shorter logic-第44章

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utterance　it　remains　just　as　essential；　and　only　is　essential；　in　so　far　as　it　is
immediate　external　existence。　

We　have　ere　this　met　Being　and　Existence　as　forms　of　the　immediate。　Being　is；　in
general；　unreflected　immediacy　and　transition　into　another。　Existence　is　immediate
unity　of　being　and　reflection：　hence　appearance：　it　comes　from　the　ground；　and
falls　to　the　ground。　

In　actuality　this　unity　is　explicitly　put；　and　the　two　sides　of　the　relation　identified。
Hence　the　actual　is　exempted　from　transition；　and　its　externality　is　its　energising。
In　that　energising　it　is　reflected　into　itself：　its　existence　is　only　the　manifestation　of
itself；　not　of　another。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　142n
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Exists　but　not　Real

Actuality　and　thought　（or　Idea）　are　often　absurdly　opposed。　How　commonly　we　hear　people
saying　that；　though　no　objection　can　be　urged　against　the　truth　and　correctness　of　a　certain
thought；　there　is　nothing　of　the　kind　to　be　seen　in　reality；　or　it　cannot　be　actually　carried　out！
People　who　use　such　language　only　prove　that　they　have　not　properly　apprehended　the　nature
either　of　thought　or　of　actuality。　Thought　in　such　a　case　is；　one　the　one　hand；　the　synonym　for　a
subjective　conception；　plan；　intention；　or　the　like；　just　as　actuality；　on　the　other；　is　made
synonymous　with　external　and　sensible　existence。　This　is　all　very　well　in　common　life；　where　great
laxity　is　allowed　in　the　categories　and　the　names　given　to　them；　and　it　may　of　course　happen　that；
e。g。；　the　plan；　or　so…called　idea；　say；　of　a　certain　method　of　taxation　；　is　good　and　advisable　in　the
abstract；　but　that　nothing　of　the　sort　is　found　in　so…called　actuality；　or　could　possibly　be　carried　out
under　the　given　conditions。　But　when　the　abstract　understanding　gets　hold　of　these　categories　and
exaggerates　the　distinction　they　imply　into　a　hard　and　fast　line　of　contrast；　when　it　tells　us　that　in
this　actual　world　we　must　knock　ideas　out　of　our　heads；　it　is　necessary　energetically　to　protest
against　these　doctrines；　alike　in　the　name　of　science　and　of　sound　reason。　For　on　the　one　hand
Ideas　are　not　confined　to　our　heads　merely；　nor　is　the　Idea；　on　the　whole；　so　feeble　as　to　leave　the
question　of　its　actualisation　or　non…actualisation　dependent　on　our　will。　The　Idea　is　rather　the
absolutely　active　as　well　as　actual。　

？



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　The　Actual　is　Real

And　on　the　other　hand　actuality　is　not　so　bad　and　irrational；　as　purblind　or　wrong…headed　and
muddle…brained　would…be　reformers　imagine。　So　far　is　actuality；　as　distinguished　from　mere
appearance；　and　primarily　presenting　a　unity　of　inward　and　outward；　from　being　in　contrariety　with
reason；　that　it　is　rather　thoroughly　reasonable；　and　everything　which　is　not　reasonable　must　on　that
very　ground　cease　to　be　held　actual。　The　same　view　may　be　traced　in　the　usages　of　educated
speech；　which　declines　to　give　the　name　of　real　poet　or　real　statesman　to　a　poet　or　a　statesman
who　can　do　nothing　really　meritorious　or　reasonable。　Aristotle　to　that　of　Plato。　Popular　opinion
makes　the　difference　to　be　as　follows。　While　Plato　recognises　the　idea　and　only　the　idea　as　the
truth；　Aristotle；　rejecting　the　idea；　keeps　to　what　is　actual；　and　is　on　that　account　to　be　considered
the　founder　and　chief　of　empiricism。　On　this　it　may　be　remarked：　that　it　is　not　the　vulgar　actuality　of
what　is　immediately　at　hand；　but　the　idea　as　actuality。　Where　then　lies　the　controversy　of　Aristotle
against　Plato？　It　lies　in　this：　Aristotle　calls　the　Platonic　idea　a　mere　dynamis；　and　establishes　in
opposition　to　Plato　that　the　idea；　which　both　equally　recognise　to　be　the　only　truth；　is　essentially　to
be　viewed　as　an　energeia；　in　other　words；　as　the　inward　which　is　quite　to　the　fore；　or　as　unity　of
inner　and　outer；　or　as　actuality；　in　the　emphatic　sense　here　given　to　the　word。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　143
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Actuality　is　concrete

Such　a　concrete　category　as　Actuality　includes　the　characteristics　aforesaid　and
their　difference；　and　is　therefore　also　the　development　of　them；　in　such　a　way
that；　as　it　has　them；　they　are　at　the　same　time　plainly　understood　to　be　a　show；　to
be　assumed　or　imposed。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Possibility

＇a＇　Viewed　as　an　identity　in　general；　Actuality　is　first　of　all　Possibility　…the
reflection…into…self　which；　as　in　contrast　with　the　concrete　unity　of　the　actual；　is
taken　and　made　an　abstract　and　unessential　essentiality。　Possibility　is　what　is
essential　to　reality；　but　in　such　a　way　that　it　is　at　the　same　time　only　a　possibility。　

It　was　probably　the　import　of　Possibility　which　induced　Kant　to　regard　it　along
with　necessity　and　actuality　as　Modalities；　'since　these　categories　do　not　in　the
least　increase　the　notion　as　object；　but　only　express　its　relation　to　the　faculty　of
knowledge'。　For　Possibility　is　really　the　bare　abstraction　of　reflection…into…self　…
what　was　formerly　called　the　Inward；　only　that　it　is　now　taken　to　mean　the
external　inward；　lifted　out　of　reality　and　with　the　being　of　a　mere　supposition；　and
is　thus；　sure　enough；　supposed　only　as　a　bare　modality；　an　abstraction　which
comes　short；　and；　in　more　concrete　terms；　belongs　only　to　subjective　thought。　It
is　otherwise　with　Actuality　and　Necessity。　They　are　anything　but　a　mere　sort　and
mode　for　something　else：　in　fact　the　very　reverse　of　that。　If　they　are　supposed；　it
is　as　the　concrete；　but　not　merely　suppositions；　but　intrinsically　complete。　

As　Possibility　is；　in　the　first　instance；　the　mere　form　of　identity…with…self　（as
compared　with　the　concrete　which　is　actual）；　the　rule　for　it　merely　is　that　a　thing
must　not　be　self…contradictory。　Thus　everything　is　possible；　for　an　act　of
abstraction　can　give　any　content　this　form　of　identity。　Everything　however　is　as
impossible　as　it　is　possible。　In　every　content　…　which　is　and　must　be　concrete　…　the
speciality　of　its　nature　may　be　viewed　as　a　specialised　contrariety　and　in　that　way
as　a　contradiction。　Nothing　therefore　can　be　more　meaningless　than　to　speak　of
such　possibility　and　impossibility。　

In　philosophy　in　particular；　there　should　never　be　a　word　said　of　showing　that　〃It
is　possible〃；　or　〃There　is　still　another　possibility〃；　or；　to　adopt　another
phraseology；　〃It　is　conceivable〃。　The　same　consideration　should　warn　the　writer
of　history　against　employing　a　category　which　has　now　been　explained　to　be　on　its
own　merits；　untrue：　but　the　subtlety　of　the　empty　understanding　finds　its　chief
pleasure　in　the　fantastic　ingenuity　of　suggesting　possibilities　and　lots　of
possibilities。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　143n
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Possible　and　Actual

Our　picture…thought　is　at　first　disposed　to　see　in　possibility　the　richer　and　more　comprehensive；　in
actuality　the　poorer　and　narrower　category。　Everything；　it　is　said；　is　possible；　but　everything　which
is　possible　is　not　on　that　account　actual。　In　real　truth；　however；　if　we　deal　with　them　as　thoughts；
actuality　is　the　more　comprehensive；　because　it　is　the　concrete　thought　which　includes　possibility
as　an　abstract　element。　And　that　superiority　is　to　some　extent　expressed　in　our　ordinary　mode　of
thought　when　we　speak　of　the　possible；　in　distinction　from　the　actual；　as　only　possible。　Possibility
is　often　said　to　consist　in　a　thing's　being　thinkable。　

'Think'　however；　in　this　use　of　the　word；　only　means　to　conceive　any　content　under　the　form　of　an
abstract　identity。　Now；　every　content　can　be　brought　under　this　form；　since　nothing　is　required
except　to　separate　it　from　the　relation　in　which　it　stands。　Hence；　any　content；　however　absurd　and
nonsensical；　can　be　viewed　as　possible。　It　is　possible　that　the　moon　may　fall　upon　the　Earth
tonight；　for　the　moon　is　a　body　separate　from　the　Earth　and　may　as　well　fall　down　upon　it　as　a
stone　thrown　into　the　air　does。　。　。　。　In　language　like　this　about　possibilities；　it　is　chiefly　the　law　of
sufficient　ground　or　reason　which　is　manipulated　in　the　style　already　explained。　Everything；　it　is
said；　is　possible；　for　which　you　can　state　some　ground。　The　less　education　a　man　has；　or　in　other
words；　the　less　he　knows　of　the　specific　connection　of　the　objects　to　which　he　directs　his
observations；　the　greater　is　his　tendency　to　launch　out　into　all　sorts　of　empty　possibilities。　An
instance　of　this　habit　in　the　political　sphere　is　seen　in　the　pot…house　politician。　In　practical　life　too　it
is　no　uncommon　thing　to　see　ill　will　and　indolence　slink　behind　the　category　of　possibility；　in　order
to　escape　definite　obligations。　To　such　conduct　the　same　remarks　apply　as　were　made　in
connection　with　the　law　of　sufficient　ground。　Reasonable　and　practical　men　refused　to　be　imposed
upon　by　the　possible；　for　the　simple　ground　that　it　is　possible　only。　They　stick　to　the　actual　（not
meaning　by　that　word　merely　whatever　immediately　is　now　and　here）。　Many　of　the　proverbs　of
common　life　express　the　same　contempt　for　what　is　abstractly　possible。　'A　bird　in　the　hand　is
worth　two　in　the　bush'。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Everything　is　Possible　？

After　all；　there　is　as　good　reason　for　taking　everything　to　be　impossible　as　to　be　possible：　for　every
content　（a　content　is　always　concrete）　includes　not　only　diverse　but　even　opposite　characteristics。
Nothing　is　so　impossible　for　instance；　as　this；　that　I　am：　for　'I'　is　at　the　same　time　simple
self…relation　and；　as　undoubtedly；　relation　to　something　else。　The　same　may　be　seen　in　every　other
fact　in　the　natural　or　spiritual　world。　Matter；　it　may　be　said；　is　impossible：　for　it　is　the　unity　of
attraction　and　repulsion。　The　same　is　true　of　life；　law；　freedom　。　。　。　

Generally　speaking；　it　is　the　empty　understanding　which　haunts　these　empty　forms：　and　the
business　of　philosophy　in　the　matter　is　to　show　how　null　and　meaningless　they　are。　Whether　a　thing
is　possible　or　impossible；　depends　altogether　on　the　subject…matter：　that　is；　on　the　sum　total　of　the
elements　in　actuality；　which；　as　it　opens　itself　out；　discloses　itself　to　be　necessity。　
？　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　144
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　＇b＇　Contingency　（accidents）

But　the　Actual　in　its　distinction　from　possibility　（which　is　reflection…into…self）　is
only　the　outward　concrete；　the　unessential　immediate。　In　other　words；　to　such
extent　as　the　actual　is　primarily　the　simple　merely　immediate　unity　of　Inward　and
Outward；　it　is　obviously　made　an　unessential　outward；　and　thus　at　the　same　time
it　is　merely　inward；　the　abstraction　of　reflection…into…self。　Hence　it　is　itself
characterised　as　a　merely　possible。　When　thus　valued　at　the　rate　of　a　mere
possibility；　the　actual　is　a　Contingent　or　Accidental；　and；　conversely；　possibility
is　mere　Accident　itself　or　Chance。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　145
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Possibility　and　Contingency

Possibility　and　Contingency　are　the　two　factors　of　Actuality　…　Inward　and
Outward；　put　as　mere　forms　which　constitute　the　externality　of　the　actual。　They
have　their　reflection…into…self　on　the　body　of　actual　fact；　or　content；　with　its
intrinsic　definitiveness　which　gives　essential　ground　of　their　characterisation。　The
finitude　of　the　contingent　a