shorter logic-第26章

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always　mediated　by　a　something　else；　and　to　forget　that　in　the　very　act　of
mediation　the　mediation　itself　vanishes。　And　to　show　that；　in　point　of　fact；　there　is
a　knowledge　which　advances　neither　by　unmixed　immediacy　nor　by　unmixed
mediation；　we　can　point　to　the　example　of　Logic　and　the　whole　of　philosophy。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§76

If　we　view　the　maxims　of　immediate　knowledge　in　connection　with　the　uncritical
metaphysic　of　the　past　from　which　we　started；　we　shall　learn　from　the
comparison　the　reactionary　nature　of　the　school　of　Jacobi。　His　doctrine　is　a　return
to　the　modern　starting…point　of　this　metaphysic　in　the　Cartesian　philosophy。　Both
Jacobi　and　Descartes　maintain　the　following　three　points：　

（1）　The　simple　inseparability　of　the　thought　and　being　of　the　thinker。　Cogito；　ergo
sum　is　the　same　doctrine　as　that　the　being；　reality；　and　existence　of　the　'Ego'　is
immediately　revealed　to　me　in　consciousness。　（Descartes；　in　fact；　is　careful　to
state　that　by　thought　he　means　consciousness　in　general。　Princip。　Phil。　i。　9。）　This
inseparability　is　the　absolutely　first　and　most　certain　knowledge；　not　mediated　or
demonstrated。　

（2）　The　inseparability　of　existence　from　the　conception　of　God：　the　former　is
necessarily　implied　in　the　latter；　or　the　conception　never　can　be　without　the
attribute　of　existence；　which　is　thus　necessary　and　eternal。。　

　　　　　Descartes；　Princip。　Phil。　i。　15：　'The　reader　will　be　more　disposed　to　believe　that　there　exists　a
　　　　　being　supremely　perfect；　if　he　notes　that　in　the　case　of　nothing　else　is　there　found　in　him　an
　　　　　idea；　in　which　he　notices　necessary　existence　to　be　contained　in　the　same　way。　He　will　see　that
　　　　　that　idea　exhibits　a　true　and　unchangeable　nature　…a　nature　which　cannot　but　exist；　since
　　　　　necessary　existence　is　contained　in　it。'　A　remark　which　immediately　follows；　and　which　sounds
　　　　　like　mediation　or　demonstration；　does　not　really　prejudice　the　original　principle。　

　　　　　In　Spinoza　we　come　upon　the　same　statement　that　the　essence　or　abstract　conception　of　God
　　　　　implies　existence。　The　first　of　Spinoza's　definitions；　that　of　the　Causa　Sui　（or　Self…Cause）；
　　　　　explains　it　to　be　'that　of　which　the　essence　involves　existence；　or　that　whose　nature　cannot　be
　　　　　conceived　except　as　existing'。　The　inseparability　of　the　notion　from　being　is　the　main　point　and
　　　　　fundamental　hypothesis　in　his　system。　But　what　notion　is　thus　inseparable　from　being？　Not　the
　　　　　notion　of　finite　things；　for　they　are　so　constituted　as　to　have　a　contingent　and　a　created
　　　　　existence。　Spinoza's　eleventh　proposition；　which　follows　with　a　proof　that　God　exists
　　　　　necessarily；　and　his　twentieth；　showing　that　God's　existence　and　his　essence　are　one　and　the
　　　　　same；　are　really　superfluous；　and　the　proof　is　more　in　form　than　in　reality。　To　say　that　God　is
　　　　　Substance；　the　only　Substance；　and　that；　as　Substance　is　Causa　Sui；　God　therefore　exists
　　　　　necessarily；　is　merely　stating　that　God　is　that　of　which　the　notion　and　the　being　are　inseparable。　

（3）　The　immediate　consciousness　of　the　existence　of　external　things。　By　this
nothing　more　is　meant　than　sense…consciousness。　To　have　such　a　thing　is　the
slightest　of　all　cognitions：　and　the　only　thing　worth　knowing　about　it　is　that　such
immediate　knowledge　of　the　being　of　things　external　is　error　and　delusion；　that　the
sensible　world　as　such　is　altogether　void　of　truth；　that　the　being　of　these　external
things　is　accidental　and　passes　away　as　a　show；　and　that　their　very　nature　is　to
have　only　an　existence　which　is　separable　from　their　essence　and　notion。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§77

There　is　however　a　distinction　between　the　two　points　of　view：　

（1）　The　Cartesian　philosophy；　from　these　unproved　postulates；　which　it　assumes
to　be　unprovable；　proceeds　to　wider　and　wider　details　of　knowledge；　and　thus
gave　rise　to　the　sciences　of　modern　times。　The　modern　theory　（of　Jacobi）；　on　the
contrary；　（§　62）　has　come　to　what　is　intrinsically　a　most　important　conclusion
that　cognition；　proceeding　as　it　must　by　finite　mediations；　can　know　only　the
finite；　and　never　embody　the　truth；　and　would　fain　have　the　consciousness　of
God　go　no　further　than　the　aforesaid　very　abstract　belief　that　God　is。　

　　　　　Anselm　on　the　contrary　says：　'Methinks　it　is　carelessness；　if；　after　we　have　been　confirmed　in
　　　　　the　faith；　we　do　not　exert　ourselves　to　see　the　meaning　of　what　we　believe。'　＇Tractat。　Cur　Deus
　　　　　Homo？＇　These　words　of　Anselm；　in　connection　with　the　concrete　truths　of　Christian　doctrine；
　　　　　offer　a　far　harder　problem　for　investigation；　than　is　contemplated　by　this　modern　faith。　

（2）　The　modern　doctrine　on　the　one　hand　makes　no　change　in　the　Cartesian
method　of　the　usual　scientific　knowledge；　and　conducts　on　the　same　plan　the
experimental　and　finite　sciences　that　have　sprung　from　it。　But；　on　the　other　hand；
when　it　comes　to　the　science　which　has　infinity　for　its　scope；　it　throws　aside　that
method　and　thus；　as　it　knows　no　other；　it　rejects　all　methods。　It　abandons　itself　to
wild　vagaries　of　imagination　and　assertion；　to　a　moral　priggishness　and　sentimental
arrogance；　or　to　a　reckless　dogmatising　and　lust　of　argument；　which　is　loudest
against　philosophy　and　philosophic　doctrines。　Philosophy　of　course　tolerates　no
mere　assertions　or　conceits；　and　checks　the　free　play　of　argumentative　see…saw。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§78

We　must　then　reject　the　opposition　between　an　independent　immediacy　in　the
contents　or　facts　of　consciousness　and　an　equally　independent　mediation；
supposed　incompatible　with　the　former。　The　incompatibility　is　a　mere　assumption；
an　arbitrary　assertion。　All　other　assumptions　and　postulates　must　in　like　manner
be　left　behind　at　the　entrance　to　philosophy；　whether　they　are　derived　from　the
intellect　or　the　imagination。　For　philosophy　is　the　science　in　which　every　such
proposition　must　first　be　scrutinised　and　its　meaning　and　oppositions　be
ascertained。　

Scepticism；　made　a　negative　science　and　systematically　applied　to　all　forms　of
knowledge；　might　seem　a　suitable　introduction；　as　pointing　out　the　nullity　of　such
assumptions。　But　a　sceptical　introduction　would　be　not　only　an　ungrateful　but　also
a　useless　course；　and　that　because　Dialectic；　as　we　shall　soon　make　appear；　is
itself　an　essential　element　of　affirmative　science。　

Scepticism；　besides；　could　only　get　hold　of　the　finite　forms　as　they　were
suggested　by　experience；　taking　them　as　given；　instead　of　deducing　them
scientifically。　To　require　such　a　scepticism　accomplished　is　the　same　as　to　insist
on　science　being　preceded　by　universal　doubt；　or　a　total　absence　of
presupposition。　Strictly　speaking；　in　the　resolve　that　wills　pure　thought；　this
requirement　is　accomplished　by　freedom　which；　abstracting　from　everything；
grasps　its　pure　abstraction；　the　simplicity　of　thought。　




VI。　Logic　further　Defined　&　Divided


　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§79

In　point　of　form　Logical　doctrine　has　three　sides：　＇a＇　the　Abstract　side；　or　that　of
understanding；　＇b＇　the　Dialectical；　or　that　of　negative　reason；　＇c＇　the　Speculative；
or　that　of　positive　reason。　

These　three　sides　do　not　make　three　parts　of　logic；　but　are　stages　or　'moments'　in
every　logical　entity；　that　is；　of　every　notion　and　truth　whatever。　They　may　all　be
put　under　the　first　stage；　that　of　understanding；　and　so　kept　isolated　from　each
other；　but　this　would　give　an　inadequate　conception　of　them。　The　statement　of
the　dividing　lines　and　the　characteristic　aspects　of　logic　is　at　this　point　no　more
than　historical　and　anticipatory。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§80

＇a＇　Thought；　as　Understanding；　sticks　to　fixity　of　characters　and　their
distinctness　from　one　another：　every　such　limited　abstract　it　treats　as　having　a
subsistence　and　being　of　its　own。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§80n

In　our　ordinary　usage　of　the　term　thought　and　even　notion；　we　often　have　before　our　eyes　nothing
more　than　the　operation　of　Understanding。　And　no　doubt　thought　is　primarily　an　exercise　of
Understanding；　only　it　goes　further；　and　the　notion　is　not　a　function　of　Understanding　merely。　The
action　of　Understanding　may　be　in　general　described　as　investing　its　subject…matter　with　the　form
of　universality。　But　this　universal　is　an　abstract　universal：　that　is　to　say；　its　opposition　to　the
particular　is　so　rigorously　maintained；　that　it　is　at　the　same　time　also　reduced　to　the　character　of　a
particular　again。　In　this　separating　and　abstracting　attitude　towards　its　objects；　Understanding　is
the　reverse　of　immediate　perception　and　sensation；　which；　as　such；　keep　completely　to　their　native
sphere　of　action　in　the　concrete。　

It　is　by　referring　to　this　opposition　of　Understanding　to　sensation　or　feeling　that　we　must　explain
the　frequent　attacks　made　upon　thought　for　being　hard　and　narrow；　and　for　leading；　if　consistently
developed；　to　ruinous　and　pernicious　results。　The　answer　to　these　charges；　in　so　far　as　they　are
warranted　by　the　facts；　is　that　they　do　not　touch　thinking　in　general；　certainly　not　the　thinking　of
Reason；　but　only　the　exercise　of　Understanding。　It　must　be　added；　however；　that　the　merit　and
rights　of　the　mere　Understanding　should　unhesitatingly　be　admitted。　And　that　merit　lies　in　the　fact
that　apart　from　Understanding　there　is　no　fixity　or　accuracy　in　the　region　of　theory　or　of　practice。　

Thus；　in　theory；　knowledge　begins　by　apprehending　existing　objects　in　their　specific　differences。　In
the　study　of　nature；　for　example；　we　distinguish　matters；　forces；　genera；　and　the　like；　and
stereotype　each　in　its　isolation。　Thought　is　here　acting　in　its　analytic　capacity；　where　its　canon　is
identity；　a　simple　reference　of　each　attribute　to　itself。　It　is　under　the　guidance　of　the　same　identity
that　the　process　in　knowledge　is　effected　from　one　scientific　truth　to　another。　Thus；　for　example；　in
mathematics　magnitude　is　the　feature　which；　to　the　neglect　of　any　other；　determines　our　advance。
Hence　in　geometry　we　compare　one　figure　with　another；　so　as　to　bring　out　their　identity。　Similarly
in　other　fields　of　knowledge；　such　as　jurisprudence；　the　advance　is　primarily　regulated　by　identity。
In　it　we　argue　from　one　specific　law　or　precedent　to　another：　and　what　is　this　but　to　proceed　on
the　principle　of　identity？　

But　Understanding　is　as　indispensable　in　practice　as　it　is　in　theory。　Character　is　an　essential　in
conduct；　and　a　man　of　character　is　an　understanding　man；　who　in　that　capacity　has　definite　ends　in
view　and　undeviatingly　pursues　them。　The　man　who　will　do　something　great　must　learn；　as　Goethe
says；　to　limit　himself。　The　man　who；　on　the　contrary；　would　do　everything；　really　would　do　nothing；
and　fails。　There　is　a　host　of　interesting　things　in　the　world：　Spanish　poetry；　chemistry；　politics；　and
music　are　all　very　interesting；　and　if　any　one　takes　an　interest　in　them　we　need　not　find　fault。　But
for　a　person　in　a　given　situation　to　accomplish　anything；　he　must　stick　to　one　definite　point；　and　not
dissipate　his　forces　in　many　directions。　In　every　calling；　too；　the　great　thing　is　to　pursue　it　with
understanding。　Thus　the　judge　must　stick　to　the　law；　and　give　his　verdict　i