　substantial　participation　in　political　power。　One　of　the　most　disputed　topics　in　American　politics；　during　the　early　part　of　this　century；　was　whether　the　power　of　the　Federal　Government　ought　to　extend；　and　whether　by　the　Constitution　it　did　extend；　to　making　roads　and　canals　at　the　cost　of　the　Union。　It　is　only　in　transactions　with　foreign　powers　that　the　authority　of　the　Federal　Government　is　of　necessity　complete。　On　every　other　subject；　the　question　depends　on　how　closely　the　people　in　general　wish　to　draw　the　federal　tie；　what　portion　of　their　local　freedom　of　action　they　are　willing　to　surrender；　in　order　to　enjoy　more　fully　the　benefit　of　being　one　nation。

　　*　Mr。　Calhoun。

　　Respecting　the　fitting　constitution　of　a　federal　government　within　itself　much　need　not　be　said。　It　of　course　consists　of　a　legislative　branch　and　an　executive；　and　the　constitution　of　each　is　amenable　to　the　same　principles　as　that　of　representative　governments　generally。　As　regards　the　mode　of　adapting　these　general　principles　to　a　federal　government；　the　provision　of　the　American　Constitution　seems　exceedingly　judicious；　that　Congress　should　consist　of　two　Houses；　and　that　while　one　of　them　is　constituted　according　to　population；　each　State　being　entitled　to　representatives　in　the　ratio　of　the　number　of　its　inhabitants；　the　other　should　represent　not　the　citizens；　but　the　State　Governments；　and　every　State；　whether　large　or　small；　should　be　represented　in　it　by　the　same　number　of　members。　This　provision　precludes　any　undue　power　from　being　exercised　by　the　more　powerful　States　over　the　rest；　and　guarantees　the　reserved　rights　of　the　State　Governments；　by　making　it　impossible；　as　far　as　the　mode　of　representation　can　prevent；　that　any　measure　should　pass　Congress　unless　approved　not　only　by　a　majority　of　the　citizens；　but　by　a　majority　of　the　States。　I　have　before　adverted　to　the　further　incidental　advantage　obtained　of　raising　the　standard　of　qualifications　in　one　of　the　Houses。　Being　nominated　by　select　bodies；　the　Legislatures　of　the　various　States；　whose　choice；　for　reasons　already　indicated；　is　more　likely　to　fall　on　eminent　men　than　any　popular　election…　who　have　not　only　the　power　of　electing　such；　but　a　strong　motive　to　do　so；　because　the　influence　of　their　State　in　the　general　deliberations　must　be　materially　affected　by　the　personal　weight　and　abilities　of　its　representatives；　the　Senate　of　the　United　States；　thus　chosen；　has　always　contained　nearly　all　the　political　men　of　established　and　high　reputation　in　the　Union：　while　the　Lower　House　of　Congress　has；　in　the　opinion　of　competent　observers；　been　generally　as　remarkable　for　the　absence　of　conspicuous　personal　merit　as　the　Upper　House　for　its　presence。　　　When　the　conditions　exist　for　the　formation　of　efficient　and　durable　Federal　Unions；　the　multiplication　of　them　is　always　a　benefit　to　the　world。　It　has　the　same　salutary　effect　as　any　other　extension　of　the　practice　of　co…operation；　through　which　the　weak；　by　uniting；　can　meet　on　equal　terms　with　the　strong。　By　diminishing　the　number　of　those　petty　states　which　are　not　equal　to　their　own　defence；　it　weakens　the　temptations　to　an　aggressive　policy；　whether　working　directly　by　arms；　or　through　the　prestige　of　superior　power。　It　of　course　puts　an　end　to　war　and　diplomatic　quarrels；　and　usually　also　to　restrictions　on　commerce；　between　the　States　composing　the　Union；　while；　in　reference　to　neighbouring　nations；　the　increased　military　strength　conferred　by　it　is　of　a　kind　to　be　almost　exclusively　available　for　defensive；　scarcely　at　all　for　aggressive；　purposes。　A　federal　government　has　not　a　sufficiently　concentrated　authority　to　conduct　with　much　efficiency　any　war　but　one　of　self…defence；　in　which　it　can　rely　on　the　voluntary　co…operation　of　every　citizen：　nor　is　there　anything　very　flattering　to　national　vanity　or　ambition　in　acquiring；　by　a　successful　war；　not　subjects；　nor　even　fellow…citizens；　but　only　new；　and　perhaps　troublesome；　independent　members　of　the　confederation。　The　warlike　proceedings　of　the　Americans　in　Mexico　were　purely　exceptional；　having　been　carried　on　principally　by　volunteers；　under　the　influence　of　the　migratory　propensity　which　prompts　individual　Americans　to　possess　themselves　of　unoccupied　land；　and　stimulated；　if　by　any　public　motive；　not　by　th