representative government-第48章

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ericans　to　possess　themselves　of　unoccupied　land；　and　stimulated；　if　by　any　public　motive；　not　by　that　of　national　aggrandisement；　but　by　the　purely　sectional　purpose　of　extending　slavery。　There　are　few　signs　in　the　proceedings　of　Americans；　nationally　or　individually；　that　the　desire　of　territorial　acquisition　for　their　country　as　such　has　any　considerable　power　over　them。　Their　hankering　after　Cuba　is；　in　the　same　manner；　merely　sectional；　and　the　northern　States；　those　opposed　to　slavery；　have　never　in　any　way　favoured　it。　　　The　question　may　present　itself　（as　in　Italy　at　its　present　uprising）　whether　a　country；　which　is　determined　to　be　united；　should　form　a　complete　or　a　merely　federal　union。　The　point　is　sometimes　necessarily　decided　by　the　mere　territorial　magnitude　of　the　united　whole。　There　is　a　limit　to　the　extent　of　country　which　can　advantageously　be　governed；　or　even　whose　government　can　be　conveniently　superintended；　from　a　single　centre。　There　are　vast　countries　so　governed；　but　they；　or　at　least　their　distant　provinces；　are　in　general　deplorably　ill　administered；　and　it　is　only　when　the　inhabitants　are　almost　savages　that　they　could　not　manage　their　affairs　better　separately。　This　obstacle　does　not　exist　in　the　case　of　Italy；　the　size　of　which　does　not　come　up　to　that　of　several　very　efficiently　governed　single　states　in　past　and　present　times。　The　question　then　is　whether　the　different　parts　of　the　nation　require　to　be　governed　in　a　way　so　essentially　different　that　it　is　not　probable　the　same　Legislature；　and　the　same　ministry　or　administrative　body；　will　give　satisfaction　to　them　all。　Unless　this　be　the　case；　which　is　a　question　of　fact；　it　is　better　for　them　to　be　completely　united。　That　a　totally　different　system　of　laws；　and　very　different　administrative　institutions；　may　exist　in　two　portions　of　a　country　without　being　any　obstacle　to　legislative　unity　is　proved　by　the　case　of　England　and　Scotland。　Perhaps；　however；　this　undisturbed　co…existence　of　two　legal　systems；　under　one　united　legislature；　making　different　laws　for　the　two　sections　of　the　country　in　adaptation　to　the　previous　differences；　might　not　be　so　well　preserved；　or　the　same　confidence　might　not　be　felt　in　its　preservation；　in　a　country　whose　legislators　were　more　possessed　（as　is　apt　to　be　the　case　on　the　Continent）　with　the　mania　for　uniformity。　A　people　having　that　unbounded　toleration　which　is　characteristic　of　this　country　for　every　description　of　anomaly；　so　long　as　those　whose　interests　it　concerns　do　not　feel　aggrieved　by　it；　afforded　an　exceptionally　advantageous　field　for　trying　this　difficult　experiment。　In　most　countries；　if　it　was　an　object　to　retain　different　systems　of　law；　it　might　probably　be　necessary　to　retain　distinct　legislatures　as　guardians　of　them；　which　is　perfectly　compatible　with　a　national　Parliament　and　King；　or　a　national　Parliament　without　a　King；　supreme　over　the　external　relations　of　all　the　members　of　the　body。　　　Whenever　it　is　not　deemed　necessary　to　maintain　permanently；　in　the　different　provinces；　different　systems　of　jurisprudence；　and　fundamental　institutions　grounded　on　different　principles；　it　is　always　practicable　to　reconcile　minor　diversities　with　the　maintenance　of　unity　of　government。　All　that　is　needful　is　to　give　a　sufficiently　large　sphere　of　action　to　the　local　authorities。　Under　one　and　the　same　central　government　there　may　be　local　governors；　and　provincial　assemblies　for　local　purposes。　It　may　happen；　for　instance；　that　the　people　of　different　provinces　may　have　preferences　in　favour　of　different　modes　of　taxation。　If　the　general　legislature　could　not　be　depended　on　for　being　guided　by　the　members　for　each　province　in　modifying　the　general　system　of　taxation　to　suit　that　province；　the　Constitution　might　provide　that　as　many　of　the　expenses　of　the　government　as　could　by　any　possibility　be　made　local　should　be　defrayed　by　local　rates　imposed　by　the　provincial　assemblies；　and　that　those　which　must　of　necessity　be　general；　such　as　the　support　of　an　army　and　navy；　should；　in　the　estimates　for　the　year；　be　apportioned　among　the　different　provinces　according　to　some　general　estimate　of　their　resources；　the　amount　assigned　to　each　being　levied　by　the　local　assembly　on　the　principles　most　acceptable　to　the　locality；　and　paid　en　bloc　into　the　national　treasury。　A　practice　approaching　to　this　existed　even　in　the　old　French　monarchy；　so　far　as　regarded　the　pays　d'etats；　each　of　which；　having　consented　or　been　required　to　furnish　a　fixed　sum；　was　left　to　assess　it　upon　the　inhabitants　by　its　own　officers；　thus　escaping　the　grinding　despotism　of　the　royal　intendants　and　subdelegues；　and　this　privilege　is　always　mentioned　as　one　of　the　advantages　which　mainly　contributed　to　render　them；　as　some　of　them　were；　the　most　flourishing　provinces　of　France。　　　Identity　of　central　government　is　compatible　with　many　different　degrees　of　centralisation；　not　only　administrative；　but　even　legislative。　A　people　may　have　the　desire；　and　the　capacity；　for　a　closer　union　than　one　merely　federal；　while　yet　their　local　peculiarities　and　antecedents　render　considerable　diversities　desirable　in　the　details　of　their　government。　But　if　there　is　a　real　desire　on　all　hands　to　make　the　experiment　successful；　there　needs　seldom　be　any　difficulty　in　not　only　preserving　these　diversities；　but　giving　them　the　guarantee　of　a　constitutional　provision　against　any　attempt　at　assimilation；　except　by　the　voluntary　act　of　those　who　would　be　affected　by　the　change。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　18　　　　　　　　　Of　the　Government　of　Dependencies　by　a　Free　State。

　　FREE　STATES；　like　all　others；　may　possess　dependencies；　acquired　either　by　conquest　or　by　colonisation；　and　our　own　is　the　greatest　instance　of　the　kind　in　modern　history。　It　is　a　most　important　question　how　such　dependencies　ought　to　be　governed。　　　It　is　unnecessary　to　discuss　the　case　of　small　posts；　like　Gibraltar；　Aden；　or　Heligoland；　which　are　held　only　as　naval　or　military　positions。　The　military　or　naval　object　is　in　this　case　paramount；　and　the　inhabitants　cannot；　consistently　with　it；　be　admitted　to　the　government　of　the　place；　though　they　ought　to　be　allowed　all　liberties　and　privileges　compatible　with　that　restriction；　including　the　free　management　of　municipal　affairs；　and　as　a　compensation　for　being　locally　sacrificed　to　the　convenience　of　the　governing　State；　should　be　admitted　to　equal　rights　with　its　native　subjects　in　all　other　parts　of　the　empire。　　　Outlying　territories　of　some　size　and　population；　which　are　held　as　dependencies；　that　is；　which　are　subject；　more　or　less；　to　acts　of　sovereign　power　on　the　part　of　the　paramount　country；　without　being　equally　represented　（if　represented　at　all）　in　its　legislature；　may　be　divided　into　two　classes。　Some　are　composed　of　people　of　similar　civilisation　to　the　ruling　country；　capable　of；　and　ripe　for；　representative　government：　such　as　the　British　possessions　in　America　and　Australia。　Others；　like　India；　are　still　at　a　great　distance　from　that　state。　　　In　the　case　of　dependencies　of　the　former　class；　this　country　has　at　length　realised；　in　rare　completeness；　the　true　principle　of　government。　England　has　always　felt　under　a　certain　degree　of　obligation　to　bestow　on　such　of　her　outlying　populations　as　were　of　her　own　blood　and　language；　and　on　some　who　were　not；　representative　institutions　formed　in　imitation　of　her　own：　but　until　the　present　generation；　she　has　been　on　the　same　bad　level　with　other　countries　as　to　the　amount　of　self…government　which　she　allowed　them　to　exercise　through　the　representative　institutions　that　she　conceded　to　them。　She　claimed　to　be　the　supreme　arbiter　even　of　their　purely　internal　concerns；　according　to　her　own；　not　their；　ideas　of　how　those　concerns　could　be　best　regulated。　This　practice　was　a　natural　corollary　from　the　vicious　theory　of　colonial　policy…　once　common　to　all　Europe；　and　not　yet　completely　relinquished　by　any　other　people…　which　regarded　colonies　as　valuable　by　affording　markets　for　our　commodities；　that　could　be　kept　entirely　to　ourselves：　a　privilege　we　valued　so　highly　that　we　thought　it　worth　purchasing　by　allowing　to　the　colonies　the　same　monopoly　of　our　market　for　their　own　productions　which　we　claimed　for　our　commodities　in　theirs。　This　notable　plan　for　enriching　them　and　ourselves；　by　making　each　pay　enormous　sums　to　the　other；　dropping　the　greatest　part　by　the　way；　has　been　for　some　time　abandoned。　But　the　bad　habit　of　meddling　in　the　internal　government　of　the　colonies　did　not　at　once　terminate　when　we　relinquished　the　idea　of　making　any　profit　by　it。　We　continued　to　torment　them；　not　for　any　benefit　to　ourselves；　but　for　that　of　a　section　or　faction　among　the　colonists：　and　this　persistence　in　domineering　cost　us　a　Canadian　rebellion　before　we　had　the　happy　thought　of　giving　it　up。　England　was　like　an　ill…brought…up　elder　brother；　who　persists　in　tyrannising　over　the　younger　ones　from　mere　habit；　till　one　of　them；　by　a　spirited　resistance；　though　with　unequal　strength；　gives　him　notice　to　desist。　We　were　wise　enough　not　to　require　a　second　warning。　A　new　era　in　the　colonial　policy　of　nations　began　with　Lord　Durham's　Report；　the　imperishable　memorial　of　that　nobleman's　courage；　patriotism；　and　enlightened　liberality；　and　of　the　intellect　and　practical　sagacity　of　its　joint　authors；　Mr。　Wakefield　and　the　lamented　Charles　Buller。*

　　*　I　am　speaking　here　of　the　adoption　of　this　improved　policy；　not；　of　course；　of　its　original　suggestion。　The　honour　of　having　been　its　earliest　champion　belongs　unquestionably　to　Mr。　Roebuck。

　　It　is　now　a　fixed　principle　of　the　policy　of　Great　Britain；　professed　in　theory　and　faithfully　adhered　to　in　practice；　that　her　colonies　of　European　race；　equally　with　the　parent　country；　possess　the　fullest　measure　of　internal　self…government。　They　have　been　allowed　to　make　their　own　free　representative　constitutions　by　altering　in　any　manner　they　thought　fit　the　already　very　popular　constitutions　which　we　had　given　them。　Each　is　governed　by　its　own　legislature　and　executive；　constituted　on　highly　democratic　principles。　The　veto　of　the　Crown　and　of　Parliament；　though　nominally　reserved；　is　only　exercised　（and　that　very　rarely）　on　questions　which　concern　the　empire；　and　not　solely　the　particular　colony。　How　liberal　a　construction　has　been　given　to　the　distinction　between　imperial　and　colonial　questions　is　shown　by　the　fact　that　the　whole　of　the　unappropriated　lands　in　the　regions　behind　our　American　and　Australian　colonies　have　been　given　up　to　the　uncontrolled　disposal　of　the　colonial　communities；　though　they　might；　without　injustice；　have　been　kept　in　the　hands　of　the　Imperial　Government；　to　be　administered　for　the　greatest　advantage　of　future　emigrants　from　all　parts　of　the　empire。　Every　colony　has　thus　as　full　power　over　its　own　affairs　as　it　could　have　if　it　were　a　member　of　even　the　loosest　federation；　and　much　fuller　than　would　belong　to　it　under　the　Constitution　of　the　United　States；　being　free　even　to　tax　at　its　pleasure　the　commodities　imported　from　the　mother　country。　Their　union　with　Great　Britain　is　the　slightest　kind　of　federal　union；　but　not　a　strictly　equal　federation；　the　mother　country　retaining　to　itself　the　powers　of　a　Federal　Government；　though