shorter logic-第3章

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therefore；　philosophy　may　and　even　must　presume；　that　and　a　certain　interest　in
them　to　boot；　were　it　for　no　other　reason　than　this：　that　in　point　of　time　the　mind
makes　general　images　of　objects；　long　before　it　makes　notions　of　them；　and　that
it　is　only　through　these　mental　images；　and　by　recourse　to　them；　that　the　thinking
mind　rises　to　know　and　comprehend　thinkingly。　

But　with　the　rise　of　this　thinking　study　of　things；　it　soon　becomes　evident　that
thought　will　be　satisfied　with　nothing　short　of　showing　the　necessity　of　its　facts；
of　demonstrating　the　existence　of　its　objects；　as　well　as　their　nature　and　qualities。
Our　original　acquaintance　with　them　is　thus　discovered　to　be　inadequate。　We　can
assume　nothing　and　assert　nothing　dogmatically；　nor　can　we　accept　the　assertions
and　assumptions　of　others。　And　yet　we　must　make　a　beginning：　and　a　beginning；
as　primary　and　underived；　makes　an　assumption；　or　rather　is　an　assumption。　It
seems　as　if　it　were　impossible　to　make　a　beginning　at　all。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§2

This　thinking　study　of　things　may　serve；　in　a　general　way；　as　a　description　of
philosophy。　But　the　description　is　too　wide。　If　it　be　correct　to　say；　that　thought
makes　the　distinction　between　man　and　the　lower　animals；　then　everything　human
is　human；　for　the　sole　and　simple　reason　that　it　is　due　to　the　operation　of　thought。
Philosophy；　on　the　other　hand；　is　a　peculiar　mode　of　thinking　…　a　mode　in　which
thinking　becomes　knowledge；　and　knowledge　through　notions。　However　great
therefore　may　be　the　identity　and　essential　unity　of　the　two　modes　of　thought；　the
philosophic　mode　gets　to　be　different　from　the　more　general　thought　which　acts　in
all　that　is　human；　in　all　that　gives　humanity　its　distinctive　character。　And　this
difference　connects　itself　with　the　fact　that　the　strictly　human　and
thought…induced　phenomena　of　consciousness　do　not　originally　appear　in　the　form
of　a　thought；　but　as　a　feeling；　a　perception；　or　mental　image　…　all　of　which　aspects
must　be　distinguished　from　the　form　of　thought　proper。　

According　to　an　old　preconceived　idea；　which　has　passed　into　a　trivial　proposition；
it　is　thought　which　marks　the　man　off　from　the　animals。　Yet　trivial　as　this　old
belief　may　seem；　it　must；　strangely　enough；　be　recalled　to　mind　in　presence　of
certain　preconceived　ideas　of　the　present　day。　These　ideas　would　put　feeling　and
thought　so　far　apart　as　to　make　them　opposites；　and　would　represent　them　as　so
antagonistic；　that　feeling；　particularly　religious　feeling；　is　supposed　to　be
contaminated；　perverted；　and　even　annihilated　by　thought。　They　also　emphatically
hold　that　religion　and　piety　grow　out　of；　and　rest　upon　something　else；　and　not　on
thought。　But　those　who　make　this　separation　forget　meanwhile　that　only　man　has
the　capacity　for　religion；　and　that　animals　no　more　have　religion　than　they　have
law　and　morality。　

Those　who　insist　on　this　separation　of　religion　from　thinking　usually　have　before
their　minds　the　sort　of　thought　that　may　be　styled　after…thought。　They　mean
'reflective'　thinking；　which　has　to　deal　with　thoughts　as　thoughts；　and　brings　them
into　consciousness。　Slackness　to　perceive　and　keep　in　view　this　distinction　which
philosophy　definitely　draws　in　respect　of　thinking　is　the　source　of　the　crudest
objections　and　reproaches　against　philosophy。　Man　…　and　that　just　because　it　is　his
nature　to　think　…　is　the　only　being　that　possesses　law；　religion；　and　morality。　In
these　spheres　of　human　life；　therefore；　thinking；　under　the　guise　of　feeling；　faith；
or　generalised　image；　has　not　been　inactive：　its　action　and　its　productions　are　there
present　and　therein　contained。　But　it　is　one　thing　to　have　such　feelings　and
generalised　images　that　have　been　moulded　and　permeated　by　thought；　and
another　thing　to　have　thoughts　about　them。　The　thoughts；　to　which　after…thought
upon　those　modes　of　consciousness　gives　rise；　are　what　is　comprised　under
reflection；　general　reasoning；　and　the　like；　as　well　as　under　philosophy　itself。　

The　neglect　of　this　distinction　between　thought　in　general　and　the　reflective
thought　of　philosophy　has　also　led　to　another　and　more　frequent
misunderstanding。　Reflection　of　this　kind　has　been　often　maintained　to　be　the
condition；　or　even　the　only　way；　of　attaining　a　consciousness　and　certitude　of　the
Eternal　and　True。　The　（now　somewhat　antiquated）　metaphysical　proofs　of　God's
existence；　for　example；　have　been　treated；　as　if　a　knowledge　of　them　and　a
conviction　of　their　truth　were　the　only　and　essential　means　of　producing　a　belief
and　conviction　that　there　is　a　God。　Such　a　doctrine　would　find　its　parallel；　if　we
said　that　eating　was　impossible　before　we　had　acquired　a　knowledge　of　the
chemical；　botanical；　and　zoological　characters　of　our　food；　and　that　we　must
delay　digestion　till　we　had　finished　the　study　of　anatomy　and　physiology。　Were　it
so；　these　sciences　in　their　field；　like　philosophy　in　its；　would　gain　greatly　in　point
of　utility；　in　fact；　their　utility　would　rise　to　the　height　of　absolute　and　universal
indispensableness。　Or　rather；　instead　of　being　indispensable；　they　would　not　exist
at　all。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§3

The　Content；　of　whatever　kind　it　be；　with　which　our　consciousness　is　taken　up；　is
what　constitutes　the　qualitative　character　of　our　feelings；　perceptions；　fancies；　and
ideas；　of　our　aims　and　duties；　and　of　our　thoughts　and　notions。　From　this　point　of
view；　feeling；　perception；　etc。；　are　the　forms　assumed　by　these　contents。　The
contents　remain　one　and　the　same；　whether　they　are　felt；　seen；　represented；　or
willed；　and　whether　they　are　merely　felt；　or　felt　with　an　admixture　of　thoughts；　or
merely　and　simply　thought。　In　any　one　of　these　forms；　or　in　the　admixture　of
several；　the　contents　confront　consciousness；　or　are　its　object。　But　when　they　are
thus　objects　of　consciousness；　the　modes　of　the　several　forms　ally　themselves
with　the　contents；　and　each　form　of　them　appears　in　consequence　to　give　rise　to　a
special　object。　Thus　what　is　the　same　at　bottom　may　look　like　a　different　sort　of
fact。　

The　several　modes　of　feeling；　perception；　desire；　and　will；　so　far　as　we　are　aware
of　them；　are　in　general　called　ideas　（mental　representations）：　and　it　may　be
roughly　said　that　philosophy　puts　thoughts；　categories；　or；　in　more　precise
language；　adequate　notions；　in　the　place　of　the　generalised　images　we　ordinarily
call　ideas。　Mental　impressions　such　as　these　may　be　regarded　as　the　metaphors　of
thoughts　and　notions。　But　to　have　these　figurate　conceptions　does　not　imply　that
we　appreciate　their　intellectual　significance；　the　thoughts　and　rational　notions　to
which　they　correspond。　Conversely；　it　is　one　thing　to　have　thoughts　and　intelligent
notions；　and　another　to　know　what　impressions；　perceptions；　and　feelings
correspond　to　them。　

This　difference　will　to　some　extent　explain　what　people　call　the　unintelligibility　of
philosophy。　Their　difficulty　lies　partly　in　an　incapacity　…　which　in　itself　is　nothing
but　want　of　habit　…　for　abstract　thinking；　i。e。　in　an　inability　to　get　hold　of　pure
thoughts　and　move　about　in　them。　In　our　ordinary　state　of　mind；　the　thoughts　are
clothed　upon　and　made　one　with　the　sensuous　or　spiritual　material　of　the　hour；
and　in　reflection；　meditation；　and　general　reasoning；　we　introduce　a　blend　of
thoughts　into　feelings；　percepts；　and　mental　images。　（Thus；　in　propositions　where
the　subject…matter　is　due　to　the　senses　…　e。g。　'This　leaf　is　green'　…　we　have　such
categories　introduced；　as　being　and　individuality。）　But　it　is　a　very　different　thing　to
make　the　thoughts　pure　and　simple　our　object。　

But　their　complaint　that　philosophy　is　unintelligible　is　as　much　due　to　another
reason；　and　that　is　an　impatient　wish　to　have　before　them　as　a　mental　picture　that
which　is　in　the　mind　as　a　thought　or　notion。　When　people　are　asked　to　apprehend
some　notion；　they　often　complain　that　they　do　not　know　what　they　have　to　think。
But　the　fact　is　that　in　a　notion　there　is　nothing　further　to　be　thought　than　the
notion　itself。　What　the　phrase　reveals　is　a　hankering　after　an　image　with　which　we
are　already　familiar。　The　mind；　denied　the　use　of　its　familiar　ideas；　feels　the
ground　where　it　once　stood　firm　and　at　home　taken　away　from　beneath　it；　and；
when　transported　into　the　region　of　pure　thought；　cannot　tell　where　in　the　world　it
is。　

One　consequence　of　this　weakness　is　that　authors；　preachers；　and　orators　are
found　most　intelligible；　when　they　speak　of　things　which　their　readers　or　hearers
already　know　by　rote　…　things　which　the　latter　are　conversant　with；　and　which
require　no　explanation。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§4

The　philosopher　then　has　to　reckon　with　popular　modes　of　thought；　and　with　the
objects　of　religion。　In　dealing　with　the　ordinary　modes　of　mind；　he　will　first　of　all；
as　we　saw；　have　to　prove　and　almost　to　awaken　the　need　for　his　peculiar　method
of　knowledge。　In　dealing　with　the　objects　of　religion；　and　with　truth　as　a　whole；
he　will　have　to　show　that　philosophy　is　capable　of　apprehending　them　from　its
own　resources；　and　should　a　difference　from　religious　conceptions　come　to　light；
he　will　have　to　justify　the　points　in　which　it　diverges。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§5

To　give　the　reader　a　preliminary　explanation　of　the　distinction　thus　made；　and　to
let　him　see　at　the　same　moment　that　the　real　import　of　our　consciousness　is
retained；　and　even　for　the　first　time　put　in　its　proper　light；　when　translated　into　the
form　of　thought　and　the　notion　of　reason；　it　may　be　well　to　recall　another　of　these
old　unreasoned　beliefs。　And　that　is　the　conviction　that　to　get　at　the　truth　of　any
object　or　event；　even　of　feelings；　perceptions；　opinions；　and　mental　ideas；　we
must　think　it　over。　Now　in　any　case　to　think　things　over　is　at　least　to　transform
feelings；　ordinary　ideas；　etc。　into　thoughts。　

Nature　has　given　every　one　a　faculty　of　thought。　But　thought　is　all　that　philosophy
claims　as　the　form　proper　to　her　business：　and　thus　the　inadequate　view　which
ignores　the　distinction　stated　in　§3　leads　to　a　new　delusion；　the　reverse　of　the
complaint　previously　mentioned　about　the　unintelligibility　of　philosophy。　In　other
words；　this　science　must　often　submit　to　the　slight　of　hearing　even　people　who
have　never　taken　any　trouble　with　it　talking　as　if　they　thoroughly　understood　all
about　it。　With　no　preparation　beyond　an　ordinary　education　they　do　not　hesitate；
especially　under　the　influence　of　religious　sentiment；　to　philosophise　and　to
criticise　philosophy。　Everybody　allows　that　to　know　any　other　science　you　must
have　first　studied　it；　and　that　you　can　only　claim　to　express　a　judgement　upon　it　in
virtue　of　such　knowledge。　Everybody　allows　that　to　make　a　shoe　you　must　have
learned　and　practised　the　craft　of　the　shoemaker；　though　every　man　has　a　model
in　his　own　foot；　and　possesses　in　his　hands　the　natural　endowments　for　the
operations　required。　For　philosophy　alone；　it　seems　to　be　imagined；　such　study；
care；　and　application　are　not　in　the　least　requisite。　

This　comfortable　view　of　what　is　required　for　a　philosopher　has　recently　received
corroboration　through　the　theory　of　immediate　or　intuitive　knowledge。