shorter logic-第15章

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philosophy；　means　determination　from　without　only　…　as　in　finite　mechanics；　where　a　body　moves
only　when　it　is　struck　by　another　body；　and　moves　in　the　direction　communicated　to　it　by　the
impact。　This　however　is　a　merely　external　necessity；　not　the　real　inward　necessity　which　is　identical
with　freedom。　

The　case　is　similar　with　the　contrast　of　Good　and　Evil…the　favourite　contrast　of　the　introspective
modern　world。　If　we　regard　Evil　as　possessing　a　fixity　of　its　own；　apart　and　distinct　from　Good；
we　are　to　a　certain　extent　right：　there　is　an　opposition　between　them；　nor　do　those　who　maintain
the　apparent　and　relative　character　of　the　opposition　mean　that　Evil　and　Good　in　the　Absolute　are
one；　or；　in　accordance　with　the　modern　phrase；　that　a　thing　first　becomes　evil　from　our　way　of
looking　at　it。　The　error　arises　when　we　take　Evil　as　a　permanent　positive；　instead　of…what　it　really
is…a　negative　which；　though　it　would　fain　assert　itself；　has　no　real　persistence；　and　is；　in　fact；　only
the　absolute　sham…existence　of　negativity　in　itself。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§36

The　fourth　branch　of　metaphysics　is　Natural　or　Rational　Theology。　The　notion　of
God；　or　God　as　a　possible　being；　the　proofs；　of　his　existence；　and　his　properties；
formed　the　study　of　this　branch。　

（a）　When　understanding　thus　discusses　the　Deity；　its　main　purpose　is　to　find　what
predicates　correspond　or　not　to　the　fact　we　have　in　our　imagination　as　God。　And
in　doing　it　assumes　the　contrast　between　positive　and　negative　to　be　absolute；　and
hence；　in　the　long　run；　nothing　is　left　for　the　notion　as　understanding　takes　it；　but
the　empty　abstraction　of　indeterminate　Being；　of　mere　reality　or　positivity；　the
lifeless　product　of　modern　'Deism。'　

（b）　The　method　of　demonstration　employed　in　finite　knowledge　must　always　lead
to　an　inversion　of　the　true　order。　For　it　requires　the　statement　of　some　objective
ground　for　God's　being；　which　thus　acquires　the　appearance　of　being　derived
from　something　else。　This　mode　of　proof；　guided　as　it　is　by　the　canon　of　mere
analytical　identity；　is　embarrassed　by　the　difficulty　of　passing　from　the　finite　to
the　infinite。　Either　the　finitude　of　the　existing　world；　which　is　left　as　much　a　fact
as　it　was　before；　clings　to　the　notion　of　Deity；　and　God　has　to　be　defined　as　the
immediate　substance　of　that　world…which　is　Pantheism：　or　he　remains　an　object
set　over　against　the　subject；　and　in　this　way；　finite…which　is　Dualism。　

（c）　The　attributes　of　God　which　ought　to　be　various　and　precise　had；　properly
speaking；　sunk　and　disappeared　in　the　abstract　notion　of　pure　reality；　of
indeterminate　Being。　Yet　in　our　material　thought；　the　finite　world　continues；
meanwhile；　to　have　a　real　being；　with　God　as　a　sort　of　antithesis：　and　thus　arises
the　further　picture　of　different　relations　of　God　to　the　world。　These；　formulated
as　properties；　must；　on　the　one　hand；　as　relations　to　finite　circumstances；
themselves　possess　a　finite　character　（giving　us　such　properties　as　just；　gracious；
mighty；　wise；　etc。）；　on　the　other　hand　they　must　be　infinite。　Now　on　this　level　of
thought　the　only　means；　and　a　hazy　one；　of　reconciling　these　opposing
requirements　was　quantitative　exaltation　of　the　properties；　forming　them　into
indeterminateness…into　the　sensus　eminentior。　But　it　was　an　expedient　which
really　destroyed　the　property　and　left　a　mere　name。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§36n

The　object　of　the　old　metaphysical　theology　was　to　see　how　far　unassisted　reason　could　go　in　the
knowledge　of　God。　Certainly　a　reason　derived　knowledge　of　God　is　the　highest　problem　of
philosophy。　The　earliest　teachings　of　religion　are　figurate　conceptions　of　God。　These　conceptions；
as　the　Creed　arranges　them；　are　imparted　to　us　in　youth。　They　are　the　doctrines　of　our　religion；
and　in　so　far　as　the　individual　rests　his　faith　on　these　doctrines　and　feels　them　to　be　the　truth；　he
has　all　he　needs　as　a　Christian。　Such　is　faith：　and　the　science　of　this　faith　is　Theology。　But　until
Theology　is　something　more　than　a　bare　enumeration　and　compilation　of　these　doctrines　ab　extra；
it　has　no　right　to　the　title　of　science。　Even　the　method　so　much　in　vogue　at　present…the　purely
historical　mode　of　treatment…which　for　example　reports　what　has　been　said　by　this　or　the　other
Father　of　the　Church…does　not　invest　theology　with　a　scientific　character。　To　get　that；　we　must　go
on　to　comprehend　the　facts　by　thought…which　is　the　business　of　philosophy。　Genuine　theology　is
thus　at　the　same　time　a　real　philosophy　of　religion；　as　it　was；　we　may　add；　in　the　Middle　Ages。　

And　now　let　us　examine　this　rational　theology　more　narrowly。　It　was　a　science　which　approached
God　not　by　reason　but　by　understanding；　and；　in　its　mode　of　thought；　employed　the　terms　without
any　sense　of　their　mutual　limitations　and　connections。　The　notion　of　God　formed　the　subject　of
discussion；　and　yet　the　criterion　of　our　knowledge　was　derived　from　such　an　extraneous　source　as
the　materialised　conception　of　God。　Now　thought　must　be　free　in　its　movements。　It　is　no　doubt　to
be　remembered　that　the　result　of　independent　thought　harmonises　with　the　import　of　the　Christian
religion：　for　the　Christian　religion　is　a　revelation　of　reason。　But　such　a　harmony　surpassed　the
efforts　of　rational　theology。　It　proposed　to　define　the　figurate　conception　of　God　in　terms　of
thought；　but　it　resulted　in　a　notion　of　God　which　was　what　we　may　call　the　abstract　of　positivity　or
reality；　to　the　exclusion　of　all　negation。　God　was　accordingly　defined　to　be　the　most　real　of　all
beings。　Anyone　can　see　however　that　this　most　real　of　beings；　in　which　negation　forms　no　part；　is
the　very　opposite　of　what　it　ought　to　be　and　of　what　understanding　supposes　it　to　be。　Instead　of
being　rich　and　full　above　all　measure；　it　is　so　narrowly　conceived　that　it　is；　on　the　contrary；
extremely　poor　and　altogether　empty。　It　is　with　reason　that　the　heart　craves　a　concrete　body　of
truth；　but　without　definite　feature；　that　is；　without　negation；　contained　in　the　notion；　there　can　only
be　an　abstraction。　When　the　notion　of　God　is　apprehended　only　as　that　of　the　abstract　or　most
real　being；　God　is；　as　it　were；　relegated　to　another　world　beyond：　and　to　speak　of　a　knowledge　of
him　would　be　meaningless。　Where　there　is　no　definite　quality；　knowledge　is　impossible。　Mere　light
is　mere　darkness。　

The　second　problem　of　rational　theology　was　to　prove　the　existence　of　God。　Now；　in　this　matter；
the　main　point　to　be　noted　is　that　demonstration；　as　the　understanding　employs　it；　means　the
dependence　of　one　truth　on　another。　In　such　proofs　we　have　a　presupposition…something　firm　and
fast；　from　which　something　else　follows；　we　exhibit　the　dependence　of　some　truth　from　an
assumed　starting…point。　Hence；　if　this　mode　of　demonstration　is　applied　to　the　existence　of　God；　it
can　only　mean　that　the　being　of　God　is　to　depend　on　other　terms；　which　will　then　constitute　the
ground　of　his　being。　It　is　at　once　evident　that　this　will　lead　to　some　mistake：　for　God　must　be
simply　and　solely　the　ground　of　everything；　and　in　so　far　not　dependent　upon　anything　else。　And　a
perception　of　this　danger　has　in　modern　times　led　some　to　say　that　God's　existence　is　not　capable
of　proof；　but　must　be　immediately　or　intuitively　apprehended。　Reason；　however；　and　even　sound
common　sense　give　demonstration　a　meaning　quite　different　from　that　of　the　understanding。　The
demonstration　of　reason　no　doubt　starts　from　something　which　is　not　God。　But；　as　it　advances；　it
does　not　leave　the　starting…point　a　mere　unexplained　fact；　which　is　what　it　was。　On　the　contrary　it
exhibits　that　point　as　derivative　and　called　into　being；　and　then　God　is　seen　to　be　primary；　truly
immediate；　and　self…subsisting；　with　the　means　of　derivation　wrapped　up　and　absorbed　in　himself。
Those　who　say：　'Consider　Nature；　and　Nature　will　lead　you　to　God；　you　will　find　an　absolute　final
cause'　do　not　mean　that　God　is　something　derivative：　they　mean　that　it　is　we　who　proceed　to　God
himself　from　another；　and　in　this　way　God；　though　the　consequence；　is　also　the　absolute　ground　of
the　initial　step。　The　relation　of　the　two　things　is　reversed；　and　what　came　as　a　consequence　being
shown　to　be　an　antecedent；　the　original　antecedent　is　reduced　to　a　consequence。　This　is　always
the　way；　moreover；　whenever　reason　demonstrates。　

If　in　the　light　of　the　present　discussion　we　cast　one　glance　more　on　the　metaphysical　method　as　a
whole；　we　find　its　main　characteristic　was　to　make　abstract　identity　its　principle　and　to　try　to
apprehend　the　objects　of　reason　by　the　abstract　and　finite　categories　of　the　understanding。　But　this
infinite　of　the　understanding；　this　pure　essence；　is　still　finite：　it　has　excluded　all　the　variety　of
particular　things；　which　thus　limit　and　deny　it。　Instead　of　winning　a　concrete；　this　metaphysic　stuck
fast　on　an　abstract；　identity。　Its　good　point　was　the　perception　that　thought　alone　constitutes　the
essence　of　all　that　is。　It　derived　its　materials　from　earlier　philosophers；　particularly　the　Schoolmen。
In　speculative　philosophy　the　understanding　undoubtedly　forms　a　stage；　but　not　a　stage　at　which
we　should　keep　for　ever　standing。　Plato　is　no　metaphysician　of　this　imperfect　type；　still　less
Aristotle；　although　the　contrary　is　generally　believed。　




III。　Second　Attitude　of　Thought　to　Objectivity
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ONE。　EMPIRICISM


　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§37

Under　these　circumstances　a　double　want　began　to　be　felt。　Partly　it　was　the　need
of　a　concrete　subject…matter；　as　a　counterpoise　to　the　abstract　theories　of　the
understanding；　which　is　unable　to　advance　unaided　from　its　generalities　to
specialisation　and　determination。　Partly；　too；　it　was　the　demand　for　something
fixed　and　secure；　so　as　to　exclude　the　possibility　of　proving　anything　and
everything　in　the　sphere；　and　according　to　the　method　of　the　finite　formulae　of
thought。　Such　was　the　genesis　of　Empirical　philosophy；　which　abandons　the
search　for　truth　in　thought　itself；　and　goes　to　fetch　it　from　Experience；　the
outward　and　the　inward　present。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§37n

The　rise　of　Empiricism　is　due　to　the　need　thus　stated　of　concrete　contents；　and　a　firm　footing　…
needs　which　the　abstract　metaphysic　of　the　understanding　failed　to　satisfy。　Now　by　concreteness
of　contents　it　is　meant　that　we　must　know　the　objects　of　consciousness　as　intrinsically　determinate
and　as　the　unity　of　distinct　characteristics。　But；　as　we　have　already　seen；　this　is　by　no　means　the
case　with　the　metaphysic　of　understanding；　if　it　conform　to　its　principle。　With　the　mere
understanding；　thinking　is　limited　to　the　form　of　an　abstract　universal；　and　can　never　advance　to　the
particularisation　of　this　universal。　Thus　we　find　the　metaphysicians　engaged　in　an　attempt　to　elicit
by　the　instrumentality　of　thought　what　was　the　essence　or　fundamental　attribute　of　the　Soul。　The
Soul；　they　said；　is　simple。　The　simplicity　thus　ascribed　to　the　Soul　meant　a　mere　and　utter
simplicity；　from　which　difference　is　excluded：　difference；　or　in　other　words　composition；　being
made　the　fundamental　attribute　of　body；　or　of　matter　in　general。　Clearly；　in　simplicity　of　this　narrow
type　we　have　a　very　sh