shorter logic-第8章

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than　this。　Yet　to　be　well　informed　about　thought；　even　as　a　mere　activity　of　the　subject…mind；　is
honourable　and　interesting　for　man。　It　is　in　knowing　what　he　is　and　what　he　does　that　man　is
distinguished　from　the　brutes。　But　we　may　take　the　higher　estimate　of　thought　…　as　what　alone　can
get　really　in　touch　with　the　supreme　and　true。　In　that　case；　Logic　as　the　science　of　thought
occupies　a　high　ground。　If　the　science　of　Logic　then　considers　thought　in　its　action　and　its
productions　（and　thought　being　no　resultless　energy　produces　thoughts　and　the　particular　thought
required）；　the　theme　of　Logic　is　in　general　the　supersensible　world；　and　to　deal　with　that　theme　is
to　dwell　for　a　while　in　that　world。　Mathematics　is　concerned　with　the　abstractions　of　time　and
space。　But　these　are　still　the　object　of　sense；　although　the　sensible　is　abstract　and　idealised。
Thought　bids　adieu　even　to　this　last　and　abstract　sensible：　it　asserts　its　own　native　independence；
renounces　the　field　of　the　external　and　internal　sense；　and　puts　away　the　interests　and　inclinations
of　the　individual。　When　Logic　takes　this　ground；　it　is　a　higher　science　than　we　are　in　the　habit　of
supposing。

（3）　The　necessity　of　understanding　Logic　in　a　deeper　sense　than　as　the　science　of　the　mere　form　of
thought　is　enforced　by　the　interests　of　religion　and　politics；　of　law　and　morality。　In　earlier　days　men
meant　no　harm　by　thinking：　they　thought　away　freely　and　fearlessly。　They　thought　about　God；
about　Nature；　and　the　State；　and　they　felt　sure　that　a　knowledge　of　the　truth　was　obtainable
through　thought　only；　and　not　through　the　senses　or　any　random　ideas　or　opinions。　But　while　they
so　thought；　the　principal　ordinances　of　life　began　to　be　seriously　affected　by　their　conclusions。
Thought　deprived　existing　institutions　of　their　force。　Constitutions　fell　a　victim　to　thought：　religion
was　assailed　by　thought：　firm　religious　beliefs　which　had　been　always　looked　upon　as　revelations
were　undermined；　and　in　many　minds　the　old　faith　was　upset。　The　Greek　philosophers；　for
example；　became　antagonists　of　the　old　religion；　and　destroyed　its　beliefs。　Philosophers　were
accordingly　banished　or　put　to　death；　as　revolutionists　who　had　subverted　religion　and　the　state；
two　things　which　were　inseparable。　Thought；　in　short；　made　itself　a　power　in　the　real　world；　and
exercised　enormous　influence。　The　matter　ended　by　drawing　attention　to　the　influence　of　thought；
and　its　claims　were　submitted　to　a　more　rigorous　scrutiny；　by　which　the　world　professed　to　find
that　thought　arrogated　too　much　and　was　unable　to　perform　what　it　had　undertaken　It　had　not　…
people　said　…　learned　the　real　being　of　God；　of　Nature　and　Mind。　It　had　not　learned　what　the　truth
was。　What　it　had　done　was　to　overthrow　religion　and　the　state　It　became　urgent　therefore　to
justify　thought；　with　reference　to　the　results　it　had　produced：　and　it　is　this　examination　into　the
nature　of　thought　and　this　justification　which　in　recent　times　has　constituted　one　of　the　main
problems　of　philosophy。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Thought　regarded　as　an　activity
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§20

If　we　take　our　prima　facie　impression　of　thought；　we　find　on　examination　first　（a）
that；　in　its　usual　subjective　acceptation；　thought　is　one　out　of　many　activities　or
faculties　of　the　mind；　coordinate　with　such　others　as　sensation；　perception；
imagination；　desire；　volition；　and　the　like。　The　product　of　this　activity；　the　form　or
character　peculiar　to　thought；　is　the　UNIVERSAL；　or；　in　general；　the　abstract。
Thought；　regarded　as　an　activity；　may　be　accordingly　described　as　the　active
universal；　and；　since　the　deed；　its　product；　is　the　universal　once　more；　may　be
called　the　self…actualising　universal。　Thought　conceived　as　a　subject　（agent）　is　a
thinker；　and　the　subject　existing　as　a　thinker　is　simply　denoted　by　the　term　'I'。　

　　　　　　　　　The　distinction　between　Sense；　Conception；　and　Thought。

The　propositions　giving　an　account　of　thought　in　this　and　the　following　sections
are　not　offered　as　assertions　or　opinions　of　mine　on　the　matter。　But　in　these
preliminary　chapters　any　deduction　or　proof　would　be　impossible；　and　the
statements　may　be　taken　as　matters　in　evidence。　In　other　words；　every　man；
when　he　thinks　and　considers　his　thoughts；　will　discover　by　the　experience　of　his
consciousness　that　they　possess　the　character　of　universality　as　well　as　the　other
aspects　of　thought　to　be　afterwards　enumerated。　We　assume　of　course　that　his
powers　of　attention　and　abstraction　have　undergone　'a　previous　training；　enabling
him　to　observe　correctly　the　evidence　of　his　consciousness　and　his　conceptions。

This　introductory　exposition　has　already　alluded　to　the　distinction　between　Sense；
Conception；　and　Thought。　As　the　distinction　is　of　capital　importance　for
understanding　the　nature　and　kinds　of　knowledge；　it　will　help　to　explain　matters　if
we　here　call　attention　to　it。　For　the　explanation　of　Sense；　the　readiest　method
certainly　is　to　refer　to　its　external　source　…　the　organs　of　sense。　But　to　name　the
organ　does　not　help　much　to　explain　what　is　apprehended　by　it。　The　real
distinction　between　sense　and　thought　lies　in　this　…　that　the　essential　feature　of　the
sensible　is　individuality；　and　as　the　individual　（which；　reduced　to　its　simplest
terms；　is　the　atom）　is　also　a　member　of　a　group；　sensible　existence　presents　a
number　of　mutually　exclusive　units　…　of　units；　to　speak　in　more　definite　and
abstract　formulae；　which　exist　side　by　side　with；　and　after；　one　another。
Conception　or　picture…thinking　works　with　materials　from　the　same　sensuous
source。　But　these　materials　when　conceived　are　expressly　characterised　as　in　me
and　therefore　mine；　and　secondly；　as　universal；　or　simple；　because　only　referred
to　self。　Nor　is　sense　the　only　source　of　materialised　conception。　There　are
conceptions　constituted　by　materials　emanating　from　self…conscious　thought；　such
as　those　of　law；　morality；　religion；　and　even　of　thought　itself；　and　it　requires　some
effort　to　detect　wherein　lies　the　difference　between　such　conceptions　and
thoughts　having　the　same　import。　For　it　is　a　thought　of　which　such　conception　is
the　vehicle；　and　there　is　no　want　of　the　form　of　universality；　without　which　no
content　could　be　in　me；　or　be　a　conception　at　all。　Yet　here　also　the　peculiarity　of
conception　is；　generally　speaking；　to　be　sought　in　the　individualism　or　isolation　of
its　contents。　True　it　is　that；　for　example；　law　and　legal　provisions　do　not　exist　in　a
sensible　space；　mutually　excluding　one　another。　Nor　as　regards　time；　though　they
appear　to　some　extent　in　succession；　are　their　contents　themselves　conceived　as
affected　by　time；　or　as　transient　and　changeable　in　it。　The　fault　in　conception　lies
deeper。　These　ideas；　though　implicitly　possessing　the　organic　unity　of　mind；　stand
isolated　here　and　there　on　the　broad　ground　of　conception；　with　its　inward　and
abstract　generality。　Thus　cut　adrift；　each　is　simple；　unrelated：　Right；　Duty；　God。
Conception　in　these　circumstances　either　rests　satisfied　with　declaring　that　Right　is
Right；　God　is　God；　or　in　a　higher　grade　of　culture　it　proceeds　to　enunciate　the
attributes：　as；　for　instance；　God　is　the　Creator　of　the　world；　omniscient；　almighty；
etc。　In　this　way　several　isolated；　simple　predicates　are　strung　together：　but　in　spite
of　the　link　supplied　by　their　subject；　the　predicates　never　get　beyond　mere
contiguity。　In　this　point　Conception　coincides　with　Understanding：　the　only
distinction　being　that　the　latter　introduces　relations　of　universal　and　particular；　of
cause　and　effect；　etc。；　and　in　this　way　supplies　a　necessary　connection　to　the
isolated　ideas　of　conception；　which　last　has　left　them　side　by　side　in　its　vague
mental　spaces；　connected　only　by　a　bare　'and'。

The　difference　between　conception　and　thought　is　of　special　individuality　and
mutual　exclusion　of　the　members。　It　is　well　to　remember　that　these　very　attributes
of　sense　are　thoughts　and　general　terms。　It　will　be　shown　in　the　Logic　that　thought
（and　the　universal）　is　not　a　mere　opposite　of　sense：　it　lets　nothing　escape　it；　but；
outflanking　its　other；　is　at　once　that　other　and　itself。　Now　language　is　the　work　of
thought：　and　hence　all　that　is　expressed　in　language　must　be　universal。　What　I
only　mean　or　suppose　is　mine：　it　belongs　to　me　…　this　particular　individual。　But
language　expresses　nothing　but　universality；　and　so　I　cannot　say　what　I　merely
mean。　And　the　unutterable　…　feeling　or　sensation　…　far　from　being　the　highest　truth；
is　the　most　unimportant　and　untrue。　If　I　say　'the　individual'；　'this　individual'；
'here'；　'now'；　all　these　are　universal　terms。　Everything　and　anything　is　an
individual；　a　'this'；　and　if　it　be　sensible；　is　here　and　now。　Similarly　when　I　say　'I'；　I
mean　my　single　self　to　the　exclusion　of　all　others；　but　what　I　say；　viz。　'I'；　is　just
every　'I'；　which　in　like　manner　excludes　all　others　from　itself。　In　an　awkward
expression　which　Kant　used；　he　said　that　I　accompany　all　my　conceptions　…
sensations；　too；　desires；　actions；　etc。　'I'　is　in　essence　and　act　the　universal：　and
such　partnership　is　a　form；　though　an　external　form；　of　universality。　All　other　men
have　it　in　common　with　me　to　be　'I'；　just　as　it　is　common　to　all　my　sensations　and
conceptions　to　be　mine。　But　'I'；　in　the　abstract；　as　such；　is　the　mere　act　of
self…concentration　or　self…relation；　in　which　we　make　abstraction　from　all
conception　and　feeling；　from　every　state　of　mind　and　every　peculiarity　of　nature；
talent；　and　experience。　To　this　extent；　'I'　is　the　existence　of　a　wholly　abstract
universality；　a　principle　of　abstract　freedom。　

Hence　thought；　viewed　as　a　subject；　is　what　is　expressed　by　the　word　'I'；　and
since　I　am　at　the　same　time　in　all　my　sensations；　conceptions；　and　states　of
consciousness；　thought　is　everywhere　present；　and　is　a　category　that　runs　through
all　these　modifications。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Thought　regarded　as　an　activity
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§20n

Our　first　impression　when　we　use　the　term　'thought'　is　of　a　subjective　activity　…　one　among　many
similar　faculties；　such　as　memory；　imagination；　and　will。　Were　thought　merely　an　activity　of　the
subject…mind　and　treated　under　that　aspect　by　Logic；　Logic　would　resemble　the　other　sciences　in
possessing　a　well…marked　object。　It　might　in　that　case　seem　arbitrary　to　devote　a　special　science
to　thought；　while　will；　imagination；　and　the　rest　were　denied　the　same　privilege。　The　selection　of
one　faculty　however　might　even　in　this　view　be　very　well　grounded　on　a　certain　authority
acknowledged　to　belong　to　thought；　and　on　its　claim　to　be　regarded　as　the　true　nature　of　man；　in
which　consists　his　distinction　from　the　brutes。　Nor　is　it　unimportant　to　study　thought　even　as　a
subjective　energy。　A　detailed　analysis　of　its　nature　would　exhibit　rules　and　laws；　a　knowledge　of
which　is　derived　from　experience。　A　treatment　of　the　laws　of　thought；　from　this　point　of　view；　used
once　to　form　the　body　of　logical　science。　Of　that　science　Aristotle　was　the　founder。　He　succeeded
in　assigning　to　thought　what　properly　belongs　to　it。　Our　thought　is　extremely　concrete；　but　in　its
composite　contents　we　must　distinguish　the　part　that　properly　belongs　to　thought；